
Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy

by Elizabeth-Jane Peatfield

February 2017
Abstract

This thesis critically analyses the UK Government’s current counter-radicalisation policy, focusing in particular on groups presented as vulnerable or susceptible to the drivers of radicalisation outlined within the counter-radicalisation policy Prevent (2011). Although there have been a number of studies looking at the effect of counter-radicalisation policy on Muslim communities in Britain, this study is unique in its kind, as it examines the impact of counter-radicalisation policy on non-Muslim minorities. This work draws attention to the linking of terrorism to socio-economically marginalised groups and the concomitant gaze of surveillance or suspicion directed towards those considered risky. Based on the evidence gathered, it is argued that the negative framing of communities based on race and class has linked them to the risk of radicalisation through the construction of counter-radicalisation drivers and vulnerabilities.

To explore the intersectionality of race and class with assumptions embedded in counter-radicalisation policy, the research employed both quantitative and qualitative methodology to examine minority communities in two areas of Liverpool. The research sought to gauge how much non-Muslim minorities knew about Prevent (2011) and the drivers identified in the document, alongside whether they believed they had been affected by counter-radicalisation/terrorism policy. The first phase was designed to position the research by considering the dynamics of identity construction. Phase two used semi-structured interviews to directly gauge the opinions of the groups highlighted for concern, in order to assess what they thought of as their own ‘vulnerabilities’, and the capacity of the ‘drivers of radicalisation’ identified in Prevent (2011) to influence behaviour and action.
The evidence presented in the thesis suggests that racialisation of Muslims and a re-classification of minority groups as Muslim have seen many non-Muslim minorities subject to the same security intrusions as many British Muslims, through an amalgamation of risk-based interventions and institutional discrimination. It is argued that the concepts of race and ethnicity can be fluid and linked with economic salience, which could act as a determinant for treatment and representation by the state. This research also suggests that class can intersect with race and ethnicity to create new targets for counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism consideration. The negative framing of poor communities within policy can create a local resilience towards state intrusions, but also creates deep social divides.
In Loving Memory of My Beautiful Mum

Patricia Ellen Simpson

9th Nov 1947 – 8th June 2017

I miss you always and each day
Dedication

The journey through academia was a somewhat unexpected journey for me, but this thesis is dedicated to one person, my husband Russell Peatfield. Russ gave me the confidence to begin this journey, the strength to stick it out when it got tough and was understanding when I wanted to quit. He has supported me in everything, and without him this dyslexic ex-bouncer would not have even come back to school to get her basic English, let alone go on to a degree and beyond.

Acknowledgements

I would also like to acknowledge and thank the most important women in my life, my fabulous Mum and Aunty Pam. Growing up in a house full of women who challenged the stereotype of a ‘normal’ family and embraced diversity was the best start a kid could have. Learning tolerance and accepting people as they were was a gift you gave me, so thank you.

In addition, I would like to thank both my supervisors: Professor Gabe Mythen and Professor Sandra Walklate. Thank you for believing that a mouthy ex-bouncer could do this, and for supporting me all the way. You have both given me such strength through your unwavering support.

Thank you also to my best friend Beattie (aka Sandra Tollick). You have held my hand through this when I have wanted to quit. You are my unofficial supervisor and I love you for it.
Declaration

This thesis is the result of my own work. The material contained in the thesis has not been presented, nor is currently being presented, either wholly or in part for any other degree.
Contents

Dedication ...........................................................................................................5
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................5
Declaration ..........................................................................................................6
List of Figures .....................................................................................................12
List of Tables.......................................................................................................13
Chapter One: The Prevent Policy ........................................................................14
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 14
1.1 Policy Construction, Confusion and Challenge ......................................... 17
Civilisation and the Civilised? ................................................................. 18
Preventing Radicalisation .......................................................................... 21
1.2 Non-Violent/Violent Ideology ................................................................... 27
The Reduction of a Problem ....................................................................... 32
1.3 Policing the ‘Vulnerable’: Evidence-Based Policing .................................... 35
Exploring the Facts and Figures ........................................................... 38
2016 Duty Guidance ................................................................................... 40
Prevent in Liverpool .................................................................................... 43
1.4 Is Prevent Value for Money? ...................................................................... 44
Policy Failures ......................................................................................... 45
Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 48
Chapter Two: The Need for Terminological Specificity ....................................50
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 50
2.1 Reducing Radicalisation ......................................................................... 50
2.2 Problematising, Radicalisation and Language ......................................... 55
A Blurring of the Targets ............................................................................ 57
2.3 Problematising the Risk of Radicalisation ................................................ 60
2.4 Radicalisation and the Assumptions of Violence ......................................... 64
The Quantification of Difference: Special Crimes by Special People ........ 67
Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 75
Chapter Three: Liverpool, the Suspect City ........................................................76
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 76
3.1 In my Liverpool Home ........................................................................... 77
3.2 Scouse Folk Devils: Liverpool 1970s-80s .......................................................... 78

A Historically Diverse City ............................................................................... 79
Policing: the Wider Context Post-1980s ......................................................... 88
3.3 The Resilient City: the Creation of a Fortress Mentality .............................. 91
Financial Insecurities ..................................................................................... 92
3.4 The Communities under Study .................................................................... 96
Princes Park Ward (PPW) Liverpool 8 ............................................................. 97
Speke Garston Ward (SGW) Liverpool 24 ..................................................... 99
3.5 Suspect City? ............................................................................................... 105

Chapter Four: Policy, Place and People ............................................................ 108
Methodology Introduction: The Dilemma of an Insider/Outsider Status ....... 108
4.1 Reflecting on Position, People and Place .................................................... 110
Presumptions and Positionality ....................................................................... 110
The Production of Knowledge ....................................................................... 111
4.2 The Research Design ................................................................................. 114
Theoretical Problems- Stopping Them Before They Begin ............................ 116
The Communities under Study: Framing The Boundaries ............................. 117
Area One – The Princess Park Ward ............................................................... 118
Area Two- Speke/Garston Ward ................................................................. 119
Safeguarding the Respondents ...................................................................... 120
Safeguarding the Researcher ....................................................................... 122
Choosing the Respondents ....................................................................... 123
4.3 A Tale of Two Parts: Phase One of the Research ....................................... 124
Phase One: The Questionnaires ................................................................. 124
The Advantages of This Approach ............................................................ 125
The Disadvantages of This Approach ........................................................ 126
Phase Two Semi-Structured Interviews ...................................................... 128
Theoretical Considerations ........................................................................ 130
Language .................................................................................................. 130
4.4 The Complexities of Coding: An Overview of the Phase Two Data ....... 131
Phase Two Questions.................................................................................. 132
Primary Code One: The Drivers of Radicalisation .................................... 134
Primary Code Two: Power and Conflict .................................................... 136
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Code Three: Social Cohesion</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary code Four: Place and Identity</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Reflections of a Researcher</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five: Phase One</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Variations in the Self-Categorisation of Respondents</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examining the self-classification of the respondents regarding their</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnicity/race by GAUS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoding the Data</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Comparing Muslim and non-Muslim Responses: Phase One</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six: Identity, History and Race</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Racisms and the Perspective of Change</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenting and Policing Minorities</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 9/11 Effect</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 The Challenge of Re-Racialisation</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Re-Racialisation</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Re-Racialisation</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 The Terminology of Racism or Racist Terminology</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of the Right</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Seven: Contesting the Terminology of Prevent</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Not What You Say, But Why You Say It</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Importance of Legitimacy and Shared Understanding</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Challenging the Drivers of Radicalisation</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-Policed and Under Protected</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radically Different Radicals?</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Examining the Perceptions of Power</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Judgements?</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Eight: History and Representation</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Identities Through Time: The Influence of Generational Tale Telling</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Minorities, Muslims and the Media</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing a Problem</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3 Policy, Protection, Presentation and Effect</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism – A Radical Solution</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Nine: Methodological Reflections</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1 Adaptations</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatekeepers</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Respondents: Colour Coding Identity</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2 Research Expansion</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Ten: Discussion of the Data</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1 What did the Respondents Think?</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2 Main Themes</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Sorting and the Construction of Race</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Oversimplification: Colour Coding Race</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown Bodying: The Racial Hierarchy</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Class Considerations: New World, Old Targets</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3 Poor Whites: The ‘Poor White’ Burden</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.4 Policy Implications, Challenging Past Mistakes</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5 Future Research</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Eleven: Conclusion and Final Word</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1: Phase One Ethical Approval</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two: Phase Two Ethical Approval</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3: Phase One Questionnaire</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4: Phase Two Information Sheet</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 5: Phase Two Consent Form</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 6: Phase Two De-Brief Sheet</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 7: A Tale from the Past ................................................................. 367
Appendix 8: The Terrorism Act 2000 Definition of Terrorism ............ 369
Nine: Report Justifications ................................................................. 371
Appendix 10: Pilot Study in Brief ....................................................... 372
Eleven: Abbreviations List .............................................................. 377
Twelve: Pen Portrait of Respondents ............................................. 378
List of Figures

Figure 1 Representation of the Coding Process .................................................. 132
Figure 2 The Drivers of Radicalisation Sub-Divided into Secondary Codes .... 134
Figure 3 Power and Conflict Sub-Divided into Secondary Codes ................... 136
Figure 4 Social Cohesion Sub-Divided into Secondary Codes ....................... 138
Figure 5 Place and Identity Sub-Divided into Secondary Codes ..................... 140
Figure 6 Variations in Self-Classification of Ethnicity/Race by GAUS .......... 148
Figure 7 Self-Classification of Religious Affiliation by Respondents .......... 151
Figure 8 Self-Classification of the Respondents’ Religious Affiliation in the 2 GAUS .................................................................................................................. 152
Figure 9 Comparison Between GAUS Concerning Educational Achievement .. 155
Figure 10 The Cycle of Mistrust .....................................................................244
List of Tables

Table 1 Comparison Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 1 ................................................................. 158
Table 2 Comparison Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 2 ............................................................. 161
Table 3 Comparison Between Muslims and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 3 ................................................................. 163
Table 4 Comparison Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 4 ................................................................. 165
Table 5 Comparisons Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 5 ................................................................. 167
Table 6 Comparisons Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 6 ................................................................. 169
Table 7 Comparison Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 7 ................................................................. 171
Table 8 Comparison Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 8 ................................................................. 173
Table 9 Comparison Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 9 ................................................................. 175
Table 10 Comparison Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 10 ............................................................... 179
Chapter One: The Prevent Policy

Introduction

There can be little argument that over the last two decades, terrorism has been a high political priority in most Western societies. The increase of suspicion and accusation post-9/11 has led to what could be described as a non-stop assault on the public vectored through fear (Misis, Bush, and Hendrix, 2016; Altheide, 2006). Fear has been used as a tool to divide populations by highlighting some sections of society as other, and through the creation of policy and legislation in order to address an increased security risk, thereby creating what Hillyard (1993) described as suspect communities. Concern regarding specific terror attacks in Britain (Scott, Poulin and Silver, 2013), has seen an exponential growth in counter-terrorism legislation (Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008) which has coincided with the surge in suspicion. Security concerns regarding minority communities, specifically Muslims (Mythen and Walklate, 2016; Hickman, and Silvestri 2011: Pantazis and Pemberton, 2011), and repressive security measures, have arguably seen targeted policing and the surveillance of ‘poor’ British Muslims based on the presumption of vulnerabilities. This has placed British Muslims and non-Muslim minorities at the heart of these security concerns and suspicions.

However, it is not the first time that this type of suspicion and labelling has occurred within British culture. Nor, one may argue, is it the first time that a section of British society has been labelled as deviant, presented as risky and over-policed (the experiences of Liverpool-born Blacks being a case in point). This research seeks to explore the intersectionality between the presentation of risk and the experiences of
those who are considered suspect, by examining the vulnerabilities outlined in the government’s current counter-radicalisation policy, the ‘Prevent’ Strategy (2011).

This thesis examines the effects of security policy formally designed to protect vulnerable communities from radicalisation. The research will consider awareness around and perceptions of the UK Prevent strategy. It will also examine the effects of counter-terrorism policies on individuals and communities defined as ‘suspect’ by examining how faith and class intersect to present particular ethnic-minority communities as targets for legislation based on assumed characteristics of their identities. The project is driven by examining what respondents in the two areas of Liverpool under consideration think about the so-called ‘drivers’ of radicalisation outlined in Prevent. The methodology deployed is constructed to assess how the vulnerabilities outlined within the document shape and influence perceptions, gauging whether participants feel vulnerable to radicalisation in accordance with the criteria identified in Prevent.

It will build on previous research (Peatfield, 2012, see Appendix 10) which identified race as playing a part in the targeting of individuals, and will ask if the respondents feel there is an intersection between race status and the classification of vulnerability. This work will build upon core themes concerning racism, exclusion and identity (Fredrickson, 2015; Bonnett, 2013) by using the theoretical base of Hillyard’s (1993) suspect community. Hillyard (1993) contends that becoming ‘suspect’ is the outcome of a process by which a section of society or a ‘community’ is identified as a threat. The suspect community thesis describes the way in which labelling is followed by state interventions which are created to ‘protect’ that community from external and internal dangers. While Hillyard
Race and Radicalisation E J Peatfield University of Liverpool

(1993:7) deployed the concept in relation to Irish communities, this research will be applying the suspect communities framework to both the Black and minority ethnic (BME) community and also to the city of Liverpool as a whole. It will use Liverpool as a situational case study for the research base due to its citywide presentation as suspect (Boland, 2008).

This research seeks to inform the debate concerning the presentation of policy and its effects on those groups intentionally or unintentionally targeted by State policy. The choice to use Liverpool as a situational focus and research base has been due in part to its citywide presentation as suspect (see Boland, 2008). However, Liverpool was also chosen as a site of inquiry as a result of reflecting on my own lived experiences growing up in Liverpool during the 1970s and 80s in a multi-faith, multi-racial family, and my experiences of living in Liverpool for over 20 years. These experiences, coupled with unprecedented national security responses to terrorist attacks that have unfolded over the last two decades, have led me to believe that there had been a negative shift in focus in suspicions from the Black community towards the Muslim community (see Ali, 2016) and subsequently to any community considered ‘brown bodied’ (see Patel, 2012).

This work therefore hopes to give voice to socio-economically challenged communities that have a history of questioning assumptions when they have been presented as immoral, risky or both (see Boland, 2008). In the first chapter, I will examine key legislation created to challenge terrorism, and will consider whether policies such as Prevent are fit for purpose, as well as the extent to which they have facilitated a broader negative shift towards the construction of suspect communities in the UK.
1.1 Policy Construction, Confusion and Challenge

Since the attacks of 9/11 there has been a raft of counter-terrorism (C/T) policies developed by the British government, most noticeably CONTEST. Developed in early 2003 but published in 2006, CONTEST was created to reduce the risk of effective terrorist activity on the British mainland and abroad. CONTEST has identified a four-phased approach to tackling terrorist activity: Pursue, Protect, Prepare and Prevent. The logic for this phased approach was simple: it would allow the government to target each phase to a specific aspect of terrorism by identifying six main priorities for Pursue related work (HM Government 2010:8).

When published, the government identified that to implement CONTEST it would have to ensure that state agencies would have the power needed through law to effectively implement each strand of the strategy. This would see an increase in the powers of detention and deportation to those charged and convicted with offences under the current Counter Terrorism Act 2006 (see Appendix 8).

The history of the construction of counter-terrorism legislation (CTL) since 9/11 has been repeatedly challenged concerning its legality in the House of Commons, the House of Lords and in the European Court of Human Rights. From Prevent to the newly proposed Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill, legislation has been seemingly continuously challenged concerning its legitimacy and its effectiveness.

In a report for the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping point’ (2016/17), a number of rethinks concerning the government’s need to approach the issues surrounding radicalisation and counter-terrorism are suggested. The committee argued that the government needed to consider counter-radicalisation/counter-terrorism in a much
more informed and focused way, and the report suggested that the government needed to take a far more sophisticated approach to identifying factors which instigate radicalisation, as without a solid foundation they would be ineffective (2016:33).

Apart from the negative impact on those communities considered suspicious (Hillyard, 1993) through the construction of negative policy framing, one can examine previous examples of challenges to the legitimacy of policy. For example, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that section 44 stops (part of the Pursue strategy) contravened the European Convention of Human Rights in 2010. The justification for amendments in surveillance, stop and search or an increase in detention times have come from a framing of terrorism in militaristic terminologies. The suggestion by Jackson (2006:111) that terrorism has been framed as such in order to maintain a certain level of social fear and to justify the government’s extraordinary counter-terrorism measures can be exampled by the response of Jack Straw (2004), the then British Foreign Secretary, to criticism of CTL policy. Straw suggested that a restriction of civil liberties was necessary for the security of ‘civilised’ societies (ibid). What was not made clear by Straw at that time was what constituted a civilised society.

**Civilisation and the Civilised?**

Forbes (2015) suggests that security is the grounding for any civilised society because as humans we are driven, hardwired physically and conditionally to seek out security and situations offering us security. The security motivation is considered by Forbes (2015:54) not simply as being concerned with dire
circumstances that threaten biological survival, but is important when considering certainty.

Apart from the lack of specifics denoting what civilised actually meant, the protection of the ‘civilised’ using militaristic policy and language was also criticised when Sir David Omand, a former UK security and intelligence coordinator and Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet Office, questioned the effectiveness of any strategy aimed at reducing the risk of terrorist/radicalisation activity based on a militarisation of society. In his evidence to the Home Affairs oversight of the security and intelligence agencies (2014), Omand suggested that the use of terminologies such as ‘strategic objective’ within the realms of public/governmental office wording, had negative military connotations. When combined with statements such as ‘the war on terror’, these types of terminologies could be harmful to the perception of equality and fairness within targeted communities. Understandably, those groups highlighted for concern in counter-terrorism legislation (CTL) would be affected, as that was the design of the policy, but part of the remit of this research is to consider who else might be caught in the terminological crossfire.

Forbes (2015) suggested that ‘familiarity’ was one of the bases for the psychology of security. Maslow (1943) also suggested that security was one of the base elements for self-actualisation. It must therefore make sense to consider that within society, groups who are not considered part of the majority population such as minority communities might have their positions negatively exacerbated in some way as insecure, through their framing within policy. The highlighting of lower socio-economic sections of society as suspect though the presentation of drivers
outlined in Prevent (2011) will be examined through the theoretical lens of Hillyard’s (1993) suspect community theory.

When contemplating minority group status, it is important to consider the effect of belonging to a group that is considered separate from majority society and in some ways less civilised. Evidence has shown that the status ‘minority’ itself can have a negative psychological impact that can affect minorities throughout their lifetimes. For example, studies have shown that often minority group members can experience imposter feelings (Cokely, McClain and Enciso, 2013) or internalised stigma (Herek, Gillis and Cogan, 2015). As such, terminology is important in framing discussions regarding security. Omand (2005) argues that the trade-off between effective intelligence gathering and individual privacy must be considered in order to prevent a facilitation of terrorism by a global polarisation of Islam, a group problematised within Prevent (2011:20). Omand (2005:112) suggests that language is therefore important to reduce a polarisation between groups based on faith or political ideology:

He further suggests underpinning strategies with good, solid communication with the wider social audience (2005, 2010 and 2012). Omand suggests proper justification of legislation that is appropriate for the protection of the public is needed, in order to gain support from the public. Miraz, Senthikumaran and Ja’far (2007:89) mirrored this opinion when suggesting that counter measures should be applied across society equally, without the focus being primarily on Muslim communities. They argue that differences in communities should not be institutionalised.
Coming full circle somewhat, back to Jack Straw’s idea of a ‘civilised society’, the shared values approach is considered within Prevent (2011:13). It suggests that a rejection of shared values is one of the driving forces behind the support for terrorism. The idea that values are not shared, however, proffers the idea that all communities must share the same values for there to be equilibrium within society, a point which is contested, for example, in the business world (see Crane et al 2014)

Preventing Radicalisation

What must therefore be scrutinised is the effect of negative framing both through terminology and policy on those groups considered suspicious and are therefore a security concern. As the last phase of the government approach to tackling terrorism, Prevent is the government’s response to radicalisation and has been in place for years since its original manifestation in 2006/7. Entitled ‘The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England. Stopping people becoming or supporting terrorists and violent extremists’. A large majority of government ministers endorsed this strategy at the time—signatures on the document were impressive, indicating that this was a well-supported top-down policy. Prevent originally outlined five key objectives, but when it first appeared it was criticised for focusing exclusively on Al-Qaeda-influenced terrorism (Klausen, 2009). The first key component would ‘challenge’ violent extremism by utilising a mainstream voice to combat destructive ideology. The second would disrupt the promotion of extremism and organisations or individuals who sought to promote it, by removing them from their power positions. Third, it would support susceptible and vulnerable individuals who may be targeted by extremists. Fourth, it would increase local
communities’ ability to resist extremists by aiding social growth, and finally it would address grievances raised by communities.

Prevent relied on the strategic cooperation of local community groups for its successful implementation, effectively asking them to take the lead in multi-agency planning to develop and deliver a coordinated response. The Home Office announced that a number of successful projects were underway, funded under the £6m pathfinder funding in 2007-08 and supported by activity and funding from across government. A further £12.5m was to be spent on counter-violent extremism, and to support those individuals who were highlighted as ‘at risk’ across a range of key sectors. This included prisons, youth offender institutions, community-led projects and police-led projects.

However, the reliance on local community groups to initiate the response to radicalisation, with the support of government as well as police-led projects, was criticised as being unrealistic. This was due to the endemic mistrust of the state within marginalised suspect minority communities, built up over decades of over-policing and suspicion, as well as the reliance on Prevent from a criminal justice perspective (Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis, 2014; Richards, 2011). Because of controversy surrounding the focus on Islamist terrorism, the strategy was re-issued with revisions in 2009 and 2011.

After the criticisms of the 2008 and subsequent 2009 Prevent, a review of Prevent was commissioned when the new coalition government came to power in 2010. The Report to the Home Secretary of Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy, was published in June 2011 (H.M Office 2011a). The review raised a number of concerns concerning the scope of Prevent and its implementation. It was
Race and Radicalisation E J Peatfield University of Liverpool

reported that there was concern concerning the implementation of the overall strategy. There was also calls for the strategy to focus less on communities who already felt stigmatised and suspect by widening its scope on a range of threats (H.M Office 2011a:8, 23 and 24).

To investigate the impact on equality, a further assessment by government was commissioned and the Prevent Strategy Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) was also published in June 2011. The EIA (2011c) found that previous versions of Prevent had some beneficial impact on integrating some Muslims into wider society, but it was concerned that it had also had a negative impact and had been perceived as disproportionally impacting on religion and to some extent race (2011c:15).

What the EIA did not consider was the impact of Prevent on those individuals or groups misidentified as Muslim and who may have suffered Islamophobia and/or had faced increased security scrutiny because of the policy. This research will consider these points by examining the perception of those communities who have been considered suspect due to factors such as race and class in conjunction with the counter-terrorism/radicalisation narrative. The former Home Secretary, now Prime Minister, Theresa May, released a revised issue of the strategy in June 2011 with a foreword. In the first paragraph of the policy she highlighted the increased threat from Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism and specifically home-grown terrorism. No other forms of terrorism were mentioned in the foreword, which I would suggest frames the threat from Islamic-inspired terrorism as a priority for counter-terrorism/radicalisation consideration. It arguably framed British followers of Islam as the primary suspect pool: with the language used they were linked to this suspicion by their membership of a specific faith group. The associations through
language and implicit psychological associations will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.

After framing Islam as a major concern, May’s foreword then continued to criticise the previous versions of the strategy for being flawed in their implementation and their ability to tackle extremism. However, it wasn’t just May’s foreword that highlighted home-grown terrorism and Islamic-inspired terrorism as a major concern. In his preface, the independent reviewer of the policy, Lord Carlile, suggested that the new strategy was far more defined in its scope. Carlile argued that a speech given by the former Prime Minister (FPM) David Cameron at the Munich security conference in 2011, in which he highlighted that combating the insider threat of home-grown terrorism was the driving force of the new Prevent. Oscillating between his justifications and narrative, Carlile cites Cameron who highlighted British Muslims in his speech, blaming a lack of community cohesion and limited cohesive activities in past strategies. Carlile again focused on Islamic-inspired terrorism and maintained the previous Prevent strategy’s efficiency. This seems confusing, as the government’s own independent review had criticised Prevent for its negative effect on minority groups within Britain (see Home Office 2011a). Carlile (Prevent 2011), however, suggested:

This new strategy defines far more strongly than before the proper scope of Prevent as an integral part of counter-terrorism strategy. It reflects the clear impetus and policy imperatives arising from the Prime Minister’s speech in Munich on 05 February 2011…However, as the recent death of Usama bin Laden has shown, Prevent has to cope with a changing and sometimes dramatic agenda. At least in the short term,
his death will make us more vigilant about a possible extremist backlash (2011:3).

Carlile made the importance of this strategy and its role in counter-terrorism abundantly clear. The FPM’s speech at the Munich security conference was cited as key to the reconstruction of the strategy. This same speech focused on the threat from young men who follow a ‘completely perverse warped interpretation of Islam’ and who were ‘prepared to blow themselves up and kill their fellow citizens’, as this was the UK security services main concern (Cameron, 2011). Ideologies both violent and non-violent as well as non-violent radicalisation and violent radicalisation were also a major focus of concern for the FPM. He suggested that non-violent radicalisation was as dangerous as violent radicalisation, due to evidence that had emerged about the backgrounds of convicted terrorists. He suggested:

Now, you might say as long as they’re not hurting anyone, what’s the problem with all this? Well, I’ll tell you why. As evidence emerges about the backgrounds of those convicted of terrorist offences, it is clear that many of them were initially influenced by what some have called ‘non-violent extremists’, and they then took those radical beliefs to the next level by embracing violence (2011).

Contestably, what the FPM could not know was how many people may have embraced the ideology of radical Islam but not intended to turn that belief into acts of violence. These unknown knowns, opposed to the known knowns, were seemingly less important to the government.
Although the re-issued Prevent (2011b) did widen its focus somewhat to include threats from Northern Ireland-related terrorism and extreme right-wing terrorism, it was clear that the focus was still Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism. The first three sentences of the Context Summary can illustrate this: ‘The UK faces a range of terrorist threats. The most serious is from Al Qaeda, its affiliates and like-minded organisations. All the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalize and recruit people to their cause’ (2011b:18). Unlike the previous strategy, which had five key components, the 2011 version of Prevent had reduced its focus to three key objectives: Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it (sec 8); Protecting vulnerable people (sec 9); and Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation (sec 10). Along with a tightening up of the criteria for funding, Prevent projects and the delivery of projects, the focus of the document was nonetheless still the same (the reduction of Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism) targeting all forms of radicalisation and extremism, with the addition of non-violent radicalisation. Non-violent radicalisation was one of the aspects of counter-terrorism included in the 2011 version of Prevent, as it was highlighted for consideration by Cameron’s Munich speech. The addition of this, however, has been criticised in a report for the Islamic Human Rights Commission, as the inclusion of non-violent radicalisation decreases the facility to analyse policy and challenge government assumptions. Bodi (2014) suggests this is problematic, due to its effect on free speech and debate, saying:

Prevent has also progressively become more aggressive, with the definition of extremism, in particular, growing to cover more types of
behavior and views… limiting the range of views that can be discussed freely (Bodi, 2014:15).

The progression of negative framing regarding radicalisation throughout UK counter-radicalisation policy can be exampled by Monaghan and Molnar (2016) who explored how the theories of radicalisation have placed an emphasis on an indicator approach to policing. This approach has left minority groups vulnerable to racial profiling and suspicion, a point examined and discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. Monaghan and Molnar (2016:1) suggest this profiling can affect the policing of minority groups.

1.2 Non-Violent/Violent Ideology

The release of Prevent in 2011 was followed shortly by an updated version of the CONTEST strategy. Like the previous manifestation of the strategy, the focus was again on the prevention of terrorism and the prevention and protection of individuals who were ‘vulnerable’ and therefore targeted by extremists (Richards, 2012). However, unlike previous versions of Prevent, there was an additional focus on non-violent ideology/radicalisation. Similarly, along with the concern with violent extremist ideology, non-violent ideas were now targeted and thrown into the camp of ‘causality’ concerning violent or risky extremist behaviours. Within Prevent (2011b), it is suggested that government work had:

Illuminated the drivers of radicalisation, the characteristics of people who have been radicalised and who have joined terrorist groups…

These causal factor or drivers have been identified as playing some part in an individual’s propensity for radicalisation as outlined in the
strategy; some recent academic work suggests that radicalisation occurs as people search for identity, meaning and community. It has been argued in particular that some second or third generation Muslims in Europe, facing apparent or real discrimination and socio-economic disadvantage, can find in terrorism a ‘value system’, a community and an apparently just cause. We note that organisations working on Prevent have also found evidence to support the theory that identity and community are essential factors in radicalisation (2011b: 23).

The very language used within this document highlights sections of society, specifically young Muslims, as suspect in the same way Hillyard (1993) suggested the Irish had previously been targeted. According to Prevent, the 2010 Citizenship Survey provided information which shed light on what it described above as ‘personal vulnerabilities’ and ‘local factors’. The document indicated that support for all kinds of violent extremism was more prevalent among the young and among lower socio-economic income groups. It contended that people who distrusted Parliament, who believe that ethnic and faith groups should not mix, and who saw a conflict between being British and their own cultural identity, were likely to be more supportive of violent extremism. Also contended within the document was that support for extremism was significantly associated with a perception of discrimination and the experience of racial or religious harassment and the association with a negative view of policing (Home Office 2011b:23, 24, 26).

Notwithstanding this, by framing groups that did not trust Parliament as risky/suspect, alongside individuals who have had a negative experience with the police, or people from lower socio-economic backgrounds, the vulnerabilities
identified within Prevent have framed some communities as suspect. I suggest that these groups have been placed within this category for simply being economically challenged, for challenging the political status quo or for being minorities. All of which, this research would contend, does not necessarily make those groups prone to violence, and it does not necessarily justify their being presented as suspect. In fact, in the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Review (2016/17:7), the factors or drivers of radicalisation were critiqued and it was suggested that there was no clear template for factors that might lead to radicalisation, only possible contributing factors, such as grievances and ideology. A lack of specifics married with ambiguous terminology within Prevent does not help clarify its position. For example extremism, which is the main topic for the strategy, is itself described within Prevent (2011b) as:

Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faith and beliefs (2011b:12).

The differentiation between violent extremism and non-violent extremism is also lost within the policy. Richards (2012) suggests that one of the most controversial aspects of the revised Prevent is the attempt to tackle non-violent ideology as part of the counter-terrorism response. He suggests that the increase in emphasis on non-violent ideology within the context of counter-terrorism had facilitated wider concern with radicalisation. This has allowed the expansion of the remit of Prevent beyond the scope of counter-terrorism into other policy areas such as community cohesion. Nevertheless, because there is little consensus as to the specific definition of radicalisation or the radical, not only within Prevent but within discourse as a
whole, Prevent confusingly oscillates between promoting community cohesion and tackling violent extremism (Richards, 2011).

The suggestion in Prevent (2011B:44) that people who believe in ideology are prepared to kill themselves is contested. There is no empirical evidence to support such an over-generalisation (Silke and Brown, 2016; Eriksen, 2012; Bartlett and Miller, 2012). Furthermore, it has been suggested that some people who engage with violent ideology ‘may be’ willing to behave violently but others, arguably the majority, may not. Although a consideration within the literature, the concept of non-violent extremism/radicalisation does not seem to tally with the implied (non-violent) meaning of radicalisation in Prevent. Richards (2015) contests the suggestion that preventing radicalisation must mean challenging extremist ideas. Richards (2015:371) argues that it seems more reasonable to suggest that notwithstanding the narrow definitions, there are both violent and non-violent forms of radicalisation. He also suggests that the focus on extremism has served to confuse the remit of counter-terrorism, and that the terms radical and extreme have created a single discursive framework. A single framework denies the possibility that extremist ideology could manifest in both violent and non-violent positions regarding society and action. The government itself in Prevent (2011b:12) suggests that support for violent extremism is minimal in Britain.

So why, then, was the threat from terrorism classed by the FPM as the greatest threat facing the UK? If the threat is minimal, as stated in Prevent, is the creation of divisions in society through the construction of suspect communities justified? It has been proposed by Richards that any successful counter-terrorism strategy must be based on a clearer understanding of the distinct forms of radicalisation. The
importance of having a clear distinction between definitions was also highlighted by Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010) in the Demos report (2010). They suggested that the past decade has seen a growth in many types of what they called *non-violent radicalisation*.¹ They also suggest that for any successful counter-terrorism strategy to work there needs to be clear definitions and distinctions. Understanding the distinction between forms of radicalisation could separate the counter-terrorism response and could also remove the need for the expansions of CT legislation. Spalek (2016), who suggests that there is also confusion concerning the framing of institutions, has suggested the need for a clear definition. For example, institutions such as the family can be highlighted for both concern as a breeding ground for radicalisation and, at the same time, proffered as a solution against radicalisation. Families are therefore in a state of limbo between being considered risky and protective depending on the way they are framed within the discourse. Arguably, this consideration, both negative and positive, is directed towards minority groups and based on a profile of those groups, a point I will discuss in more detail in the research analysis.

Noticeably, there is confusion regarding the terminology within Prevent, as there is some fluctuation between what one can and cannot say. In the context summary for Prevent the importance of free speech is highlighted. It states:

> We remain absolutely committed to protecting freedom of speech in this country. But preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist

---

¹ Italics added at source.
(and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology (2011: 5).

But what must be considered is that if non-violent radicalisation language is now effectively illegal, how can people enter into a debate concerning radicalisation without being criminalised further if their position challenges that of the government? The need for specificity regarding definitions is therefore paramount in maintaining the right to free speech whilst protecting against dangerous radical rhetoric. The inclusion of non-violent radicalisation without definition may leave free speech under attack, leaving groups such as Muslims and alternative political voices vulnerable to government targeting, and leading to an increase in security consideration.

What must also be considered is the way in which radicalisation has been framed over time and how the discourse has been problematised.

*The Reduction of a Problem*

I would suggest that once again a terrorist incident, the death of Drummer Lee Rigby, heralded a resurgence in activity focusing on what the government was doing to reduce radicalisation in Britain. The three key objectives of the revised Prevent placed local communities as the central actors of resistance to radicalisation. It also relied on the resilience of local communities and, as such, it has been considered a ‘soft approach’ to the government’s wider counter-terrorism strategy (Eriksen, 2012). The fear of radicalisers indoctrinating individuals into extremism, and/or turning their current belief systems into extremism, potentially culminating in terrorist activity, permeates the Prevent agenda. How the ‘vulnerable’ individual
thinks, is influenced and ultimately acts once they are brainwashed and radicalised seems to be the policy’s major concern, due to an endemic fear of the radicalisers’ influence.

Richards (2011:143) argues that there has not yet been any ‘consistent notion of what is meant by radicalisation’ or any agreement as to the part that radicalisation plays in encouraging violent behaviour. Spalek (2016) suggested that there could be no single definitive definition of radicalisation as it is based, in part, on positionality. For example, what does radical or radicalisation mean? The understanding of language and meaning is in part based on experiences, and so who is considered a radical must also be based in part on one’s position gained through experience.

The example of the Benouis (Adams) brothers Rahman, Ibrahim and Lamine has been used in highlighting this point by Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010a). The three brothers, originally from Algeria, spent much of their lives in the UK with their family. Their father changed the family surname to Adams from Benouis as it sounded more English, an attempt to integrate into the local London / Ilford community. Unlike his brothers Ibrahim and Lamine, Rahman changed his first name to Anthony Garcia in order to further his ambitions of becoming a male model. The least pious of the brothers, Rahman/Anthony smoked, drank alcohol and seemed to embrace western secular values entirely. Yet Rahman was arrested in 2004 as part of Operation Crevice and convicted the following year for conspiracy to cause explosions. It was suggested at his trial that Rahman had become radicalised through a combination of online videos and access to extremist teachings (BBC, 2007) which seemingly supports the initiatives in Prevent.
Githen-Mazer and Lambert (2010) suggest that this may not, however, be the case, and that it would be a reductive over-simplification concerning the true events surrounding the actions of the brother. They suggest that this case is particularly important because it indicates the ‘inherent unpredictability of who becomes violent and who does not’. This is because Rahman’s older brother Lamine had been a follower of Abu Hamza, a radical cleric in North London. Lamine had become interested in radical ideology when he was part of the Finsbury Park mosque, and had introduced this to his younger brother. It was Lamine, not Rahman, who was vocal about his support for the extremist ideology and political mobilisation. They suggest:

Despite a superficial fit with the ‘conventional wisdom’ on radicalisation, then, the case of the Adams brothers raises significant problems for the application of such thinking in the real world. On the one hand, it is fairly easy to recognise patterns, to varying degrees, in how people come to participate in violence. On the other, conventional wisdom fails to explain how one brother became a terrorist and the other did not. If identity issues and exposure to ‘extremist’ ideas are causal factors in the one case, why wasn’t this combination equally causal for both brothers? (Githen-Mazer and Lambert, 2010: 894)

If this case had been judged on the drivers identified in Prevent and the vulnerabilities of the brothers based on terrorism profiling, then the wrong brother would have been considered a threat. One has to ask how this type of profiling can stop those who fall outside of the recognised parameters.
1.3 Policing the ‘Vulnerable’: Evidence-Based Policing

Prevent definition of Vulnerability (2011b:108): Vulnerability describes the condition of being capable of being injured; difficult to defend; open to moral or ideological attack. Within Prevent, the word describes factors and characteristics associated with being susceptible to radicalisation.

As with most police work, evidence-based strategies are encouraged to provide best practices. Currently there is only one published work on evidence-based policing of Muslim communities by Murray, Johnston and Sherman (2015). Their research looked at secondary data from an independent survey that examined public confidence in the police service. They then coded this secondary data by comparing it to confidential police intelligence to classify vulnerability. They suggest Muslim communities can be split into three categories, contending that:

We map the intelligence data by classifying each Census Output Area (COA) as a high, medium or low risk of vulnerability to violent extremism. Independent survey data for each neighborhood that measures confidence in the police is then compared to categorisations of vulnerability from intelligence sources (Murray, Johnston and Sherman, 2015:1).

This type of evidence gathering relies on the preconceived notion of vulnerability based on security intelligence that no one outside of the security services is entitled to see apart from a limited number of researchers. This makes it very hard to peer review the evidence and therefore impossible to critique it. Murray, Johnston and Sherman’s data was drawn from an independent polling company for the police,
and the report itself criticises the response levels within some COA. The level of vulnerability used for cross analyses was based on the police’s International Terrorism data, in which the score assigned was based on a points system depending on how serious the piece of information was considered by the police. If considering this type of evidence gathering in conjunction with cases such as the Benouis brothers, sometimes the more obvious candidate for security consideration may not necessarily be the person or persons who pose the greatest risk.

Ultimately, one might suggest that the effects of minority stereotyping can impact on the way intelligence is gathered, its analysis, interpretation and the policy constructed from it, as well as the behaviour of those so labelled. As the Benouis brothers case indicated, this may leave individuals who are a risk to the public free to engage in violent radical behaviour, as they have effectively slipped through the net due to not meeting the preconceived assumptions of vulnerability or adhering to the identified drivers. Identified within Prevent are factors of vulnerability such as socio-economic status, age or political beliefs. What must be remembered is that these same factors have previously been identified for all sorts of criminality. These assumptions have also been challenged as a form of labelling which in itself can be self-defeating (Hale, 2013; 290). Schepers (2016:1) considers crime through Situational Action Theory (Wikstrom, 2015) and proffers the idea that rather than being causal concerning criminality, it is rather the cause of the cause.

In addition to these confusions, the term radicalisation, which is the focus of Prevent, is itself a contested term and is a source of confusion as a concept (Sedgwick 2010: 479). Debatably, Prevent, along with other aspects of CONTEST, has targeted ‘all’ Muslims for security consideration (Eriksen, 2012). Prevent (2011) suggests that
Muslims (the only faith group mentioned in the policy document) are specifically vulnerable to radicalisation, as it states:

It has been argued in particular that some second or third generation Muslims in Europe, facing apparent or real discrimination and socio-economic disadvantage, can find in terrorism a ‘value system’, a community and an apparently just cause. We note that organisations working on Prevent have also found evidence to support the theory that identity and community are essential factors in radicalisation (2011b:17).

This type of statement suggests that Muslims are considered the target population and are therefore presented within the public consciousness as suspect. Therefore, Muslim communities are pivotal in either the fight against radicalisation or the radicalisation of community members. This presents Muslim communities as both the problem and the solution. Ouston (2013:9) has suggested that it is seen as being more about information gathering than protection and prevention. As such, he criticises this type of approach.

I would suggest that a comparison should be drawn to the Irish population of Britain during the IRA (S) bomb campaign of the 1970s. After all, the whole of the Irish population was not charged with the task of countering radicalisation within Irish communities in the same way that Muslim communities are seemingly being asked to do. Similarly, ‘white’ Christians have not been asked to play their part in countering right-wing radicalisation, even after killers such as Anders Breivik or Thomas Mair. In 2012, Europol warned that right-wing extremism should be a priority for security consideration, and with a growth in right-wing parliamentary
success across Europe (Liang, 2016) this seems a legitimate concern. Added to these concerns, the amalgamation of all Muslims into one homogenous group through policy language frames Muslims as vulnerable, which I would suggest is dangerous, as it gives a warped legitimacy to the voice of the far right\(^2\) and creates a suspect community (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Hillyard, 1993). This can be evidenced by the way in which Muslims have been subjected to pervasive security scrutiny (see Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009:736).

The need for a separation of the individual, who may claim to be acting for a group, was highlighted in a report for the Home Affairs Committee (Walker 2012: Section 15).

Further complications with the government’s focus on Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism is that in order to prevent it, policy seems to be ignoring other extremist groups by leaving less funding and less focused programmes of reduction.

*Exploring the Facts and Figures*

Official statistics by the European Union (EU) law enforcement agency, Europol, demonstrated that between 2006-2011 only nine of a total 2313 ‘failed, foiled or successful terrorist attacks’ in the EU were classified as Islamist (TE-SAT Reports 2007:13; 2008:10; 2009:12; 2010:12; 2011:26; 2012:36). This equates to 0.39 of the total number coming from Islam-inspired or Islamist terror groups. However, in Prevent the far right is very briefly considered when compared to the consideration of Islamist-inspired terrorism.

\(^2\) Personally I do not believe that any far right narrative has any place in society. However, the far right has historically used fear as a tool. For example, the alienation of the Jewish people prior to WW2.
Eriksen (2012) highlights a number of reasons to consider the risk from right wing extremist action seriously. There are currently a number of individuals serving prison sentences for right-wing terrorism-related offences, including Terence Gavan who was found to have a stockpile of more than fifty explosives and small arms, Neil Lewington who had turned his bedroom in his parents’ house into a bomb-making factory and Trevor Hannington and Michael Heaton who were convicted for inciting racial hatred when they promoted violence against Jewish people, describing them as ‘treacherous scum’ (source Crown Prosecution Service, 2010). The security minister James Brokenfield accused groups such as the English Defence League (EDL) of the radicalisation of its members (Morris, 2013). Yet it seems the risk from the ‘radical’ far right seems far less considered by government and by the media than the risk from radical Islam, given the focus on radical Islam in Prevent.

There is no doubt that within some Muslim communities, like any community, there is a potential for radicalisation and a risk of this translating into violent action. The English Defence League (EDL), a right-wing pseudo-political organisation in Britain, frequently attracts more than a thousand members to its rallies. Jackson (2011) described it as acting as a gateway for right-wing terrorism. It must therefore be important to place risk into context and to allocate funding accordingly (far-right politics will be examined further in subsequent chapters). Concerning the targeting of communities under the Prevent remit, there have also been concerns raised regarding the impact of radicalisation discourse on young people. Once again, the classification of ‘vulnerable’ to radicalisation has become problematic, as it intersects with presentation of the individual already facing targeting due to their
age and/or socio-economic position within society. Coppock and McGovern (2014) suggest this is problematic for a number of reason, contending:

These knowledge paradigms ‘legitimise’ a pre-emptive, interventionist and securitising approach that affects the lives of young British Muslims (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 242).

They further contest that the identification of people has been:

Underpinned by essentialised, racialised constructions of ‘childhood vulnerability’, and bolstered by pseudo-scientific ‘psychology of radicalisation’ discourse…. Positioned at the forefront of the late ‘war on terror’ (ibid).

2016 Duty Guidance

Added to the already extensive intrusion into the lives of those people, including children, targeted for Prevent consideration, in June 2015 the Prevent duty (2015) departmental advice for school and childcare providers was published by the Department for Education. The advice within the document was non-statutory but framed as a way for childcare professionals to understand the Prevent duty. The Prevent duty was created within the Counter Terrorism Security Act section 26 (2015) to prevent people being drawn into terrorism. Focused on children under 16 years old (p 3), its main point was to explain what the Prevent duty meant for schools and childcare providers, to make clear what school and childcare providers should do to demonstrate compliance with the duty and to inform schools and childcare providers about other sources of information.
The remit of the duty was based on a fourfold approach, which would identify children who may be vulnerable to radicalisation (2015: 5). This included early-years children aged 0-5 up to 15. Approaching radicalisation as a safeguarding issue, similar to drug use, child exploitation or neglect, the duty placed responsibility on childcare professionals to identify through a risk assessment those children who were vulnerable to radicalisation. This comparative approach is interesting, given that in child exploitation policy there is no specific definition of vulnerability; rather, it suggests that any child may be vulnerable to exploitation. However, within the Prevent duty remit childcare providers were tasked with instilling fundamental British values in children, although fundamental British values were not explained or even described within the document, and they were to challenge extremist views whilst allowing open debate on controversial topics. The document states that even very young children may be at risk from radicalisation (2015: 6) from within their own families or from outside, and that childcare professionals should be aware of a child ‘displaying concerning behaviour’. If the childcare professionals believed a child was at risk then they should refer that child and their family to the Channel programme, even though within the Prevent duty document (PDD) they state:

There is no single way of identifying an individual who is likely to be susceptible to a terrorist ideology (PDD, 2015: 6).

Designed to build upon existing Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) who work with police and civil society organisations, the document placed families at the heart of radicalisation consideration, stating that:
Effective engagement with parents/the family is also important as they are in a key position to spot signs of radicalisation (PDD, 2015: 7)

They continue that families that ‘raise concern’\(^3\) should be pointed in the right direction for support. As a researcher, I find it disturbing to consider the question of how much radicalised behaviour an early-years child, 0-5 years old, may exhibit before being referred. Nonetheless, staff, through the Prevent duty scheme, were offered Prevent awareness training and were asked to build up children’s resilience to radicalisation, again whilst promoting fundamental British values (2015: 8).

Linked to the Prevent duty (2014), another policy paper from the Department for Education was available to practitioners called *Promoting Fundamental British Values*, as part of spiritual, moral, social and cultural development (SMSC) in schools. The document states that:

> Schools should promote the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs (SMSC, 2014: 5).

SMSC was accountable to Ofsted: it was the Ofsted inspector’s job to determine if children were developing a good SMSC as part of the assessment of schools. Linked directly with Prevent, childcare professionals were now the providers of not only a child’s education, but also their spiritual, moral and cultural guardians. In a sense, taking this responsibility away from parents is what can only be described as an over-reaching, ‘nanny state’ intrusion into individual families and cultures. If we consider the experiences of Muslims in the UK, already one may suggest that it is

\(^3\) This is contestable as the policy is vague and so the term is places in inverted comers.
minority cultures which will be scrutinised more than the majority culture in Britain. The focus and need to promote the Prevent agenda in order to identify those individuals who may be vulnerable to radicalisation, and to counter any radicalising influences, has, as we have previously discussed, been highlighted by government as being of paramount importance. So much so that foundation-year children aged 0-5 are now considered.

_Prevent in Liverpool_

At the end of 2012 Liverpool for the first time had the Prevent initiative and team positioned within the city. Although there is no information available regarding the cost of these initiatives, I interviewed social researcher, who had interview data from 2015 regarding the Prevent expenditure in Liverpool. Their interview data suggests that the initial cost allocated to the Prevent team was around £85,000. Due to the lack of information available from Liverpool City Council, Merseyside Police or the Merseyside Police and Crime Commissioner’s office regarding costings for Prevent (I have applied to all the organisations for the expenditure figures, though none have been forthcoming) the interview data from 2015 is the only information available at this time. The initial sum was spent on wages for the Prevent lead in the local authority, who subsequently left his post at the end of March 2016 (although at the point of writing there has been no replacement June 2016), and for the salary of the Channel Police Practitioner. So, from the perspective of Liverpool as well as the rest of the UK, the question must be asked: is Prevent giving the British public value for money, how much is actually being spent, and on what?
1.4 Is Prevent Value for Money?

Funding for Prevent initiatives has previously been allocated to local authorities with more than two thousand Muslims within their catchment area. There also seems to have been a strong correlation between the amount of funding allocated and numbers of Muslims, regardless of other factors (Kundnani, 2009; 12-14). Arguably, this effectively removed funding opportunities from other projects not focused on Islamist-inspired radicalisation. No further information about funding criteria has been forthcoming at this point via the Liverpool Prevent team (September 2016). Using freedom of information request 205350, this research discovered that although Liverpool is home to one of the oldest Muslim communities in the country, it still has a thriving Muslim community and home to three mosques. As of early 2012, as previously discussed, there were no Prevent initiatives within Merseyside. In a discussion with the now ex-programme director of Prevent in Liverpool (2015), Clive Finch, I was informed that there were already a number of community projects in place, which worked to maintain a good local cohesiveness that embraced Liverpool’s multicultural heritage already, and so Prevent initiatives were considered an addition rather than a replacement of these successful local community initiatives. Prior to 2012, the local Liverpool council worked to promote multicultural values and to counter negative radical voices within Liverpool’s communities, and this was seen as a constructive approach by members of the Muslim community interviewed in the pilot study for this research. The pilot study, which involved seventy-two Muslims based in North West England, indicated that even if Prevent projects were funded, if they involved the police, there would have been a reticence for local people to get involved (Peatfield, 2012), due
to an overall suspicion of ‘all things government’. This reticence to be involved with any projects funded through counter-radicalisation/security programmes was also proposed by O’Toole et al. (2015:2).

Policy Failures

A costings report by the independent group Tax Payers Alliance (TPA) (2009), using the Freedom of Information Act and through parliamentary questions raised by Paul Goodman MP, found that local councils have so far allocated over £12 million to fund community groups through Prevent. The report, which is now seven years old, also found that ‘there has been insufficient monitoring of how Prevent money is spent, with the Government unsure of what groups Councils have disbursed money to’. However, this point was addressed in Theresa May’s foreword to the revised Prevent (2011b:1), in which she promised to improve monetary monitoring.

Highlighted by the TPA (2009) was the case of the Cordoba Foundation, that was initially allocated £39,000 but withdrew only £4000. The funds had been released despite the cohesion minister stating in Parliament that the local council of Tower Hamlets has actually terminated their agreement. Mathew Sinclair, the research director for the TPA, suggested:

Giving councils millions of pounds to dole out to hundreds of community groups clearly create a massive risk that money will be wasted or finance groups hostile to Britain's liberal, democratic values... Grants to community groups aren’t just risky though; they can also be divisive and wasteful. Politicians of all parties need to acknowledge that
the approach has failed, cancel this programme and start focusing directly on stopping terrorists (TPA, 2009).

If the monitoring of Prevent is insufficient, and the operational objectives are unachievable, then why has there not been a radical rethink of counter-radicalisation policy? Herman and Chomsky (2002) argue that pressure from the media may push the government to need to be seen to be doing something in the public eye, a point reiterated by Nacos (2007). This, however, would still not seem to address the focus on Islamic radicalisation, or the lack of funding available to reduce right-wing radicalisation/extremism. Using the Freedom of Information Act, HM Treasury informed this researcher that between 2011 and 2012 £3 million was allocated to twenty-five councils to implement Prevent strategy projects and another £3 million will be allocated to twenty-eight councils in 2013. If we place this figure in perspective, it indicates that, £120,000 has been allocated per council across 2011/2012 and £107,142 in 2012/2013 (£3 million divided by twenty-five councils). We can then compare this to the £600,000 that was allocated to the Greater London Authority to erect a giant video screen for the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee (Jones, 2012). Given the importance of counter-radicalisation, this amount seems unrealistic for operational effectiveness in comparison.

Since beginning this research, there have been numerous criticisms of Prevent from both within the government (Prevent Equality Impact Assessment, 2011) and from outside bodies (Open Society Foundations, 2016). The counter-radicalisation impact of Prevent, alongside the situation of Prevent within the health service and education, have come under heavy criticism from teachers and health-service unions. The capacity of policy to alienate the very communities it seeks to protect
due to poor specificity in language has been highlighted not only by this research but also by independent review bodies, such as the Open Society Foundation. A report by the Open Society Foundation entitled *Eroding Trust: the UK’s Prevent Counter-Extremism Strategy in Health and Education* (2016: 16) suggests:

First, the current Prevent strategy suffers from multiple, mutually reinforcing structural flaws, the foreseeable consequence of which is a serious risk of human rights violations. These violations include, most obviously, violations of the right against discrimination, as well the right to freedom of expression, among other rights. Prevents structural flaws include the targeting of “pre-criminality”, “nonviolent extremism”, and opposition to “British values”. This “intensifies” the government’s reach into “everyday lawful discourse”. Furthermore, Prevents targeting of non-violent extremism and “indicators” of risk of being drawn into terrorism lack a scientific basis. Indeed, the claim that non-violent extremism –including “radical” or religious ideology – is the precursor to terrorism has been widely discredited by the British government itself, as well as numerous reputable scholars.

In addition to this, a research paper by the ICCT, entitled ‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review’ (Schmid, 2013), suggested that as far as domestic counter-radicalisation policy is concerned, there should be a focus on maintaining legitimacy amongst the public regarding fairness in the judicial and political system (p. 63). It also suggests that policy language and the presentation of policy and language could be more thoughtfully considered, so that understanding is shared and communicated to the wider social audience. The author contends:

Governments and media should be more aware that both verbal rhetoric and non-verbal signalling matter; greater care should be taken in the use
of language and other symbols in public discourse and in all counter-
radicalisation and counter-terrorism communication efforts (Schmid,
2013: 63).

Clarity to avoid misinterpretation of policy is therefore critical to promote a shared and common rejection of extremist views from all walks of society, not just those highlighted for concern within policy. A cohesiveness in understanding would also help stop a distortion of counter-radicalisation/counter-terrorism facts. That is why it is important to know what those groups, who are arguably the target of policy, know, understand and think about it, points this research will address simply by asking how much do non-Muslim minorities know about Prevent (2011) in general? What do people think about the identification of drivers within Prevent and do people believe they have ever been affected by counter-radicalisation policy, and if so, how?

**Conclusion**

As I have previously discussed, the premise throughout Prevent, that it will rely upon local communities for cooperation in implementing preventative strategies, has been problematic. These communities vilified within Prevent are the same communities which are relied upon to reduce, challenge and police radicalisation. Often these communities have been framed as suspect and targeted due to assumptions of ‘vulnerability’ and risk associated to that ‘vulnerability’ in policy. This would suggest that this has thrust them into the spotlight of suspicion by the state, at the same time as withdrawing state protection.
The ambiguous terminology in policy alongside militaristic language, that has been criticised, has alienated targeted communities, and as the EIA report suggested, has had a negative effect on community/police relations. The effect of policy such as Prevent on those communities affected by it, through increased suspicion either deliberately or as a consequence of vague specifics or terminologies, is an area of key concern for this research. For example, radicalisation as a construct is contested: what exactly is radicalisation, who decides the definition and how can we frame specific forms of radicalisation in order to separate them as uniquely problematic from other forms?

The terms radical/radicalisation, I would suggest, are context dependent, and so this research challenges the sweeping generalisations made within Prevent regarding the target populations. Ultimately wavering between its own narratives, Prevent seems ill-equipped to provide a counter-radicalisation programme fit for purpose and that is suited to embrace the diversity within British society. Ultimately, one might suggest it is creating new problems and defeating its own purpose.
Chapter Two: The Need for Terminological Specificity

‘Radicalisation refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism’


Introduction

In Chapter One I looked at the current UK counter-radicalisation policy Prevent, discussing the use of descriptive terminology and touching upon the potential ramifications of that terminology. This chapter will discuss in more detail the specifics of language and will challenge them. Language is particularly interesting to this research, as one of the key research questions examines how people perceive policy language (specifically drivers) and internalise it. The top-down presentation of risk within policy and an increase in suspicion of both deliberately and unintentionally targeted communities due to vague terminologies has, this research would contend, increased those members of society placed within the ‘vulnerable’ policy category and has framed them as suspect. This then has the potential to create cause and a dangerous effect.

2.1 Reducing Radicalisation

As I discussed in Chapter One, radical ideology has been linked through discourse and political terminology with extremism. It has been suggested within documents such as Prevent that radical terminology not only influences violent actions, but is also a precursor of violent extremism. The attack by Anders Behring Breivik on July 22nd 2011 in which he executed a combined bomb and gun attack in Norway,
targeting what he perceived to be the liberal left (Pantucci, 2011), showed that violence perpetrated by individuals or groups does not have to be influenced by religious ideology; other extremist views could lead to violent behaviour.

Given the tidal wave of legislation created since the terror attacks of 9/11 (a point criticised by the independent reviewer of UK policy Lord MacDonald ((MacDonald, 2011)), most counter-radicalisation/counter-terrorism policies have been focused either directly or indirectly on the Islamic faith (Hickman et al., 2011). Brown (2006:297) contends that after the attacks of 9/11 there was a negative paradigm shift in attitudes towards Muslims, which was commensurate with an increase and concern about ‘home-grown’ terrorist action in Europe over the last decade. The continuing fear of British support for the conflict in Syria and Afghanistan has, I would contend, exacerbated a negative association with radicalisation as well as the fear of the ‘home-grown’ radical. Altheide (2016:181) suggests that the politics of everyday life incorporate these discourses of fear. They are now so engrained within society that the fear itself has become part of society.

The increase in radicalisation discourse both through the construction of policy alongside a rise in suspicion of anyone perceived as being Muslim has helped to construct the perception of state aggression as a social reality within some Muslim communities (Saeed, 2007), alongside other minority groups falsely identified as Muslim. In England and Wales over 2014-15 there were 3,254 faith hate crimes not including anti-Semitism. Although this number is dwarfed by race hate crimes, which stood at 42,930 (Corcoran, Lader and Smith 2015: 4), there is no way to know how many of those crimes crossed over into both categories or indeed if the race crimes were as a result of faith hate actions or vice versa (see Burnett, 2013).
How and if the identification of faith through race is connected will be one of the areas that this research will be considering, as well as the representation of groups within policy.

The increase in discourse surrounding the processes of radicalisation, home-grown radicals and the rise of radicalisation amongst young British Muslims have been highlighted for major policy concern by the FPM David Cameron (HM Government, 2013). The Home Affairs Committee on Radicalisation (2016/17: 3) reported that 800 UK-linked fighters have travelled to Syria and Iraq since the conflict began with over 50% of those returning home to the UK already. Considering counter-terrorism policy, there seems some disquietude/fear in British society that some of its citizens who received combat training abroad will target the British population (Home Office, 2014). I would suggest that in advancing policies based on such (populist) fears the British government remains blind to the dynamics of action and reaction within conflicts (McCauley and College, 2015) as it reduces the complexity of terrorism/radicalisation to a one-dimensional problem.

What must also be considered is the way in which radicalisation has been framed over time, and how the discourse has been problematised. Edwards (2015:103) suggests that the language of radicalisation in political, academic, media and legal discourses has changed from its initial conceptual origins over a century ago in the United States. He suggests that it has been applied to groups considered politically marginal or ideological, echoing Hillyard’s (1993) suspect community theory.

Clarity in order to avoid misinterpretation of policy is therefore critical to promoting a shared and common rejection of extremist views from all walks of society, not just those highlighted for concern within policy. A cohesiveness in
understanding would also help stop common distortions regarding the ‘facts’ about counter-radicalisation/counter-terrorism. This is why it is important to know what those groups, who are arguably the target of policy, know, understand and think about it. This project will directly address how much non-Muslim minorities know about Prevent (2011) in general. What do people think about the identification of drivers within Prevent? To what extent have non-Muslim minority individuals been affected by counter-radicalisation policies such as Prevent?

Government concern along with a now endemic fear of the radical and the process of radicalisation (see Lavin, 2006) has seen growth in the production of documents, publications and output from the security services. This, along with the media interest in the subject, placed British Muslims at the heart of counter-terrorism policy and suspicion (see Home Office, 2007; Quilliam foundation, 2007). This research suggests that this is also the case for anyone ‘misidentified’ as Muslim.

British counter-terrorism strategies have been orientated towards the prevention of radicalisation, but there does not seem to be much academic evidence or primary research into the specifics of terminology, which is surprising given its importance. How factors/drivers have been identified and are interpreted by groups or individuals, or how risks have been communicated by the state, are, I would contend, all contestable. One may suggest that the terms radical/radicalisation have been linked throughout post-9/11 policy with the terminology of terrorism as defined by The Terrorism Act 2000 (see Appendix 8) and by Prevent (2011b: 18), in which the terminology of the radical/radicalisation have been associated with violent action. This linking of radicalisation with violence does not consider how many radicalised people do not go on to offend.
The shaping and reshaping of radicalisation discourse has meant that finding a specific definition is a problematic task. For example, the current Prevent duty guidance notes (2015), although sharing the same definition for radicalisation as Prevent, details a more specific approach to radicalisation. However, the duty guidance is directly informed by Prevent and so, in a sense, is still a regurgitation of the policy, plus additions and exceptions. The ‘them’ and ‘us’ attitude still permeates the narrative, and Islamic-inspired terrorism is still highlighted for the bulk of concern. For example, whilst stating that Islamist extremists regard Western intervention in Muslim countries as a ‘war’ on Islam, they proffer the idea that this creates a ‘them’ and ‘us’ narrative used to radicalise (2011:3).

The assumption within Prevent that everyone who has radical thoughts or ideas is driven by violent intentions is debateable. The question should be asked: how does the government know that everyone who believes in social and political change, or who has a different opinion outside of a dominant narrative, has some form of violence in mind? One must consider the limitations of research surrounding motivation, and ask what even constitutes a ‘radical’, why are they are considered special and do we even need to be concerned about radicalisation?

If we consider this through a sociological lens, we might also want to question whether attempts at counter-radicalisation are causing a proliferation of the problem through labelling and moral panic. Moral panic around radicalisation can be broached by using the attributional model of Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009:37-41). This is a constructionist approach, in so far as they suggest that any moral panic involves a heightened level of concern about the behaviour of a group or category of person, and the use of language which can include opinion polls, lobbying
activities and media coverage. The hostility that is then directed towards the groups must show a certain level of consensus across society, or at least designated segments of society. In addition, the level of public concern must be disproportionate to the level of objective harm. What must be considered is the definition of the radical, radicalisation or radicalisers, how we understand those definitions, and the significance of one’s personal position in influencing that understanding.

2.2 Problematising, Radicalisation and Language

Richards (2011:143) argues that there has not, to date, been any ‘consistent notion of what is meant by radicalisation’, or any agreement as to the part that radicalisation plays in encouraging violent behaviours. Spalek (2016) suggested that there could be no single definitive definition of radicalisation, as it is based, in part, on positionality. For example, what does radical or radicalisation mean? The understanding of language and meaning are based on experiences, and so who is considered a radical must also be based, in part, on one’s position, gained through experience. Throughout Prevent the terms radical and radicalisation are used interchangeably, alongside the terms terrorist and terrorism. For example, in the Prevent summary (2011b), it states:

_All the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalise and recruit people to their cause; We now have more information about the factors which encourage people to support terrorism and then to engage in terrorist-related activity; Terrorist groups can take up and_
However, these terms are contestable and their meaning can vary depending on one’s culture, political and sociological position, as well as one’s basic understanding of language (Schmid, 2004). Dalgaard- Nielsen (2010: 798) suggests that there is a separation in understanding between someone framed as a radical and someone framed as a violent radical. An understanding of the process in which the radical develops into violent radical is in itself problematic, with a clear separation needed to fully understand both processes and labels.

In Prevent, the description of radicalisation is limited; it simply states that radicalisation refers to the process by which someone comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism (2011:108). This limited description means that separating the concept of radical and violent radical becomes impossible, as there is no room for interpretation within the description. Violent or non-violent, vocal or non-vocal, political or subversive, all forms of extremism are swept up within the description of terrorism. Terrorism is itself equally minimally described in the Terrorism Act 2000. One may suggest that a vague interpretation could occur due to a lack of terminological specifics within policy. The specifics needed in order to understand the challenges of terrorism from differing perspectives is highlighted by Dojcinovski and Odzakov (2014), who address the problem of terrorism strategies from an international perspective. They say that:

Different perspectives on the problem of broadening of crises left the firm stance on fighting terrorism and contributed to a selective support in preventative actions of international organisations and collective
security systems. Terrorism is defined as an act of violence, but the intensity of the activities is different at different stages of action (Dojcinovski and Odzakov, 2014: 99).

This research would suggest that having a shared understanding of terminology (both policy makers and targeted communities) is paramount in order to facilitate cooperation through shared motivation (the reduction of violent terrorism). Post-9/11, we have seen the terminology of radicalisation/radical become firmly established within academic discourse as well as in the political vocabulary (see Antunez and Tellidis, 2013). And yet, conceptual clarity still seems lacking. There still seems little consensus of understanding regarding what exactly radicalisation is (Pisoiu, 2013). However, this has not stopped the ‘process’ of radicalisation being blamed for violent extremism by government (Cameron, 2011; Home Office, 2013; Home Office, 2014). With a lack of agreement on what the radical or the radicalisation process is, however, there can be no clarity as to how this process may differ from other learning/socialisation processes.

_A Blurring of the Targets_

The war on terror heralded an increase in punitive security strategies that have placed Muslims under increased pressure and speculation from politicians, security experts and the media (Giroux, 2016). I would suggest that these processes have also targeted other non-Muslim minority groups, due to a blurring between the neo-Western categorisation of race and ethnicity in association with identity. The Prevent strategy assessment (2011b) contained very little differentiation between the terminologies of race and ethnicity. Effectively, they were used interchangeably
and melded together and so a distinct separation of concepts was rejected. The report suggests:

As such, the analysis of the comments received under these is included together. For the purposes of this EIA, Race has been taken to include colour, nationality, ethnic and national origins, in line with the Race Relations Act 1976 (2011b:6).

This blurring between race and ethnicity suggests that the construction of an identity, be it Black/Muslim/Black-Muslim, or any other, can be interchangeable (see Nishi, Matias and Montoya, 2015). A study by Moosavi (2013: 1) suggested that this may be true given that ‘White’ converts to Islam can be re-racialised as ‘not quite white’ or even as ‘non-white’, because of a persistent conflation of Islam as a ‘non-white religion’. The loss of ‘whiteness’ faced by converts to Islam can be entailed by being ‘Pakistanised’ (Kose, 1996:135), or, as Franks (2000) suggests, by crossing the borders of whiteness. Moosavi (2013) further suggests that this re-racialising to something other than ‘white’ marks subjects as something other than ‘normal’. It identifies them away from the dominant culture as outsiders and leaves them vulnerable to racial targeting. He suggests that one of the starkest manifestations of this targeting is when converts are called names such as ‘Paki’ (a derogatory term for a Pakistani person), or ‘(dirty) Arab’. The re-racialising of converts is also linked with the disassociation of Britishness and a negative assumption that ‘non-white’ is in some way foreign. The mutual reinforcement of

---

4 The categorisation of people based on skin pigmentation is rejected in this thesis. The terms ‘Black’, ‘white’, or any other colour descriptive are therefore placed in inverted commas here and elsewhere in the thesis to highlight this rejection.
concepts such as foreign or ‘non-white’ can be seen in work by Jensen (2008: 390) and Franks (2000: 922).

Unlike the fluidity concerning the categorisation of race and racial language within political language, there seems to be an agreement that although all radicals are not terrorists or engaged in any other form of illegal activities per se, all terrorists are radical (see Bakker and De Graaf, 2010). What must be considered is the way in which the terminology of radical/radicalisation has been used, and the way radicalisation is being researched within a broader context, in order to better understand if this assumption is in fact true. Debatably, incidents of violent terrorist acts have sparked research into causation and the processes of radicalisation. Nevertheless, there has also been an assumption that to successfully stop violent terrorist action governments must prevent radicalisation. This has arguably linked the two constructs. Examining the definitions and the evidence used to construct the state’s position on the subject of radicalisation is a way for us to evaluate those positions, but also the agendas that may have influenced them. The consensus from the British government is that radicalisation is bad. This is apparent by the construction of Prevent and the fear of the radical presented throughout the document. However, one’s positionality must be considered an influencing factor in the use of the term radical: in 2015 the Former Prime Minister suggested that the government must be fearlessly radical regarding equality within British universities (available at gov.uk). The term radical here takes on positive connotations, since the Former Prime Minister was effectively talking about radical issues while under the protection of his position within society. Had a Muslim from a minority group in Britain voiced this same discussion challenging the way British universities
recruited their students, it may have been considered differently. How radicalisation is problematised and framed is important to consider, and it is to this issue that we now turn.

2.3 Problematising the Risk of Radicalisation

Given the current research on radicalisation, the question must be asked: is the risk of radicalisation even a problem, or is the problematisation of radicalisation increasing the risk? (Spalek, 2016, Eriksen, 2012) Part of the remit of this research is to examine how much people actually know about current counter-radicalisation strategies and the aspects identified within it concerning vulnerability to radicalisation. To this end, the study investigates how much non-Muslim minorities know about the Prevent (2011) strategy and about counter-radicalisation policy in general. What do participants think about the identification of drivers within Prevent policy, and do they believe they have ever been affected by counter-radicalisation policies such as Prevent?

If, as Pisoiu (2013) argues, the European Union, including Britain, is working under the assumption that radicalisation processes ‘might’ lead to terrorism, there can only be two possible underlying rationales. The first is to assume that there are two types of radicalisation processes: malign and benign. The malign process propels individuals onto a destructive pathway leading to acts and involvement with acts of violence, while the benign simply leads to a pathway where the individual may embrace a radical ideology. The second is to assume that under certain circumstances all radicalisation can lead to terrorism, and focuses on stopping the whole process regardless of the outcome. I would suggest that the second approach
is the one adopted by the British government. Within Prevent, radical ideology, whether it is violent or non-violent, is considered to be a high security risk and therefore is under consideration. However, both the malign and benign approaches are discussed on the European Union home affairs website and can be found in counter-radicalisation literature (see Sageman, 2008). The link between belief and behaviour, however, remains unclear, as Fishman (2010) suggests:

The key question for radicalisation researchers and security personnel is the extent to which an individual engages in violent behaviour and what predicts that behaviour. One question this raises is whether radicalisation is about beliefs, subscribing to radical thoughts, or about actions, engaging in radical behaviour. It seems obvious to say that individuals who engage in radical behaviour hold radical beliefs, but, in fact, it is not entirely learnt that one’s attitudes or beliefs necessarily underlie behaviour. Thus, radical attitudes may not be a good indicator of radicalisation. Further, subscribing to a radical belief does not necessitate engaging in radical actions, and civil liberties dictate that private beliefs should be free from public scrutiny (Fishman, 2010: 10).

The unqualified relationship between violent radicalisation and its link with terrorism has implied that the two are symbiotic in some way. Bartlett and Miller (2012) contest this, suggesting that not all radicalisation can lead to violent terrorist activities. They describe the difference between ‘doers’ and ‘talkers’. They propose that it is wrong to assume that all violent radicalisation can be linked with the membership of a faith, or that violent action is a rational choice, arguing that:
Especially in the case of ‘homegrown’ young men, violent radicalisation is not necessarily, or wholly, a religious, intellectual, or rational decision. There is an emotional pull to radicalisation. To join the battle against the power and authority of Western states is considered risky, exciting, heroic, and taps into a counter-cultural and anti-establishment tradition exemplified by many youth subcultures, both Muslim and non-Muslim (Bartlett and Miller, 2012: 17).

Similarly, Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) describes radicalisation as a growing readiness to pursue far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order. This is not to suggest that this readiness is in anyway violent or socially destructive. One may contend that it is imperative to challenge the existing order to enact positive change for the growth of all societies and to enable sustained stability through innovations in thought. So when did radicalisation become such a key phrase, or problem? Prior to 9/11 there was scant discussion of radicalisation/the radical in either academic discourse or research. Silke (2011) argues that during the 1970s there was very little discussion of radicalisation in connection to the activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Silke argued that in the 1970s and 1980s, there were no claims of IRA members being radicalised, and there was no reference to a radicalisation process. This terminology and framework has primarily been a post-9/11 phenomenon, developed in regard to Islamist militant groups such as Al-Qaeda (Silke, 2011: 20). The problematic conflation of the violent terrorist with the radical/radicalisation has taken place almost exclusively in relation to Islam. Pisoiu (2013:248) suggests that the common denominator attached to terrorism is faith, specifically the faith of Islam. He
suggested that clarity was less important, and that the exact content of ‘being a radical’ was less important an ingredient than ‘being a Muslim’ [both in the religious sense and as a quasi-ethnic denominator].

Policy initiatives to prevent radicalisation, along with research investigating ‘vulnerable’ or ‘violent’ Muslim youth, debatably ingrain individuals within a constructed identity (see Bettiza, 2015). The fear of home-grown radicalisation and/or UK citizens being radicalised whilst fighting in conflicts in other countries has recently been highlighted in a national security report (Home Office 2013, 2014). However, a report for DEMOS by Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010) found that there was widespread support from within Muslim communities for young Muslims defending themselves against invaders in Afghanistan or Iraq. These actions were framed in the language of self-defence and therefore were considered differently. Descriptive language changed the meaning of the same acts. They suggest:

There are potential allies amongst radicals who denounce terrorism at home, but support the principle of violent Jihad overseas as a natural extension of just war theory (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010: 11-12).

This is not to say that security services should not be concerned about individuals who engage in conflicts abroad, as there is always the potential for violence once a person has been taught violent skill sets. Nevertheless, that does not necessarily mean that individuals would engage in terrorist behaviours in the UK, and Bartlett, Birdwell and King rejected the deterministic nature of the policy assumptions. The DEMOS Report (Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, 2010) also suggests that
governments must be careful to distinguish the term radical from violent, as being radical is not always a first step towards violence. They further contend that violence could be distinguished by different indicators than those for a purely ‘religious’ non-violent radicalisation. Again rejecting the deterministic approach, they argue:

Assuming that radical views constitute the base of the terrorist pyramid can allow for counter-radicalisation strategies against large numbers of people who object entirely to Al-Qaeda’s methods (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010: 1).

The suggestion by DEMOS was that radical ideas, even the ones perceived as having negative connotations that may represent a threat to the democratic order, should be treated as a social problem and not as a subset of the Al-Qaeda threat. This would effectively take it out of the remit of counter-terrorism/counter-radicalisation policy, as the assumption of violence was effectively incorrect. They suggested that a more nuanced consideration of the subject may be more beneficial to the debate about radicalisation in general.

2.4 Radicalisation and the Assumptions of Violence

The assumptive nature of government policy regarding radicalisation and violence has been in some part due to the limitations of research, which has investigated the connections and root causes of radicalisation pathways, and needs to be considered critically. With the identification and construction of drivers/pathways, research has focused on defining the pathways to radicalisation and placing them into an order.
This has failed to address the observation that individual radicalisation ‘pathways’ seem to differ case by case and are not necessarily deterministic. Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010) suggest that factors do not necessarily equate to a deterministic process. They argue that permissive factors help only to explain why radicalisation might occur, not how it occurs. They argue that:

The identification of permissive factors helps to explain why radicalisation might occur, but it does not explain the process by which some peoples who experience those factors come to justify violence within this process (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010: 19).

The rational choice model contends that terrorism can be rationally selected from numerous tactical options as a way to achieve a set goal. Crenshaw (2008) argues that terrorism can be constructed as legitimate in order to enforce political change. One model that attempts to understand the process is the stage model (Moghaddam, 2005). This attempts to explain the process as a series of stages, and uses the metaphor of a staircase in which the participant has to climb up and through levels. Each level represents the psychological engagement that is necessary to be able to move up to the next one. This model was criticised by Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010) as it does not clearly identify what drives the individual’s progression from one stage to the next, and it assumes that the initial stage also exists in some conscious way. Further, it also suggests that violent action is a linear progression from radicalisation, even though the relationship between violence and radicalisation is unclear. Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010) suggest that the use of polling data is insufficient to be classed as evidence-based research, as it does not give a clear picture of the subtle nuances of the decision-making processes which
need to be identified. Prevent uses information gained, for example, through the
citizenship survey. This survey is anonymous and so whether or not it is a true and
accurate representation of opinions rather than simple posturing, especially by
younger disaffected respondents, is unclear. Added to the controversy regarding the
route into radicalisation and the conception of violence as a linear outcome of
radicalisation, there is also scant literature examining the suggestion that the
process of radicalisation is reversible, or that the individual’s engagement with
radical ideology may simply be a phase in life. There is also no consideration of the
idea that an individual may simply lose interest or change orientation in a ‘group’
movement. The role of group mechanisms, socialisation, intersubjectivity and an
initial moment of personal crisis that could push someone into the adoption of a
fundamentalist ideology for a short period of time has been overlooked in policy
(Coolsate, 2016; Abbas and Awan, 2015).

Pisoiu (2013) suggests that this can lead to the empirical and theoretical difficulties
associated with radicalisation research. Throughout the literature, there has never
been conclusive consensus regarding the effects of ‘drivers’ or ‘root causes’ of
radicalisation. The variation in, for example, the socio-economic status, educational
achievement or family backgrounds of radicalised individuals makes it impossible
to determine how each variable has influenced behaviour. Bakkers’ (2006) study of
the profiles of two hundred and forty-two Jihadists throughout Europe concluded
that ‘with regards to socio-economic status there are not typical similarities or
dissimilarities between networks’ (Bakkers, 2006: 32). Part of the remit of this
research is to examine how much people actually know about current counter-
radicalisation strategies and the aspects these strategies identify concerning personal vulnerability to radicalisation.

It is therefore impossible to explain why only a few out of the many individuals affected by similar circumstances through their lives, such as marginalisation, discrimination or unemployment, become radicalised. It is even harder to explain why out of those few an even smaller amount go on to commit acts of violence (see King and Taylor, 2011). A further problem discussed by Pisoiu (2013) is that of causality, the relationship between the cognitive opening and the adoption of fundamentalist/radical ideology. Whether or not unemployment, discrimination or social deprivation amount to a level of crisis in which a cognitive opening occurred, the individual would then have to assimilate and conceptualise a new set of values and beliefs through interaction with other current and previously adopted ones. The argument presented by Prevent (2011: 5) that quasi-indoctrination may occur in which previous belief structures can be simply eliminated and replaced by a fundamentalist mentality is unrealistic (see Wiktorowicz, 2005). This would, at a stretch, lead us to propose that in some way radical and violent terrorists are different from other members of society in so far as they possess the capacity to psychologically override past knowledge and to adopt new values, ideologies and morals. So, are radicals really different, and if so, how?

*The Quantification of Difference: Special Crimes by Special People*

The conjecture that radicals are somehow different from the mainstream, and that in some way they are unique and special, is the underlying assumption of a deterministic approach to counter-radicalisation policy and policing. This assumption can be linked to the premise that violent terrorist acts are in some way
different from other violent crimes, and that the perpetrators of such special crimes are themselves special. At the psychological level, the discussion about causation has primarily been a closed or a regurgitated version of the theories of socio-economic and cultural isolation (see Silke, 1998). Like other minority groups, Muslims throughout Europe have often been portrayed as culturally marginalised and negatively caught between identities, which are contested points (see Mythen, 2012; Fekete, 2009; Miraz, 2007).

Sweeping cultural generalisations fail to identify individual specificities and so create the perception of an ‘abnormal community’ (see Pisoiu, 2013). In the last chapter I talked about how the identification of Muslims as the only religious group specifically mentioned in Prevent had been previously criticised by DEMOS (2010) and the Prevent Equality Impact Assessment (2011), due to its generalisation of communities. I would suggest that it is this generalisation in research regarding this ‘abnormality of a community’ that is most concerning. Rather than focusing on why most do not engage in ‘terrorist’ activities, research has tended to focus on why people do engage in terrorism. This negative focus on aspects of Islam for over a decade is a point criticised in previous research for causing the alienation of Muslims within Western society (Ustad Figenschou, Beyer and Thorbjørnsrud, 2015). For example, Bartlett and Miller (2012) found that many Muslims who voiced anti-war protests did so due to involvement in groups unrelated to their faith. Involvement with left-wing movements, or other forms of political discontent, was more influential than religious affiliation, a point often left unreported.5

---

5 In the pilot study to this research, political membership of the Labour party in Liverpool was also identified as an ideological driving force for some of the Muslim respondents (Peatfield, 2012).
It may be more constructive to consider radicalisation as a process driven by the subjective interpretation of ‘reality’, rather than considering that radicals are somehow different or steered by an invisible ideological hand without the ability to self-reflect. Other more mundane reasons for the involvement in terrorism should also be considered, rather than the radicalisation route. Cottee and Hayward (2011) acknowledge that some individuals may not be pushed or drawn into terrorism by their psychology, or because of political or ideological forces, but, in some cases, they explain that it could be due to an affinity for excitement. The ‘terrorist lifestyle’ can be seen as exciting or rebellious in much the same way as other criminal occupations. The assumption of difference afforded to radicals helps construct an acceptance within policy and legislation that a literal adoption of grievances is enough to lead some to jihad. It also helps construct the idea that the individual engaging with radical ideology is a tabula rasa, and is therefore willing and able to forgo all other learnt behaviours regarding their position within society. This research, then, will strive to answer these questions by asking those groups targeted directly or indirectly for security consideration what they think about the framing of the policy.

Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010: 15) go further and suggest that a significant proportion of young Muslims, like other young people from other religious or ethnic backgrounds, might simply want to rebel. The idea of being part of an international jihadist movement may seem exciting. They suggest that government should utilise this in order to create programmes that offer young Muslims a valid alternative to jihad. They suggest schemes that may allow young Muslims to go abroad and defend other Muslims under the ‘just war’ category, in places such as Iraq or
Afghanistan, as a way to allow them the excitement of combat without alienating them from the rest of society by effectively criminalising them.

Elaboration regarding the question of how someone comes to identify themselves as part of a particular group in order to identify with ‘a cause’ is also required to get a more detailed picture of causality. An often exploited link is that of a shared faith, especially in the case of Muslims and Islamic extremism. This is an assumption that helps fuel the concept of ‘humiliation by proxy’ (Khosrokhavar, 2005: 152). The linking of faith and cause in the case of Muslims, however, would only be feasible if the individuals involved identified themselves as part of a global Ummah. Although an aspiration of Al-Qaeda’s ideology, the concept of a global Ummah has been criticised as being an illusion, as has the construction of one’s Muslim identity (Roy, 2004).

Roy (2004) suggests that that the concept of a ‘Muslim community’ is a neo-ethnic categorisation, constructed to help identify Muslim relationships within Western cultural and legal categories. This imaginary ‘community’ is labelled by Roy as the neo-Ummah, and this may allow for the development of solidarity and a sense of belonging, illusionary or not. Political mobilisation would only occur because of socialisation processes, in much the same way as other political mobilisations of other individuals. Again, this disputes the assumption that in some way there is a special process by which one becomes radicalised, or that radicals are in some way special or different from any other politically motivated individual.

Throughout academic literature, the topic of radicalisation/the radical has primarily been associated with Islam, and, as I have mentioned, there seems to be no consensus regarding how an individual is radicalised or drawn into violent terrorism.
After an investigation to draw together the relevant contributions surrounding the topic of radicalisation, Ranstrop (2010:13) concluded that the scientific research into radicalisation must be considered fragmentary and embryonic at best. The assumptions behind many of the theoretical and policy approaches regarding the individual process/processes of radicalisation are flawed, and I suggest this remains the same in 2016. The drivers of radicalisation identified in Prevent, such as social deprivation and the mistrust of government and the police, are similar problems faced by many minorities and non-minority groups throughout Britain and Europe that lack the associated risk of radicalisation. It seems to be that the only differentiation factor that tips them into a ‘vulnerable’ category is that of faith. Many assumptions made with little evidence regarding terminology, or of the association of radicalisation with violent terrorism, have constructed ‘facts’ out of political language and discursive perceptions. That determinism, the differentiation of the radical from ‘others’ and the assumption of a collective ‘Muslim identity’ have helped shape a false ‘reality’ surrounding cause and effect.

Pisoiu (2013) suggests that a quick fix approach to the subject of radicalisation/the radical throughout discourse and policy is damaging, as it draws attention away from other areas that may provide an explanation for the phenomenon. She suggests that a more promising approach for any future research may be to conceptualise the individual Islamist’s radicalisation process not as a process that leads to terrorism. Research by Smith et al. (2016) suggests that radicalisation is a process that is constructed through changes in identity and through a frustration of legitimate modes of action. They suggest:
This process of identity formation based on thinking and priorities sufficiently powerful to energise radical and violent objectives and actions seeks change perceived as unattainable through legitimate modes of action that seek non-violent change. (2016: 2)

However, the way in which the quality of being a Muslim or belonging to the ‘Muslim community’ is not an essential precondition for terrorism seems not to have been considered within policy. Furthermore, Pisiou (2013: 256) suggests that using a determinist approach to causality, with socio-economic features or the concept of identity, has recurrent empirical problems and does little to explain individual socio-psychological mechanisms that may be at play. It would be dangerous, therefore, to assume that, because some radical behaviour may be violent and consequently deviant, all radical behaviour is deviant, or processes leading to radical behaviour are deviant. Considering the commonalities in behaviour between the radical and other groups may be a way to consider the process as unexceptional rather than exceptional.

The linking of an ‘exceptional’ problem to Islam through the construction of the ‘radicalisation problem’ has led to the construction of policy designed to combat it. However, targeting has arguably normalised an Islamophobic narrative, and has been criticised as feeding a negative image of Muslims globally. The Muslim Council of Great Britain suggested that the negative presentation of Muslims has been normalised. The European Network of Experts on Radicalisation (2008) suggests that this was due to an association between language concepts. This now implicit association has been due to the overwhelming links made by policy and in
the media between the term ‘Muslim’ and negative constructions such as terrorism or radicalisation. They suggest:

The evidence for the ‘normalisation’ of Islamophobic discourse in politics and the media and in EC Member states where there is a substantive (though still small) and visible presence of Muslim communities is wide-ranging and strong. It is well evidenced in the literature and commentary in the case of the UK, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, and supported by substantive reviews of work on media, racism and Islamophobia. These findings assert that the media overwhelmingly associate Muslims/Islam with negative connotations have been reproduced in research throughout Western media, including throughout the European Union (2008: 5).

This being true, Herschinger (2013: 195) suggests that the targeting of one religion is a self-defeating approach which has the capacity to fuel radicalisation, warning that policy makers should not fall into the trap of division set by the extremists by provoking a clash of civilisations. This, of course, links back to the key question posed in Chapter One: does the problematisation of radicalisation in effect fuel radicalisation by creating a moral panic and a reaction to that panic?

When approaching the topic of moral panic, it needs to be remembered that the world is more interconnected than at any point in history, with the creation of the internet and the success of social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and Flicker, amongst others. Fear and distrust, which is the base for moral panic to flourish, cannot be constructed in the same way as, say, in the 1960s, when moral panic theory was developed by thinkers such as Cohen (1972). Cohen presented the
amplification spiral when writing about the development of moral panic and the emergence of folk devils, suggesting that there were three key stages: first, exaggeration and distortion, next, prediction and, finally, symbolisation. All of these stages culminate in a presentation of groups as a threat and something to be feared by society. In a world in which information is shared globally across multiple networks and platforms through the press of a key, one might consider this type of moral panic redundant. However, if moral panic theory is considered within a modern framework as being based more on the attributes of those considered risky, one can still see a progression in the presentation of groups. We can also see that some groups could be considered vulnerable to their presentation within a moral panic due to their membership of a ‘vulnerable’ community in a post-9/11 world. Pisoiu (2013:252) suggests that this perception of vulnerability is due to many Muslims being disadvantaged in comparison to the majority population. ‘Due to their outsider status in western culture they are marginalised, deprived, alienated and suffering from identity crises’.

Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009:37-41) suggest that there are five key elements to consider with modern moral panics. First, there must be a heightened level of concern over the behaviour of a certain group. Second, hostility must develop towards those designated as the enemy of respectful society, and there must be a certain level of consensus that there is a real threat to wider society from the group’s bad behaviour that can be challenged by organised opposition. Third, there must be disproportionality in the public concern, and it must be disproportionate to the perceived threat. Fourth, the statistics must be exaggerated and the existence of harmful behaviours fabricated. Fifth, the panic must be volatile, and even if it lasts
a relatively short period it can re-emerge later. Critcher (2016, xxi) suggests this is the attributional model of moral panics, because the panic is based on attributes which are defining characteristics. I would suggest that Liverpool, like the followers of Islam, has been vulnerable to being framed within a moral panic as a suspect community (Hillyard, 1993). The five core elements of attributional moral panic fit Liverpool and its population, which has arguably been folk devilled, presented as criminal and ultimately framed as suspect by a distortion of facts and negative targeting, a point we will look at in more detail in the next chapter.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, the importance of position concerning the understanding of terminology within policy cannot and should not be underestimated or dismissed. The formation of identity and the formation of an understanding within that identity regarding one’s place and position and one’s acceptance or rejection of the norms within society has to be considered if, as a society, we are going to challenge violent radicalisation. The effect of assumptive legislation and ill-considered terminologies is a point this research will explore, as well as the imbalance concerning the drivers or factors that may influence one’s proclivity for radical action. This research will examine the specific drivers in relation to those groups deemed ‘vulnerable’ by legislation, and it will consider the identification of drivers and ‘vulnerability’ on their sense of self. In addition, this research will be examining the effect on those groups who are feeling the fallout from policy due to ‘unintentional’ suspicion transfer. By going back to basics, this research will draw on the lived experiences of respondents in a city which has a strong identity, has often been forgotten by policy makers in the past, but one which has the capacity to influence the future.
Chapter Three: Liverpool, the Suspect City

Introduction

In the first two chapters, I considered the history of counter-radicalisation legislation and the criticisms that have plagued it. I suggested that counter-radicalisation policy relied on the communities it sought to regulate, whilst at the same time placing them under increased scrutiny by creating a negative frame in which to situate them. I examined the formation of identities within policy assumptions, based on the position and place from which one views those policies. With this in mind, I would suggest that it is important to understand the history of those considered either intentionally or unintentionally within policy, and the position from which they view policy. Any community’s historical tale telling helps create the community narrative (Perks and Thomson, 2015), and being aware of the history of a people and of a place, I would suggest, gives a far more balanced approach to any community research.

Krauss (2005:758) suggests that understanding the epistemological construction of the research is important in order to understand the position of both the subject and the researcher within the research parameters, and also contends that meaning making is generated from data analysis; therefore, understanding positionality is important from the outset. With this in mind, this chapter will look briefly at the history of Liverpool, specifically examining the historical labelling of Liverpudlians and Liverpool’s minority population throughout the 1980s as suspect (Hillyard, 1993).
This research would suggest that it is important to understand how historical policy has impacted on communities within Liverpool in order to understand how modern-day policy is perceived. By examining generationally inherited attitudes through the lens of Hillyard’s suspect communities (1993), the perception of discriminations hidden within policy can be illuminated by discussing historical state-orchestrated racism, and by examining what has changed in Liverpool since the 1980s.

3.1 In my Liverpool Home

Throughout the 1980s, the mistreatment of minority communities in Liverpool seemed to be escalating (see Frost and Phillips, 2011). This mistreatment culminated in civil unrest in 1981. The disturbance in 1981 lasted for nine days, saw hundreds of police and public injured, one man dead, 500 arrested, 70 buildings destroyed and damage estimated at £11m (Liverpool Echo, 2013). However, this was not the first time Liverpool had erupted due to racial inequality or because of sectarian violence. One of the first was reported in 1919 (Bean, 1980), with a number of sectarian riots throughout the decades. In 1972, a race riot fuelled in part by built up discontent was reported in a documentary by Thames Television (1972) which highlighted attitudes from a number of ‘Black’ and ‘white’ locals who expressed their discontent at social conditions. So, was there something different about Liverpudlians that gave them the propensity for ‘radical’ action? Some difference that made them more likely to express their discontent than other cities? Was the presentation of Liverpool and Liverpudlians in some way different? In this next section I will explore how and why this happened.
3.2 Scouse6 Folk Devils: Liverpool 1970s-80s

When considering suspect communities, Mythen and Walklate (2016) suggest that pre-emptive policies target those who fall outside of the mandate of state protection due to their ‘outsider’ status. This outsider status can be created from the way some communities are framed through a variety of mediums and information sources (see Bridge and Watson 2003: 7-9). Boland (2008: 355) contends that, with a city such as Liverpool, this narrative has been developed through different means, including imagery and discourse that has changed through time, such as literature, radio, television, newspapers, internet and films which are all media that influence and affect the construction of meaning (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995). Frosh and Wolfshead (2007:108-113) posit that how places are represented, constructed and imagined is a blend of these representations combined with generations of cultural knowledge. This research seeks to understand these interpretations when considering the perceptions or cultural knowledge of communities concerning counter-radicalisation legislation, as well as the presentation of those communities framed as suspect.

Liverpool as a city has had to challenge deeply entrenched and negative place imagery (Boland 2008: 356) which, coupled with bad publicity, has stereotyped Liverpool and Scousers by symbolically characterising (Avraham, 2000: 369) them as problematic. As Boland (2008: 357) suggests, ‘Liverpool has been stung by its poor image since the 1990s’. I would suggest that this sting far predates the 1990s.

---

6 ‘Scouse’ is a colloquial expression for ‘belonging to Liverpool’. A Scouser is a person from Liverpool.
when accounting for the representation of Scousers during and after the unrest in the early 1980s.

Scraton (2007:28) contends that negativity towards Liverpool was partly due to the negative views of external commentators, which cast a shadow over the city and its people, alongside the historical representation of Scousers as belligerent navvies. The Irish influence in Liverpool and the representation of the Irish as historically suspect has meant that Scousers have commonly been represented as ‘other’ and less than British. High profile disasters involving people from the city, such as Heysel (see Madsen 1992: 634) and Hillsborough (see Scraton, 1999: 10), coupled with the ‘looney left-wingers’ stereotype (see Murden 2006: 469) has reinforced negative characteristics within the wider social lens, not only of a city but of its people. Liverpool could thus be considered a ‘suspect city’, and is therefore well placed to be the base for this research that examines how negative representations, led by top down policy, are perceived by those communities under scrutiny.

**A Historically Diverse City**

Liverpool, as a seafaring city, has always been home to many different races and cultures. Many sailors from around the world have made Liverpool their home through the centuries. But there have been times of great social shifts in Liverpool, and none were as influential as the great famine in Ireland in the 1840s. During this period there was large-scale migration to Liverpool from Ireland, and an analysis of the pre-famine 1841 census reveals that Irish-born people accounted for over 17% of the population in Liverpool. However, by 1851 this figure had risen to over 22% (83,813) of the city’s population. The influx of the Irish continued throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, and by 1930 immigration from Ireland was a
source of discontent within the city, with an estimated 25% of the city born in Ireland (source BBC, History).

Like the historic Irish community, Liverpool’s Black community is also a well-established historic community within the city. It has been described (Costello, 2001: 8) as one of the oldest minority communities in Europe, with some members of the community being able to trace their lineage back for as many as seven generations. The historic Liverpool minority communities were home to the first working Mosque in Britain in 1887, and it was the first place to promote Islam within the community over the next 20 years (Greaves, 2012: 5). Many black and Asian seamen settled in South Liverpool due to the seafaring links with West Africa and the Caribbean during the Atlantic slave trade. Black seamen, soldiers, students and munition workers settled and married non-Black women, and a mixed-race origin community developed, which spans several generations in Liverpool (see Christian, 1995). This historical minority community, described as ‘Liverpool-born Blacks’ (Christian, 1998: 20), has long been characterised as facing significant racial discrimination, which has been described as ‘uniquely horrific’ compared to other Black communities across Britain (Gifford et al, 1989).

Although a diverse city, discrimination has always dogged Liverpool’s communities, from anti-Irish sentiment to racism throughout the 70s and 80s. (Scranton, 2007; Christian, 1998). However, discrimination led by those in power can be highlighted if we examine the then chief constable Kenneth Oxford’s preface in James McClure’s book *Spike Island: Portrait of a Police Division*. Oxford (in McClure, 1980) describes Liverpool in the preface as rumbustious (unruly/boisterous).
Oxford further suggested in his preface to the book that crime in the city was specific to troubled areas. McClure (1980) suggested that Liverpudlians were ‘characteristically’ flawed by an ‘evil streak’ manifested in ‘an astonishing propensity for violence’. McClure interviewed what he described as a ‘softy spoken veteran officer’ who in turn described some of the areas of Liverpool that he might see. The descriptions of the south end of the city, Upper Parliament Street and into what we will refer to as the Princes Park Ward (PPW), give us an example of the way in which minority communities were considered at that time. Language and descriptions, such as ‘jungle behaviours’ and ‘jungle noises’, were used alongside ‘black people country’ to describe minorities and minority-rich areas. This indicates that there was a level of dehumanisation occurring within the narrative. This dehumanisation, presenting non-whites as savage, seemed acceptable within the police service at that time, given the backing of the work by the Chief Constable. The presentation of a minority-rich community is one of the reasons that this area is considered within this research, as it is the most diverse area in Liverpool according to the current census data.

This assault by the police service as a whole and the over-policing of minorities alongside the other residents of areas such as Speke Garston Ward (SGW) and Princes Park Ward (PPW) can be seen in the response to questioning by a local resident, Margret Simey, in 1981 (in Scraton, 2007: 26). Ms Simey commented on the police treatment of local inhabitants, saying that no one was safe after 10pm on the streets of Liverpool 8.

The tensions that arose during the 1970s and 80s in Liverpool were fuelled in part by what is now widely accepted as the over-policing of marginalised communities
(Cooper, 1985: Lea and Young, 1982: Waller, 1981a, 1981). The police often targeted Black and mixed-race community (BMR) members for special attention, but many of the non-Black residents of socially deprived areas such as PPW and SGW faced constant harassment. During a BBC Nationwide programme in 1980, presented to reassure the local community that the police force in Liverpool was not racist, the Liverpool Chief Constable, Kenneth Oxford, spoke about the ‘problem’ of mixed-race community members, describing them as the product of Black seamen and white prostitutes. He went on to comment that many half-caste children had done the rounds of homes and institutions, ‘they gradually realise they are nothing and outside of recognized society’ (Scraton 2007:26).

Scraton (2007) suggests that Oxford’s statement reflected the attitudes of police officers interviewed for the story, and that it gave credibility to the claims of implicit police racism and the crude, reductionist stereotyping of local communities. During the 1980s, a ‘new racism’ was suggested by Barker (1981: 23), which had a cultural top-down basis, stemming from the right-wing Tory policies of the Thatcher regime. He suggested that it was a fusion of nationalism and xenophobia, articulated through a ‘common sense’ political understanding in what he describes as a ‘particularly pernicious bland of pseudo-biological culturalism’. Alongside what Anderson (1983) described as an ‘imagined community’, minority groups in the UK were experiencing state rejection. Like the young Muslims of the UK today, the silencing of questioning voices could have potentially serious consequences for national cohesiveness and security.

In 1980, the Merseyside Area Profile Group submitted evidence to the 1980 Home Affairs Committee on Racial Disadvantage. They warned that police harassment
and aggression towards Black youths had escalated, although the chief constable denied this and stated that relations were ‘in a very healthy position’ and that he did not foresee any future problems. It was unsurprising, then, that in 1981 Liverpool’s communities were involved in over a month of serious civil disturbances (Ben-Tovim, 1988). Criticisms of the police by the L8 defence committee called for the resignation of Oxford, who had dismissed the rioters as:

A crowd of Black hooligans intent on making life unbearable and indulging in criminal activities (Frost and Phillips, 2012: 40).

Scraton (2007: 25) however suggests that, rather than base criminality, the unrest could be considered as an uprising or resilience against endemic racism and as a resistance to an unjust state, contending:

Its depiction as ‘riot-fuelled’… deflected attention from the recent history of endemic racism. It failed to explain that in ‘taking on the police’ many in the black community were embarking on a reasoned response to free themselves of unacceptable differential policing (Scraton, 2007: 25).

During the events of 6th July to 15th August 1981, 781 officers were injured, 214 police vehicles were damaged and £6 million of property was damaged (Waller, 1981a: 344). In PPW 320 people were arrested, one man was killed and another seriously injured when a police Land Rover was driven at speed onto the pavement. The chief constable had warned that ‘law-abiding citizens should get off the streets’, which effectively identified anyone who did not stay in their homes as a criminal and made them subject to police brutalities. CS gas was also used for the first time
on British citizens by the police service in Liverpool, and the use of ‘barrier–
penetrating’ projectiles saw four more people seriously injured. The chief constable
subsequently accepted that the cartridges fired ‘were of a type not designed for use
in a public order situation’ (Evidence to the Scarman Inquiry, 1981: 6).

The subsequent report into the causes for unrest in Brixton had been extended to
include other cities such as Liverpool by Lord Scarman (1981). Scarman did not
apportion blame onto police officers or the police service per se, but he did identify
a number of problems that had exacerbated an already volatile social environment
(see Appendix 9).

The Report stated that allegations that the police are the oppressive arm of a racist
state not only displayed a complete ignorance of the constitutional arrangements of
controlling the police, it was an injustice to the senior officers of the force. When
giving evidence to the Scarman Inquiry regarding the disturbances in Liverpool the
then Chief Constable Oxford portrayed the community in Liverpool 8 as
pathologically criminal (1981: 28). When describing Liverpudlians in general he
used phrases such as ‘aggressive nature’ and ‘belligerent attitude’. Oxford also
blamed the unrest on the large-scale immigration of Irish to the city and the
influence of foreign nationals within the local communities. The parallels in the
representation of minority communities as other, and the fear of the foreign
exhibited by Oxford during the 1980s, is strikingly similar, I would suggest, to the
presentation of Muslim communities today alongside the fear of immigration. The
framing of the foreign as a negative force within society is once again high on the
political agenda, given the historic British vote to leave the European Union. The
fear of the foreign has once again seen a rise in hate crime against those members of society considered foreign, and the linking of race to identify the ‘foreign’.

Scraton (2007) suggested that this time was challenging for those communities targeted, who were presented as morally degenerate, their communities presented as a breeding ground for criminality. There was a brutal reality for the BME community in Liverpool, being the butt of white racism in both government practices and legislation which filtered down to the general population. Scraton further contests that not only did the state fail to provide reasonable living conditions for inner city communities, but that the laws were enforced differently on inner city streets. The use of saturation policing and special task force units encouraged an aggressive, siege-like mindset within policing, he argues:

Offensive methods emerged and consolidated as force policy elevated racism from personnel to an institutional level. However visible in policing, institutional racism permeated all state agencies, corporate bodies and private enterprise (Scraton, 2007:29).

Unsworth (1982:67) suggests that there was an accentuation of ‘creeping authoritarianism’ at the time that eroded liberal policing. This was due to the centralisation, militarisation, intensification and politicisation of policing during that time. As suggested in Chapter One (Omand 2012, 2010), the militarisation of the ‘terror problem’ has seen the introduction of terminologies that create a militaristic approach to thinking about terrorism/radicalisation. Counter-terrorism/radicalisation policy, and the policing of terrorism/radicalisation, I would suggest, are causing the pressures which saw dissent and reaction from the communities within Liverpool and throughout Britain in the 1980s. This would
mean that once again government policy that isolates communities based on suspicion, coupled with austerity, is dangerously positioned.

Continuing throughout the 1980s there were a number of civil disturbances in Liverpool and numerous allegations of police harassment were made to the Police Committee chairperson, Councillor Margret Simey. The introduction of the police operational support division (OSD) in Liverpool, and their use of unmarked vehicles, saw a rise in aggressive and racist policing. Scraton, who was researching in Liverpool during the 1980s, suggests that there was:

Aggressive and racist policing against Black people in the city centre; the use of unreasonable force in evicting Black demonstrators from City Council meetings; selective searches of ‘Black only’ properties … the stereotyping of Black people as criminals, despite Scarman initiatives in training (Scraton, 2007: 30).

Allegations of police abuse and misconduct were repeated a number of times to the City Council, and Councillor Simey recorded her concern that there was a consistency of allegations against the police. After a disturbance in 1985, the Liverpool Archbishop Warlock and the Bishop of Liverpool David Sheppard wrote to Councillor Simey about police (OSD) behaviour towards residents of Liverpool 8. They stated that they had:

…cordoned off the areas and sent in large numbers of riot police and armoured vehicles… and there seems to have been mounting anger at this show of force … the price seems to have been high in damaging
the good relations built up through community policing in recent years (Scraton, 2007: 31).

As a teenager and young woman growing up in Liverpool 8, I myself experienced abuse from OSD officers during this time period, with monkey noises shouted out the windows of police vans when I was with non-‘white’ family members. During this time, it was not just Black and minority communities that were affected by negative profiling or just the community in Liverpool 8. Exemplified by the comments by Oxford, the Liverpool Irish communities were also targeted and negatively stereotyped. The growth of out-of-town estates such as Speke, in 1932, or Kirby, saw many communities with a high density of Irish families settle together, which once again caused tensions to rise within those communities due to sectarianism, this having been a problem throughout Liverpool’s Irish history (Jenkins, 2010). Part of the justification for the use of Liverpool 8 and 24 has been the historical narratives associated with both areas. Each area has been affected by negative discourses and representations, both are economically similar with similar class variance and both have faced downturns in living conditions and prosperity, especially during the 1970s and 80s.

As a child, my own grandmother told me tales about the discrimination she had faced being poor and Irish in the Dingle in Liverpool (PPW), and my mother, who was born in Speke (SGW) when my Grandmother moved there during the Second World War, also recounted tales of discrimination due to her Irish heritage. Unlike Liverpool 8, Speke is a relatively new community, as until the 1930s it was only a very small locally-owned village. The development of Speke in 1932 as a ‘garden estate’ meant that it was considered a prosperous area at that time, with limited
unemployment and social deprivation, unlike Liverpool 8. However, Speke suffered a rapid decline in prosperity in the post-war period and soon faced its own social problems, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. The primary goal of this research is to examine the perception of policy by those groups directly or indirectly affected by it. The study aims to specifically ask participants who may feel targeted due to their characteristics and social situations what they think of policy. What do participants think about the counter-radicalisation policy? What do they think about the drivers identified in Prevent, and do they feel that the policy has affected them personally or their community?

Understanding how policy construction has been interwoven with the historical perceptions about Liverpool and its people is therefore, I would suggest, critical to understanding modern day perceptions. One could ask, have the lessons of the past been learnt by policy makers and have old grievances been considered? This research would suggest the answer is no, as Pantazis and Pemberton (2009 and 2011) contend that Britain has seen a new suspect community emerge post 9/11. The new Irish, the new Black, the new targets for suspicion in a never-ending cycle of accusation and reaction. So what are the historical impacts of behaviours such as this on the current residents of Liverpool? The tales of police behaviour have arguably permeated into the community narrative, becoming a shared history, a point, again, we will address in more detail throughout the analysis chapters.

Policing: the Wider Context Post-1980s

Moving forward in time ten years, the denial of Scarman that there was institutional racism within the British police forces was challenged after the death of teenager Stephen Lawrence and the treatment of his family in the wake of his murder. In
April 1993, Stephen Lawrence was killed in a racist attack, and the police, during the initial investigation, refused to accept that the murder was racially motivated. Institutional stereotyping of Stephen Lawrence based on his race and failings in the subsequent investigation allowed known named suspects to dispose of evidence and establish alibis. In 1997 a verdict of unlawful killing was found at a coroner’s inquest, with an added rider that Stephen had been the victim of an unprovoked racist attack by five white youths. In July 1997, the Home Secretary Jack Straw appointed Macpherson (1999) to:

Inquire into the matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence ….to identify the lessons to be learned for the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crime (Macpherson, 1999: 6).

The Macpherson report was thorough in its analysis of the treatment of the Lawrence family and the investigation into the murder of the teenager. It identified a number of failings within the Metropolitan Police, and although the Police Commissioner denied institutional racism within the police service, Macpherson disagreed. Macpherson (1999: 321) defined institutional racism as:

A collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to peoples because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin.

He further identified that the presence of this institutional racism could:

be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance,
thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people (Macpherson, 1999: 321).

With 70 recommendations, the Macpherson report highlighted that very little had changed in policing attitudes since Scarman, over ten years before. Macpherson insisted that the incompetence could only be explained by ‘pernicious and persistent institutional racism’ (Hall, 1999: 187). Nonetheless, while Macpherson was acclaimed as ‘far-sighted’ and ‘radical’ with his findings into the death of Stephen Lawrence, he still defended police policy and placed all the responsibility for the failings on a culture of institutionalised racist practices and the practices of individual police officers. However, Macpherson did confirm ‘institutional racism’ across police practices. Scraton (2007) suggests this was a limited explanation, suggesting that policy also shaped practices:

> Institutionalised racism, however, is more profound… racism which is prevalent within ideology, underpinning policies, priorities and practices within institutions, rather than solely an expression of an institution’s policies, priorities and practices (Scraton, 2007: 36).

A report by Bowling and Phillips (2007) suggested that attitudes concerning society and the police service have not evolved over the last 30 years. The criminalisation of minority communities based on an assumption of deviance remained entrenched. They argue:

> Research evidence shows that while the extent to which ethnic minorities are accepted and represented in British society has transformed over the past three decades, racist beliefs, xenophobic
attitudes and racial prejudices remain widespread … stereotypes are commonly used by police officers to classify people on the basis of their ethnic origin…black people were believed to be prone to violent crime and drug abuse, incomprehensible, suspicious… lacking brainpower…

(Bowling and Phillips, 2007: 954)

If we once again consider the drivers and the criteria of vulnerability in Prevent we can see that a stereotyping of ‘the poorer’ members of society has played its part in the creation of targeted communities. Arguably this targeting of ‘poorer’ people affects minority communities more so than non-minorities, given that social deprivation can be directly linked with minority status (Institute of Race Relations). The importance of breaking the cycle of labelling should not be underestimated, given lessons from the past.

However, the treatment of the Black, mixed-race and Irish communities within Liverpool by the police is only part of the Liverpool story. The way central government has framed Liverpool as a city also has to be considered if we are to present a rounded picture of the challenges faced by the respondents in this research. The impact of city-wide negative targeting has had an unforeseen consequence: this research would suggest it helped to create a unique ‘scouse’ identity, one which was quick to defend itself and challenged dominant representations

3.3 The Resilient City: the Creation of a Fortress Mentality

Throughout the next part of this chapter I will be looking at the effect of central government on the communities targeted within Liverpool. I will examine the way in which Liverpool was constructed as a ‘city under attack’ from central
government, and the emergence of what this research would describe as a fortress mentality throughout the 70s and 80s, due to Liverpool being framed as suspect.

**Financial Insecurities**

In the 1980s the City of Liverpool teetered on the brink of financial bankruptcy. Parkinson (1988: 110) suggests that this bankruptcy was ‘symptomatic of a much deeper national economic, political and policy failure’ from central government. But I would suggest that the bankruptcy of Liverpool was not simply due to the city's financial crisis, but due to the framing of a city and its population as problematic by central government, and their decision to challenge that problem. A new grant regime introduced by the Conservative government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in order to streamline national spending was, like the austerity measures under the current government, particularly damaging to Liverpool. Liverpool City Council has always been one of the city’s biggest employers, and under the new grant system the council was faced with cutting public services and imposing massive job losses. A period of intense local ideological disputes and a chaotic political response to the city's financial decline all added to the challenge faced by the city.

The emergence of the Liberal Party in Liverpool in the 1970s saw the Labour Party and the Conservative Party challenged over budgets and resulted in bitter arguments and political infighting, which dominated the city for over a decade (see Parkinson, 1988). By 1973/4 the residents of Liverpool were paying 45% higher than national average rates for their homes. By 1978 these high rate charges had fallen by only 1% (Parkinson 1988: 112) and, although the rates were high, the city failed to keep pace with inflation and the city’s expenditure fell behind other local authorities.
Over a decade of financial turmoil culminated in 1985 with central government taking control of the city’s finances and setting tax limits for the authority. The grant system which allocated monies based on the population of a city was seen as unfair, as Liverpool had had a sharp population decline from 850,000 to 490,000 over the previous 30 years (Parkinson 1988: 114). This meant that it was virtually impossible to cut the city’s spending as quickly as the grant system required. Due to the failure of local infrastructure and its delivery because of local financial conditions, economic deprivation was high. Spending cuts directly affected those communities who had the least, and added to an already volatile situation within Liverpool’s poorest communities.

The impact on Liverpool’s poorest was huge, and to place the figures into perspective, prior to the Thatcher government’s new grant regime almost 63% of the city’s revenue was funded by central government. 37% of that had been raised through rates, which had taken the burden off the city’s failing economy and population. After 1983, the government contribution to Liverpool had fallen to 44%, which meant that rates now had to make up the shortfall. This burden was shouldered by individual households and businesses, who saw an increase in local rates from 9% to 17%. Many families, already under financial strain due to the lack of work opportunities in the city, struggled to make ends meet. The increase in rates, however, was still not enough to plug the hole left by central government, and a period of ‘creative accounting’ simply transferred the deficit to the next year’s accounts, and so a cycle of debt was ingrained into the city (see Parkinson, 1988; Mannin, 1987).
Throughout this period, the city’s Labour councillors refuse to balance the books, and presented central government with a second budget. Despite the expenditure target set by government of £222 million for 1985/86, the council had budgeted to spend £265 million. The budget crisis carried on through 1985, ’86 and ’87, with a standoff between Liverpool’s city council, central government and its unions. The Labour Party who were in power in Liverpool delayed setting a central budget, and rejected the government’s rate capping legislation. They refused to set the city’s rates, which culminated in the District Auditor bringing proceedings against the councillors in court, a case which they lost at both the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The councillors’ defence was they had held out in the hope that central government would not want to see a city bankrupt and would provide extra money to plug the city’s financial holes. This of course did not happen; Liverpool lost the financial fight with central government and its councillors were expelled from office.

During the post-war, period Britain had remained a relatively harmonious country with very little civil disobedience. However, this was set to change under Thatcher (Benyon and Solomos, 1988: 402). Led from the top down, Liverpool had challenged central government and the cuts by stating that, as a city, its leaders would reject any policy they believed to be unfair. As a city it had lost the fight, and local government had been made an example of by central government, arguably ingraining, at least within the political landscape, a ‘them and us’ position between Liverpool and Westminster. In 2015 it was revealed the level at which Liverpool’s future was discussed by Thatcher and her ministers during the 1980s. Government files released under the 30 years rule showed that ministers were
encouraged to allow a managed decline of Liverpool after the 1981 disturbances. Although Thatcher had enrolled Michael Heseltine very publicly as Minister for Liverpool in order to kick-start urban renewal, behind the scenes there was a different approach towards Liverpool and Merseyside as a whole. In correspondence between Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe, Liverpool’s future was considered, the population was described as problematic and options were discussed. Howe acknowledged the suggestion that the city could be handled and a ‘managed decline’ was considered. The letter further revealed that the government had to be careful in how they phrased the managed decline, as it was potentially explosive. Howe suggested that the argument should be presented in a more positive light, saying ‘this is not a term for use, even privately. It is much too negative’. Howe questioned the wisdom of sending Mr Heseltine to Liverpool, as it was a stony ground to place the seeds of recovery. He suggested:

It would be even more regrettable if some of the brighter ideas for renewing economic activity were to be sown only on relatively stony ground on the banks of the Mersey…I cannot help feeling that the option of managed decline is one which we should not forget altogether. We must not expend all our limited resources in trying to make water flow uphill (BBC, 2011).

The stage had been set during the 1980s with a decrease in social mobility, a loss of benefits, an increase in punitive policing policies and a targeting of Liverpool’s poorest communities. Drawing parallels between now and then, the current austerity measures, an increase in police powers and the framing of some minority
communities, specifically Muslims, as other, is, I would suggest, once again setting the stage for decades of uncertainty.

3.4 The Communities under Study

As a researcher born and raised in Liverpool 8, and having made my home in Liverpool 24 for 20 years, my experience of growing up during the 1970s and 80s in a multi-faith and multi-racial family inspired me to challenge assumptions and stereotyping. Watching events unfold over the last two decades, I began to believe that there had been a shift in focus of suspicion from the Black community to the Muslim community (see Ali, 2016). I have chosen to study Liverpool 8 and 24 for a number of reasons, both pragmatic and personal. Liverpool 8 is an area of historical Black settlement, and although Liverpool 24 shares a similar class base to Liverpool 8, it is racially very different from Liverpool 8, with a higher number of people identifying themselves as minorities in L8 than the national average, and a lower number of people in L24 then the national average.

Liverpool City Council vehemently denied the findings of the Gifford Report when, in 1989, it labelled Liverpool a racist city. Since then there have been a number of community initiatives created to help alleviate BME social exclusion within the city. However, it has been suggested by Christian (1998:26) that the only people to have benefited from the ‘stop-start piecemeal projects’ have been the bureaucrats. Amongst the initiatives aimed at breaking the cycle of poverty in Liverpool have been urban renewal, community development programmes, the Liverpool Inner Area Study, the Merseyside Task Force, the City Challenge and Poverty.
Princes Park Ward (PPW) Liverpool 8

The first area I will consider is the Princes Park Census Ward (PPW), which is within the boundary of Liverpool 8. Although there have been a number of initiatives, including ‘training for long-term unemployed, young people and those at risk of being excluded from work’, the PPW is one of the most socially deprived areas in Liverpool, with high rates of unemployment. However, Christian (1998: 27), having previously considered funding opportunities within Liverpool, suggests that often the time scale and criteria for accessing funding by local community projects has been, in many cases, so intricate that many possible initiatives have been overlooked. This has been problematic for those communities in need, given that the social status of poorer areas has meant they would have met the funding criteria had they had help in applying. As of 2016, the Granby and Toxteth Development Trust (GTDT) was one of the few remaining voluntary organisations within PPW, in Lodge Lane. Lodge Lane is the area I concentrated on when collecting respondents, as it is centrally located within PPW. I will discuss this in further detail in the chapter on methods.

The GTDT currently provides free access to the internet and volunteers to help service users access internet facilities. In 2011, the funding to the GTDT was cut by over a third by local government, which has directly impacted on its ability to be effective. The cuts limited the GTDT’s ability to provide basic necessities such as paper for printing or pens. An insider within the GTDT told me that without these facilities most of the service users would not be able to access government websites in order to search for jobs, as there is no local Job Centre (the nearest is in High Park Street), One Stop Shop (the nearest in Park Road) or local Library (the nearest
in Windsor Street) as they have all been closed due to the reallocation of funding. Without transportation or money for bus fares, this leaves many residents without access to the internet and unable to meet the government’s job-seeking targets in order to receive their benefits.

In 2013 the British benefit system was transferred to an electronic base, and users were encouraged to search for jobs online, to make benefit claims online as well as to chase up and dispute claims online. The assumption by government that all communities have access to the internet is contested, and it has been suggested that it leaves poorer communities excluded due to a lack of available facilities. A report by the Citizens Advice Service Scotland (Anderson, Gijon and Whalley, 2015) found that in many instances poorer communities were being penalised for not having access to the internet due to the closure of local services and libraries. In their report, ‘Internet Access in Glasgow’s Deprived Areas’, their research showed instances of people being penalised at the Jobcentre for not applying for jobs online. This was even found to have happened when people had applied for jobs in writing or by phone due to their inability to use a computer (Anderson, Gijon and Whalley 2015: 37).

The report suggests that poorer communities who are in need of local government services are being denied the services which enable them to receive the benefits on which they survive. Anderson and Whalley (2015: 521) also suggest that the closure of libraries which enabled poorer communities to access the internet has impacted on them significantly, increasing social inequality and disadvantage by removing access to education. There have of course also been a number of studies which have
identified the intersection between race and social inequality, poor health and a lack of social mobility (Troyna, 2012; Laurence, 2009).

A lack of progress concerning initiatives to encourage more racial diversity in positions of influence during the years since the Gifford report can be exemplified by the distinct lack of Black leaders in positions of power on the city council. Boyle and Charles (2011) found that despite rhetoric about policy initiatives from Liverpool City Council, which is still the city’s largest employer, it had failed to equalise the Black/white disparity within the council workforce to a ‘nationally normal level’ (Nelson, 2000; 216). Race, it would seem, may still be a hindrance in gaining employment. A report for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2015) found that:

Poverty does not affect all ethnic groups equally, with ethnic minority groups more likely to experience poverty than the majority White group (Catney and Sabater, 2015: 5).

Speke Garston Ward (SGW) Liverpool 24

The second community under consideration in this research is Speke, identified in this research as the Speke Garston Ward (SGW). Speke is the most southerly community within the boundary of Liverpool and is one of the oldest parts of Liverpool, having been mentioned in the Doomsday Book in 1086. Its name is derived from the word ‘spec’, meaning brushwood, as the area was primarily wooded, later to be turned into rich farm land. The parish of Speke itself was owned privately from 1795 to 1922 by the Watt family, who sold the land to the Liverpool Corporation in 1928 for development into a self-sufficient ‘garden city’, which
became part of the county borough of Liverpool when the first phase was built in 1932. Seen originally as a middle/upper-working class development, Speke saw a fast industrial rise until the 1970s, with the Triumph car plant, the Bryant and May match factory and a cluster of pharmaceutical companies. However, there was an equally fast decline during the 1970s and 80s, when many of these companies closed and Speke was left as a ghost town. When the index of Multiple Deprivation was published in 2000, Speke was one of the most deprived wards in England. There were few facilities in Speke, with limited shops and even more limited work opportunities.

Unlike PPW, which had an historically established Black and mixed-heritage community, Speke was, and is, a primarily ‘white’ population, originally formed from Irish Protestant skilled labour during the 1930s. However, even though the community was primarily ‘white’, the Irish/Irish mixed-heritage community has been described as facing a similar type of discrimination as the Black community in Liverpool (Belchem, 1999). Belchem suggests that there was a representation of the Irish as an underclass, even though they sought socio-economic integration. Moving out of Liverpool’s inner-city communities to suburbs such as Speke, the Irish middle classes sought to disconnect from the presentation of them as ‘navvies’:

An underclass unable, unwilling or unsuited to take advantage of opportunities but unlike the Black/Mixed-race communities there was an Irish middle class who were a longer-established and mainly Protestant mercantile presence who sought socio-economic integration in the more desirable residential areas of suburban Merseyside (Belcham, 1999: 131).
These Irish middle-class workers were some of the first residents in Speke who moved from ghettoised areas in Liverpool 8, Vauxhall and Scotland Road that had been home to large numbers of Irish, both skilled and unskilled. The unskilled Catholic Irish labourers, or ‘navvies’, largely remained in those areas. However, as I have said, by the mid-1980s Speke was far from the middle-class haven it was built to be, having high unemployment, limited facilities and suffering from antisocial behaviour. I first moved to Speke in 1999, as it was one of the cheapest areas in Liverpool to buy a house. By the new millennium things had not improved and in early 2000 there were a number of antisocial incidents on local buses that saw Mersey Transport Limited (MTL), the bus company at the time which serviced Speke, refuse to send buses into the estate. Working for MTL at the time, I was witness to a number of driver assaults and attacks on local buses, and with a reduction in access to the Speke estate the area saw little hope for improvement.

Nonetheless, since the turn of the century Speke has seen a positive shift in prosperity due to an increase in job opportunities linked to the building of a new shopping outlet. The opening of the New Mersey Shopping Park in the late 90s saw huge investment in 2000 and the creation of over 1000 new jobs in the area (source: newmerseyshoppingparkplans.com). A new multi-million pound Morrisons Store and trading estate created over 400 new jobs, plus the take over and rebranding of the Ford car factory by Jaguar Land Rover not only protected the current workforce but also created a further 1000 new positions (source: jaguarlandrover.com).

Notwithstanding the positives (more job prospects, new housing developments and a better chance of social mobility in the area) once again Liverpool, specifically Speke this time, was presented negatively by government. Instead of celebrating
the strides taken in the area to tackle poverty and antisocial behaviour, Tory minister Chris Grayling likened Speke to the crime-ridden streets of Baltimore depicted in the American TV series *The Wire* (O’Keefe, 2009). The negative stereotyping of the Speke community was criticised by local residents in interviews to *The Echo*, the city’s local newspaper. Locals were reported in the local paper as being disgusted at the negative stereotyping of their community as criminal and they openly challenged the minister’s representation. Once again, there was a top-down misrepresentation of both Liverpool and Liverpudlians. The increase in social mobility afforded through access to more job opportunities seemed to have done little to dispel a negative representation of Liverpudlians as criminal.

Liverpool, a seafaring city, has always had a large minority population, whether Black seamen in the seventeenth century, Chinese settlers in the eighteenth, Irish settlers in the nineteenth or Polish settlers in the twentieth. This accumulated mongrel identity has been constructed within the boundaries of Liverpool, and I would suggest the numbers of settlers who made the city their home makes Liverpool unique. I also contend that this uniqueness is also true in its defiance towards central government, and it is this defiance which has helped feed the Scouse identity. Since beginning this research, there have been a number of revelations that have given weight to the suggestion that Liverpool and Scousers have been misrepresented within the British society from the top down. From the release of documents and letters between Thatcher and Howe, to the findings of the Hillsborough inquiry, the vilification of a city and its people seems finally becoming unearthed.
So how has the presentation of Liverpool affected Liverpudlians? The creation of identity is in part based on how an individual or a group is presented, how they interpret places, their personnel experiences, plus a variety of processes and information sources (Bridge and Wilson, 2004: 8). As this research is interested in the part policy and the presentation of risk plays in affecting identity and the sense of self, understanding how Scousers are presented seems an interesting starting point. Hall (2003: 192) suggests that there are different narratives presented within society and communities which change over time. These narratives include radio, television, newspapers, internet and films, amongst others. MacRobbie and Thornton (1995: 561) suggest that the media, for example, play a role in ‘constructing meanings’ about places and people. This construction then has the ability to change, distort and construct understanding. They further suggest that the media are ‘not separate from society’: rather, ‘social reality is experienced through language, communication and imagery’ (1995: 570). So how have Scousers been framed within British social reality?

Arguably, one of the most positive aspects of cultural knowledge surrounding Scousers is their sense of humour. Murden (2006: 423) suggests that Liverpool and Scousers have developed a ‘long-standing reputation for humour- the scouser being, according to legend, the one with all the backchat and jokes’. Television programmes such as *The Liver Birds*, or *Boys from the Black Stuff* with comedy characters such as the crazed Yosser Hughes, have all added to the cheeky-chappy representation of Scousers. The music scene of the 1960s, with Beatlemania and the Liverpool sound, again have added to positivity around Scousers and Liverpool. However, one might suggest that this positive representation of Liverpool was
challenged throughout the 1980s when a government went to war with a city, a point we have discussed earlier in this chapter. Not only did the government attempt to ‘manage a decline’ of the city, but the population of Liverpool was vilified at its most vulnerable time, when on 15th April 1989 96 Liverpool football fans lost their lives, and a city stood in shock.

Due to the cover-up by South Yorkshire Police revealed by the subsequent inquiry, I, together with Liverpool football fans, would argue that the people of Liverpool were presented negatively by the press and by government. The media presentation of the events that day were epitomised by The Sun’s infamous ‘Truth’ article, in which it inaccurately reported that Liverpool football ‘yobs’ had caused the disaster due to their drunken behaviour. There seemed, at the time, a common thread running through the media of loutish Liverpudlians (Scraton 1999:10), and of the population as being suspect. Over the next 25 years, the presentation of Liverpudlians as happy, cheeky chappies was being eroded into a more negative one (Boland, 2008). After a 25-year campaign by the families of the dead and the city of Liverpool, in April 2016 the truth finally emerged about the events. The Hillsborough inquest ruled that the 96 fans had been unlawfully killed. Not only that, but the inquiry also found that police actions had contributed to the deaths, and it vindicated the fans and the bereaved families, who campaigned against the police’s efforts to blame supporters for the tragedy.

A further example of the representation of Liverpudlians comes from statements by the Conservative MP Boris Johnson, the former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. He demonstrated the negative attitude in comments he made in the Spectator magazine (2004) cited in Boland (2008: 364). Johnson
criticised the city’s expression of grief over the beheading of Liverpool hostage Ken Bigley in Iraq as inappropriate, saying it was ‘disproportionate grief’. Johnson went on to describe the ‘deeply unattractive psyche’ among locals. He contended that Liverpudlians had a penchant for ‘wallowing in their victim status... [and] shared sense of tribal grievance’. Once again, Liverpudlians were presented as dramatic moaners, empathically attaching to others’ misfortunes and imagined wrongs. It should be asked whether, had Liverpudlians/Scousers not been considered suspect and the presentation of them had not been so negative, would they still be thought of as moaners or sympathetic? Had the population of, say, Cambridge come out in support and solidarity of a murdered child of their city, would the narrative be the same?

3.5 Suspect City?

When considering suspect communities, Mythen and Walklate (2016) suggest that pre-emptive policies target those who fall outside of the mandate of state protection due to their outside status. Outsider status, therefore, could be created from the way some communities are framed through a variety of mediums and information sources (see Bridge and Watson 2003: 7-9). Boland (2008:355) contends that, with a city such as Liverpool, this narrative was developed through different ways, including through imagery and discourse that changes through time, such as literature, radio, television, newspapers, internet and films, all mediums that influence and affect the construction of meaning (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995). How, therefore, places are represented, constructed and imagined is determined by a blend of these representations, combined with generations of cultural knowledge (Frosh and Wolfshead, 2007: 108-113).
So, has the misrepresentation of Liverpool as a ‘suspect city’ changed following the release of information from the government between Thatcher and Howe, or the Hillsborough findings? After the results of the European referendum, Liverpool was once again thrust negatively into the spotlight when it was accused of rioting on the BBC’s *Question Time* programme because of the referendum result. During the programme a member of the audience who claimed to live outside of Liverpool (Preston) told the panel that there had been wide-scale riots in Liverpool after the results of the referendum were revealed (Weston, 2016). The audience member told other members of the audience and panel that throughout Liverpool there had been clashes between right-wing and left-wing factions. Even though there had been no reports in the press of these supposed riots, none of the panel challenged the legitimacy of the claims. The willingness of not only the members of the panel, who included MP Douglas Carswell, shadow Foreign Secretary Emily Thornberry and the host David Dimbleby, but also of the audience to accept this claim, I suggest, indicates an automatic assumption that it was true. Negativity about Liverpool and Liverpudlians once again was going unchallenged.

Although a television programme is not representative of British society, I would suggest it does indicate that the negative stereotyping of Liverpool is still ingrained in British culture. Whether it is Harry Enfield’s Scouser wigs and moustaches, which are still on sale nearly 30 years after his sketch show, or jokes about not leaving your car in Liverpool because the wheels will be stolen, Liverpool has been presented as criminal. Somehow outside of society, this presentation has itself forced Liverpudlians to either embrace their unique city-wide identity, to fight to challenge that perception, or to take on injustice, as in the case of the Hillsborough
campaign. As both a Scouser and a researcher, I would argue that Liverpool has done both, and in this struggle has created a unique city and population, making it an interesting place to investigate the effects of policy.
Chapter Four: Policy, Place and People

Methodology Introduction: The Dilemma of an Insider / Outsider Status

The choice to research in Liverpool was a deeply personal one, which stemmed from a lifetime of experiences growing up in Liverpool as a member of a mixed-race and mixed-faith family. The dilemma of being an insider/outsider, however, is something which needs reflection.

Sherif (2001:436) suggests that there has been an emerging crisis within the social sciences, as traditional post-positive and positivist forms of research have been challenged by the emergence of critical ethnography. Understanding boundaries, and balancing them with the development of rapport, means that determining whether it is more productive to have an insider or outsider status is more important than at any point in research previously. Richardson (1991: 173) observed that at the core of any sensibility was doubt that any discourse has a privileged position, and that any theory or methodology has a universal claim to authority. This being said, it is debatable whether the end of the days of producing value-free ‘objective’ (Sherif, 2001:436) research is necessarily a bad thing. Whatever one’s position, there is a consensus amongst researchers now that reflexivity and boundary maintenance is important (Berger, 2015).

As part of both communities, Greene (2014:1) suggests that, as qualitative researchers, our status determines how we perceive information. How we understand the narrative as part of a shared community is inevitably influenced by our insider or our outsider status. However, Carling, Bivand and Ezzati (2013: 36)
suggest that simply defining an insider/outsider status is not adequate to determine the influence of that status, and suggest a more nuanced approach to positionality.

In the last chapter I discussed the importance of the process of reflection. In this chapter I will examine not only my position as the researcher, but also the choice of research design. Further, I elaborate the coding process, showing examples of that process by placing some of the statements in context. I will also describe the pilot study, which is the basis for this study and will examine the opinions of non-Muslim minorities with reference to the three core research questions:

- **How much do non-Muslim minorities know about the Prevent (2011) strategy and counter-radicalisation policy in general?**
- **What do the respondents in the two areas under consideration think about the identification of drivers within Prevent policy?**
- **Do the respondents believe they have ever been affected by counter-radicalisation policy such as Prevent, and if so what impact has that had on them and their communities?**

The questions were constructed using the information gained during the pilot study (Peatfield, 2012) and were derived from statements and assumptions made in Prevent. As I discussed in Chapter One, Prevent, as a constituent part of CONTEST, claims that drivers of radicalisation have been identified as influencing an individual’s propensity for radicalisation and radical behaviour. Arguably, these same drivers or factors have long been associated with criminality, such as social deprivation, age and a disassociation from the state (Bridges, 2012).
4.1 Reflecting on Position, People and Place

Berger (2015) suggests that it is critical for a researcher to reflect on their position before engaging in research. My experiences of growing up in Liverpool as part of a multi-race and multi-faith family in the 1970s and 80s have influenced the type of research topic I have chosen, as well as the areas I have chosen to consider within the research. Richardson (2000) considers self-reflection, the consideration of the choice of research topic alongside why and how one decided the topic, as well as the choice of research design, an important exercise, suggesting:

I consider writing, as a method of inquiry, a way of finding out about a topic... form and content are inseparable (2000: 92).

Presumptions and Positionality

When considering one’s philosophical position, C Wright Mills (2000) suggests that, as an exercise, it can allow the researcher to consider why they are engaging in research and what drives them. However, he also suggests that philosophical musings are not the whole sum of research and that it may be better to spend time allowing the research some imagination and creativity to answer questions, saying:

Awareness of it enables us to become more conscious of our conceptions and our procedures, and to clarify them. It provides a language with which we can do these things. But its use ought to be of a general nature; no working social scientist need take any such model very seriously and above all, we ought to take it as a liberation of our imagination and a source of suggestion for our procedures, rather than as a limit upon our problems (2000: 120).
With this in mind, this research is tentative to place its feet within any philosophical camp. Whilst being critical of the way in which policy is constructed and implemented, and the effect on communities either deliberately or coincidentally targeted, it is at the same time realistic, and aware of the need to have counter-radicalisation/terrorism policy in place. As a researcher, my own experiences of discrimination, including homophobia and racism towards my family, have shaped my own position and influenced my choice of research area. Racism directed at members of my family and friends, although not directed at me, has affected my life choices politically, culturally and socially. As a young person I was not aware of government policy or legislation, and yet I felt their effects.

Similarly, whether or not the respondents in the study are aware of counter-radicalisation/terrorism legislation, they may have felt its effects. For example, an increase in detention without charge, stop and search under the umbrella of counter-terrorism (C/T) legislation or increased security within targeted communities identified as vulnerable may have affected them in some way. This again is a point addressed by this research, by asking what the respondents know about the current policy, and if they felt they had been affected by counter-radicalisation policy, and how?

The Production of Knowledge

Archer et al. (1998) suggest that the focus of the production of knowledge should be based within the natural elements of society, saying:

Similarly, Zachariadis, Scott and Barrett (2013) suggest that knowledge can then be sub-divided and examined in three distinct ways, arguing:

Besides the distinction between transitive and intransitive dimensions of knowledge, critical realism assumes a stratified ontology divided into three domains: the real, the actual and the empirical (2013: 857).

I suggest that it is important to understand the distinction between transitive and intransitive dimensions, as this helps illustrate that there is no one reality. It is also important to understand that researchers will not necessarily have access to realities that are not their own, even if they are able to observe fully every aspect of another’s [individual] reality. Within the domain of the ‘real’ are objects and structures that have inherent causal powers and liabilities which result in a mechanism that may not be visible. Lawson (1997) suggests that by observing the way things (society, philosophical constructs, and social interactions) work or do not work as a mechanism will help determine the phenomena of the world, suggesting:

A mechanism is basically the way of acting or working of a structured thing … structured things [physical objects or social processes] possess causal [or emergent] powers which when triggered… act as a generative mechanism to determine the actual phenomena of the world (Lawson, 1997: 121).

Similarly, Bhaskar (1978) contends that while generative mechanisms may not necessarily constantly be observed empirically, their capability to ‘have effect’ may still exist, whether they are exercised or unexercised. The ‘actual’ is thus a subset of the ‘real’, which can include generated events from both exercised and
unexercised mechanisms. It may be argued that one of the main objectives for critical research should be to use the perceptions of events that can be observed or experienced [empirical] to identify the mechanism that in turn gives rise to those events (see Volkoff et al., 2007). For example, the respondents may not be aware of the specifics of policy, but then may feel like they were affected by the policy nonetheless. Within the context of this research, consequently, the experiences of the respondents may be recorded, given value and shared.

Approaching research from this position allows for a basic understanding that cause does not necessarily equal effect. There is, within distinct relationships, an often non-linear process of events: (A) may be followed by event (B), and yet this does not mean that event (A) somehow caused event (B). If event (A) did cause event (B), then understanding the mechanism of how and why this happened is paramount to critical research (CR) (Volkoff et al., 2007: Sayer, 1992).

However, due to the influence placed on everyday interactions between people, and how language is used to construct their reality, this research also accepts that there must be some form of social construction occurring. This is important, given the interest this research has in the effect of policy, identity and the individual’s ‘place’ within society. This research questions the use of legislation, the terminologies within legislation and its impact upon the reality of minority groups living in Liverpool. This is important when we consider how language is being used in legislation, due to its power to affect the perceptions of people within society and the way they are presented to a wider social audience.

By accepting that society exists both subjectively and objectively, one can take a critical yet realist stance (Andrews, 2012). This allows the research room to address
questions regarding the impact of society’s language and the shaping of the individual’s realities and identities whilst staying realistic in its reach, understanding that it is concept-dependent and requires interpretive understanding.

Placing one’s feet tentatively within critical realism allows me a place to consider the intransitive domain within social structures. These can be addressed whilst remaining critical of their influence and inference, inference being the conclusions someone comes to, based on evidence and reasoning. Unlike influences, which are innate (often cognitively unconscious), inference is considered (a cognitively conscious process). Huberman and Mills suggest this is fundamental, saying:

> Fundamentally, we think of social phenomena exists not only in the mind, but in the objective world as well, and that there are some lawful, reasonable stable relationships to be found among them... it is from these that we derive the constructs that account for individual and social life (Huberman and Mills, 1998:182).

### 4.2 The Research Design

Burke Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) argued that the use of mixed methods facilitates a rich data collection and provides an attractive philosophical bridge between philosophies. This is appealing when considering the approach of this research, which is fluid and somewhere between methodologies. The distinction between qualitative and quantitative research has been argued (Hammersley, 1996: 154) to have become a ‘key axis in methodological discussion within the social sciences’. It was seen as a challenge against experimentalism, which was listed by Rosnow (1981) as the artefacts crisis, ethics crisis and relevance crisis. This ‘crisis’
in research has led to ‘new paradigm’ in research which is internally diverse, and has led to the development of contextualist and constructionist approaches (Rosnow and Georgoudi, 1986; Reason and Rowan, 1981).

Hammersley (1996: 160) suggests that the alternative approaches to research, away from experimentalism, can be ranged along a spectrum. He contends that a continuum between research paradigms is a far more effective way to combine positions to facilitate data retrieval and analysis, saying:

At one end is the idea that ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ refer to an internally coherent and comprehensive research paradigm which are founded on incommensurable philosophical or political presuppositions. At the other end of the spectrum is the belief that quantitative and qualitative methods are complimentary, should be used as and when appropriate, depending upon the focus, purpose and circumstances of the research (Hammersley, 1996: 160).

Smith (1989) also suggests that there has been a misperception that these two new ‘paradigms’ are not compatible and are in some way in conflict with each other. Hammersley (1986) suggests that an oversimplification of and the use of two paradigms ignores the fact that much of modern sociological research does not fall neatly into either quantitative or qualitative categories, arguing:

There are multiple methodological dimensions on which research varies these do not lie in parallel and each involves a range of positions, not just two (Hammersley, 1986: 160).
Sometimes defined at the methodological level as involving different forms of data, the contrast is often formulated as being the difference between hard and rich data (Bryman, 1992, 2008). Hammersley’s suggestion for eclecticism within methodology would seem to advance the pragmatic approach to data collection. The advantage of eclecticism with methodology has long been established throughout research literature (Sieber, 1973) and the diversity of approaches can be found within the social sciences (Bryman, 2008, 1992). Hammersley (1996) suggests that the eclectic approach can take at least three forms: triangulation, facilitation and complimentary. Central to this research, I would suggest, is the blend of methodology which fits within Hammersley’s category of facilitation. Within this research, the questionnaires used in phase one have been used to gauge the broad opinion of the wider community living in the two geographical areas under study. This was to afford the researcher the opportunity to frame the qualitative second phase by considering the findings from the analysis of phase one data. Methodological eclecticism has emphasised the pragmatic/practical characteristics of the research analysis at each step.

_Theoretical Problems- Stopping Them Before They Begin_

It is also important to bear in mind that there are a number of theoretical problems concerning research in the social sciences. Quantitative researchers tend to infer cause from patterns. Qualitative researchers have often stressed the contingent and diverse nature of human actions and perceptions, the role of cultural interpretation, as well as looking for patterns from a shared understanding (Hammersley, 1996). A pragmatic emphasis on practicality within this research may be valuable, as it recognises and accepts that research rests upon problematic presuppositions.
A failure to recognise this could lead the researcher into assumptions. To assume that one can generalise about the wider social audience based on a small sample of a larger population, as well as being unrealistic, can be problematic. Cultural variations, ethnic variations, regional variations as well as a multitude of other social variations must be considered when trying to draw inferences. An example of this type of assumption can come from looking at most government departments or agency research, which can be used to affect communities nationally based on relatively small sample sizes. Within this research, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative methodology is unhelpful, as both phase one and phase two both utilise language and expression. Practically, the research does employ a mixed methodology, but one would argue that this is a pragmatic approach, in which there is little distinction between designs.

The Communities under Study: Framing The Boundaries

As I previously examined in Chapter Three, Liverpool has been shaped by its population and the population in turn has been shaped by the city. As I suggested in Chapter Three, the two communities under study have been chosen based on my 40-plus years of knowledge, living in the two communities. However, the choice was also due to an examination of census data. The understanding that comes from being an insider and living within communities and facing the same challenges throughout time gives an in-group dimension and orthodoxy to research (Scraton, 2010). As discussed at the outset of this chapter, that outsider/insider dilemma seems an emerging crisis within social research (Sherif, 2001) and understanding those boundaries is pivotal.
In terms of the group dimension, what I would contest somewhat counters the reduction within the social sciences of neighbourhoods to laboratories, as well as a disconnection from historical narratives. This may leave researchers vulnerable to a misidentification of causality. Understanding the researcher’s positionality within the research is therefore imperative, as well as understanding the population under study. The census wards Princes Park (PPW) and Speke-Garston (SGW) were chosen to reflect the variations within one city’s population. Two areas which were both at one time prosperous and which have both developed from communities who have historically been constructed as suspect. The choice also was able to draw on my own local knowledge in an attempt to avoid challenges to its orthodoxy by blending local knowledge with academic pragmatism.

*Area One – The Princess Park Ward*

Although Liverpool 8 is recognised as being an area which encompasses the whole of the postcode Liverpool 8, it has been subdivided between two specific census wards, Riverside and Princes Park. This research will be using the boundary of the PPW as the geographical area under study. This was due to higher minority numbers within the community identified within that census area. The postcodes of each of the participants were also collected in order to check if the ward data coincided with the individual super output for the postcode, and to see if this was representative of each of the participant’s individual experience of diversity within their home addresses. I found that the ward data was representative of the individual postcodes. Liverpool City Council describe Princes Park Ward:

Princes Park’s 2012 estimated population was 17,650. The ward’s population has increased by 23.2% (an additional 3,319 residents) since
2002. This is the 3rd largest increase of all Liverpool wards. Prince’s Park is the only ward in Liverpool where more than half of residents are BME. 8,758 (51.2%) residents are BME, which is almost 4 times the Liverpool average.⁷

*Area Two - Speke/Garston Ward*

The second geographical area under consideration was SGW. Unlike Liverpool 8, which has been subdivided into two wards, the area of Speke-Garston was amalgamated into one for purposes of census data collection. It encompasses a number of postcodes, but for the purpose of this research only the L24 Speke postcode has been used when recruiting respondents. This limited the catchment area to be more in line with that of PPW. Unlike PPW, SGW has a below national average for minority/non-white British community members. In juxtaposition to PPW, SGW was well placed as a good oppositional area for consideration. Again, the research used the postcodes of each of the participants to check if the ward data coincided with the individual super output for the home postcodes. Once again, it found that the ward data was representative of the individual home addresses. Liverpool City Council describes the population of the Speke-Garston ward:

Speke-Garston’s 2012 population was 20,527 and has increased by 1,552 residents (8.2%) since 2002. The ward’s population is a young one, with the proportion of the population aged 0-15 significantly above the city average and fewer working age and older people. 8.4% of the

⁷ Details for population can be found on the Liverpool City Council’s web page at: http://liverpool.gov.uk/media/9961/princes-park.pdf
population are BME, which is significantly below the Liverpool average.\(^8\)

**Safeguarding the Respondents**

Participant protection is paramount in research, and a number of safeguards were put in place in this research to protect respondents’ identities and their data. Although ethical considerations vary over time (Johnson, 1982) pseudonyms have long been used as a practical way to protect respondents’ privacy. Anonymity protects respondent identity and allows researchers to guarantee that information gathered through the research process cannot harm the respondents in the public realm. It also allows the researcher to disguise the research sites which have been indispensable in ensuring co-operation in research on deviance (Jenkins, 1987).

Consulting with the respondents in phase two, it was decided that it was appropriate to identify the two areas involved as there was limited risk to either the respondents or the researcher. Also considered was the identification in phase one of the gatekeeper locations, and again, through consultation with the respondents and the gatekeepers themselves, this was considered unproblematic, so both locations have been identified. However, respondents’ anonymity had to be guaranteed and, therefore the respondents’ postcodes will not be shared. The ability to guarantee protection for participants is paramount when engaging with communities who may be talking about sensitive subjects, including criticising the state or criminality. In this research it was important to be meticulous about maintaining respondents’

---

\(^8\) Details for population can be found on the City Councils web page at: http://liverpool.gov.uk/media/9963/speke-garston.pdf
anonymity, as some of them were under increased scrutiny due to their social situations.

Colvard (1967) argued that full disclosure of information aids a critical assessment of information and, consequently, the onus is on the researcher to justify participant anonymity. Dispensing with anonymity is seen to protect against research falsehoods, as the information can be checked against the public record of participants (Fielding, 1982). Disguising the participants’ details has also been criticised, as it has the ability to distort the data, potentially threatening the validity of the study (Barnes, 1979). However, as Adler and Adler (1989) suggest, in many cases there may be ‘immediate and tangible reasons’ that participants need their anonymity protecting. As stated, it is this approach that this research has adopted.

In phase two, the minority community in Speke is, according to the census data, only small, and therefore it was important not to include any information that might be used to identify the respondents to anyone but their closest family and friends. To maintain transparency between the research and the respondents, a copy of the researcher-censored transcribed interviews was sent to each respondent in both areas. This was to allow them to self-censor any information they were unhappy about sharing. It was explained to them that they had a twenty-one-day period in which to alter the transcriptions, after which the researcher would assume consent had been given for the data use, in line with the consent forms.

Schepers-Hughes (1981) suggests that self-censorship may be important, as not only does a researcher have to respect the respondent’s privacy, but researchers also have to make sure that they do not reveal ‘community secrets’: negative aspects of social life which, while common knowledge within the community, are rarely articulated.
publicly. Johnson (1982) suggests that some respondents may feel upset by the publication of information that they feel portrays them or their community in a bad light. Therefore, sensitivity had to be taken to balance the need for data and the needs of the respondents.

*Safeguarding the Researcher*

Research around race, identity and exclusion can be, due to the sensitivity of the topic, emotive for both the respondents and the researcher. Gregory, Russell and Phillips (1997) suggest that the researcher themselves may be emotionally vulnerable due to the nature of the information they become privy to. With this in mind, to safeguard against becoming emotionally distressed, a network of support was put in place for the researcher, including academic support within the University of Liverpool, family support and community support.

The physical safety of the researcher was also considered. Hayes et al. (1996) suggest that the best way to reduce risks to field researchers is to anticipate the dangers and prepare a response. A full assessment of the research sites was conducted prior to the phase two qualitative interviews. I also avoided situations and settings in which I was not visible to others, as well as scheduling meetings as early in the day as possible in line with other safety strategies (see Monahan et al., 1993). Research participants were accessed through gatekeepers within the local communities, and were informed of their rights regarding withdrawal from the research before interviewing, which helped minimise the risk of confrontational situations arising.
Choosing the Respondents

The specific groups under consideration for this research were African/African mixed-race and Indian/Indian mixed-race. This was due in part to the identification during the pilot study of skin colour influencing Islamophobic targeting, and because the Black/ mixed-race minorities had previously been identified as facing significant racial discrimination in Liverpool (Gifford et al., 1989; Christian, 1989). The inclusion of Indian/ Indian mixed-race was due to the identification through the previous pilot study (Peatfield, 2012) of another group often misidentified as Muslim, and consequently prone to Islamophobia (see Appendix 10). The term Black as a descriptive is very broad, but within the discourse of race, I would suggest, is primarily used as a descriptive associated with those individuals of an African or Afro-Caribbean heritage. This research specified that respondents were people of African or African mixed heritage, as it gave me a broad scope for participation in line with my understanding of the descriptive term. An interesting point, looking at the description of race from the respondents, is that all but one was identified as mixed-race. I find this point particularly interesting, given the history of the mixed-race community in Liverpool as mentioned in Chapter Three, and based on my own family genealogy in which all my own family members, who can be classified as minorities, are also all mixed-race.

The research also identified the need for all the respondents to be adults, as an understanding of society pre-7/7 was required in order to address the historic narrative within each community. This was in order to examine the changes in perceptions over the last decade. Consequently, anyone under the age of eighteen would not be able to draw comparisons, as they would have been too young.
Participants were gained through random convenience and snowball sampling within the two geographical areas under consideration in phase one, through trusted gatekeepers. The gatekeepers were aware of the full scope of the study and the respondent criteria.

In phase two, the respondents were snowball sampled from connections given by the same gatekeepers in phase one and from researcher contacts. To counter any priming from the researcher, all the contacts were given information regarding the study, but no specifics concerning the content of the interviews or what questions would be asked. Also, no family members or close personnel contacts were used in this study, as the exclusion criteria describes.9

4.3 A Tale of Two Parts: Phase One of the Research

Phase One: The Questionnaires

In order to understand the communities under study in relation to the impact of policy and the understanding and awareness of legislation, a questionnaire was constructed based on a literature review and a review of Prevent. A five-point Likert styled self-completion questionnaire was produced, which took seven statements from Prevent and asked respondents to rate their responses, from disagree strongly to agree strongly (see Appendix 3). The grading scale allowed the participants to rate the statements disagree strongly/disagree/don’t know/agree/ agree strongly (see Camparo and Camparo, 2013 for the benefits of Likert-styled questionnaires). The statements were chosen due to the need to highlight sections of the strategy in which

---

9 Copies of the University Ethics Approvals are included in the appendix numbers 1 and 2.
the word Muslim had not been included and yet terrorism and the drivers for radicalisation had. Three further questions were constructed and were designed to ask three simple but effective questions. These questions had previously been used in the pilot study.

The Advantages of This Approach

The advantages of this approach were fourfold. The technique was quick to administer, a number of questionnaires could be given to both the gatekeepers and distributed quickly to allow for random and convenient samples to be acquired in a relatively short amount of time. It removed the interviewer effect from the responses, so the researcher could be assured that they had played no part in influencing the responses of the respondents. Sudman and Bradburn (1982) suggest that in some ways postal questionnaires worked better than personal interviews, as the presence of the researcher could elicit ‘social desirability biases’ from the respondents. Given the possible emotive nature of the questionnaires, respondents would have the ability to answer frankly without any anxiety about a subject they may be sensitive about in private (Tourangeau and Smith, 1996).

Because the questionnaires were being used to give me a brief snapshot into community opinion, the third benefit of the self-completion questionnaire was that there could be no interviewer variability, as each respondent would be asked the same question. Because the questionnaires gave the respondents the ability to give a description of their ethnicity and religious status, this would give me some insight into the way in which people classified themselves. The last benefit of the self-completion questionnaire was the convenience for the respondents. Using statements from Prevent on the questionnaires has meant that some of the language
used was complicated, a point we will discuss further in the analysis chapters. Allowing the respondents to fill in the questionnaires by themselves let them take as much time as was necessary to fully understand the questions and choose their response.

The Disadvantages of This Approach

There are, however, also drawbacks to self-completion questionnaires, which should also be considered. Not being able to collect more information from the respondents at the time of engagement was one of the first drawbacks. This was not considered vital within phase one of the research, as this was just a broad review of the general population within the two areas. Another disadvantage of this technique was not knowing who had taken part in the study. However, again, the negative aspects of this were mitigated by using gatekeepers to give out the questionnaires, as they knew the areas and were able to gain a broad spectrum of respondents based on their local knowledge. I trusted the gatekeepers’ judgement to make sure that the questionnaires reached appropriate adults who were happy to be involved, due to knowing both gatekeepers for over twenty years.

The last drawback to self-completion questionnaires was the problem that for some of the respondents the questions and language used was too complicated. Limited levels of adult literacy were considered when the questionnaire was created. It is estimated that 5.2 million adults in England are ‘functionally illiterate’ (source: The Literacy Trust, 2013). Nevertheless, to examine policy it was important to use the actual statements and language used in Prevent. This was considered a way to gauge how much the respondents understood and agreed/disagreed with what was being presented in ‘their’ interests by the state. Those respondents who struggled with
terminology were given the opportunity to find out for themselves what words meant (due to the self-completion aspect). The respondents were not pressurised to finish the forms within any specific time frame, which was a deliberate attempt to mitigate any embarrassment they may have had if they had struggled due to having limited reading skills. The gatekeepers collected the completed forms, which in turn were collected by the researcher. By collecting the forms, the researcher was then able to discuss any issues the respondents may have had that the gatekeepers were aware of.

Prior to completing the questionnaires, the respondents were also asked to complete a brief descriptive section in which they were asked to describe their ethnicity and their religion, which was part of the questionnaire. Rather than producing a standard tick box, I felt it was important for the participants to have the opportunity to choose how they classified themselves. This was to investigate if the word ‘ethnicity’ was perceived as meaning a ‘racial descriptive’ by the participants. In the Prevent Strategy Equality Impact Assessment (2011), the terminology was found to be interchangeable, suggesting:

> Respondents often used the terms ‘race and ‘religion/belief’ interchangeably… For the purpose of this the EIA, Race has been taken to include colour, nationality, ethnic and national origins, in line with the Race Relations Act 1976 (2011: 6).

It was determined that within this research it was also important to investigate whether ethnicity/race were being used interchangeably. This was due to the nature of the argument by right-wing groups that Islamophobia is not a racist practice, as the Islamic faith encompasses multiple racial identities. Nonetheless, research by
Moosavi (2012). as I discussed in Chapter Two, indicated that membership of the Islamic faith superseded any other type of categorisation, and that in the case of white converts race was lost once they had converted to Islam. This intersection of faith with race was a point this research sought to explore. The results from phase one were then inputted into the current IBM SPSS 20 programme for analysis. The age range of the participants was 18 to 79; p = 60.

**Phase Two Semi-Structured Interviews**

Drawing on the data collected in phase one, phase two was designed to target non-Muslim minority members living in PPW and SGW using the same selection criteria as phase one. The use of semi-structured interviews in phase two was chosen for a number of reasons. The flexibility of the interview process was needed alongside a framework that allowed the researcher to address questions constructed from the analysis of the phase one data and the previous review of the literature. An interview guide was constructed in order to allow for off-topic divergences without losing primary focus. Leidner (1993) describes this type of interview as allowing room to pursue topics of particular interest. This was seen as crucial, in order to examine the life experiences of the participants. Bryman (2008: 440) suggests that doing multiple case-study research needs some structure to allow for cross-case comparability, and so a completely unstructured interview would not be appropriate for this research. Commenting on their own research, Beardsworth and Keil (1992) suggested that the semi-structured interview allowed fluidity within its structure, enabling tangents to be explored, arguing:

The interview programme was not based upon a set of relatively rigid pre-determined questions and prompts. Rather, the open ended
discursive nature of the interviews permitted an iterative process of refinement, whereby lines of thought identified by earlier interviews could be taken up and presented to later interviewees (Beardsworth and Keil, 1992: 261).

In much the same way, the insight into the local communities gained during phase one could be utilised as a starting point in phase two by using Hammersley’s facilitation approach. The interviews were conducted primarily in an office at the University of Liverpool during the daytime. Although there were three occasions when I had to visit respondents in their homes, home visits were kept to a minimum in order to reduce risk to both the respondents and to myself. Prior to each interview the participants were contacted and sent a sheet which outlined the drivers which have been identified in Prevent as playing some part in the vulnerability of individuals to engage in radical behaviour and/or be radicalised (see Appendix 4).

The need for the information sheets was identified in the analysis of phase one and they were left with the participants for no less than seven days prior to the interview. This was to enable the respondents adequate time to read the information and to research the subject on their own should they wish. After seven days, arrangements were made for the interview to take place. No incentives were given to the participants to take part in the study, and all participants were advised of their rights to withdraw at any point from the research. Before the interviews began the respondents were asked to complete a consent form which informed them of their rights (see Appendix 5). Once interviewed, the respondents were given a debrief sheet in which their options were explained to them. The participants were informed they would be offered a transcribed version of their interview in order to give them
the opportunity to self-censor any information that they may have felt identified them (see Appendix 6).

**Theoretical Considerations**

The analysis of the data from phase two was data driven and based on the theoretical framework of suspect communities. The analysis of the first phase informed the second phase, although the use of different respondents meant that I was able to code fresh, without looking for any categories, allowing the codes to emerge organically rather than seeking them out in a predetermined fashion as a result of pre-existing conceptions (Hammersley and Atkins, 1983).

Within this research I was relying on my experience of the interviews to help shape the analysis when ‘exploring relationships between identified clusters’. Within any research, the positionality of the researcher has to be considered in order to understand the choice of research, the design of the research and coding of the data. The positionality of the researcher has been considered within this work on multiple occasions, in the hopes of avoiding preconceived assumptions. A blend was made to facilitate understanding and to allow a fluid movement between both phases of the research, and between the clusters identified during the coding process.

**Language**

Throughout the interviews, some of the respondents used what can only be described as ‘colourful language’. I have chosen to use those responses verbatim in order to try and show how passionate the respondents were about what they were

---

10 Coding fresh simply means that I was not looking for answers to the research questions. Rather I allowed whatever codes and categories were there to emerge, and then sought meaning from them in relation to my research questions.
saying. I myself am not offended in any way by the use of expletives/cursing, and Chaika (1982: 107) suggests, in fact, that cursing has often been associated with class, and used as a tool to denote one’s station and as a weapon to repel the middle class. I would suggest that within the context of this research it was used to emphasise points made by the respondents. I was not prepared to censor the language used, as I believe that the true uncensored voice of the respondents should be given value, rather than a sanitised version.

4.4 The Complexities of Coding: An Overview of the Phase Two Data

This section of the chapter will examine a brief overview of the data in its totality prior to discussing specific findings, which is related in later chapters to the research questions. To place the codes within context, examples will be given of both the primary and secondary codes created using the NVIVO20 programme. The way in which the codes have been identified has been based upon the experiences of each interview and on notes taken at the time, plus unspoken communication such as body language or tone of voice. The opinions are the respondents’ only, and how they relate to the research questions will be examined further in the subsequent analysis chapters. However, given the time restraints of the research and the word count, not all of the cluster will be examined in the analysis chapters, only those which were dominant and pertain specifically to the research questions. This overview will present all the clusters identified, although in a limited form.

These statements are the perceptions of the respondents concerning the drivers identified within Prevent and their reflections as to the impact of policy such as Prevent. This is not a criticism of Prevent, rather it is a look at how the document
is being perceived by those groups who may feel the impact of the policy at a street level. However, not all the respondents were in agreement regarding Prevent or the drivers identified within. Therefore, I have occasionally pointed out an individual’s opinion which is not representative of the whole if it is relevant within the context of the analysis. The data was first subdivided into four identified primary codes. These were then subdivided through a secondary coding phase into a further four secondary sub-codes.

*Figure 1 Representation of the Coding Process*

Phase Two Questions

Many of the questions asked during the semi-structured interview were an organic progression from the constructed questions, which allowed for an evolution off topic. As I have previously discussed, phase two was shaped in part by the findings in phase one and the literature review performed prior to research commencement.

The constructed questions asked during the interviews were:

- In the UK government’s Prevent strategy, drivers are identified as playing some part in the radicalisation of extremists, what are your thoughts about this?

- ‘The government suggest that support for extremism is significantly associated with the perception of discrimination and the experience of
racial or religious harassment. It is also associated with a negative view of policing. Do you agree or disagree with this? If so why, if not why not?’

‘The government argues that approval of violent extremism is higher amongst young people. Do you agree or disagree with this? If so why, if not why not?’

‘The government suggests that people from lower income and socio-economic groups are more likely to support extremism, do you agree or disagree with this? If so why, if not why not?

The questions included aspects which would examine language used in Prevent, such as drivers, vulnerability and radicalisation, but they allowed the respondents to consider the problem of extremism from within communities which were identified as risky by the policy. Throughout the next part of this chapter, we examine the identified clusters and look at examples of one within each secondary sub-code to demonstrate the process of coding. The clusters were representative of the majority opinions within the data and, as with any coding process, could have continued to be subdivided further into ever-decreasing code categories. However, it was determined, due to time constraints and the small sample size, that the subdivisions of four primaries into four secondary codes was sufficient to explore the data. The code’s titles were the working titles, and were changed during the writing process, although the categories themselves have remained the same.
Primary Code One: The Drivers of Radicalisation

Figure 2 The Drivers of Radicalisation Sub-Divided into Secondary Codes

The first primary code identified during the coding process was The Drivers of Radicalisation. This was naturally identified within the data, as the structured questions have especially asked the respondents for their opinions on the drivers identified in Prevent, and was therefore on topic. It was also the largest of the identified primary codes. A secondary phase of coding identified a need for a subdivision of this category, which established four secondary codes: rejection of drivers, acceptance of drivers, radical language within policy and the ramifications from the identification of drivers. This primary category and the secondary categories were derived from constructed questions regarding the drivers identified within Prevent, as one would expect. Questions then developed as a consequence of the constructed questions, as respondents expanded and elaborated their positions on the topic.

When speaking to the respondents about the identified drivers being a factor in someone’s proclivity for radical actions and/or leaving people vulnerable to
radicalisation, all the respondents related the drivers identified in Prevent with their own lives and situations. There was an overall dismissive attitude towards the drivers identified, the respondents believing, rather, that the identification of drivers was reducing the complex process of radicalisation to its base elements. There was a shared belief from all 12 respondents that an oversimplification of the groups under consideration was also problematic, as if revealing deep ingrained assumptions about minorities and poorer communities. The coding was an interesting process, as at first glance it seemed as if some of the respondents agreed with the drivers identified in Prevent in principle. However, when the respondents considered each one in relation to their own experiences, they subsequently changed their position. This was not to say they consciously changed their positions, it was just that the answers did not equate to what they said in the first instance. Whilst coding it was therefore very important to consider the context in which the statements were given and the narrative running through the discussion, rather than simply taking one sentence as the answer. By considering the whole rather than its parts we get a clearer picture emerging, for example, Grace, discussing the drivers of radicalisation, suggested:

_Ermm I think that the causal factors [talking about the drivers] are probably all correct but I think there are more, it says people on a low income and low income areas I think that’s wrong. Coz it could be from any areas and from any incomes on all different levels._

In this one paragraph Grace agreed, but then went on to challenge the drivers identified in Prevent. A benefit of being the interviewer and the coder meant that this type of variation in responses could be placed into context regarding the rest of
the interview, and subtle cues, such as body movement, tone of voice and inflection, could help me navigate through the coding process.

**Primary Code Two: Power and Conflict**

*Figure 3 Power and Conflict Sub-Divided into Secondary Codes*

The second primary code identified within the data was Power and Conflict. This was identified as there were a number of references by respondents to the dynamic between those perceived by them as powerful within society and those perceived to be powerless. Power was subsequently identified as having the ability to influence not only one’s own life but the lives of others. The respondents’ understanding and definition of power is the definition used throughout this research.

Power, like many of the terms under consideration, is a contested term dependent on one’s position and understanding. The struggle between the powerful and powerless has often been considered within academic literature (see Tombs and Whyte, 2003; Braithwaite, 2013). The subdivision of this primary code into four secondary codes again was then a natural progression through continued analysis. As example of a secondary code, media and discourse, was identified due to, again, all of the respondents at some point during their interviews talking about the
influence of the press. All of them spoke about media influences concerning terrorism and radicalisation. Whether the amount of media coverage concerning radicalisation, Islam or Islamophobia was correct, it was the respondents’ perceptions of this coverage which was important in understanding its influence. The respondents were convinced that the media was the key source of information for most people, whether that was tabloid newspapers or information via television. The independence and objectivity of the media was also considered and challenged, as well as the freedom of the press to report without an agenda. The right to free speech was also considered by the respondents as under threat, a point exampled by James, who suggested:

*Freedom of speech depends on who you are eh, do you understand what I mean eh? Freedom of speech like, it doesn’t exist in this country, it’s a fallacy to believe that it does.*

James sums up the dominant feeling throughout the interviews that free speech was an illusion created by those in power to placate the powerless. Again, hearing the shifts in volume gives a far better idea of the passion showed by some of the respondents concerning this topic. Again, a benefit of being the interviewer and the coder made this link easier to define and account for within the codes.
The third primary code was Social Cohesion, a code identified within the data as many of the references that the respondents used talked about the way in which society affected their lived experiences through a number of differing factors. These factors were placed within the identified secondary codes: pre-crime legislation, multiculturalism, racism and the rise of the right and rejection of social cohesion.

For example, pre-crime legislation was identified by the respondents as something they were deeply concerned about. It has been suggested that ‘pre-crime links coercive state actions to suspicion without the need for charge, prosecution or conviction’ (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009: 628). When talking about new police powers of arrest, the respondents suggested that being arrested without charge based on anonymous tips, for example, was worrying. The use of pre-crime was seen as a way to silence those groups within society who were classified as a ‘problem’. The criminalisation of thought through the inclusion of non-violent radicalisation in policy such as Prevent was blamed, for example, for the removal...
of free speech, open debate and challenge towards the government. This can be
examined by Edward, who suggested that the only legitimate opinion accepted in
Britain was the state’s opinion, suggesting:

You are free to give an opinion as long as it’s the state’s opinion,
freedom of speech doesn’t exist in this country by a long shot.

Edward’s response was representative of the dominant narrative within the
interviews. The way in which the opportunity for voicing radical protest had
changed within Britain was another theme considered by the respondents. Although
all of the respondents were totally opposed to groups such as the National Front or
radical Islamist groups, many of them suggested that they had a right to their
opinions and that open debate and discussion was the only way to change opinions.
The silencing of debate was seen as dangerous, as without debate the only recourse
for expression was physical action and that was considered far more dangerous.
Edward’s statement, although placed within this code cluster, would also have fitted
nicely into the previous code of power and control, as it addressed free speech.
However, placed within the context of the conversation, this statement fitted within
the realms of power, as Edward had been speaking about how power is maintained
through a restriction of radical voices. It is these coding subtleties that could be
achieved through participating in every stage of the interview process.
The final primary code to be identified was Place and Identity, which was again subsequently divided into four secondary codes during the second phase of coding. The codes identified were: personal narrative, a city under attack, the generational effect and geographical impact.

As one would expect, the experiences of the respondents were identified as playing a role in their opinions regarding the questions asked. Personal experiences help to shape not only the individual’s reality, but also their shared social reality. As such, within the primary code of place and identity, personal narratives have been identified as an important secondary code structure. If we take the example of Isabella, she faced daily torment and physical attack as a mixed-race child growing up in Liverpool in the 1940s. The racism faced by her and her family was constructed by them as a rite of passage, to whit, they exhibited social resilience. When asked about negative experiences with organisations such as the police or
members of the general public being identified as a driver which had the capacity to influence someone’s susceptibility for radicalisation, she was quite clear about social resilience based on her own experiences, saying:

So however bad the police are now or so people say, it’s not as bad as it was then, my dad wouldn’t have become an evil man. That how I know the government are wrong when they say people change if they have a bad experience.

As I discussed in Chapter Two, the assumption that previous learning is eradicated automatically was rejected by the respondents. Isabella is representative of the majority opinions (Edward, Molly, Brima, Airyana, Raymon, Jazmin, Grace) in rejecting the policy premise that morals can be removed or completely reshaped.

In conclusion, although the respondents may not be representative of all sections of society, or even their own communities, it is their opinions that I am interested in as a researcher. Research on a small scale such as this can only dip its feet into community opinions, trusting in the recruitment process to deliver a diverse sample of any population. As such, it is important to allow the clusters and codes to develop naturally without any preconceived theory, in line, again, with a grounded approach. Entering the coding process with no preconceived categories allowed for the primary clusters to develop due to the observed patterns of responses. The second phase of coding then looked for examples within each code block, again, based on the identified characteristics from the first code. Variables which affected responses were also then taken into consideration, such as language, age or ethnicity/race.
For example, if we consider language, there was a generational difference which must be considered. Some older respondents described themselves as coloured or half-caste, terminology which is now deemed inappropriate. The younger respondents described themselves using a more modern terminology, such as Black, Brown or Mixed-race. The generational differences also played a part in the way the historical narrative was interpreted by respondents, with the older respondents having a greater experience of previous legislation through the 1960s, 70s and 80s. This meant that they could link, through experience, the similarities in stop and search legislation under the remit of counter-terrorism to the abolished stop and search (SUS) laws, unlike the younger respondents who had never experienced SUS but were more aware of current targeting.

**4.4 Reflections of a Researcher**

Throughout this research project I have been fully aware of my own historical narrative and affiliation to both geographical communities under study. My positionality and reflexivity are therefore points which need further discussion. As a member of the communities under study, I share a cultural heritage and local understanding with the respondents. However, what I was not aware of was the impact that their minority race status had on their position in or out of society. Nonetheless, my position as a local researcher served to enrich my understanding of the complexities of life in Liverpool, facilitated empathy with the respondents through our shared history and allowed me access to communities which are considered hard to reach (Cook, 2002).
This has allowed me to engage with the respondents from a position of honesty, as someone who had shared both the misrepresentation of Liverpudlians and the challenges of living within both inner-city communities. This shared knowledge and enculturation was important, as they allowed a symbiotic relationship through the data gathering process to develop concerning knowledge transfer. Trust-based advantages were utilised to yield rich in-depth data regarding the effect of policy, its presentation and the perception of identities. Academic research can never be entirely value free, as Becker (1967) suggests, nor should it try to be. As a mature researcher raised during the 1970s and 80s when Liverpool was the focus of very public disparities in inequality, I have been ideally placed to engage with not only the more mature respondents, but also to understand the challenges faced by the younger respondents.

Rather than rejecting or denying my connection to both the communities and/or subject matter, it has been paramount from the initial stages of the research to utilise the connection. From the outset, in Chapter Three, I positioned myself clearly as emotionally linked to both the subject matter and the communities involved in order to be transparent and to self-guard against bias. To ensure my subjectivity, rigour and reflexivity in the design of the research I also chose not to engage with any community members I had a pre-existing relationship with, and chose to use gatekeepers in order to mitigate both participant and researcher bias. When considering the analysis, I maintained my objectivity by utilising the close relationship with my supervisors, and mitigated potential problems of bias or omission through regular discussion of my findings and a sharing of data for analysis.
Chapter Five: Phase One

Introduction

In the first quantitative phase of the research, the respondents (P=60) were asked to complete a Likert\textsuperscript{11}-style questionnaire which allowed participants to rate the statements on a sliding scale. The questionnaires included a cover sheet in which the participants self-categorised their faith and ethnicity as well as informing researchers of their level of educational achievement (Appendix 3). The questionnaire consisted of ten questions, seven statements constructed from information taken from Prevent (statements were taken from Prevent sections 1.01, 3.29, 5, 5.6, 5.18, 5.22, 5.26) and three statements which had also been used in the pilot study, which were:

1) Over the last decade relationships between minority groups and government agencies, such as the police, have improved.

2) Islamophobia is not the same as other forms of discrimination or racism.

3) A person’s faith determines their treatment by state agencies such as the police, more so than their skin colour or economic class.

The premise for keeping the same questions and statements from the pilot study was that it allowed me to directly compare the pilot study phase one data and the current phase one data. It allowed me the facility to examine if the Muslim and non-Muslim perceptions about the statements were similar and if so how, or if they were different.

\textsuperscript{11}A five-point Likert grading system allows the respondents to disagree strongly / disagree / don’t know / agree / agree strongly.
dissimilar, and if so how. The independent variables identified and used for analysis were:

1) The area in which the respondents were located. This was to examine if there were any geographical variations.

2) The educational achievement of the participants, to examine if there were any educational variations.

3) The self-classification of faith, to examine if there were any religious variations.

5.1 Variations in the Self-Categorisation of Respondents

Recognising that race and ethnicity are constructed concepts, I believed that giving the respondents the chance to self-classify might shed some light on the variations of self-classification outside constructed parameters. Those used in census data collection, for example, although constantly evolving, are, I would suggest, still somewhat restrictive. Similar to other classifications, such as sexuality or religion, the classification of ethnicity had been carefully developed within the British census to try and encompass variations within British society. Howard and Hopkins (2005: 69) suggest that this consideration is still needed when creating categories.

In a constantly changing and shifting global population, the British census is constantly redesigned in each iteration to include new categories, in order to keep pace with population shifts. Sillito and White (1992) suggest the development of questions around ethnicity and race has been based on the need to encompass modern-day diversity within the British population, as well as to reduce confusion regarding pre-designed classifications. The need to be sensitive regarding
classification of both race and ethnicity may be due in part to the change in what is considered politically correct and the appropriate language of description. As I mentioned in Chapter Two, the need for descriptive specifics alongside an understanding of the shifts in language patterns means adaptations are required.

In his 1995 memoir *Coloured People*, Henry Louis Gates described how he constructed the first sentence of his Yale application to exemplify the change in language and the framework of meaning in any given time and place. His first sentence, ‘My grandfather was coloured, my father was Negro, and I am black’¹² is a perfect mini-lesson in the rhetorical triangle. Gates effectively demonstrates the concern of identity and rhetoric, how one self-defines and classifies oneself in conjunction with how one is defined. As mentioned in Chapter One, given that this research is concerned with the effect of policy, including policy language on communities under scrutiny, understanding rhetoric within the construction of language needs to be considered.

Taylor (2004) suggests that language, as well as shaping our experiences, is itself shaped by experience. He proposes that language is not only interpretive but is also an expressive device. He further argues that clarity concerning language and the meaning of ‘race talk’ can be problematic when discussing the concept of race and the definition of race within the race continuum. I suggest that this may be due to the determination of where a group or individual is placed within the race continuum. For example, whether an individual chooses a position or has a position enforced makes a difference concerning the acceptance or rejection of that position.

¹² Excerpt taken from the 2008 Conference on College Composition and Communication, Shepard University.
The unique process that leads to a self-identification and the social identification of the self must be connected to the construction of identity and the perception and understanding of that construction. For example, how one perceives oneself can be influenced by how one is perceived, how one classifies oneself may not be how one is classified. The sophisticated understanding of identity within society demands that the definition of race or ethnicity must be clearly defined and placed within context at the philosophical, political, analytical and social level.

Considering race on the social level, we can consider the ‘common sense’ classification of races and can contest the symbology of race, debating our place within a hierarchical system of classification based on skin pigmentation. This social approach to race uses an idealistic stereotyping of people within the ‘mono-race’ paradigm. To be ‘Black’ or ‘white’, to consider your main identity as one or the other, is common within popular discourse. Consequently, if we look at the classifications of ethnicity on the British census form, the complex problems associated with the classification of people’s ethnicity are evident (see Office for National Statistics, 2013), often falling into neither the ‘Black’ nor the ‘white’ category. I resolved to allow the respondents to self-classify their ethnicity/race and faith status in their own way, to give me a glimpse into those variations.

The semantics of race mean that, just like the construction of the terminology of the radical/radicalisation, as a society we must address the meaning within the context of race. The who, what, why and where of terminology must be placed within a specific mainframe, a specific context, in order to understand it. As with other definitions, it is only within context that we can measure and access the impact upon the psycho-social self, as well as the social self, and how one may describe oneself.
within the racial hierarchy (Taylor, 2004). This research may not be examining the psycho-social self, but it is examining how one’s social representation affects one’s self-representation.

Exchanging the self-classification of the respondents regarding their ethnicity/race by GAUS

The respondents were able to self-classify their ethnicity/race in the blank space provided for them on the consent forms. The chart below shows that variation. It shows that many of the respondents classified themselves outside the normal identified parameters from forms such as the census.

Figure 6 Variations in Self-Classification of Ethnicity/Race by GAUS
As the chart shows, there is a mixing of classification throughout the groups between ethnicity and race. For example, white/British or Black/British or mixed/Asian/white. The blurring of the categorical lines between race and faith was discussed in the Prevent strategy Equality Impact Assessment (2011). The Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) found that when researching the effects of Prevent in order to consider if the strategy had a disproportionate effect on any of the characteristics listed in the Equality Act (2000), (race, religion or belief, disability, gender, gender reassignment, sexual orientation, age, pregnancy and maternity and marriage and civil partnership) there was a tendency for participants to use the terms race and religion interchangeably. The EIA (2011: 6) suggests that, similarly to ethnicity and race, religion/belief and race can also be interchangeable, saying:

Respondents often used the terms ‘race’ and ‘religion/belief’ interchangeably; as such the analysis of the comments received under these is included together. For the purposes of this EIA, Race has been taken to include colour, nationality, ethnic and national origins, in line with the Race Relations Act 1976.

Although in this study there was no interchangeable classification of race and religion/belief, one could assume that this was due to the separation within the design of the questionnaire of race/ethnicity and religion/belief. Nonetheless, the interchangeable nature of the respondents from this study coincided with the findings of the EIA concerning the shifting between race and ethnicity. The choice of the EIA to include colour, nationality, national origins and ethnicity within the terminology of Race has interesting connotations, not least in the reporting and identification of hate crime. As I touched on briefly in Chapter Two, what must
give pause for thought is the separation of crime descriptive. How can we know if someone is attacked because they are believed to be Muslim due to their skin colour, or whether there is an assumption regarding the intersectionality of race and religion? Also, as I mentioned in Chapters Three and Four when considering Liverpool’s Black and Irish communities who have previously been constructed as suspect because of the rates of crime associated with them (Stafford and Galle, 1984), I would suggest that Muslims are now portrayed as ‘suspect’ due to the fear of radicalisation and extremism that has resulted in them being constructed as ‘other’ (see Lynch, 2013).

How race and class intersect is something this research will examine by exploring the lived realities of the respondents. Given the importance of language and description, the self-description of religious affiliation would also seem an important construct to consider. As such, religious affiliation was also self-classified by the respondents in order to examine the variations.

The next figure (Figure 7) shows the self-classification of respondents’ religious affiliation. The majority of the respondents indicated that they were Christians, with the three largest responses Church of England, Catholic and Christian. However, there were a number of blank responses, as well as less conventional responses, which may not be present on a standard diversity forms, such as membership of the Church of Rock and Roll, a first nation American who categorised herself as Native American or a scientist who classified his religion simply as Physics. This variation in self-classification indicates that people may not self-identify within constructed boundaries. Each individual is exactly that, individual, and therefore how they label themselves may be outside identified parameters, even if the identified parameters
classed them within the same category. Taking time to allow for a more nuanced self-description identified differences that otherwise may be scoffed at, making light of the individual’s right to individuality.

*Figure 7 Self-Classification of Religious Affiliation by Respondents*

The variation in self-attached labels regarding religion and belief from within the respondent pool was sixteen different descriptions in a small sample pool of sixty. The following figure (Figure 8) shows the self-classification of respondents concerning their religious affiliation separated into the two geographical areas under study (GAUS). As we can see, within PPW there was more diversity within the classifications with fourteen identified categories. SGW has less diversity, with
seven identified categories and two dominant groups, Church of England and Agnostic.

*Figure 8 Self-Classification of the Respondents’ Religious Affiliation in the 2 GAUS*

The majority of the respondents from the phase one random sampling in this research were primarily white/British. This is in line with the census data from both areas, which show that the largest single identified group in PPW was white, English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Ireland accounting for 47.2% of the population. SGW was also white, British accounting for 95.41%. The census indicates that these figures are in line with the North West regional average of 87.1%, and the national average of 79.8%.
Although PPW is the most racially/ethnically diverse ward in Liverpool, what was interesting to me is that it was only slightly minority dominant. 47.2% identified as ‘white’, with 52.3% identifying as ‘non-white’. By choosing to use convenience random sampling I was able to get a greater understanding of the geographical areas in question. As researcher, I was able to reflect personally about the area dynamics, and was surprised they were so evenly matched. I had previously believed PPW had far more minorities than people who identified as ‘white’, based on my experience of the area within my own family and social group. Phase one was designed to inform phase two and, as such, it did. However, the use of random convenient samples also had its drawbacks, as it meant that the gatekeepers were unable to target specifically non-Muslim minorities, who were the specific group under study in phase two, as the samples were random.

The national census data indicated that SGW and the PPW both had a below average population of Indian/Indian mixed groups, with the national average 2.06%, SGW 0.19% and PPW 1.1%. Speke did however nearly match the national average for mixed white/Black African: the national average is 0.3% and SGW is 0.27%. PPW was above the national average, with 3.7%. SGW also had a lower than national average of Black/African/Black/British: the national average is 1.8% and SGW is 0.2%. PPW, on the other hand, is far higher than the national average, accounting for 9.6% of its population (Census data –Ethnic Group KS06).

The results of the participant responses were unexpected in PPW, an area that had been selected specifically for its diversity, with the majority of the respondents describing themselves within the white/British category. Examining the census data shows that even though the Black/Black-mixed groups are higher than the national
average in PPW, as a single identifying group the white/British population was the largest. These findings were vital in allowing me the chance to reflect on my own preconceived understanding of the population of PPW/SGW and the data, in order to shape the second phase of data collection. Understanding identity, how people perceive their own and shared realities, is important within this research, as I am examining how policy can affect people’s perceptions of themselves and society around them.

Recoding the Data

Due to the relatively small number of respondents (p=60) the data was recoded in order for an analysis to be effective, by limiting the considered codes. Initially the respondents’ responses were graded using the Likert system as I previously discussed. The responses were then entered into and coded using the SPSS 20 programme: disagree strongly/disagree were coded to rejecting the statements, do not know was coded as neutral, and agree/strongly agree were was coded as accepting the statements. This was done to look for any pattern in the responses and to examine whether the respondents agreed in principle with the statements or disagreed with them. The education achievement of the respondents was also recoded into two coded levels on the SPSS programme. The code ‘school’ was used to categorise any respondent that had a basic school-level education, and ‘higher education’ was used to encompass college, university and post-graduate education. Again, this was done due to the small numbers within each category. As the following graph indicates, there were, for example, no respondents from SGW who had attended university, and so having a code which encompassed all higher education seemed logical.
As the chart shows, there was a higher level of educational achievement in PPW from within the respondent pool, although both areas are school-level dominant in comparison with higher education. As a point of interest, the gatekeepers, specifically in SGW, reported that there was a problem with adult literacy. The gatekeepers reported that they had had to explain a lot of the terminology used in the questionnaire to a number of the respondents due to a lack of language comprehension. The complexity of language within policy was not something that I had considered as being problematic from a research position. Again, this phase of the research facilitated a reshaping of the phase two data collection concerning the use of language. Due to this, phase two was re-evaluated and reshaped, a point I discuss further later.
Educational achievement has been linked to social mobility (Haveman and Smeeding, 2006; Deary et al., 2005) and although there have been strides to correct the inequalities concerning access to higher education, there seems to still be a huge class gap (Wilkins and Burke, 2015). When reporting on the increase in university numbers and the increase in female participation at university over two decades ago, Blackburn and Jarman suggest:

> Turning to class inequality the position is depressing. There is still a strong class differential among both men and women, and little has changed despite the large expansion of provisions. At least there is still a large untapped pool of ability for the current expansion, this time based more on class than gender. It will be interesting to see how far this pool is tapped (Blackburn and Jarman, 1993: 211).

This data indicated that in the two areas under research consideration there seemed very little shift towards higher education (HE), especially in SGW. Blanden and Machin (2004) suggest that the lack of education expansion within poorer socio-economic areas may be due to policy. Their study looked at changes in higher education over three time periods and examined the temporal shift in participation, attainment and income groups. They suggest:

> The key finding is a highly policy relevant one, namely that HE expansion has not been equally distributed across people from richer and poorer backgrounds. Rather, it has disproportionately benefited children from relatively rich families (Blanden and Machin, 2004: 230).
This suggestion is reiterated by research by Pennell and West (2005: 127) who contend that financial problems are often cited as being the reason young people from poorer socio-economic backgrounds do not continue into higher education. Financial constraints, alongside a need for immediate financial gratification from employment, may be the reason why poorer socio-economic areas such as PPW and SGW have lower higher educational achievements in comparison to school achievements. However, the figures in this research are small and therefore inference cannot be draw from them regarding wider society, or even the city of Liverpool as a whole. It is just interesting to note, given that class is mentioned throughout the phase two data as being a major determinant of life choices from the respondents, which I will discuss in the phase two analysis.

Nonetheless, as this phase one was a rerun of the previous pilot study phase one (p=60), comparisons can be made between the pilot study and this to examine differences, if any, between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents concerning the statements made in Prevent, and the statements constructed to investigate community attitudes. In the next section I will compare and contrast the responses to the statements on the questionnaire between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, from both this study and the pilot study.
5.2 Comparing Muslim and non-Muslim Responses: Phase One

Table 1 Comparison Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination of Groups</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>The UK faces a range of terrorist threats. The most serious is from Al Qaeda, its affiliates and like-minded organisations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non School Muslim</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Toxteth</td>
<td></td>
<td>%within</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speke Count</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%within</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%within</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Toxteth</td>
<td></td>
<td>%within</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speke Count</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%within</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%within</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Toxteth</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%within</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speke Count</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%within</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%within</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim School School from Liverpool</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Muslins</td>
<td></td>
<td>%within</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%within</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Muslins from Liverpool</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Muslins</td>
<td></td>
<td>%within</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%within</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Toxteth</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Muslins from</td>
<td></td>
<td>%within</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%within</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 shows the dependent variable (DV), membership of the Islamic faith or non-membership of the Islamic faith, alongside the geographical area under study (GAUS) and the acceptance or rejection of the statements, which were taken from Prevent (2011:19), which states:

_The UK faces a range of terrorist threats. The most serious from Al Qaeda, its affiliates and likeminded organisations._

Comparing the non-Muslim to the Muslim responses, one can see that the majority of the Muslim respondents, 75.0%, reject this statement. We can also see that the non-Muslim participants have the highest percentage of acceptance concerning the statement, with a combined percentage of 55.0. Variations between the areas PPW/SGW are comparatively small and statistically insignificant. However, the figures do indicate that school education level shows the greatest disparity between the two areas, with 23.1% rejecting the statement from PPW and only 6.7% rejecting it from SGW. Comparing these figures to the Muslim respondents, it is dramatically different, with 8.3% of Muslims accepting the premise of the statement with 75.0% rejecting it. The figure for neutrality within the Muslim respondents is 16.7% and with the non-Muslim respondents from both areas 21.7%.

Comparing the findings to the educational achievement of the participants, one can see that acceptance of the statement between the educational levels of non-Muslim respondents is very small, with 57.1% in the school education category and 53.1% in the higher education category accepting the premise of the statement. If we compare this to 3.2% of Muslims with school education and 13.8% with higher education, we can see the Muslim respondents with higher educational achievement were more likely to reject the premise of the statement. The data therefore indicates
that the largest influence on the respondents’ acceptance/rejection/neutrality regarding the proposition in statement one is religious affiliation.

This, again, is not surprising, given the impact on Muslim communities throughout Britain of counter-terrorism/radicalisation targeting. Research by Murray, Muller, Johnson and Sherman (2015) looked at evidence-based policing of Muslim communities in order to link the confidence in policing with areas that were outlined as vulnerable to violent extremism. They used census data to map areas that had been designated high, medium or low risk based on intelligence data. They suggested that:

Muslim respondents have lower levels of confidence in the police than other ethnic minority groups, their confidence levels are even lower in areas where intelligence suggests the greatest risk of extremist violence (Murray, Muller Johnson and Sherman, 2015: 1).

The majority of the non-Muslim respondents classified themselves within the ‘white’ majority. It would be interesting to re-run this questionnaire amongst non-Muslim minority groups, only in order to see if the lack of confidence in the authorities was more in line with Muslim respondents. However, due to time restraints, this was not possible, although may be considered for further research.
Table 2 Comparison Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 2.

Table 2 shows the DV, membership or non-membership to the Islamic faith, GAUS and the acceptance/rejection of the proposition in statement two, taken from Prevent (2011:20), which states:

*The threat from terrorists in Northern Ireland has increased significantly over the past two years.*
The data shows that, concerning the second statement, both the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents’ acceptance of the statement is low across all the groups. The neutral category, however, is high in the Muslim respondent group, with 55.0% of them expressing neutrality on the statement. There is not a large difference between PPW and SGW concerning acceptance of the statement, with a combined total of 25.0%. This is also true when considering a rejection of the statement: 35.0% of Muslims rejected the statement, and similarly 31.7% of the non-Muslim respondents rejected the statement. Liverpool, as I have previously discussed in Chapter Three, has had a somewhat tumultuous relationship with Ireland and Irish identity.

The city itself, although never targeted by the IRA, has seen sectarian violence (Belcham, 1994; Neal, 1990). Belcham (1999) suggests that Liverpudlians, unlike other migrant Irish communities, have retained their unique Irish identities, contending:

> An underclass unable, unwilling or unsuited to take advantage of opportunities elsewhere, they retained a kind of Irishness which others were quick to shed or disown (Belcham, 1995:5).

The retention of the Irish identity within the city could be suggested as one of the reasons the fear of Irish violence was limited, with the fear of the known, rather than the fear of the unknown, influencing perceptions. As I discussed in Chapter Two, the fear of the unknown and the fear of the other are far stronger drivers than fear of something which is more commonplace.
Table 3 shows the DV, membership of the Islamic faith, GAUS and the acceptance or rejection of the proposition of the statement from Prevent (2011: 18), which states:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination of GAUS</th>
<th>Support for extremism is significantly associated with a perception of discrimination and the experience of racial or religious harassment. It is also associated with a negative view of policing.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non School Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Support for extremism is significantly associated with a perception of discrimination and the experience of racial or religious harassment. It is also associated with a negative view of policing.

The dependent variable of religious affiliation indicated that, for concerning statement three, there was a divergence in opinion between the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. 70.0% of non-Muslims agreed with the statement. The figures indicated that within this sample the respondents with a lower level of educational achievement were more likely to accept the statement, with the highest percentage (82.1) in the school educated category. In comparison to the Muslim respondents, the data indicates that the majority 78.3% reject the statement. Only 1.7% accepted it in the higher education category, with no acceptance from any respondents in the school category. There was little divergence between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents within the neutral category.

The responses to statement three indicate that the variable which has the most impact on the data is the category of religious affiliation. Again, these findings between groups may have been different if the non-Muslim respondents had been drawn from a minority only pool, again something for future research to investigate.
Table 4 Comparison Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 4

Radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process, it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-related activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination of GAUS</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>reject statement</th>
<th>accept statement</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslim School Location</td>
<td>Toxteth</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speke Location</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Location</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education Location</td>
<td>Toxteth Location</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speke Location</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Location</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim School Location</th>
<th>Muslims from Liverpool Location</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>reject statement</th>
<th>accept statement</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toxteth</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speke</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 shows the DV, membership of the Islamic faith, the GAUS and the respondents’ acceptance or rejection of statement four from Prevent (2011: 8), which states:
Radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-related activity.

Table 4 indicates once again that there is a divergence in opinion between the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. Acceptance of the statement among the non-Muslim participants in the two areas is a majority 65.0%. This subdivides with a higher acceptance in the category of higher educational achievement, 78.1%, and school educational achievement, 50.0%. Acceptance among the Muslim respondents is significantly lower, with 6.5% in the school subsection and 6.9% in the higher education subsection, totalling 6.7% who accept the statement. Comparing these figures to the rejection of the statement, we can see that, as a group, the non-Muslim respondents reject the proposition, at a combined level of 6.7%.

This is diametrically different from the Muslim respondents, who rejected the proposition at a combined level of 70.0%. The separation between PPW and SGW is slight throughout the categories, and as such I have found only a subtle divergence between the two. The figures once again indicate, however, that the most influential variable within the data was religious affiliation. The separation of opinions between the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents once again indicates an antipodal opinion. As I have mentioned previously, it would be interesting to see if a pool of minority respondents showed the same results compared to the Muslim respondents.
Table 5 shows the DV, membership of the Islamic faith, the GAUS and the respondents’ acceptance or rejection of statement five from Prevent (2011: 63), which states:

*In the UK, evidence suggests that radicalisation tends to occur in places where terrorist ideology and those that promote them go uncontested and are not open to free, open and balanced debate and challenge.*
Table 5 shows that the majority of Muslim respondents, 61.7%, are unsure of the statement, and have chosen the neutral/don’t know category. Acceptance was 11.7% and rejection of the statement was 26.7% from Muslim respondents. There was very little divergence between the educational levels of the Muslim respondents, with less than 5.0% difference across the school and higher educational categories. The non-Muslim respondents, however, accepted the statement with a combined 55.00%. This figure was evenly split between both PPW and SGW. The educational achievement categories of school and higher education had less than a 5.0% difference across the groups.

There was some variation between the location variable in the school educational categories, but this was not statistically significant. The emerging pattern within the data indicates that the most influential dependent variable was, again, religious affiliation. The separation of opinions between the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents indicates that the Muslim respondents are either far less sure regarding the causality of radicalisation identified within the statement than the non-Muslim respondents, or far less willing to comment on their opinion. If we consider how Muslims globally have been constructed as other, with an increase in discourse around Islam and terrorism, it might not be to unrealistic to suggest that maybe the lack of opinion could be a strategic position, concerning an area in which Muslims have been vilified and subject to scrutiny.
Table 6 Comparisons Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination of GAUS</th>
<th>Approval of violent extremism is higher amongst young people and people from lower socio-economic groups.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>reject statement</td>
<td>accept statement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslim School</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toxteth</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 23.1%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speke</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 26.7%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 25.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 11.8%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speke</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 13.3%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 12.5%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 16.7%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speke</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 20.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 18.3%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim School</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 38.7%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 38.7%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 48.3%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 48.3%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 43.3%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 43.3%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 shows the DV, membership of the Islamic faith, the GAUS and the respondents’ acceptance or rejection of statement six from Prevent (2011: 16), which states:

*Approval for violent extremism is higher amongst young people and people from lower socio-economic groups.*

The analysis of statement six indicates that both the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents accept the statement that approval of extremism is higher amongst young people and lower socio-economic groups. This is the first statement in which we have seen a parallel of opinion amongst Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, with 50.0% of Muslims and 51.7% of non-Muslims agreeing. Nonetheless, there is still a disparity in the rejection category, as 30.0% of non-Muslim and only 6.7% of Muslim respondents reject the premise of the statement. We also see that with 43.3% of Muslim respondents aligning themselves in the neutral category, opposed to only 18.3% of non-Muslim respondents. Muslim respondents once again are far more reticent to reject the statement. Further investigation would be needed to understand the cause of this.

Examination of the education category indicates that there is a very slight difference between the school and higher education subgroups within both the Muslim and non-Muslim respondent groups. The two GAUS also show a slight difference, but given the small numbers of respondents no inferences can be made. The emerging pattern, once again, is that the most influential dependent variable within the data is religious affiliation. The variation in opinion between the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents once again indicates that the Muslim respondents were either less sure regarding the support for radicalisation identified within the statement than
the non-Muslim respondents, or they were unwilling to commit themselves to a position that may be seen as critical of the policy.

*Table 7* Comparison Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination of GAUS</th>
<th>Location Toxteth</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within Location</th>
<th>Counts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non Muslim School</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Reject statement</td>
<td>Accept statement</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speke</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim School</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Reject statement</td>
<td>Accept statement</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speke</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td></td>
<td>% within Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows the distribution of responses to the statement among Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, categorized by location and educational background, with counts and percentages for neutral, reject, and accept statements.
Table 7 shows the DV, membership of the Islamic faith, the GAUS and the respondents’ acceptance or rejection of statement seven from Prevent (2011: 17), which states:

*Radicalisation occurs as people search for identity, meaning and community*

The analysis of statement seven’s data indicates acceptance for the statement amongst the non-Muslim respondents, with a majority 66.7%. There was no significant divergence between either the educational achievement of GAUS and the two GAUS themselves. Rejection of the statement was a combined 8.3% and neutrality a combined 25.0%. However, once again the data does show a divergence between the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. Acceptance of the statement was only 5.0% from the Muslim respondents, the majority 55.0% aligning themselves within the rejection category. The neutral category was also significantly higher than the non-Muslim respondents, at 40.0%, and there was no significant difference between the educational subgroups.

The data indicates that the most influential variable within the data was, once again, religious affiliation. The variation in opinion between the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents indicates that the Muslim respondents are either less sure regarding the support for radicalisation identified within the statement than the non-Muslim respondents or, once again, they may be reticent to commit to a position that criticises the assumptions within the policy. Throughout the analysis of the data, the Muslim respondents have indicated the neutral/don’t know option more than non-Muslims. This would indicate that the non-Muslim respondents are more likely to express an opinion regarding a statement than their Muslim counterparts.
Table 8 shows the DV, membership of the Islamic faith, the GAUS and the respondents’ acceptance or rejection of statement eight, which is a constructed question and states:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination of GAUS</th>
<th>Over the last decade relationships between minority groups and government agencies such as the police, have improved.</th>
<th>reject statement</th>
<th>accept statement</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Muslim School</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Speke</td>
<td>% within Location 7.7% 38.5% 53.8% 100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Toxteth</td>
<td>% within Location 17.6% 47.1% 35.3% 100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speke</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Location Toxteth</td>
<td>% within Location 13.3% 73.3% 13.3% 100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speke</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim School</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Muslins</td>
<td>% within Location 58.1% 25.8% 16.1% 100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Liverpool</td>
<td>Count 18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58.1% 25.8% 16.1% 100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Muslins</td>
<td>% within Location 58.6% 17.2% 24.1% 100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Liverpool</td>
<td>Count 17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58.6% 17.2% 24.1% 100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Location Muslins</td>
<td>% within Location 58.3% 21.7% 20.0% 100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Liverpool</td>
<td>Count 35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58.3% 21.7% 20.0% 100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Over the last decade relationships between minority groups and government agencies such as the police, have improved.

This is one of the first constructed questions, and with hindsight, given the majority of respondents in the current study came from a non-minority background, could have been phrased differently. However, had the statement been changed, I would not have been able to compare the findings to the pilot study. In addition, like the Muslim respondents, I was unaware, at the time of constructing the questionnaire, what the ethnic/race respondent breakdown would have been, due to convenience sampling. The table indicates that the response from non-Muslim respondents is split, with less than 2.0% separating the reject category (43.3%) and the accept category (41.7%). There is also very little split between the two GAUS, as well as between all the categories of educational achievement.

However, once again the Muslim respondents’ highest response figures are in the neutral/do not know category, with 58.3%. The two accept and reject categories are both similarly matched, with less than 2.0% difference between them: accept is 20.0% and reject is 21.7%. In line with the previous statements, a pattern has emerged showing that the most influential variable within the data is religious affiliation. The data also indicates that the Muslim respondents are less sure about improvements over the last decade in relations between minority group members and state authorities such as the police. I would contest what must be considered is the position of the Muslim respondents with regard to the focus over the previous decade on risk and Islam.

The large non-committal category allowed within the questionnaires has been utilised by the Muslim respondents more than the non-Muslim respondents. As we
have previously mentioned, this could be due to the reticence of the Muslim respondents to position themselves in opposition to, in this instance, the police. This is a possible area for research expansion, given that free speech and opinion may be limited if the individual feels threatened or unable to challenge policy or voice concern, due to a heightened awareness about their place within a society that treats them as other.

*Table 9 Comparison Between Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents (Current Study) Concerning Statement 9*
Table 9 shows the DV, membership of the Islamic faith, the GAUS and the respondents’ acceptance or rejection of statement nine, another constructed statement, which states:

*Islamophobia is not the same as other forms of discrimination or racism.*

Table 9 shows the strongest opinion by Muslim participants, with an acceptance of the statement of 93.3%. Only 6.7% of Muslim respondents rejected the statement, and non-Muslim respondents chose the neutral category with the response ‘don’t know’. The majority of non-Muslim respondents disagreed with their Muslim counterparts about the statement, and over half, 53.3%, rejected the premise. Unlike the Muslim respondents, there was also a split between the accept category (20.0%) and the neutral category (26.7%). There was no significant difference between the GAUS or in the data concerning educational achievement. Islamophobia is a targeted discrimination directed towards members of the Muslim faith and, as such, one must assume this has influenced the response of the Muslim respondents who are at risk from such discrimination. Over 93.0% in both the school and higher educational categories agreed that Islamophobia was not the same as other forms of racism or discrimination.

In the pilot study (see Appendix 10) this question was investigated further during the qualitative phase. A number of participants described Islamophobia as different because of a dominant discourse that constructed Muslims as different. As an example of the statements from the pilot study (Peatfield, 2012), I have chosen a few which represent the majority, in order to place these findings in some sort of context. These statements are taken from the second phase of the pilot study, the semi-structured interviews, but they address the topic of Muslim representation in
the media and Islamophobia, the media being identified as promoting the
Islamophobic narrative. The first statement comes from Nasrin, who told me:

Okay, I erm, feel that the media needs to cut down on a lot of this
Islamophobia, erm, you get it like non-Muslims are bombarded with
media erm like bad images and perceptions of Muslims, 99% of it is not
true, it’s elaborated.

Similarly, Amir talked about media representations fuelling Islamophobia by
constructing Muslims as different and other, saying:

Do you think we are treated the same by the media or say the TV? Then

nope, we most definitely are not.

Kadhir talked about the differentiation of Muslims from wider society, even when
the narrative was supportive. He contended:

Even when they say that they are trying help they not helping, all they
are doing is drawing attention to us and making people think that we
are different, when not different, we just have a different faith.

Araham suggested the framing of the ‘problem’ of radicalisation and terrorism
highlighted the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims. He suggested:

The public perception of our differences is so acute because they keep
getting those differences pushed in their face rather than pushing our
similarities.
Finally, this comment by Zenia summed up the overall narrative from the pilot study respondents in phase two, when she spoke of how alone many Muslims felt and how they felt abandoned by their state:

*It’s as if Islamophobia doesn’t count because it’s only us after all.*

The differences between Muslim and non-Muslim were blamed for somehow removing the legitimacy of Islamophobia as a form of discrimination. However, like other targeted faith groups, British Muslims have had some legislative protection with other faith groups, such as Jews and Christians, through the Racial and Religious Hate Crime Act 2006. Notwithstanding this, this research will investigate what happens if a misidentification as a Muslim based on racial characteristics is the reason for Islamophobic targeting. Does that crime fall into the faith hate category or the race hate category? The dominant group of hate crimes, statistically, is race hate crime. What is unknown is how many race hate crimes are caused due to a racialisation of Islam, and a misidentification of the victim as Muslim. Statistics from the crime survey of England and Wales show that 82% of hate crimes recorded in England and Wales in 2014/2015 were race hate crimes and 6% were religiously motivated hate crimes. However, it is also believed that many hate crimes have more than one motivating factor. The complexity of trying to separate motive is often therefore impossible, leaving a gap in the knowledge regarding causality. This, again, is something this research hopes to address, by considering the construction of identity and the way that identity is perceived.
Table 10 shows the DV, membership of the Islamic faith, the GAUS and the respondents’ acceptance or rejection of statement ten, the final constructed statement, which states:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination of GAUS</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Toxteth</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within Location</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>reject statement</th>
<th>accept statement</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non Muslim School</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Toxteth</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speke</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Toxteth</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Toxteth</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speke</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Toxteth</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim School</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Toxteth</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Liverpool</td>
<td>Muslins</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Muslins from</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>72.4%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Liverpool</td>
<td>Muslins</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Muslins from</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A person’s faith determines their treatment by state agencies such as the police, more so than their skin colour or economic class.

Table 10 indicates that once again there is a split between the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. The majority of Muslim respondents agree with the statement that faith determines one’s treatment by the state more so than other factors such as skin colour or class, with 68.3% in agreement. Given the increase of suspicion of Islam and its followers over the past two decades, it is not surprising that the Muslim respondents would think this. As one of their primary aspects of identity, faith and association to faith were high within their cognitive framework, and as such within their social realities. It was unsurprising, then, that the majority saw discrimination towards Islam taking centre stage.

However, over half of the non-Muslim respondents, 51.7%, rejected the statement, which is again unsurprising, given they were not Muslim, and so Islamophobia was not as high in their cognitive framework. There was not much difference either between the GAUS or between the variable of educational achievement throughout the groups. Similarly to statement nine, the non-Muslim respondents were split between 20.0% accepting, with the second highest response in the neutral group.

**Conclusion**

Throughout the analysis, it was clear that the dominant variable was the difference in the respondents from the pilot study and the current study’s religious status. This was not considered problematic regarding the next phase of the research, as the second phase would not be engaging with Muslim respondents. Nonetheless, the identification of a clear split between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents does
pose questions for future research. such as, why do some British Muslims feel disconnected from British society when they have a good sense of Britishness, and fear terrorism the same as other members of society? One answer, I would suggest, is the legislation itself. The Muslim respondents understood and were far more aware of legislation than the non-Muslims questioned. This could be due to the fact that legislation such as Prevent was directed at them by the inclusion and focus on Islamic-inspired terrorism and radicalisation. The legislation had, in a sense, created the sense of suspicion surrounding Muslims, while at the same requiring Muslim cooperation to be an effective counter-radicalisation strategy. Muslims in Britain, therefore, were constructed as both the problem and solution. The non-Muslims were simply not aware of the policy, as it did not affect them as much. Unlike their Muslim counterparts, they were not labelled by the policy, and so the need to be aware of it was not as great.

What was also evidenced was that there was no clear split between the two geographical areas under study. The results from both PPW and SGW showed no asymmetry. This may have been due to the random convenience samples used and the fact that the majority of the respondents were part of the dominant white population in Liverpool. Rather than getting a specific minority opinion regarding the propositions, the dominant white population were not affected by discrimination to the same level as either the Muslim respondents and/or other minority groups. Although this phase of the research was used to simply inform the second phase concerning the population, and in some ways the researcher’s position, there is no theoretical or methodological dilemma caused by the choice of participants, as the second phase uses only minority respondents from both GAUS.
The choice to use minority respondents in phase two will allow a direct comparison of two minority groups, with a specific focus on faith. This will allow me to determine if it is faith membership or minority race status that impacts on the position of the respondents, regarding their experiences of counter-radicalisation/terrorism legislation. It will also allow me to examine how, from a minority perspective, faith and race may intertwine, becoming problematised within policy. The term Islamophobia was created to specifically describe discrimination based on faith, however, one of the points this research is seeking to examine is how race and faith connect. Is the discrimination faced by many Muslims based on a rejection due to fear-mongering and labelling in policy, or is it a simple case of racism, revitalised by a new element?

By using minority respondents in phase two, I can investigate this in more detail by drawing a comparison between the experiences of Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. Nonetheless, the positionality of the respondents was an interesting point to consider within this phase of the research. Examining both the pilot study data and this current phase, it is quite clear to see that there is a split between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents regarding neutral categories within the questionnaire. This may have been due to the sample size and the areas the respondents were drawn from. However, I would suggest that this use of the neutral category does show some patterning. The Muslim respondents were far more likely to either present themselves as either agreeing with a proposition or being neutral towards a proposition, rather than disagreeing with it directly if that statement could be perceived as provocative. This can be evidenced if we examine statement five, which suggests that in the UK, evidence suggests that radicalisation tends to occur
in places where terrorist ideology and those that promote them go uncontested, and are not open to free, open and balanced debate and challenge.

The neutral category for the Muslim respondents represents over 61% of the responses. Comparing the Muslim responses to non-Muslim responses, it seems as if the Muslim respondents were far more hesitant to take a position regarding assumptions about counter-radicalisation. This is also the case throughout the policy assumption statements: there seems to be some hesitation in the Muslim respondents to position themselves. If this is then compared to the results from the non-Muslim respondents, they were far more likely to disagree or agree with statements rather than remaining neutral. The non-Muslim respondents were, in this sense, far more likely to position themselves in opposition to the propositions made by Prevent. This could be due to the targeting of Muslims by Prevent, as they are the only faith groups considered in the document, as I mentioned in Chapter One. This targeting may have impacted on their likelihood to publicly disagree with a proposition made by government, due to a now ingrained fear of reprisal through being labelled as radical.
Chapter Six: Identity, History and Race

Introduction

Identified from the analysis of the data, the themes of identity, history and place will be examined in this chapter, in order to place the respondents’ views concerning the effects of policy such as Prevent within context. The perceptions of policy and the lived realities of the respondents as members of minority groups growing up in Liverpool will be examined alongside the policy, to show how perceptions, coloured by experience, may diverge from the policy intent and meaning. How an individual’s identity is constructed and shaped by the social world in which they live will be examined, as it has the power to affect individual understanding. The analysis will examine the respondents’ experiences of historical tale telling, their shared group experiences and social narratives.

The first aspect of identity, history and race considered within the analysis was the recurrent topic of racism. As I discussed in Chapter Three, how an individual is categorised can potentially affect how they self-categorise. This is why it is important to consider the ways in which representation of groups within policy can affect them, in order to safeguard against stereotyping and negative profiling. This again brings us back to the research questions to ask what effect policy has had on the self-representation of people considered within the policy, or who identify themselves as within the ambit of policy.

Racism as a powerful and emotive subject is a topic that crosses over throughout the individual themes, and was described as being present in some form or another in the lives of all of the respondents. Racism and race was considered as influencing
the way in which all the respondents interacted with people from outside their own communities, as well as how they perceived their own place and identity within society. When considering the effect of modern government policy such as Prevent, the research must first consider what effect historical policy has had on the respondents in order to create a baseline.

6.1 Racisms and the Perspective of Change

The first of the identified categories considered is the respondents’ perceptions regarding a change in racism since the terror attacks of 9/11. Since 9/11 there have been numerous papers looking at the effect of the incident, and subsequent impact of the event on Muslim communities (Dodd, 2016; Spalek, 2016; Ericson, 2016; Alsultany, 2012). However, there has not been the same focus directed towards examining how this event affected other non-Muslim minorities living in Britain. When talking about their experiences after 9/11 and 7/7, the respondents reported that they perceived that the events had impacted on their day-to-day experiences, specifically concerning levels of racism experienced by them, and a change in racist terminology.

Talking about how racism has changed over her lifetime, Lilly-Ann, a respondent from PPW whose response was representative of the data, reported that after the disturbances in Liverpool during the 1980s, street\textsuperscript{13} and authoritative\textsuperscript{14} levels of racism had seemed to have improved somewhat throughout the 1990s. However, after 9/11 and the 7/7 bombings in London, things once again became challenging.

\textsuperscript{13} The term used within this research to mean racist abuse from the public.
\textsuperscript{14} The term used within this research to describe racism from either officers of the state, such as police, and policies that allow discrimination through exclusionary practises, such as, surveillance and interventions such as stop and search.
Lilly-Ann believed this was due, in part, to a shared suspicion that fell upon all minorities at that time. In Lilly-Ann’s opinion there was a misidentification of non-Muslim minorities as Muslim. When talking about incidents of racism pre- and post-9/11, and specifically the way those experiences had changed, Lilly-Ann suggested:

*I think it did for a while* [talking about racism calming down after the 1981 disturbances in Liverpool] *after the 80s, things started in the 90s to improve, but soon as 9/11 hit things went downhill fast. Anyone with a brown face was a terrorist. All the new SUSS laws came in and you could be pulled when they wanted so I think now racism is worse than ever, and I mean with the police force and the government... They’re getting away with it too as they are “protecting” (making air exclamation marks) us from nasty terrorists, of course who the hell is protecting us from them? Eh? No-one, if we try to protect ourselves from the state we are terrorists, radicals, yobbos whatever they want to spin we are.*

The respondents’ proposition that racism has increased through a linking of race and ethnicity, specifically membership of the Islamic faith, is important. As discussed in Chapter Three, group and individual identities are impacted by dominant constructions of risk and othering by the state. When Lee Rigby was killed in 2012 by two ‘Black’ male Islamic converts, I would suggest that faith and race were very publicly linked through the coverage of that event. An image of a Black man standing covered in blood was on most of the front pages of newspapers across Britain. Although this act was publicly criticised by many Muslims and
Muslim organisations, the primary identifying factor in the stories was that of an extremist Muslim linked visually with a minority. This imagery created a psychological linking and fed an implicit association with faith and race (Rannazzisi, 2014). This psychological linking continued through the trial of the offenders for months after the killing. Unsurprisingly, after the event the UK saw a rise in hate crime, which rose both in the faith hate category and also race hate category, which saw a peak in May 2016 of 2,017, up from 1,579 in the previous month (source: ONS Hate Crime England and Wales, data table 2013-14).

The separation of race hate and faith hate crime is a complex issue, as I discussed in Chapter Three, and determining which category in which to place an event can be problematic, due to an intersection of both (Wortley, 2003). Hughes (1945) found that race could often be the ‘overriding characteristic phenomenon’ (OCP), or as Becker (1963) suggested when talking about labelling theory, the ‘master status’. Considering master status as an aspect of a person’s identity, used as a primary identifier by others and sometimes the self, one may consider, alongside crime, other OCPs, such as race, gender or sexual orientation. Race, therefore, becomes the master status that can predetermine one’s treatment by agencies such as the police, and a criminalisation through negative and historical prejudice. Similarly, Sharp and Atherton (2007: 746) suggest that the extent of negative behaviour and misconduct by the police service towards young Black and minority ethnic (BME) groups. This suggests that race is still an important issue in police/suspect encounters. As I discussed in Chapters One and Three, minority

---

groups have been subject to historical labelling, and race has been used as an OCP in the criminal justice system. I suggest that labelling, in a sense, gives legitimacy to negative stereotyping and subsequent actions towards those constructed as suspect.

*Presenting and Policing Minorities*

I would suggest that a further area which underlines the need for the future to be informed by the past is the policing approach towards minority communities. Bowling and Phillips (2002:139) suggest that the use of punitive policing strategies, coupled with negative attitudes towards those within BME communities and the misuse of stop and search powers, all contribute to a negative association between BME communities and the police in general. A report for the Home Office found that trust in the court system was also lower in BME communities (Pennant, 2005). Reiner’s classic study ‘Cop Culture’ (2000) describes a service that was predominantly ‘white’ and male. Reiner suggested that this created a conservative, cynical, action-orientated and inward-looking approach, suffused with racial prejudice and machismo. An attempt to make the police service more diverse after the publication of the Macpherson report in 1999, and indeed since earlier reports such as the Scarman report in 1981, have failed to make any significant difference in police minority recruitment. A report by the Commission for Racial Equality on 8th March 2005 contended that although some progress had been made concerning minority recruitment into the police service, it was far from adequate, suggesting:

> There is no doubt that the police service has made significant progress in the area of race equality in recent years. However, there is still a long way to go… Willingness to change at the top is not translating into
action lower down, particularly in middle management where you find
the ice at the heart of the police service (Holland 2013:165).

The report by the Commission for Racial Equality (2005) is, however, a decade old, but looking at the current figures for Merseyside police the suggestion that the police service has a long way to go would still seem to be accurate. The Home Affairs Select Committee report into racial diversity in policing (House of Commons, 2016) suggested that there is still a lack of diversity within the police service, and the junior roles many BME officers hold could create an unconscious bias or an implicit association, saying:

The number of BME officers in police forces is increasing to some extent but this is largely limited to junior roles... The lack of senior BME representation in the police service affects its leadership and culture and could be interpreted as suggesting that the police service has an unconscious bias (House of Commons, 2016:17).

In relation to the research questions, specifically questioning the effect of an increased interest in counter-radicalisation/terrorism and the effect of policy such as Prevent, I believe it is critical to understand how much is known about the policy, and how policy like this is perceived, in order to assess its impact on those members of society who fit the criteria for vulnerability and are considered suspect. Racism through policing practises has been blamed for a lot of the discrimination that the respondents had experienced. This included Islamophobic discrimination through an implicit association of faith and skin colour. Again, the linking of race and ethnicity as a singular construct was considered in the Prevent Impact Assessment (2011), as I discussed in Chapter One. I would contend that it is therefore not much
of a stretch to believe that race and faith could be cognitively linked in this context. The misidentification of Muslims has meant that the majority of the respondents had at some point experienced a change in discriminatory terminology. James suggested that Islamophobia fell within the realms of racism, as it was simply a change in language rather than a change in target. He suggested:

The act of Islamophobia is the same as every other bigoted act, nothing new with the way that discrimination is being acted upon and such. They are rude and abusive in the same way as calling someone a Nigger they call someone Paki or dirty rag head now, dirty. When I was young, I was called many things by bad people. The one that stuck in my head was dirty. Dirty Nigger, dirty coon. Believe me it wasn’t the bad words, the cutting words that hurt, it was the dirty. My family is clean my mother kept a clean house and so that was the thing that hurt. You here people shouting dirty Paki at the girls in their hijabs now, man that is so wrong they are nice girls, quiet girls, good, clean girls.

The story from James is especially interesting, as it was the descriptor ‘dirty’ which offended him more than the racial slurs. When asked about the racist language directed at him, he later told me that that did not bother him. He knew his skin colour was beyond his control, he was happy with his skin colour and proud of his heritage. It was not so much that he was resilient to the racism, it was more he knew he could not do anything to change his skin tone, and nor did he want to. However, what he could not accept was people thinking he was dirty or poor, the association with poverty and race in some ways seeming to bother James far more than the actual racist terminology. Challenging his social status and the assumptions made
regarding people from lower socio-economic areas was something James had fought to do throughout his life, a point we will address in the next chapter, in the discussion regarding the drivers of radicalisation.

James was more concerned that the word dirty reflected on the level of care his mother gave him, and as such it insulted her not him. Similar to James, all of the respondents had come from economically challenged backgrounds\textsuperscript{16} and were sensitive to any class stereotyping. Throughout the interviews, when the respondents talked about economic challenges and their positions within society there seemed to be an innate pride in their working-class backgrounds, but a shame about the stigma associated to less economically affluent communities.

James, like many of the other respondents, had one ‘white’ parent, but from listening to the respondents’ stories it seems as if those parents who were ‘white’ and female had suffered far worse than their male counterparts. The older respondents with ‘white’ mothers all reported that their mothers had been subject to abuse far greater than they or their fathers had. The fact that the mothers were ‘white’ and the fathers ‘Black’ meant that the mothers had been treated as prostitutes. The respondents whose fathers were ‘white’ did face ridicule from other members of society, however the mothers and mixed-race children were often subject to much more. The fact that the morals of James’ mother were called into question for falling in love with someone from outside her ‘colour’ upset him. He

\textsuperscript{16} The terms poor or socially deprived are not used in this work, as they are rejected constructs. Many of the respondents and myself reject that terminology, as they/we may have had less money as children but were not poor. This was due to having loving families, enough food on the table and support structures. If wealth can be measured in many ways, so can deprivation.
suggested, in fact, that an attack on his family was worse to him than any personal attack he could ever face.

Nonetheless, discussing the importance of terminology when framing a subject, the older respondents suggested that the terminology of racism had seen a shift from the 1980s. As I discussed in Chapter Three, the framing of communities as problematic through the use of negative terminology presented ‘Black’ and mixed-race community members as questionable. Language and the effect of language was considered important by the respondents as it affected their legitimacy when either challenging their place and treatment within society, or their representation within society. The change in racist terminology, the respondents suggested, was in part due to laws which regulate discrimination. These laws had in some ways been self-defeating, because of the context in which language could be used. The importance of language specificity was discussed in Chapter Two, in particular arguing that how language is perceived is important to make sure that there is a shared meaning. One must be aware of the dynamics of language, and understand that often meaning can be dependent on one’s social, cultural, economic or educational position. When talking about historical racist language and the way it had been forced to change, Drew suggested:

*You call someone a Nigger now you run the risk of getting arrested.*

*Whereas you call someone a Paki you just say there’s a Paki fella, you get away with it because it’s short for Pakistani.*

However, the term ‘Paki’, rather than being used in its descriptive form to describe the place of someone’s birth, could also be used as a racist term by psychologically ‘accusing’ the individual of being less than British, by being Pakistani. This
race was able to engage with a range of age groups in order to example both older respondents’ opinions but also younger members of society. As such, the older respondents, like James, could draw on their own historical experience of racism to discuss how racist terminologies had changed through the decades, even though it was still a very active part of their modern-day lives. The younger respondents were well placed to discuss racism within a modern context, and many were also aware of some of the issues faced by their parents and grandparents previously in Liverpool. I examined, in Chapter Three, the representation of Liverpool, how Liverpool and its inhabitants have been framed. Understanding language, I would suggest, is crucial to grasp the impact of negative discourses, due to their power to influence policy and practice, and affect lived realities for marginalised groups.

The generational influence of racism was observed within the interviews in relation to the terminology of racism, specifically the problem of racism faced by the respondents coupled with the changing way in which racism was being presented to them through policy. Racism was a recurrent and dominant theme identified through the analysis. As I discussed in Chapter Two, understanding the way language is used, perceived and internalised is critical to understanding if there is a shared understanding of language. So why, after 9/11 and 7/7, did the respondents believe that racism had gotten worse for them? Was it simply a shift in racist language?

The 9/11 Effect

One of the largest and most commonly identified themes throughout the data was the belief by the respondents that Muslims were being racialised, that they had a
minority race group status attached to them post-9/11. As such, the increase in racism was believed, by the respondents, to be linked to a re-racialisation (Mac, Ghaill and Haywood, 2014) of Muslims, or a re-categorisation of a minority group’s ethnicity to Muslim. The re-racialisation of Muslims, or re-categorisation of BMR people, was one way to explain why minorities could be facing more discrimination after terrorist events, in the same way that many Muslims have reported a growth in Islamophobic hate crimes after such events (Feldman and Littler, 2014).

All of the respondents stated or implied at some point within their interviews that there was a ‘common sense’ assumption that Muslims were individuals of colour. Norris and Armstrong (1999: 123) concluded that colour-coded suspicion of terrorist-related surveillance over-focused on individuals with Middle Eastern, South Asian or Arabic features, as they were marked out as members of a ‘suspect community’ within British society. Patel (2012) suggests that brown bodies are a way to describe those individuals who were subject to suspicion based on their skin colour, which was not Black, since the term Black is arguably representative of the African/Caribbean communities only.

I would suggest that the analysis of this data has indicated that it is not just those individuals who may have Middle Eastern, South Asian or Arabic features who are constructed as suspicious and ultimately constructed as suspect, but also those minority groups that have traditionally faced historic discrimination within British society (Gilroy, 2013). The killers of Lee Rigby and the images of a ‘Black’ Muslim shared across the press, I would suggest, has done little to avert this implicit association. When talking about suspicion within society, Airyana, one of the respondents, an ex-police officer, simply remarked:
You’re guilty of having a black face.

The criminalisation of race (Ward, 2014), coupled with the othering of groups within society, has placed Muslims and non-Muslim minorities in a precarious position as ‘brown bodies’ (Patel, 2012). Spalek, El Awa and McDonald (2009) argue that brown bodies experience enhanced discrimination and unnecessary surveillance, and this negative labelling has the capacity to limit individual freedoms. Moral panics (Cohen, 1972; Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2009) created around suspect communities (Hillyard, 1993) are nothing new. Nevertheless, when combined with existing racial inequalities and disparities, one has to ask why it is that there have not been more radical Black activists/terrorists in British history. By asking those communities framed as vulnerable due to them meeting some of the criteria/drivers outline in Prevent, this research seeks to answer some of these challenging questions.

6.2 The Challenge of Re-Racialisation

Throughout this thesis I have talked about race, specifically skin colour. Before I talk more about race and racialisation, either negative or positive, it is important to point out again that the author personally rejects any categorisation by skin colour, and any skin colour descriptive mentioned in this paper should be read as being in inverted commas. However, as skin colour has the ability to influence both negatively or positively an individual’s choices within society (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 2005), it is something that must be considered.
Negative Re-Racialisation

The racialising of an individual’s ethnicity and the ‘brown bodying’ (Patel, 2012) of community members was a theme that was identified within the data in two specific ways. The first was the ‘negative racialising’ of a person. Within this research, the term negative re-racialisation has been coined to explain the way in which minority groups have historically, and one would argue the same is true today, faced more economic hardships concerning employment, as well as discrimination because of minority race membership. Previous work by Moosavi (2015) found that white converts to Islam were gaining minority membership by losing their ‘whiteness’ when they converted to Islam. This was reported to have occurred at both a personal and a social level for converts. Islam, it was contended, had been constructed within the social imagination as a minority-based faith. Moosavi suggests that ‘white’ Muslim converts to Islam are re-racialised as ‘not-quite-white’ because of the conflation of Islam as a ‘non-white’ religion.

Similarly, this research found that there was a ‘common sense’ understanding by all the respondents that Muslims were individuals from minority racial backgrounds. This point can be illustrated by Lilly-Ann who, when challenged about her use of the term race in relation to Muslims, argued that, like Jewish people, Muslims may not genetically be one race of people, but they have been constructed as such. Lilly-Ann contends that this is because the majority of Muslims in Britain come from Pakistan or Somalia, saying:

\[
\text{The fact is Pakistanis in this country and Somalian make up most of the Muslims, so they are ‘brown’, most people think all Muslims are ‘brown’…so whether they are ‘brown’, ‘black’ or fucking ‘coffee’}
\]
colour they are ‘brown’ people, people who look like they have too good a sun tan, like me. So it’s racism they are thought of as one people, one race with many colours in it.

The assumption throughout the respondents’ interviews concerning skin colour and faith membership indicated that all of the respondents associated membership of the Islamic faith with race, even though it was accepted that there could be ‘white’ Muslims. Race and faith were intersected within the respondents’ narratives, a point highlighted by Saakar, another respondent from PPW, who was the only respondent who was not mixed-race. Considering the racialising of Muslims, he was asked if there was an assumptive nature about race and faith. He replied yes, but then emphasised his point by using an example of a friend who had converted to Islam.

Saakar’s friend was ‘white’ and had worked in a position of authority in the arts in Liverpool for many years. When he had converted to Islam, Saakar suggested that he had lost his ‘whiteness’ in much the same way Moosavi (2015) reported other converts has lost their ‘whiteness’. Saakar went on to explain that his friend had eventually changed his name to an Islamic name, and with this name change had found that many doors that had once been open within the business community in Liverpool were firmly shut. Challenged about his assumptions (the loss of whiteness) during the interview, Sakaar suggested:

There is an assumption because most Muslims are not ‘white’, the majority are not ‘white’, that all are somehow not ‘white’. It’s an interesting thought as they are not a race but an ethnic group, but seriously does anyone differentiate really? Ethnicity, race it’s the same, it’s not, but ask anyone and they think it’s the same thing.
Moosavi (2012) suggests that not only is Islam considered a ‘non-white’ religion, but conversion to Islam is much more than a religious process. It is also a social one. The process of becoming Islamised through one’s membership of the Islamic faith can be portrayed as a betrayal of Western virtues and a deliberate disassociation from ‘mainstream culture’ (see Said, 1978). It is important how terminology is separated and categorised, because associations with those specific categories ultimately have power to present communities in a positive or negative light. I would suggest that rather than there being a clear distinction between terminologies, language is often subject to interpretation and, as such, words can overlap in meaning. This is why, as I mentioned in Chapter One, it is so important to have specifics within policy so there can be no ambiguity in meaning.

For example, if we consider the terminologies ethnicity/race, these have previously been identified in government research (The Prevent Strategy: Equality Impact Assessment, 2011) as overlapping terminologies rather than specifically different concepts. In the impact assessment, when discussing the effect of Prevent, there was no clear distinction between terminologies describing race, religion and belief. The research found that often language was interchangeable, stating:

Respondents often used the terms ‘race’ and ‘religion/belief’ interchangeably; as such the analysis of the comments received under these is included together. For the purposes of this EIA, Race has been taken to include colour, nationality, ethnic and national origins, in line with the Race Relations Act 1976 (The Prevent Strategy: Equality Impact Assessment, 2011: 6).
Similarly, this research found that in phase one of the data collection, when the respondents were asked to describe their ethnicity, they oscillated between race and ethnicity, often using both to describe themselves. This indicted that within the research sample there was either no distinction being made between the concepts by the respondents, or they had decided that they needed to use both to describe themselves fully. This highlights the complex nature of identity and self-categorisation.

The complexities of terminology were considered by Airyana, who suggested that race and ethnicity was intrinsically important when considering negative treatment, further arguing that the two concepts were linked routinely. Airyana suggested that the use of new terminology (*Islamophobia*) for an old problem (*racism*) was in itself problematic. She further suggested that there was an assumptive nature to modern racism, arguing that an extra element (*faith, specifically Islam*) had simply been added to an old mix of discrimination. She contended:

> It’s the colour of your skin, plain old racism. Now if you black you’re a Muslim.

The ‘negative’ association with skin colour was also considered by Brima, a respondent from SGW who, like the other respondents suggested that there was an assumption that Muslims were all from minority backgrounds. Brima himself misclassified Muslims, assuming Muslims wore turbans, saying:

> Most of the time you just think of like Indian type person or if you see them wearing a turban or whatever, you think to yourself they must be Muslims.
When informed that people who wear turbans are Sikh, Brima replied:

*I think most people don’t know that, I think it’s probably ignorance, but most people think if they are wearing a turban then they must be Muslims.*

Although one would hope that most people could differentiate between, for example, Sikhs, Muslims or Hindus, there have been incidents of misidentification with atrocious consequences. For example, the attempted murder of Sikh dentist Doctor Sarandev Bhambra in a Tesco supermarket in Mold, Wales on the 14\textsuperscript{th} January 2015. The assailant, Zack Davies, told onlookers that his attack was in response to the killing of Lee Rigby. Although Doctor Bhambra was not Muslim, Zack Davies told the police, ‘I knew he wasn’t Muslim but they looked the same’. He was also reported to have told police the militant extremist Jihadi John\textsuperscript{17} was an inspiration to him. In 2012, the *Guardian* newspaper also reported that Sikhs can often be misidentified as Muslim, and as such have faced an increase in Islamophobic attacks over the last decade. Balvinder Kaur Saund, a Labour councillor for the London Borough of Redbridge and chair of the Sikh Women’s Alliance, in an interview with the *Guardian* reported that it was a common occurrence to walk through a London estate to have young boys throw stones and shout ‘Taliban’ at her (Saner, 2012).

Throughout the interview’s respondents (Grace, Molly, Edward, Raymon, Brima, Isabella, Airyana, Drew, Saakar and Jazmin) talked of the ‘common sense’

\textsuperscript{17}Jihadi John, aka Mohammed Emwazi, is a British Arab extremist alleged to be the person seen in several videos produced by the Islamic extremist group ISIL, showing the beheadings of a number of captives.
assumption that Muslims belonged to minority groups. They also suggested that the
identification of Muslims was race based. They suggested that race was associated
with negative stereotyping, which had the capacity to impact massively on an
individual’s place within society. The idea that a group within society can be
targeted for their faith or their race status is long-standing. As discussed previously,
suspect community theory (Hillyard, 1993) has long proffered an explanation for
mistreatment based on a kind of societal fear of groups it does not recognise as
‘belonging’. Marginalised groups are somewhat outside the normative social
narrative and are therefore seen as other and feared, potentially leading to suspect
communities being ostracised and discriminated against.

Educational opportunities, employment and social mobility have all been affected
by race historically (Li and Heath, 2016). Nonetheless, the act of re-racialising is
not simply a recolouring of a person’s metaphorical skin, but a rethinking of their
place and role within society. Like Saakar’s friend who had converted to Islam
found, it was not just the faith of the individual that was called into question, but
their entire place and role within society that was ultimately challenged. Many of
the respondents contended that due to the negative presentation of Muslims,
Islamophobia was a form of racism that was being hidden underneath the label of
Islamophobia. This point can be emphasised by Isabella, who suggested:

*Muslims are the new Blacks in the sense that the open discrimination
has fallen on them... Muslims are a lot of the time, ‘black’ or ‘brown’
skinned people... they are just using that [faith] to have a go at a Black
person but from a different angle.*
Continuing her discussion around racism, Isabella contended that Islamophobia gave racists a way to remain racist without fearing any legal repercussions. She contended that Islamophobia was the new modern and more acceptable version of racism. This research does not of course suggest that any form of racism is acceptable. However, it has been suggested that there are some forms of racism that are more socially acceptable than others by the respondents. For example, the unintentionally incorrect use of terminology was seen as being unproblematic depending on the situation. Isabella’s comments regarding Islamophobia were representative of the interviews: she contended that legislation criminalising racism had forced racist opinions underground rather than stopping them. Holdaway and O’Neill (2007) suggest that when considering racism in the police, overt racism had been replaced with covert racism as a result of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry. The way racist terminology was framed and considered within policy was suggested by many of the respondents (Brima, Edward, Isabella, Jazmin, Drew, Grace and Saakar) as playing some part in the general public’s acceptance of racism.

Jazmin a respondent from PPW, suggested that modern-day Muslims were now facing a similar level of discrimination that the BME communities had been experiencing for decades. Speaking about the re-racialisation of Muslims into a minority race category, she suggested the process went much deeper. Not only was a person judged on their racial categorisation, but also on their faith and their community background, in a three-way intersection of discrimination criteria. In a sense, the respondents suggested that Muslims were experiencing a similar ‘stigma
consciousness\textsuperscript{18} (Wilton, Sanchez and Garcia, 2013) to that of ‘Black’ people historically. Research suggests that the most influential form of stigma consciousness is that of negative stigma (Pinel, 1999). This type of stigma has been shown to influence the way in which people perceive greater discrimination against themselves and others from their group or community. The respondents exhibited a high stigma consciousness, and as such believe that their group membership [\textit{minority status}] influenced their social interactions and experiences. Isabella, when discussing her perception that Muslims were now members of the Black mixed-race (BMR) community due to racialisation, highlights this point, saying:

\textit{Muslims get the stereotyping that Black people got years ago and now they are the new Black people, they are the new ones that it’s kind of ok to pick on a bit then blame them... I think white Muslims don’t get the same shit, I think it’s definitely still a race thing. So if they look brown they are Muslim, so they are doubly damned. Say ok they are brown, a Muslim and have maybe a foreign accent, they are triply damned. Say they talk scouse [Liverpool dialect] and they were Muslims and they were white, no one would care coz they [people in positions of power such as MPs or police officers] have something to identify with [skin colour].}

In a study investigating the ethnic and religious variations in the reporting of racist victimisation in Britain, Karlson and Nazroo (2014: 370-371) found that racism in Britain was a persistent force, with very little change in attitudes of prejudice

\textsuperscript{18} Stigma consciousness is a psychological term to explain when someone is prone to feeling stigmatised. Whether they are or not, it is the perception of stigma that counts.
between 1983 and 2003 (National Centre for Social Research, 2003). Their study suggested that the patterning of racism had changed regarding ethnic/religious variations between 2000 and 2009 in Britain. They found that in 2000, Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Irish and South Asian Christians were less likely to report experience of racist or religiously motivated victimisation than Caribbean Christians. However, in 2008/09 African, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims were more likely than Caribbean Christians to do so. The explanation for a shift in negativity toward religious rather than race hate was considered, and they suggested that:

The emergency legislation introduced since that time has served to define Muslim people in Britain as illiberal, ignorant and fanatical, perpetual semi-citizens unable and unwilling to resolve the (presumed) inherent contradictions between their commitments to Islamic and British lifestyles. The political and media response to events has given people ‘permission to hate’, making the negative treatment of Muslims more acceptable than that of other groups (Karlson and Nazroo, 2014: 370-371).

Karlson and Nazroo also contend that when compared to the discrimination faced by Black Caribbean Christians in Britain, Muslims still had quite a long way to go in order to compare with the levels of victimisation, saying:

Despite their increased exposure to victimisation over the period, Muslim people in the United Kingdom have yet to experience the racialisation characteristics of the treatment of Black Caribbean
Christians, which requires a more prolonged exposure to racist attitudes (Karlson and Nazroo, 2014: 370-371).

But what must be considered is, I suggest, the question of what happens if the forms of discrimination intersect with each other? Negativity towards Muslims compared to the negativity faced by BMR people was discussed by some of the respondents (Edward, Isabella, Drew, Edward, Raymon, Airyana and Saakar), who suggested that the negativity towards Muslims under the guise of religious discrimination was in some way permissible, due to the construction of Muslims as illiberal or fanatical (see Qureshi and Sells, 2003). In their opinions, BMR people had long been constructed as illiberal, and so a negative framing of BMR and BME communities was nothing new. In Chapter Three, I examined the way in which Martin Young described the Liverpool mixed-race community as ‘the products of liaisons between black seamen and white prostitutes’ on a BBC nationwide programme (Scraton, 2007: 26). This type of stereotyping, as somehow immoral or criminal, saw a dehumanising process which was shaped and perpetuated through the construction of policy at that time. Could it not be argued that policy such as Prevent, which is focusing on subsections of the British population, is simply doing the same?

Continuing the investigation concerning the construction of Muslims as illiberal and their separation in discourse through their faith status, there was a shared consensus (all of the respondents) throughout the data that hidden racism/racisms within society were an underlying cause of negativity and fear towards those perceived as foreign, and therefore suspect. When considering Islamophobia separately from race, and the way in which Muslims have been constructed within
popular discourse, Edward suggested it was the fear of the foreign that fuelled the discrimination of Muslims, through a continual focus on differences. He said:

*Let’s face it historically most Muslims were dark skinned its racism clear and simple. It’s like Islamophobia exists coz you think about Muslims, I’m sorry I don’t give a shit about them,* [Talking about people being defined by a religion] *I don’t, no one did, now it’s all people can think about. They are just people but they* [Talking about the media and the government] *have made an issue with their faith. It’s not the faith that blows things up is it?*

But of course, if one considers that there could be a re-racialisation of Muslims into a minority race category which includes all the associated ‘negative’ connotations, consideration must be given the idea that re-racialisation can happen in a ‘positive’ way. It was suggested by many of the respondents (Edward, Saakar, Isabella, Airyana, Brima, Jazmin, James and Grace) that a re-racialisation of minorities has been occurring within British society for many years already, both ‘positively’ and ‘negatively’. The fear of the foreign, the fear of being overrun by different cultures and the fear of the loss of Britishness (Smith and Pain, 2012) was part of the negative re-racialisation process, in juxtaposition to the loss of minority status. The loss of minority status was linked with the propagation of wealth, and considered a positive re-racialisation. This point was emphasised by James, who suggested:

*Once you get to a certain economic status there is no difference between black and white, it then becomes about economics.*
James’s suggestion was that minority status was removed once a certain level of economic saliency had been reached. He contended that to assume that it was not was harmful to poorer communities who maintained their suspect status. This was especially significant if those in positions of power had a misguided assumption that they spoke for poorer communities based on a shared cultural position or narrative. Edward used the example of Baroness Warsi, a Muslim Conservative who had previously spoken about poverty and Islamophobia, to demonstrate this, saying:

*Baroness fucking Warsi or whatever her name is, she’s a fucking conservative, she is more conservative than Cameron, what the fuck does she know about the struggle of poor Muslims in this country? Just coz she shares a faith she doesn’t share a social class or experiences of racism does she? She’s not just some poor nigger is she? Her money changes her status like I said before. She is no longer Muslim [her master status] she is rich [her new master status] … It’s interesting coz people like that try and tell me what Britishness is, how the fuck would they know? They aren’t British working class they are cocooned away from reality, given space afforded to them with fucking money.*

Edwards’s assumptions regarding Baroness Warsi and others from a non-traditional working-class background are mirrored by other respondents. A disconnect between the working class and those in political power was seen as problematic concerning policy and its implementation.
Positive Re-Racialisation

The second identified theme within the data concerning re-racialisation was a ‘positive re-racialisation’, based on position and economic income. Unlike the re-racialisation of Muslims into minority race groups, the losing of a minority status due to the propagation of personal wealth or power was seen as ‘positive’ regarding social mobility. In the same way that some people may be re-racialised due to their membership of the Islamic faith, there was a loss of faith categorisation as well as a loss of minority race status when individuals switched to a ‘positive’ position of power. The recategorisation from Muslim to non-Muslim or from a minority to non-minority race status, and subsequently into the ‘white’ category, was understood by the respondents as affording those individuals new privileges. In this research, the term privilege is being used when we consider the levels of high unemployment among the BME groups in comparison to non-minority populations, as well as educational differences (see Rafferty, 2012; Franklin, Slate and Joyner, 2012).

There was also a perception by some of the respondents (Molly, Lilly-Ann, Edward, Isabella, Grace, Jazmin, Brima, Raymon, Saakar, Airyana and James) that somehow, once an individual was re-racialised or their master status was changed, that this would afford them greater options within British society. The propagation of wealth or success was conceived as the way one was able to change one’s master status. The change in status would, they believed, eliminate many of the day-to-day problems. The master status concept has been addressed in relation to gang membership (Miethe and Corkle, 1997), and one could proffer the idea that one’s primary master status can also be associated with race status. In a study by Aspinall
and Song (2012) using British social surveys, they found that race as a master status had been replaced somewhat by faith status, suggesting:

In Britain race appears to have been undermined by the rise of ‘Muslim’ identity, the increasing importance of ‘mixed-race’, and the fragmentation of identity is now increasingly interwoven with other attributes like religion (Aspinall and Song, 2012: 548).

If, as this research suggests, non-Muslim minorities are being re-categorised as Muslim whilst Muslims are being ‘negatively’ re-racialised as minorities, both groups are facing an increase in discrimination based on an intersection of two categories used as a discrimination predictor. The respondents rejected the assumption within policy that somehow both ‘Black’ and ‘white’ individuals were afforded the same opportunities. Throughout the interviews, there was a consensus from the respondents regarding re-racialisation. The assumption was that a negative re-racialisation occurred for poorer people, and a positive re-racialisation occurred when individuals gained significant financial success. If you were poor you were within the suspect group, and if you were wealthy, you left that group even though your wealth and position gave you more access/time to engage in radical behaviour. Success was not specifically constrained to financial success, but success also was considered in terms of celebrity. As an example of this Lilly-Ann talked about the runner Mo Farah and suggested he had experienced a shift in his master status, contending:

*Look at Mo Farah, he is Somali but he is also British like lots of people.*

*But you didn’t hear about that during the Olympics did ya? He was the poster boy for everything British.*
One may suggest that Farah’s master status was framed as British, his faith or his race being ‘overlooked’ as the country basked in his Olympic glory. The idea of a positive re-racialisation was also addressed by Airyana, who herself had encountered a shift in people’s perceptions towards her when she experienced life as a police officer in Liverpool during the 1980s. Airyana had been chosen as one of only five minority officers in a police service, which was at the time four and a half thousand. Her story highlights a number of aspects of re-racialisation as well as the fluidity of her master status. As a recruit, she was taken to the police training camp in order to learn how to become a police officer. During this time her master status was that of a mixed-race woman in a world in which she believed she did not belong. Airyana recounted the story of her status as non-white/non-Black during her time training with Merseyside police, and her classification within the police:

> When I joined the police force they didn’t have a term officially for me coz I was mixed-race. It changed all the time because of the finger print forms that we used to fill out, if you were white you put a W, if you were Black you put a B, if you were Chinese you put a C. Now when I joined because I was mixed they didn’t have anything any code for it at the time, so you had to have a D. I said what does the D stand for and it was doubtful. Right, it was doubtful, coz they said you were of doubtful origins and I remember saying I'm not of doubtful origins I know my origins. My grandfather was from Nigeria my father from Ireland so I'm not of doubtful origin. They said ‘Yeh but if we see you we wouldn’t know that, we wouldn’t know what you were and so it goes down as doubtful.
Although Airyana’s take was unique within the interviews, as she was the only respondent who had been a police officer, it highlights the challenges faced by those minority members who challenge the dominant white cultures within Britain. Airyana continued to talk about the impact of this categorisation throughout her police career, and the psychological trauma those distinctions caused. During the interview she was visibly stressed discussing the events which had occurred during her police training thirty years previously, and was asked if she would like to stop. Refusing, she continued to tell me of the hurtful ‘joke’ the staff at the training college played on her concerning her ‘nickname’:

Now, when you join the police you go away to police training college and you’re given a PE [physical training] t-shirt. An everyone gets a nickname, coz you get a nickname in the first week of training, so you get your nickname put on the back of your t-shirt. Now you get asked what’s your nickname or you get one, well I never got asked what my nickname was I had a big D put on the back of mine. Right, an underneath the big D in big block letters was the words ‘doubtful’.

The impact on Airyana of the decision taken by the police staff at the training college to label her as doubtful as was clear. The ‘joke’ was not considered by her as funny, and yet she was caught in a precarious position: had she complained about the ‘nickname’ she would have alienated herself even more from her colleagues. She decided to stay quiet and accept the ‘joke’, in order to succeed. Airyana further explained the ongoing humiliation she had to endure during the twelve weeks of training: from wearing a t-shirt with the letter D on the back of it, to having ‘golliwog’ toys put under her blankets at night.
Successful in her training, Airyana gained a position as a police officer and she graduated from the training college near the top of her class. When she spoke about the effect of labelling upon her, she stated she was surprised that she had become distressed, as it was an event that had happened 30 years ago. In what she described as a cathartic moment, the impact of the event coupled with her attempts to be accepted into a mainstream institution had never really been addressed. Like others who had experienced similar discrimination, she had never felt in a position to own her sadness, as family life and career had always been her priority. As she suggested after the conclusion of the interview, to admit that it had hurt her would be to admit she was vulnerable to racism, which, even thirty years later, was upsetting. From a personal point of view, this coping strategy had been witnessed by myself previously, when I saw how my friend had ignored racism on a bus during a racist incident (see Appendix 7).

The shift in master status was not described by any of the other respondents as occurring positively to them, although they did talk about the way celebrity or sports personalities had had theirs changed. This might be due to the fact that, out of the respondents, Airyana was the only one to enter an institution that was presented as a remit for ‘white’ people during the 1980s, and, given the current statistics, as we discussed in Chapter Three, and the lack of progression in recruiting minority groups to the police service, I would also suggest it still is. I would also suggest that the description of Airyana as ‘doubtful’ by her student cohort and trainers indicates that her master status, when she challenged the ‘white’ domain, was ‘negative’, as the language used had negative connotations.
Airyana’s master status, however, changed as she became a serving police officer and acquired the power associated with the role. This shift can be seen clearly in her next story about her time in the police service as she described the behaviour of the other officers once she was fully qualified. Airyana described sitting in a police van with her colleagues, all of whom were ‘white’, and the language used to describe some of the people they had arrested. She recalls the shift in the other officers’ perception towards her, seeing her as an in-group member rather than as someone with outsider status saying:

*You used to be in a personnel carrier with a dozen bobbies say going to a job somewhere, could be a raid or something, and they would be all talking ‘Oh yeah locked up some coon last night he was an absolute bastard’ an I’d be sitting there and then thee would go ‘Oh sorry no disrespect to you but you’re one of us you’re not one of them’ and I used to come across that all the time, and if they ever come out with racist things it would be ‘Yeah but you’re not one of them you’re one of us’.*

Airyana continued to describe the challenges of being between two worlds, in a sense between two master statuses. The first was the role she played as the ‘white’ enforcer of law, and the second as the doubtful woman policing the community she came from. The classification of Airyana as white amongst her white colleagues shows us that she had, on some psychological level, been re-racialised as ‘white’ by them, her role as a police officer being the primary identifier. The other officers had allowed her somewhat tentatively into their group, and as such they afforded her the same status concerning her race as themselves. Like them, her master status
had now become that of a serving police officer. The intra-group attachment made by a grouping of individuals into communities is, one could suggest, the same process by which the ‘negative’ racialisation occurs.

Darity, Mason and Stewart (2006: 283) suggest that the way in which a fixed population of individuals are identified using exogenous criteria can allow individuals to use a racialist or an individualist identity strategy within social interactions. This formation of identity norms can impose either positive or negative externalities on the individual’s identity and actions. This means that, given the situation in which the individuals are interacting, the master status can be fluid. The way that skin colour was presented within society and the stigma connected to skin colour, created, in their view, an implicit association. This is similar to the implicit association of race and faith due to the images used after the attack on Lee Rigby, as I discussed in Chapter Two.

Another identified theme in the data was that of language: its use, its change and its impact. Language and terminology used throughout policy, for example, was considered by many of the respondents (James, Edward, Saakar, Brima, Lilly-Ann, Isabella, Airyana and Jazmin) as a way to shape society’s narrative surrounding race and discrimination. Language is therefore considered next, when I examine racist terminology alongside laws created to police it.

6.3 The Terminology of Racism or Racist Terminology

Respondents such as James have previously told us about the way in which the word ‘dirty’ was added before a racial slur. The terminology of racism linked to negative descriptions was a theme that emerged throughout the interviews.
Although not a dominant theme, it emerged as a constant theme that was considered by many of the respondents (James, Edward, Saakar, Brima, Lilly-Ann, Isabella, Airyana, Grace, Megan and Jazmin) as influencing racism and the policing of racism. The respondents proffered the idea that a shared understanding of language was critical, in order that there be a shared understanding of policy/policing.

New laws which criminalise racist discourse and language were blamed by these respondents for forcing racism underground rather than reducing it, alongside their consideration of how language had changed. The intention to be racist was considered as being as important as language itself, and with terminological changes and the evolution of language, meanings had shifted. These respondents suggested that all racisms were not necessarily intended as negative, and to assume they were was problematic for two reasons. First, the intent of the word had to be considered, and second, the position of the person using the word also had to be considered. As Megan explains, intention was critical in understanding language. She suggests:

>You got to be very careful calling someone a racist now days. Racism exists yeah, but I think people say somethings that are racist now or they use language which is not acceptable now, but that’s just them having a bad vocabulary. Basically when I was younger we said the Paki shop because people who owned it were from Pakistan. So, when I said that I meant the Pakistani family shop. Yet I was called a Paki in school, being bullied it was meant as dirty Pakistani and a slur not a description, you understand what I mean? It’s like saying things your mum and dad said but not realising its now not politically correct. It
doesn’t mean that they would discriminate against someone because of their race, that’s racist.

The terminology of Islamophobia was also criticised by the respondents as a way to hide racism. It was considered that by using a constructed term such as Islamophobia, it mentally steered people away from the negative discrimination of Muslim-based faith rather than skin colour. The respondents found it problematic that Islamophobia had been constructed as a faith-based issue instead of a race-based issue, which meant that any non-Muslim, facing Islamophobia/racism, or Muslims facing racism/Islamophobia, were unsure of how to proceed to challenge terminological disparities. The respondents (James, Edward, Saakar, Brima, Lilly-Ann, Isabella, Airyana, Grace, Megan and Jazmin) considered, when discussing the terminology of racism, that Islamophobia was a new term coined to separate the negativity towards Muslims away from racism. They suggested that, in some way, from a psychological position, Islamophobia seemed less repulsive to the psyche than racism, which, as a concept, was constructed wholly negatively and presented as such.

Islamophobia, on the other hand, was presented again negatively, but it was also presented from a nationalist perspective as something that did not reject Islam but more embraced Britishness, as if the two could not coexist. These new terminologies in some way obscured the racist philosophies regarding, for example, immigration, which they suggested was framed negatively, as it was linked to the fear of terrorism.

The idea that allowing more ‘poor immigrants’ (especially if they were from a Muslim country) into Britain would somehow cause an increase in the risk of
terrorism and risk the British way of life was embedded to some extent. The presentation of these communities as suspect was demonstrated by the former Prime Minister, when he described migrants as a swarm (Cameron, 2015). Cameron effectively linked human beings who were in dire need of help to destructive insects, not only dehumanising them but also creating a narrative in which they were immediately suspect. Similarly, the idea that poor Muslims were a section of the population that was in ‘need of psychological safeguarding’ made any follower of Islam, or anyone misidentified as a follower of Islam, vulnerable, and again, suspect. All of the respondents in this study, indeed like this researcher, were products of migration/immigration in some form or another, be that from their Irish ancestry or their minority ancestry. At no point did any of the respondents feel like they were vulnerable, or that their minority or immigrant heritage would cause them to be so. As Boland (2009) discussed, the fact that Liverpool has a strong city-wide identity may have played some part in this.

*Fear of the Right*

Some of the respondents (Edward, Saakar, Brima, Lilly-Ann, Isabella, Airyana, Grace, Megan and James) believed that faith hate was being used by elements of the political right to target minorities, based not only on faith but also on skin colour. These respondents believed that there was a perception from the right that it was not okay to criticise race, but okay to criticise faith, because there are often multiple races within a faith group. The right wing effectively find a way to get away with racism under a new flag of ‘legitimate’ nationalism. This assumption of ‘legitimacy’ removed the fact that, historically, the Islamic faith has been followed by people of colour. Islamophobia therefore hid the inherent racist attitudes behind a
discrimination of faith, using terminology constructed to act as a psychological buffer. The respondents also contended that the terminology of Islamophobia was an unhelpful construction which simply exacerbated the problem of racism by giving it a terminology which would not be presented as ‘racist’. Edward highlights this point by suggesting that even racists reject the label of racist, and so finding another label to hide behind was more appealing. He suggested:

Do ya know what with Islamophobia it’s more like a mad-up thing, it’s like a re-invented racism. It’s only in the last few years have you heard the term, it’s just racism coz it’s against Muslims who technically aren’t a race. But, they are classed as one so what do we call it? It was probably invented by someone in the fucking media, who first of all created the threat, you could bet some fucking cunt was sitting round thinkin okay let’s see what this script is. OKAY, it’s Islamophobia, we will call it that.

However, if we unwrap the term Islamophobia, we can see that its use began in the United Kingdom around the 1980s and early 1990s. The terminology began at this point to be used to reject discrimination against the Muslim population (Allen, 2006). Allen contends that the term Islamophobia/Islamophobic began to be contested after 9/11 and 7/7 across Europe and the United Kingdom. Indeed, the very existence of the phenomena of Islamophobia was contested (Malik, 2005), with some authors trying to discredit the term by stating that it was constructed by Islamists to condemn any criticism of Islam (Forrest and Venner, 2003). The fact that many of the respondents thought that it was a ‘new’ term could be due to their outsider status. Their belief that Muslims are re-racialised as minorities in some
way overlooks their faith status. Islamophobia, having been constructed as problematic for many different reasons other than skin colour, was a problem long before 9/11, due to orientalism (Said, 1978). I would suggest that it is only now that the effects of Islamophobia are being felt by the respondents, and therefore it is only now that the term has the legitimacy of being scrutinised by them.

**Conclusion**

Clarifying terminology, both within policy and within this research is, I argue, critical, so that, as I discussed in Chapter Two, there is a shared meaning and understanding. Islamophobic discourse, for example, can be presented as somehow less ‘racist’, as it is framed as ‘protecting’ the population, including Muslims, from Islamic extremism. A ‘positive’ slant has been placed on the terminology, which is used to separate and identify Muslims, minority groups or the economically challenged, amongst others, for security consideration. As I considered in Chapter Two, when I examined the language of radicalisation, the language used to present possible victims of radicalisation has in itself shifted the narrative surrounding groups within society. The creation of a victim status in groups already targeted by the creation of negative master statuses was highlighted throughout the interviews as problematic, as it enforced a negative master status onto poorer groups within society.

Language and the definition of language has been identified as a key issue within this data. I would suggest this is because it is used to describe all aspects of society, and to construct and present sections of the population either negatively or positively. It is therefore vitally important to have unambiguous language in policy.
I have considered the contested presentation within policy of some sections of British society as ‘vulnerable to the drivers of radicalisation’. Language was also a key point in the classification of minorities, both Muslim and non-Muslim. The terminology of racism was challenged by the respondents, and a ‘common sense’ link between followers of Islam and a minority status was identified within the analysis, with all of the respondents feeling that skin colour was a driving force in identification. The language of racism was identified as subtly shifting, not just due to the generational shift in language but to a reshaping of racism in order to avoid criminalisation, because of current laws regarding hate speech. Master status and the construction of identity was also considered by the respondents as shaping the life chances of an individual. A positive re-racialisation through the acquisition of wealth or position was considered, alongside the negative re-racialisation of individuals through the choice of faith.

Throughout the literature review I discussed the importance of language and terminology. I have criticised the lack of specifics within the language/terminology in Prevent that has led to some sections of British society feeling that they have been constructed as suspect. This research asks those people identified as meeting the criteria identified in Prevent for being prone to vulnerabilities what they think of the policy, its presentation, and what they know about the current policy. Continuing from this in the next chapter, I will unpick what the respondents think of the policy and some of its assumptions.
Chapter Seven: Contesting the Terminology of Prevent

Introduction.

In the previous analysis chapter I examined how language and the definition of language was highlighted as playing a role in the construction of individual identity alongside the presentation of groups within society. Many of the respondents (James, Edward, Saakar, Brima, Lilly-Ann, Isabella, Airyana, Grace, Megan, Drew and Jazmin) believed that policy helped shape national discourse, as it fed down to the public through the media and through its implementation. In this chapter I will unpick what the respondents know about and/or think about Prevent, alongside any associated dominant themes that emerged in connection with the policy.

As the current UK government’s counter-radicalisation policy, I have already examined the drivers identified within Prevent and those groups highlighted for concern due to their vulnerability status. Prevent (2011:13) states that the drivers of radicalisation are the characteristics of a person’s identity that can contribute to their likelihood of engaging in radical action, the term radical also being contested within the literature, as I discussed previously.

The drivers identified in Prevent include categories such as membership of the Islamic faith, age (specifically youth), geography (specifically lower socio-economic areas) and individuals who have had real or ‘imagined’ negative interactions with the police (Prevent section 5). When considering the policy, the respondents were able to associate the drivers, as well as other aspects of the strategy, to their own experiences and their own positions. Were they vulnerable?
Vulnerability is important to consider, as all of the respondents adhered to some stereotypes outlined within Prevent.

As I discussed in the previous chapter, the definitions of terminology/language such as vulnerable or vulnerability have to be presented in a clear and concise way to avoid misinterpretation. All of the respondents rejected the identification of some sections of society as vulnerable, as they themselves met some or all of the criteria identified in the policy and yet they did not feel vulnerable to radicalisation. All of the respondents came from lower socio-economic areas, were members of minority groups, some were young, some had negative feelings towards government, some distrusted the police, all of which are included within the drivers of radicalisation, and included in the factors which can contribute to the ‘vulnerability’ of a person becoming radicalised. In the terminology section of Prevent, vulnerability is described.

**Vulnerability** describes the condition of being capable of being injured;
difficult to defend; open to moral or ideological attack. Within *Prevent,*
the word describes factors and characteristics associated with being
susceptible to radicalisation (Prevent 2011:108).

This specific definition itself is open to challenge. For example, being open to ideological attack does not mean that the attack would be successful and result in any form of action. It also does not make clear what ‘open’ to attack actually means. What research has not identified is how many people have their political and moral beliefs challenged and do not become radicalised. If we unpick this definition further, the characteristics and factors associated with being susceptible to radicalisation themselves are all contestable. Social factors such as poverty or a lack
of faith in government have always been present within society. Once again, ambiguity in terminology frames communities under suspicion as problematic, and links them through the terminology with terrorism, creating fear. As the respondents met some, if not all, the ‘vulnerability’ criteria identified in Prevent, they were well placed to discuss if they themselves felt ‘vulnerable’, and what effect the presentation of them as ‘vulnerable’ had on their sense of self. Throughout this next section I will carry on examining the language and terminology used within Prevent, as the acceptance of policy assumptions can, in part, be shaped by how language is comprehended.

7.1 Not What You Say, But Why You Say It

To understand policy, one must have the same comprehension of language as the writers of the policy, otherwise meaning can get lost in translation. As with any strategy, understanding can influence whether an individual accepts/supports action or rejects/opposes action (Cordner, 2014; Tyler, 2011), and so uniformity in comprehension is imperative. As the first phase of this study indicated, members of the communities where policy was targeted were often unaware of policy and/or could not understand the terminologies within it. For example, I have considered Prevent, which highlights people from lower socio-economic areas as individuals who may be more ‘vulnerable to radicalisation’ as they adhere to a number of the identified drivers. One may suggest that understanding the drivers of radicalisation and understanding vulnerabilities as outlined in Prevent may, in fact, help inform communities and guard against ‘radicalisation’. Therefore, having specifics in place to identify the meaning of terminology would seem beneficial, to both policy
makers and members of the public. However, because Prevent’s descriptive is limited, as I discussed in Chapter Two, meaning is often not shared.

If policy such as Prevent relies on local communities to self-regulate and guard against radicalisation, and yet uses terminology (as I found in the phase one analysis) which is often too complex for some community members to understand, how, then, can they be made aware of the risks to themselves or others? This is in no way to assume or to suggest that all inner-city communities may find documents such as Prevent difficult to read or understand. However, I would suggest that the terminologies used throughout Prevent are confusing as they are ambiguous and, as discussed in Chapters One and Two, contestable and open to interpretation. With this lack of specifics in mind, one of the aspects of social identity identified as a ‘driver’ of radicalisation in Prevent section 5.24 are grievances, imagined or real, considered by government to play a role in influencing one’s propensity for radicalisation and, at its most extreme, violent terrorism. There is no further information in Prevent about the type of real or imagined grievance, or against whom those grievances are formed. Therefore, one must assume that within the context of the policy, grievance with the state or state agencies must be the primary focus of legislation.

Considering this point, Raymon suggested that BMR minorities have faced targeting through policing policies/practises for many years. He further suggests that a targeting of BMR minorities has, historically, never culminated in acts of terrorism. He contends that the linking of grievances with terrorism is a relatively new concept, suggesting:
What a load of shit, Black people have had shit off bizzies [police officers] forever, but then so have the people round here [gesturing to Speke area outside] we don’t decide to go and become terrorists. If people were gonna become terrorists because of bad police or racism, then why haven’t poor Black people or poor white people for that matter been rioting every day in the streets? I think it’s just an excuse to over-police poor people again.

The lack of definitional specifics within Prevent, leaving it open to misinterpretation, have already been considered within this research. But when examining the drivers of radicalisation, the respondents’ (James, Edward, Saakar, Brima, Lilly-Ann, Isabella, Airyana, and Jazmin) rejection of the terminology of radicalisation/the radical suggests that language can have different meanings depending on the individual’s position within society, their power, and the context in which that terminology is used. Edward emphasised this point, contending that, in relation to the drivers outlined by government in Prevent, he would suggest that the identification of ‘drivers’ was a way to compromise free speech and political expression. His understanding was therefore different to the government’s. He suggested:

So the way that I have been looking at it, it’s basically saying that these categories, can’t be politically aware. Because to me that’s what radicalisation is, it’s becoming politically aware, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.

Edward criticised the use of what he perceived to be ‘negative’ phrasing within terminology, but also the lack of clarity within the document concerning language
and the drivers themselves. The drivers identified within the policy were overwhelmingly rejected by him as being deterministic, which he challenged. Edward believed that social protest and challenging the state was part of a political growth process, and that not all radical thought was problematic. Rather, it was constructive. Again, the idea that one could be suspect was not new to Edward, as he was a minority male with a mixed-Irish background. Edward had experienced both his enrolment into the suspect Irish community when growing up and his membership as a member of a minority suspect community. As he commented, he was ‘doubly damned for his background’.

He, like Drew, Molly, Brima, Lilly-Ann, James, Raymon, Saakar, Isabella, Grace and Airyana, suggested that the inclusion of non-violent radicalisation within Prevent compromised free speech and open political discussion. This, of course, is simply how they understood what they had read about Prevent, both within the prepared descriptive sheet and/or when they had looked at the policy independently. Edward’s opinions were nonetheless representative of the majority opinions from within both groups (PPW and SGW). How the respondents understood the definitions of radicalisation/the radical within policy determined what they believed radicalisation to be. For instance, who or what was a radical, who or what would they consider radicalisers? If, as Prevent suggested, radicalisation was a social process which had the capacity to turn non-violent people violent, and the drivers identified within the document were somehow correct and did indeed identify vulnerable sections of the community, then some of the respondents (Molly, Edward, Saakar and James) suggested that a number of comparisons could be made to the way the military targeted young people from lower socio-economic
backgrounds. The term radicaliser was identified in the glossary of Prevent (2011: 108) as:

A radicaliser is an individual who encourages others to develop or adopt beliefs and views supportive of terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.

This terminology was challenged by Brima, amongst other respondents (Saakar, Edward, Raymon, Airyana, Isabella, Molly and James) who suggested the description was, again, ambiguous, as the term terrorism was contested and the document did not define what it consider ‘encouraging’. The ambiguity was, Brima suggested, confusing, because of the fear and concern expressed by government surrounding those people categorised as ‘vulnerable’. For example, young people were highlighted for counter-radicalisation concern, especially those from a minority or Muslim background. Brima suggested that, as young people in Britain have limited access to military-style training or weaponry, the focus might be better directed towards young disillusioned ex-military service people who often have limited options once released from service. She suggested:

Prisons are full of ex-service men they can’t adjust when they get out the army and that. They go from having a stable regime to not knowing what to do with their day. They can than get resentful, now that’s dangerous.

Continuing, Brima spoke of the way that the British armed forces actively recruited young people from poorer areas, the military being seen as the only way to become socially mobile for some young people. From his point of view, training to kill
someone was the same, whether through British military service or through travelling to Syria to train with ISIS. The only difference was that killing in defence of Queen and Country was state-sanctioned murder. As such, he could not see the distinction. Brima suggested that there was a legitimacy of action afforded to state sanctioned deaths, suggesting:

This government makes killers of young people all the time. They radicalise them into thinking that the Queen’s way, the government’s way, is the only way. So they go out and do their bidding. Now they do that, brainwashing, assimilation into the party line. So who should we fear? Some kid who gets tugged by the cops and gets pissed off? Or, the hundreds of soldiers coming back from killing brown people abroad? Of course they are ‘trained’ so can turn their hate off at the flick of a switch.

The Importance of Legitimacy and Shared Understanding

Brima’s opinions mirrored other respondents (Molly, Edward, James, Airyana, Jazmin, Grace and Isabella) who shared his belief that murder could never be legitimised simply because the state sanctions it. For example, the state-sanctioned Iraq war to stop weapons of mass destruction has now come under criticism, in an investigation that lasted longer than the war itself. The inquiry, led by Sir John Chilcot, was created to consider the UK’s policy on Iraq from 2001 to 2009, and published its findings 6th July 2016. The Iraq inquiry stated that the justification for war was under scrutiny, saying:
In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom took part in an invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign State. That was a decision of the utmost gravity. Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a brutal dictator who had attacked Iraq’s neighbours, repressed and killed many of his own people, and was in violation of obligations imposed by the UN Security Council. But the questions for the Inquiry were: whether it was right and necessary to invade Iraq in March 2003; and whether the UK could – and should – have been better prepared for what followed (open source www.iraqinquiry.org.uk).

In a statement by Sir John Chilcot, the findings of the inquiry were summed up:

The UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort. The judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction – WMD – were presented with a certainty that was not justified. Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate. The Government failed to achieve its stated objectives (www.iraqinquiry.org.uk).

The lack of legitimate evidence for weapons of mass destruction cited by former Prime Minister Blair to take Britain into a war that was not supported by the United Nations was criticised within the report. This de-legitimisation therefore opens up a myriad of questions regarding state-sanctioned actions and the legitimacy of
actions. If the reasons for war were illegitimate and lacked legal credibility, does that mean that those responsible for taking Britain to war are themselves, as Prevent describes, radicalisers? Therefore, are the actions of the British military, like the actions of terrorists who have been radicalised, lacking in legality? Alternatively, does the fact that those responsible have the power and protection afforded to them through their position and wealth create a warped legitimacy of its own?

The government has stressed the importance of understanding radicalisation, its causes and its effects. The experiences of radicalised individuals within a British context, their perspectives on their treatment within society and how they react to that treatment have also been highlighted as an area Prevent hoped to tackle. If we then, as Brima suggests, consider ex-military personnel who are indoctrinated into a military mind-set and have fought to defend this country, often at great personal cost to themselves, it is worrying that very little information is available about the effects of abandonment once their service is finished. How does their institutionalisation/radicalisation affect their ability to function in society? Many of the same drivers of radicalisation identified in Prevent can be associated with ex-military personnel: problems finding employment and a sense of being somehow outside society or lacking control (Alpass, Long, Chamberlain and MacDonald, 1997). This can be observed if we consider the growing body of research, such as Home Office research (2001, 2003, 2004 in Treadwell, 2010: 74). It suggests that ex-servicemen account for 6% of the total prison population in England and Wales, and an investigation by Elfyn Llwyd MP forced the government to admit they have no way of knowing how many ex-military personnel end up incarcerated in prison.
It has recently been argued that a disproportionate number of the single homeless populations have a background in the armed forces and that this can be explained by ex-servicemen’s vulnerability to the effects of ‘military institutionalisation’. These popular understandings, the long-term influence of military socialisation is claimed to limit the development of a range of skills vital for re-integration into civilian life (Higate, 2000: 97).

Notwithstanding this, if we consider the process of radicalisation and the assumptions within Prevent, such as vulnerability factors and drivers, could we not equate those processes to the same process as military institutionalisation? Regardless of intended meaning and the understanding of meaning surrounding Prevent, all of the respondents (James, Edward, Saakar, Brima, Lilly-Ann, Isabella, Airyana, Grace, Megan, Drew, Raymon and Jazmin) overwhelmingly rejected the labelling of some sections of society as vulnerable, whether young people or socio-economically challenged communities. They also rejected the drivers of radicalisation outlined in Prevent on the basis that these were not ‘new social factors’. As the respondents stated in some way or another, there were many sections of British society that ‘fitted’ the criteria for ‘vulnerability’ simply because they were facing economic exclusion due to a lack of work opportunities. Jazmin emphasised this point, arguing that if being poor was a cause of terrorism, there would have been a lot more terrorists. She said:
If being poor or treated like shit was going to turn people violent, why hasn’t it? Loads of people can’t get jobs, loads hate the bizzies, loads wanna stay in their own little cliques. But you don’t see them going and blowing up the dole and the council offices.

On this note, the next section of the analysis will look at statements that consider the drivers of radicalisation outlined in Prevent. I will examine how those statements are internalised by the respondents, by examining the comparisons they make to their own lives and experiences.

**7.2 Challenging the Drivers of Radicalisation**

When considering the specific drivers of radicalisation outlined in Prevent, each respondent tended to focus on the drivers that they could relate to their own lives and experiences. This personalisation of the policy allowed the respondents to address how they felt if it was suggested that they themselves could be driven to violent extremism based on their ‘vulnerability’ and personal situations. Although at first glance Isabella, for example, seemed to agree with the drivers of radicalisation as she considered each aspect of the policy relating to her own experiences, she ultimately rejected them. Like some of the other older respondents, Isabella had grown up in Liverpool in the 1950s and had grown up in what would be described today as abject poverty. Her mother was ‘white’ and her father was a ‘Black’ seaman who was away at sea for a large part of each year. Her mother had taken in washing and worked in local pubs to make ends meet, but even then, one of her younger brothers had passed away from an infection that he was unable to fight due, in part, to malnourishment. She suggested that the groups outlined in the
policy were those who had already faced demonisation and exclusion, such as minority groups and the young. She contended they were simply ‘the easiest part of the population to blame’.

Like Isabella, James also had a very unstable background as a child, and had many negative experiences with the police which, according to Prevent, could leave him ‘vulnerable’ to radicalisation. James, like Isabella, also rejected that negative experiences would equate to radicalisation or violence. Rather, he suggested, it could, like his experiences, inspire the individual to challenge dominant policy through political engagement. The deterministic way that the policy assumed the worst was therefore seen as being a way for the government to reduce engagement and discussion with the identified groups. James also suggested that the inclusion of non-violent radicalisation effectively restricted the public debate on topics such as radicalisation, racism and inequality which, although hard to suffer, often brought out the best in people. He suggested:

*I do think that if you suffer systematic abuse, years of over-policing, suspicion and negativity with regards to your life choices, that may have the capacity to alter your opinion to a more negative one. Now, whether that would or could make a non-violent person violent, I don’t think so. Often it just toughens people up so they don’t do the same.*

The respondents could, of course, only draw on their own experiences in order to form opinions regarding the propositions in the policy. Some of the stories recounted during the interview process highlighted the severity of racist incidents suffered by the respondents. Isabella spoke of her and her family’s resilience in the face of racist attacks throughout the 50s in North Liverpool. She recounted a story
of how her father would return from sea and immediately there would be a gang of ‘white’ men waiting for him in the tenements where they lived. Her father and her mother would go and physically fight with their neighbours, people who said hello to her and her siblings each day. This would often lead to her parents being arrested, but she told me that the ‘white’ neighbours were never the ones thrown into the back of the black police vans like her parents. Isabella and her siblings, who were all under 13 years old at this time, would be left at home for the rest of the night to fend for themselves until the next morning when her parents were released. Once the fighting had stopped, the neighbours would leave her parents until the next time her father returned and the cycle of violence started all over again. In defence of her mother and father’s actions, she said:

*My dad was a Muslim and he was the most peaceful man ever, but they say if you’re a Muslim now you’re all evil and they all get tarred with the same brush. He never ever turned to it [violence] unless he had to protect himself ... but he knew the difference between right and wrong which is something they are assuming people don’t know.*

Isabella, like all of the older respondents, saw her family’s engagement with violence to protect themselves from physical attacks as legitimate. It is interesting again to note that it is the legitimacy of actions which seems to be at the heart of tolerance towards action amongst the respondents. Terrorist actions, even if they were explained as somehow being committed to protect Muslims in other countries, were not considered legitimate by the respondents. For example, the martyrdom video of the 7/7 bombers suggested their actions were in response to attacks on Muslims abroad. This type of justification was not recognised by the respondents,
as Britain was seen by them as a safe place to live compared with other countries. Modern Britain was perceived as a multicultural nation by all of the respondents, and even though racism still existed and was still an issue for the respondents, the justification of violence against the population by terrorists was totally rejected. The respondents also contended that although they may get annoyed or fed up with perceived injustices within their own lives, this did not mean that they would turn to violence to solve those problems.

Some of the respondents (James, Megan, Edward, Saakar, Brima, Isabella, Grace, Raymon and Jazmin) also suggested that class might also play a part in influencing one’s engagement with radical groups. This engagement, however, was not necessarily linked to violence. The consensus throughout the data was that radical behaviour was more focused towards political protest and/or hostility towards out-group members. This point is emphasised by Megan, who suggested:

Okay, it’s like get on the EDL [English Defence League] they like people who are on the dole they can be angry and then if you’re angry you can blame other people rather than saying erm maybe I can’t get a job coz I have no qualifications and I’m a dickhead. So they blame immigrants or Muslims or anyone really rather than looking inward and blaming their own failings. So I think yeah, poor people might be wound up easier to hate BUT [said with emphasis] that doesn’t mean they are gonna turn into a terrorist. Again it’s this thing of just coz I am poor or just coz I am angry, I am going to kill someone, erm no.

It seemed throughout the interview process that the respondents had a very simplistic understanding of the ‘problem of radicalisation’. To them it was simply
an act of violence brought about by a negative view of society. Political protest or voicing an alternative opinion to the government was not seen as radical, but rather as a legitimate form of discussion or debate. As I discussed in Chapter Two, the definitions of terminology that were contested by the respondents were contested because they were ambiguous, failing to be fully defined within Prevent.

The addition in 2011 to Prevent to include non-violent radicalisation was seen by some of the respondents (James, Edward, Saakar, Isabella, Airyana, Grace, Megan, Raymon and Jazmin) as a way to silence any challenge to the government’s foreign policy and military action. Notwithstanding this, the problamatisation of all things radical, including non-violent radicalisation in the current version of Prevent and the use of the citizenship survey as justification for a number of the assumptions made within the policy, did open up another area of critique from the respondents. They challenged the justification of policy assumptions and the policing of communities under suspicion based on the drivers and ‘vulnerability factors’. They suggested that these same communities had historically already been over-policed, as I previously discussed in Chapter Three.

*Over-Policed and Under Protected*

There was pervasive perception throughout the interviews that inner city communities such as PPW and SGW were over-policed, and that policing strategies were based directly on skin colour, class and the categorisation of those communities as criminal. This suggestion was considered within research performed by Small (2014), who argued that there had been a consistent gap between law and practise, and that despite legislation, direct racialised discrimination continues unabated in policing practises. Small contended that
comparing the experiences of Black minorities in the United States directly against the British experience indicated that racialised hostility was still ingrained in British policing structures. Barrett, Fletcher and Patel (2014) considered the satisfaction levels of BME groups from the North of England, and they identified three emergent themes:

Disconnections from young people and police (ab)use of stop and search powers…that BME communities as a whole want more communication with the police on a range of crime prevention… Police responses need to take account not only of dialectics of ethnicity but also how other variables such as age, social class and gender, intersect with ethnicity to create varied experiences. (Barrett, Fletcher and Patel, 2014: 15)

The overuse of power by the police was described by Raymon, who suggested that an increase in surveillance and police powers was terrorising some sections of inner city communities. He argued:

*Now days you can get pulled for anything, the government have given the bizzies too much power now and now they are using it too much.*

Notwithstanding, after the civil unrest in 2011, the former Home Secretary announced a review of police powers, as findings indicated that the overuse of section 60 stops had contributed to the disturbances. A report for the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2014) found that there was still a significant amount of negative racial profiling in the decision to stop and search. It stated:
The Equality and Human Rights Commission’s *Stop and think* report looked at police use of stop and search using the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1994 (PACE). It highlighted that the police carry out a disproportionate number of stops and searches on black and Asian people compared to white people relative to the ethnic profile of the population. New government data shows that people who are black, Asian or of a mixed ethnicity are also disproportionately stopped and searched when the police use the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994... The Commission found evidence that people from some ethnicities are stopped significantly more often than other people. The Metropolitan, Merseyside, Lancashire, Greater Manchester, West Midlands and British Transport Police forces each carried out more than 2,000 Section 60 stops and searches in 2008-11. Of these, six forces, Greater Manchester, West Midlands and the British Transport Police had the highest black/white and mixed/white disproportionality ratios (The Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2014: 3).

The continued over-policing of minority communities is worryingly similar to the over-policing seen in the 1980s, which was reported as playing a considerable part in the social unrest during that period (Scarman, 1981). The labelling of BME communities across Britain by policy, the criminalisation of those communities and their over-policing have long been criticised by academics (Lightowlers and Shute, 2012; Burnett 2012, 2013) and human rights groups such as Liberty. In the respondents’ view (James, Edward, Saakar, Brima, Lilly-Ann, Isabella, Airyana, Raymon and Jazmin) there was a disconnection between those groups that were...
being targeted by policy and those groups who should be considered for targeting. For example, when considering age as a ‘vulnerability’ Jazmin, like many of the other respondents, contended that youth as a driver/vulnerability factor was misplaced. She suggested that if we consider the UK prison population, it was older people who were the instigators of criminality, especially in gang-related violence and terrorism. She argued:

*It’s bollocks really isn’t it? I mean look at older people there are more of them locked up than younger people isn’t there? I mean look at people who lead gangs... When you’re under 18 you can be tried as an adult but you can’t vote to make any changes and that can you? So really no power, means no say in what’s happening, but you still feel the impact of it an that.*

It also suggested that concerning young people, most were simply trying to survive in modern Britain with little or no financial options. The suggestion that poor young people had to become moral entrepreneurs and do whatever was needed to support their families was a point that was accepted by the most of the respondents. The suggestion that financial stability was the driving force in younger people’s lives was a position that all the younger respondents found themselves in, including Drew, who suggested:

*Young people well ye know, people, are just out there trying to make money really. So people are doing whatever thee can to make money whether it’s good or bad. People who are on low income, it’s like, any means possible, all they’re trying to do is survive really. So whether*
they do good or bad thee couldn’t care less really, they’ve got fuck all anyway you know.

As age is a contested category, this research has defined mature by the current University of Liverpool definition for mature students, anyone over the age of 21. Throughout the interviews there was a shared belief that by highlighting vulnerable groups such as poor young people the government was missing out on other aspects of terrorism reduction. This included better focussing on those groups or individuals that funded terrorism rather than on disillusioned youth. Edward addressed this point, suggesting that young people and poor people, like Black people, had simply become a political scapegoat. He said:

Who paid for the pilots of the twin tower bombers to get their licenses?
It’s not cheap. Youth like the poor, are just the whipping boys in the same way black people have been for hundreds of years.

The labelling of communities as criminal was seen by most of the respondents as a way to justify the over-policing of inner city communities. They believed that in order to control the population the government criminalised those who challenged them. Parity was drawn by the older respondents to the way minority communities were treated during the 1970s and 80s in Liverpool. In Chapter Three, we looked at the challenges faced by Liverpool as a city when, during the 1980s, the city council was bankrupt and social services to the city were under jeopardy, alongside jobs in the public sector. In a similar vein, the years of austerity enforced under the current Conservative government has been felt by all of the respondents in one way or
another, not least due to the reduction in services, such as local youth centres like the Venny in Speke.\textsuperscript{19} Brima suggested:

\begin{quote}

Thee don’t give a shit about our rights, our services it’s all just down to saving money. Invest in people maybe they wouldn’t be pushed towards the radicals hey?
\end{quote}

Raymon also suggest that poverty was a driving force in radicalisation alongside a lack of educational opportunities. He suggested that many people, if they were given the facts about terrorism and groups such as ISIS, or were given more economic opportunities, could psychologically and socially insulate themselves from extremist recruiters by using facts instead of supposition to challenge radical narratives. He contended that this type of approach was rejected by government due to the assumption that people from economically-challenged backgrounds were somehow stupid because of the class they were born into. He said:

\begin{quote}

Oh right if we are poor then we are thick yeah... It’s the denial of information that gets me, look at the BNP [British National Party] and the NF [National Front] … They haven’t been educated properly and so thee can’t see that what these people [BNP/NF leaders] are saying is bullshit. It’s the same with any form of radicalisation the key to stopping it is education, giving people the actual facts not some trumped-up bullshit...
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{19} In January 2017 the last youth club in Speke, the Venny, which was opened in 1972, was earmarked for closure due to a removal of council funding. At this point the local community is fighting to keep it open, running events to try to self-fund (February 2018).
When questioned more about what trumped-up bull he was talking about, Raymon described the way that groups within society are demonised, such as immigrants. People who were framed as suspect and treated accordingly, such as the historic Irish settlers in Britain (Hillyard, 1993), or other immigrant settlers. He, alongside many of the other respondents (James, Edward, Saakar, Grace, Megan, Raymon and Jazmin), argued that the facts about immigration. Muslims and minorities were often sensationalised in the press. They argued that immigration was presented as a much larger problem than it actually was, like terrorism. People were led to believe that illegal immigrants claimed benefits, or got first access to housing, for example. If people had access to the facts, such as illegal immigrants did not have passports and therefore could not have bank accounts, and therefore no housing or benefits, it might make people think differently about immigration.

Most of the respondents (Isabella, Molly, James, Brima, Drew, Airyana, Edward and Jazmin) also alluded to the amalgamation of immigrants and Muslims as one group in order to dehumanise them and present them as the ‘other’. They perceived that all minority immigrants, alongside Muslims, are being presented negatively *en masse* by policy-makers, through the construction of targeted policies. This is then fed down through a top-down construction to the media, then fed into a scaremongering process, which then ultimately influences policy making and policy. A cycle of mistrust and misinformation occurs, self-feeding and self-perpetuating. This, of course, was only the respondent’s perception and understanding of reporting by the media of ‘marginalised’ groups. A full discourse analysis would have to be performed to clarify if this was factually correct. However, research by KhosraviNik (2009) did find that the representation of
migrants within the British press, although varying in their presentation due to their political standpoints, contributes to a similar construction of those immigrant/migrant/asylum groups negatively.

Figure 10 The Cycle of Mistrust

Radically Different Radicals?

In the 1930s, Tannenbaum studied juvenile delinquency, and he suggested that delinquents and non-delinquents were not so far removed from each other. Rather, it was the process of defining someone as delinquent that was problematic, as it could lead to a hardening of attitudes towards behaviours from the community. This could culminate in relatively minor infractions being presented as a far greater problem through intolerance of the ‘delinquent’. The change in attitude from the communities could have a knock-on effect in the perception of youth, leading to a targeting of youth, like the moral panics of the 1950 and 60s with the youth cultures of the Rockers and Mods talked about by Cohen (1972). Young people had been
demonised and constructed as folk devils, much like minorities. Ragazzi (2016) suggests:

The danger of this mechanism, of course, is that along with racist, bigoted, violent voices, policed multiculturalism excludes and undermines the credibility non-violent and radical voices that can constitute the legitimate interlocutors of a truly equal politics of recognition (Ragazzi, 2016: 738).

As I discussed in Chapter One, if we look at the inclusion of non-violent radicalisation in Prevent, there seems to be a total rejection by government of any credible, radical non-violent voices, therefore limiting any discussion or debate, a point which was also raised by the respondents in this study. The silencing of alternative voices, along with the presentation of minority communities as problematic, creates a suspect population (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009, 2011). This creation in itself has the power to change behaviour through changing the lived environments of BMR communities. Again, some of the respondents (James, Edward, Saakar, Brima, Megan, Raymon and Jazmin) suggested that being accused constantly could have the capability to push someone to rebel against society and, in effect, radicalise them. The criminalisation of young people, Muslims, people from lower socio-economic backgrounds or people who have had a negative experience with the authorities was in a sense self-defeating, as it could make the situation worse by alienating sections of society already under pressure. Jazmin suggested that reaction to the negative framing of communities was a driver for behaviour, saying:
Okay, well it’s like, when you say something to someone, erm when you are accused of something, it’s like the more you accuse someone of something the more likely they are to say fuck it, I may as well go do it coz I am getting accused anyway. Erm, it’s like when your mum keeps saying you did something, you think well I may as well go do it because I’m getting blamed anyway. Like that with the police, you get stopped and asked where you have been and you are like, none of your fucking business. But then you get into trouble, so you may as well have a laugh and get into trouble coz you are gonna get into trouble anyway. I think the police have a lot to answer for, I think they push you and they wind you up so you think fuck it, what’s the term me mam uses, yeah, you may as well get hung for a sheep as a lamb.

There was an assumption throughout the responses from all of the respondents (Edward, James, Raymon, Lilly-Ann, Airyana, Grace, Isabella, Jazmin, Drew, Megan and Grace) that being blamed for behaviour, on some level, influenced behaviour. How that reaction to targeting occurred was also discussed, and again there was a consensus that wealth and power protected individuals from targeting and accusation. The disparity in power between those groups who were the most likely to experience negative framing and those groups who have the power to frame communities is considered in the next section of this chapter. Power was seen as being linked to position and wealth and, as such, class divisions were identified as deeply embedded within the respondents’ narratives.
7.3 Examining the Perceptions of Power

Power and the perception of power emerged as a dominant theme within the data analysis. What was power, who had it and what options did power afford individuals and groups within society? These questions were all considered by the respondents at some point within their interviews. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, power was explained by the respondents as having the ability to shape society, and this was achieved through the acquisition of wealth and/or position. It included individuals such as Members of Parliament, journalists, wealthy business people and some celebrities. There was a shared understanding amongst the respondents that there was a disconnection between the working class and those in power. Power was seen by the respondents as protecting any individual or group, no matter what their ethnic or racial status, as power and wealth were identified as the most important master status (primary identifying feature) within a capitalist society. I observed that, when the respondents rejected the deterministic nature of the drivers of radicalisation, the disparity between those perceived as powerful and those perceived as having either limited power or being powerless was a theme that ran throughout all of the interviews in some form.

I observed a disconnection by the respondents regarding the morality of those who had power. Some of the respondents (Edward, James, Grace, Isabella, Drew, Megan and Grace) suggested that those who held positions of power were framed within society as somehow inheriting a greater morality than those with little or no power. The immorality of the poor and a linking of poverty to fecklessness was not just a historical concept (Paul, 2015) but one that had emerged more from austerity during
the last decade (Jensen, 2013). The respondents were critical of this metaphorical linking, a point Megan highlights, saying:

*I don’t agree that people who are poor are less moral and that’s what it comes down to they are saying that we don’t know right from wrong. It’s because the people with all the power are not poor or brown or Muslim. I mean I suppose people can get angry, then they would protest, but not terrorism. Maybe that’s why some people rioted but not terrorism. Protesting is not the same, being vocal in your unhappiness is not the same as picking up a gun.*

An examination of power was also considered by Brima, who contended that power structures based on class and position within society were important to understand when trying to understand policy and power. There was an opinion that unfair treatment by the state was based, in part, on class position. A capitalist system of government based on privilege sheltered and preserved elitist structures and protected the rich. This protection could be witnessed in the disparities between the crimes of those in power and the justice afforded to them for those crimes. Brima draws a parallel between the government’s misinformation regarding the Iraq war and the weapons of mass destruction that were never found, and the lack of accountability of those in power. She said:

*You read the definitions of drivers identified by the government and it’s basically who has no power isn’t it? It’s ridiculous as far as radicalisation I feel they have basically said okay well if you’re not rich, middle class and white you could become a radical… Look at the crime committed by Blair [ex-Prime Minister of Britain] he took an entire*
As I mentioned previously, the publication of the Iraq war inquiry by Lord Chilcot (release 6\textsuperscript{th} July 2016) found that war was not a last resort for Britain, and yet it was careful to avoid directly blaming the former Prime Minister (FPM) Tony Blair.

Documents were released after the publication of the inquiry’s findings, in which FPM Tony Blair told the former American President George Bush that Britain would be ‘with him whatever’ before the decision to enter a war in Iraq. This has been considered by many to be the FPM agreeing to action prior to justification for war being established. As yet (21/1/2017), no formal charges have been issued against the FPM for his action leading up to, during or after the Iraq war. Brima’s assumptions about the protection of power may therefore be right.

Nonetheless, continuing to challenge the terminology and assumptions made by policy, many of the respondents (Edward, James, Raymon, Grace, Isabella, Jazmin, Drew, Megan and Grace) suggested that rather than reducing radicalisation, the British government was fuelling it by creating a need for radical change. This was not to suggest that they thought that the government was creating terrorists, but, as I suggested in the previous chapter, the respondents did not associate radicalisation and radicals necessarily with terrorism. An oscillation in the position of government regarding the term radical was also considered to diminish the negative framing of the term in Prevent. This oscillation can be observed if we look at the FPM David Cameron’s speech on immigration on the 21\textsuperscript{st} May 2015, in which he spoke of ‘radical’ welfare reform. The government, it seems, was happy for the term radical to be used by them for positive changes, just not what they perceived as negative
change. It may help both the communities under suspicion and the government to define what type of radical is good and which is bad. Radical thinking seems encouraged within government, and yet is problematised in other sections of society, depending on how it is framed and more importantly, I would suggest, who uses it. As I discussed in Chapters One and Two, a specific definition of terminology is critical to understand what policy-makers intended or required.

There was again an agreed position amongst the respondents (Edward, James, Raymon, Lilly-Ann, Airyana, Grace, Isabella, Jazmin, Drew, Megan and Grace) that there was a need by government to control ‘problematic’ sections of society by a process of demonisation. This was in order for society to accept targeting, by creating a moral panic around a subject. This position was exampled by Raymon, who proposed:

*Right well I think they have just rounded up everyone they can’t control into one big group and made them the problem. Well think about it young people, can’t control them, low income or from a bad area, can’t control them, people who have got issues with the bizzies, can’t control them, Black people, can’t control them yeah?*

James, who suggested that rather than an unforeseen consequence it should be considered as a strategy of control by the powerful, also considered the setting of some sections of society against themselves:

*Well it’s like I said they [the government] are turning everyone who isn’t white, rich Christian and British into a criminal. If you don’t meet the whole criteria you are a criminal. It’s not enough to be white, it’s*
not enough to be British or middle class. See, you have all the poor white boys and girls they [the government] are turning into right-wing idiots. To keep the brown and white people at odds you get me? Divide and conquer man that’s the man’s game. Believe it or not [laughing] I’m not a conspiracy buff yeah, I am just talking about the things I see day in day out.

Class Judgements?
Along with the perception of many of the respondents (Edward, James, Raymon, Grace, Isabella, Jazmin, Drew, Megan and Grace) that legislation was being used as a way to control sections of the population, there was also a questioning of ‘the evidence’ used to ‘assume guilt’ prior to a crime taking place. The idea of pre-crime legislation used to enforce what an individual thought based on an assumption of intent was examined during the interviews. Brima, who works in Liverpool with a local youth action group, suggested that when talking to young people about how they feel regarding the police service interviewers must take into account youthful bravado and posturing. He suggested that what young people say when they are in heightened emotional states is not always what they mean, or what they would act upon. He suggests:

_I would doubt anything the young people had said_[laughing]. _I work in ******* which works with local youths. I know they bullshit all the time about what they would do here and what they would do there, it’s bollocks. They would do nothing and if something did happen they would be the first to say wow isn’t that out of order._
Alongside the other respondents, Brima believed that the government heard what it wanted to hear and accepted the information which fitted its agenda. The negative framing and over-policing of some sections of British society then lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy surrounding behaviour. The more the police looked for criminality, the more they would find it, and the more they found, the more the population was targeted and criminalised. This in itself would lead those targeted to reject the authorities, as they would be seen as illegitimate. This rejection of authority in itself would lead to more criminality, and a cycle of mistrust and accusation would emerge.

As Jazmin succinctly proposed earlier when one is being accused, ‘you may as well get hung for a sheep as a lamb’. Throughout the data there was a shared belief by the respondents that the government allowed a negative cycle of labelling to continue, as it fitted with their agendas of control. The government, by framing sections of society as the enemy, kept the focus off other aspects of government through deflection. The irony for many of the respondents was the fact that on the one hand the government constructed young people from the inner city as problematic, and on the other, they were the target for military recruitment, a point we considered earlier in Chapter Two.

The respondents’ perception regarding the inequality of treatment between poor young people in relation to rich young people was obvious. Class\textsuperscript{20} was considered to play a major role in how someone was treated within British society: wealthy members of society were perceived as more powerful therefore afforded better

\textsuperscript{20} Class was linked to wealth and power by the respondents rather than simply being defined by one’s position at birth. This way a person could move through the classes based on their earning potential.
treatment and protection from the state, while the economically-challenged lower classes were perceived as being less powerful and ultimately less protected by the state. To emphasises this point, Brima, James, Drew and Saakar suggested that this lack of protection and the aggressive treatment towards poor young people could be demonstrated by examining the way young people were presented during the civil disturbances in Britain in 2011.

A good example of this treatment and presentation was the particularly punitive penalties issued to those who had taken part in the disturbances. Research by Roberts and Hough (2013: 21) suggests that the sentencing of an offender for the 2011 civil disturbances was considerably harsher than similar offences under ‘non-riot’ conditions. They further suggest that these sentences were not in line with public opinion, suggesting:

The criminal justice response stressed expeditious and severe punishment in order to deter future rioters. There has been far less discussion of alternative responses - for example, tough yet restorative sanctions which might require rioters to meet victims of the rioting, to apologise for the riot and make amends… such alternatives would likely meet public approval (Roberts and Hough, 2013: 21)

The issue of class and the linking of it with the perception of treatment by the state was raised previously within the data when racism was considered. The re-racialisation of Muslims to brown bodies or the re-categorisation of the BMR community members to Muslim, was considered as more problematic for economically-challenged individuals than for the wealthy. Once a certain economic stability had been achieved, the idea of race, ethnicity and class were deemed a
moot point by the respondents. Whatever one’s personal master status, all became irrelevant within the structures of capitalism if one had gained enough wealth. As I have mentioned previously when I considered the re-racialisation of individuals, Edward considered this point, and suggested:

*It’s all because of capitalism at the end of the day. I mean this is one of the things that’s attractive for poor people in Islam it’s the idea of equality. People who are from a poor background are attracted by the ethos in the religion towards poverty. The fact that it should not promote poverty, you know things like erm, it’s not nice to make money off an individual just for financial gain, it’s dirty money. Do you understand what I mean eh? You’ll see that, someone will say (talking about Muslims) no, no you’ve got nothing here have that, that’s for you. We demonise anything that goes against capitalism in general. It’s as simple as that, the larger the Muslim faith gets the bigger threat it is towards capitalism.*

The respondents also contemplated the linking of capitalism and the increasing number of converts to Islam. Brice (2011) suggests that the conversion rate to Islam has increased by 50% over the last decade. I would suggest that this link could be considered a cycle. Poverty is a driving force behind an individual’s rejection of capitalism, and the rejection of capitalism then fuels the conversion to Islam, then the faith group status leads to further alienation of the individual and financial exclusion through race/ethnicity status.
Conclusion

Throughout the analysis the most important consideration has been the importance of language. The identification of language and terminology in Prevent was demonstrated by the respondents as being too vague and unclear which, as I discussed in Chapter One, has also been a criticism from academics and lobby groups. An example of this was the term ‘vulnerable’. This term was contested by the respondents, who challenged that notion of vulnerability based on the drivers identified in the policy. They suggested, for example, that if social deprivation was a driver and those who lived in deprived areas were vulnerable because they lived in an area, then why had there not been more terrorism, more terrorist attacks towards our own government? After all, social deprivation in Liverpool had been a problem for all of the respondents’ lifetimes, many had faced racism and exclusions and they had real grievances.21 It seems clear that using the facets of a person’s identity to identify them as a risk to society was not perceived by the respondents as being a good or positive approach to tackling injustice, inequality or radicalisation.

Challenging the political status quo, challenging the government’s foreign policy or challenging the right for governments to send young people to war with no evidence, were all rights the respondent believed they had as British citizens. Being a voice of protest was not perceived by them as being the same as a terrorist. Power was also considered as playing a role in the government’s targeting of economically challenged areas. The respondents perceived that power in society was linked with

21 Real or imagined grievances are identified in Prevent as driving radicalisation, as I identified in Chapter One.
the accumulation of wealth and position, both of which gave protection to individuals and framed them as a credible voice. Dissent or challenge from the powerful against the government were seen as being legitimate and constructive, unlike a challenge from a less wealthy individual or community.

Legitimacy was another important factor identified within the analysis. Policy which was perceived as fair and therefore legitimate had far more support from the respondents than policy believed to be illegitimate. Prevent, which many of the respondents were not aware of until they were asked to engage in this research and given the opportunity to inspect and consider it, was rejected. This was primarily due to ambiguous definitions and the inconsistency in terminologies.
Chapter Eight: History and Representation

Introduction

In the previous analysis chapters I have already discussed the importance of language and the representations of communities within policy, the respondents’ perceptions of identity and race, alongside the rejection of negative framing via the premise of vulnerability in Prevent. I also examined how highlighting within policy the ‘drivers’ of radicalisation can affect targeted communities by negatively framing them. There was a belief throughout the interviews that policy affected individuals whether they were aware of the specifics of policy or not, by creating a framework of marginalisation based on race/ethnicity and class.

In this final analysis chapter I will be looking at the effects of ‘generational tale telling’ and the handing down of information from one generation to the next. I will also be discussing in more detail the effect of the media on the perception of the respondents, and how moral panic, which was suggested by Brima, Edward, James and Saakar, somehow frames communities as ‘an enemy within’. Within this chapter I will explore generational tale telling and the influence of an historical narrative, media representations, moral panic and the way in which ‘an enemy’ can be framed within the social consciousness, finally finishing by critiquing policy and its presentation.

8.1 Identities Through Time: The Influence of Generational Tale Telling

In a study by Hall and Carter (2006) in the United States, the impact of racial identity ego status (one’s psychological orientation to his or her racial group
Race and Radicalisation E J Peatfield University of Liverpool

membership) was examined in order to see if there was any correlation between attitudes, ethnic identity and the perception of racial discrimination. They found that racial identity and ethnic identity were significant predictors of an individual’s perceptions regarding racial discrimination over the course of a lifetime. This might offer some explanation as to why those singled out within policy or the media may have a heightened sensitivity when mentioned. Ultimately, how one perceives one’s own identity may have the ability to colour how one perceives the actions or inactions of others.

Considering identity as an interaction between the social construction of the self (the influence of the environment) and a personal formation of the self (self-imagery), one must consider that, as such, one’s position within or outside of society can be fluid, essentially interacting with and through social stimulus. As such, historical influence has the ability to be passed down through generational tales in both professional settings, such as a ‘canteen culture’, or within non-formal settings, such as the family home. The handing down of information generationally through oral storytelling has been shown to be hugely important to group identity (Peterson, 2006). Prusak (2005) suggests that storytelling is the way in which some social norms are transmitted through generations, including behaviours, attitudes and, in part, one’s position in relation to wider society. Therefore, generational influence could significantly alter the perception of events that individuals and groups experience.

22 An example: imagine you buy a new car brand, A. You may never have noticed brand A before on the road. Yet, once you own brand A, you tend to see that brand everywhere. Your attention has been shifted by the ownership. The same is true for discrimination: being part of a targeted group makes you more aware of targeting when others may not be.
Addressing the issues of attitudes passed down generationally, Isabella, Edward, Airyana, Molly, James, Raymon and Grace suggested that discriminatory attitudes of individuals and/or professional bodies could be influenced by tale telling. They shared the belief that when an older generation told tales of the discrimination faced by them, these tales would then be reinterpreted by the younger generations and internalised. The discrimination faced by them would then, in a sense, be handed down through the tales and shared, allowing for a greater empathy towards the experiences of the older generation. This can be demonstrated by the way that history is taught in schools. The Holocaust is used as a stark reminder that intolerance cannot be allowed to flourish in society, a warning from the past to the future. The contention by the respondents that historical tales of behaviour, for both individuals and groups within society, affected contemporary attitudes surrounding institutions such as the police. This idea was considered common sense. Research has suggested that the police, for example, has its own tale telling which, given the right situation, could also affect behaviour (Fielding, 1994; Waddington, 1999).

Tale telling was considered a teaching tool. As an example of this, Airyana contended that institutional tale telling had played a significant part in her exposure as a police officer, a minority and a woman. Her participation in the canteen culture, both from the aspect of her gender and her minority status within the police service, was, for her, uncomfortable. Fielding (1994) suggests that police canteen culture had influenced gender inequality within the police service, as it was imbued with an almost pure form of ‘hegemonic masculinity’, and that this culture had been a prime force in the resistance to change within the police service at its grassroots, undermining organisational innovations threatening existing working practices.
Given the importance of the respondents’ suggestion that specific definitions in language had been identified as crucial in order to share understanding concerning policy, practice, and the legitimacy of both, it is unsurprising that they also believed that the police service still had a long way to go before it was seen as legitimate in economically challenged areas such as PPW and SGW. As I discussed in Chapter Three, due to the history of the police service and its relationship with minority groups in Liverpool, the history of the service still affected the perception of its legitimacy within minority communities. A decade on from the Lawrence inquiry, when considering how policing had changed in Liverpool in their lifetimes, the respondents suggested that no matter what changes in policy were implemented to improve relationships between the police and local residents in certain areas, very little could be done to dispel concerns. Past mistakes of labelling and marginalisation were seemingly being reproduced, using fears surrounding terrorism and radicalisation. Marginalised minority communities were already under increased stress due to austerity and the framing of the ‘problem’ of radicalisation did not help abate concerns about targeting. Lilly-Ann suggesting that this perception was not set to change, because the police did not help themselves by ignoring social problems faced by inner-city communities. She suggested that often communities felt abandoned by the police when they needed them, yet over-policing when they did not, saying:

*Look there isn’t the money for the bizzies to bother with even trying to be liked round here. They just about bother their arses turning up if summit happens now. Unless they are raiding somewhere you never see them.*
The majority opinion (Saakar, Edward, James, Drew, Raymon, Jazmin, Molly and Lilly-Ann) was the belief that cultural constrictions formed through tale telling, along with a reproduction of past mistakes by the police, restricted the ability of certain sections of inner-city communities to allow community forgiveness. The deep-seated mistrust of an organisation that kept reiterating past failings by the reproduction of actions such as stop and search had effectively not allowed those historical wounds to heal. The seemingly indiscriminate use of stop and search amongst inner-city communities was seen as a way to maintain a criminalising approach to residents, as well as the lack of engagement regarding ongoing community problems. The labelling as ‘criminal’ was seen as the same approach to the labelling of some sections of the communities as ‘vulnerable’. There was a belief that it was being used by the government and its agencies to justify the increase in surveillance, the reduction in local protection due to an indifference about those communities and the reduction of civil liberties, specifically the right to protest.

The increase in stop and searches under the remit of counter-terrorism (Parmer, 2012) was perceived by the respondents as simply another way to control inner-city communities. In the case of Liverpool, this was not the first time the population had been constructed as hostile and policed accordingly, as I discussed in Chapter Three. Jefferson (2012) contends that during the 1970s and 1980s anger had built throughout inner-city areas because of policing strategies, arguing:

That anger had a history. During the 1970s, poor, young black youths in deprived inner city locations began to be seen as troublesome and potentially criminal…Increasingly seen as a black crime, aggressive
policing using ancient stop and search powers and the old ‘sus’ laws (which allowed police to arrest and secure convictions purely on suspicion of an impending illegality), were used disproportionately against young black males (often involving the police flooding an area) (Jefferson, 2012: 8).

A historical narrative surrounding the mistreatment of minority communities in Liverpool was positioned during this time, and has since failed to be challenged. I would suggest that this was due to a perception from within those communities of continued mistreatment. However, even if the statistics (arrests/stops) and the perception may diverge somewhat, it was the perception that shaped the individual’s reality, and therefore the perception which validated their understanding. Edward, James, Megan, Saakar, Airyana and Isabella all suggested that challenging perceptions was only achievable with facts and specifics, something that they considered policy to be short of. The need of the police to carry out their duties was not in contention by the respondents. However, the targeting of inner-city communities based on the historical stereotyping of minorities was blamed for the police reproducing past mistakes. The media’s representation of poor minorities, including the BMR community and Muslims, was consistently criticised throughout the interviews by all of respondents. There was a shared perception that rather than helping address the imbalance in representation of poor communities, the mainstream media helped solidify a negative representation, ‘poverty porn’ (see Mooney, 2011).
8.2 Minorities, Muslims and the Media

Media representation is a category which emerged from the data and gives an insight into the respondents’ perception regarding media influence. All of the respondents (Edward, Jazmin, Saakar, Grace, Megan, Drew, James, Grace, Isabella, Lilly-Ann, Airyana and Brima) believed that the media problematised some communities and that this, in turn, influenced policy makers. As I touched on in the second analysis chapter when I examined how language was framed and used, the media was seen as sensationalising topics such as Islamophobia and terrorism. This sensationalism was identified within the data as being used for two reasons: first, to sell papers or drive viewing figures, and second, more disturbingly, to influence government policy by creating folk devils. Organisations such as the Murdoch group were accused of stoking the fires of racism by negatively portraying ‘poor’ brown-bodied people and the communities in which they lived. This targeting effectively criminalised whole communities rather than just an individual’s involvement with the stories being sensationalised. Like any analysis, this data represents what the respondent believed to be true based on their experiences, their understanding of those experiences and their access to information. As such, their perception of the media is what I will examine, rather than a discourse analysis of media stories. As I said at the beginning of this chapter, reality (statistics regarding the amount of coverage in the media) and the perception of reality may not be the same thing. As I have previously discussed, membership of a target group can make individuals more susceptible to news stories, as they are more attentive when their group is mentioned (Yoo and Lee, 2008).
All the respondents at some point in their interviews talked of the influence of the media. They were directly asked if they thought that people believed what was written in the press or what was reported on television. All believed that the media was a first source of information for the majority of the British public, and although they were also aware of criticism of media stories, the overwhelming belief was that most of the British public believed what they read in the press. They also believed that the media had the ability to influence perceptions of society. As someone who had spent time in prison, Edward suggested that even when his mother knew the facts about an issue discussed in the media and had experienced with him the challenges faced by ex-offenders, this was still not enough to make her challenge statements made in the press. Relating his understanding to his own experiences, Edward recounted a newspaper report published when he was last released after struggling to gain early parole, which his mother knew. He said:

> I mean, I've only just come out of prison and my mother goes 'oh look at them, they're letting all these murders out isn't it bad' Hang on mum did thee just let me out, I'm not a murderer? Did you see how hard it was for me to get out? Thee don't just let murders out, do you really believe that? The fella might have done 30 fucking years and paid he dues but thee don't mention that, what are they gonna do with him keep him locked up for ever, they have got to let him out sometime? An I know it’s not me mum's fault, she just thinks if it’s in the press, if it’s in black and white it must be true.

Selective reporting and false reporting by the media was a point constantly raised throughout the interviews. There was a perception that the media promoted a
negative attitude towards poor Muslims, poor Black and mixed-race minorities, poor young people and those from lower socio-economic areas. They did this by selectively mentioning aspects of the individual’s identity that was involved in the current news story. So, for example, if a story was about two males, one ‘Black’ and one ‘white’, the details of the race of the ‘Black’ individual would be reported, not that of the ‘white’ individual. Similarly, if reporting on two males, one of a Muslim background and one of a Christian background, there would again be no mention of the Christian background, and yet the Muslim faith would be reported in the story.

As I have previously discussed, negativity by the press was believed to be fuelled by the construction of policies such as Prevent, in a cycle of events. The policy affected the press, which affected the public, which affected the policymaker, who decided on the policy. The self-perpetuated fear and social anxiety against those members of society under suspicion also affected the targeted group’s perceptions about themselves and society, the presentation of the self affecting the self, as I discussed in Chapter Six. So were the respondents affected by Prevent and other policies that they may or may not have been aware of, as the research question asks? Simply put, yes: all the respondents believed so. The greater question may be: did all of the respondents think this was unusual or unique to Prevent? The answer was no: all the respondents knew they were controlled by legislation in some way or another. Concerning Prevent, the effect may have been subtler than being arrested or stopped and searched, but the respondents believed there was an effect, as all policy affects communities who are either identified within it directly, such as
Muslims, or indirectly, such as the young or the poor. As Saakar, commenting at the end of the day, said: *Shit rolls down hill*

For example, Jazmin highlighted the way Muslims had been presented. She contended:

*I mean, it just comes on the telly you know that Muslims are bombing this, the Muslims have done that, terrorist this terrorist that, you don’t hear about Jewish terrorists or Christian terrorists. It’s linked to Muslims all the time. So it’s through social media and through the telly, they [talking about the government and media] always pointing fingers at the Muslims. So obviously if people look at Muslims it’s like ‘obviously’ terrorists.*

Jazmin also suggested that there was a constructed and deliberate association that linked Muslims and terrorism. As I discussed in Chapter Two when I mentioned implicit association, the linking through concept association had not gone unnoticed. In a study in Australia, Akbarzadeh and Smith (2005) suggested that the media did have the capacity to influence society’s narrative. They suggested:

*The media is a significant social agent, with the potential to influence community perceptions. Its influence can seriously impact on minority groups by subjecting them to exclusionary pressures by implying that they hold ‘alien’ characteristics which do not correspond with the values and ethos of mainstream Australia (Akbarzadeh and Smith, 2005: 1).*
Saeed (2007) also suggests that Muslims have been constructed as the ‘alien other’ by the media and that they could be linked to a development in racism. As I have previously mentioned, the terminology of racism was seen by many of the respondents as developing to encompass more than just the Black/white dichotomy post-9/11. In his 1989 work, Van Dijk suggested that a negative attitude towards minorities could be due to a number of practical problems, such as labour shortages in most Western European countries. The minorities were seen as interlopers and this negativity was led in part by the government. Both Labour and the Conservative party, I would suggest, have set a bad example, as they ‘took measures’ to stop the flow of immigration into Britain during the 1950s, effectively signalling that ‘those’ people do not belong here. Van Dijk (1998) suggests that the implicit message to the native population was clear:

In this context racist parties were allowed to be founded that gave even more explicit expression to these opinions. Foreigners should return to where they came from because colours or cultures should not be mixed… these people do not belong here, and their presence may cause problems (Van Dijk, 1998: 200).

Considering this in relation to the EU referendum in Britain, the discourse used by the Brexit campaign, specifically by the political party UKIP, embodied this creation of the alien other. Domke, McCoy and Torres (1999) also examined media in the United States, and the way the representation of political subjects influenced how people thought about the issues. Their findings indicated that it activated racial or ethnic stereotyping:
The findings provide strong support for the perspective that news coverage of issues, by priming subjects to focus on some considerations and relationships and not others, influences the strength of the associations between individuals’ racial cognitions and their political evaluations (Domke, McCoy and Torres, 1995: 570).

Language used in the presentation and description of a ‘problem’ frames the ‘problem’ and those associated negatively with it. The psychology of racism and power was considered by Van Dijk (1991), who contends that the choice of news story and how it was presented was more determined by a need to maintain power than to report truth:

Structures of headlines, leads, thematic organisation, the presence of explanatory background information, style, and especially the overall selection of newsworthy topics are thus indirectly controlled by the societal context of power relations (Van Dijk, 1991:51).

Power was a theme the respondent believed was afforded to those through the acquisition of wealth and position in order to effect change in society, as I mentioned in the last chapter. James highlights this position by arguing that power maintenance was the primary goal for the ‘powerful’, and the need to pass on power as a legacy in order to maintain an uneasy status quo between the classes, the rich and the poor, the haves and the have nots. He suggested:

*They* [the state and those he perceived as being in power] *been doing it for time sister you get me? Always with brown people, young people, poor people, foreign people. You see the people in charge they ain’t*
brown or poor or young or foreign, you get me? They keep their kind in power by denying it to everyone else.

The assumption by James that there has been a maintenance of position and power since the days of the legendary folk hero Robin Hood may not be that far from the truth. A report in 2001, reissued in 2010 by Country Life magazine, found that one third of Britain was still owned by the aristocracy, most of whom gained their titles and lands under the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth century. The current British cabinet is estimated to be worth over £70 million, with eighteen out of twenty-nine ministers being millionaires.23

However, I would suggest that power cannot simply be reduced to capitalism and the reproduction of wealth. What also has to be considered is the concept of power itself. What exactly is power? Throughout the interviews the respondents talked of power and the powerful. Power itself, however, was understood by the respondents as the ability to shape society either negatively or positively, and to maintain or improve one’s position. They (Edward, James, Saakar, Megan, Isabella and Airyana) believed that the way in which the ‘powerful’ maintained power was by framing other sections of society as problematic, which deflected society’s attention, leaving them to do what they needed to do. This was linked to the way the government could, in effect, hide the introduction of legislation which removed civil liberties and human rights in plain sight by deflecting public attention.

Throughout the data there was an overriding perception from all of the respondents (Edward, James, Raymond, Drew, Saakar, Lilly-Ann, Grace, Isabella, Airyana, 

---

Megan and Brima) that there was a massive disparity of power between poor communities and those who create policy and implement it, such as the police. All of the respondents at some point in their interviews spoke of how the implementation of policing strategies targeted poor and less ‘powerful’ communities. This was deemed by the respondents to be an attack on the poor, and was blamed for galvanising resentment, not only towards the police but also towards the government. The focus on differences and divisions within society created by the state, and subsequently the media, was considered counterproductive in a multicultural society. Rather, the focus on similarities and the positivity of diversity was seen as being a far more productive strategy.

Framing a Problem

The way in which minority groups, including Muslims, were presented in policy and through the media was criticised by the respondents as framing them negatively. This negative framing created suspicion and distrust, which was considered deliberate and, as I have just discussed, a way for the government to create a divided society in order to maintain the status quo. By highlighting some sections of society as problematic, the government was creating a significance spiral, first suggested by Cohen in the 1960s. Cohen (1972) presented the significance spiral when writing about the mods and rockers and how they were portrayed in the media. A circular set of interactions between claims-makers, moral entrepreneurs and the mass media can be tracked if we look at the way BMR communities within Britain have been historically portrayed and policed.

Cohen (1972/2002) suggests that a misrepresentation of events and a negative framing of those involved is undertaken in three ways. First, there is exaggeration
and distortion, which can be observed currently regarding the number of immigrants who have been trying to gain entry to Britain. I would suggest that the ‘immigration crisis’, as it has been framed, does not represent a true and accurate depiction of how many immigrants have actually tried to enter Britain. The term ‘crisis’ has also been linked not only with the numbers trying to gain entry to Britain, but also with housing shortages and the living standards of people in Britain. These have framed immigrants as folk devils,24 in some ways depicting them as a threat to the very fabric of British society, ignoring the fact that British society has been created by an amalgamation of cultures and races from the invasion of the Roman Empire, the Norman invasion, the Saxon and Dane invasions and so on and so forth. This distortion and exaggeration only feeds the second of Cohen’s (1972/2002) identified factors: prediction.

Prediction is described by Cohen (1972/2002) as the way in which media coverage of events develops a pre-emptive aspect. This can be seen in the way the media considered terrorism, specifically home-grown terrorism after the events of 7/7. A report by Moore, Mason and Lewis (2008: 3) found that there was not only a predictive nature in the way the British print media reported Muslims post 7/7, but the aspects of reporting changed significantly. They suggest:

In recent years, however, we have seen the increasing importance of stories focusing on religious and cultural differences between Islam and British culture or the West in general (22% of stories overall) or Islamic

---

24 The term ‘folk devil’ is a term used to describe a person or group of people who are portrayed in folklore or the media as outsiders. These people are often considered deviant and can be blamed for crimes or other sorts of social problems. It was a term used by Stanley Cohen in his 1972 work ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panic: The Creation of Mods and Rockers’
extremism (11% overall). Indeed, 2008 was the first year in which the volume of stories about religious and cultural differences (32% of stories by 2008) overtook terrorism related stories (27% by 2008). Coverage of attacks on or problems facing Muslims, on the other hand, has steadily declined as a proportion of coverage. In summary, we found that the bulk of coverage of British Muslims - around two thirds - focuses on Muslims as a threat (in relation to terrorism), a problem (in terms of differences in values) or both (Muslim extremism in general) (Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008: 3).

The third aspect of moral panic suggested by Cohen was symbolisation, which I would suggest has been witnessed recently with the representation of the hijab. Post-9/11 and 7/7, Europe has seen Muslims, specifically female Muslims, come under attack for wearing traditional clothing. Of course, moral panic has developed numerous times within Britain, from the original mods and rockers considered by Cohen to the moral panic surrounding mugging in the 1970s (Hall et al., 2013). Like historical moral panics that have permeated British history, the majority of the respondents (Molly, Jazmin, Lilly-Ann, Raymon, Saakar, Isabella, James, Edward, Brima and Airyana) suggested that the government, through its construction of legislation, and the media, through sensationalising stories and focusing on race and faith, have framed those parts of British society that they consider problematic as criminal.

So, to consider the respondents’ position let us consider Cohens’ three key stages. Cohen (1972/2002) suggests that the first key stage is exaggeration and distortion. The respondents suggest that the media representation of Muslims and their
representation through policy construction has framed them as a greater threat than they actually are. Jazmin exemplifies this position, saying:

*If you’re listening to the news and everything else thee just make out that Muslims are the terrorists. An it’s like, if you’re gonna be a terrorist or not, it doesn’t mean you got to be a Muslim. It’s just that everyone (talking about government figures) has made out it’s just the Muslims who are the terrorists.*

As I have previously discussed in Chapter One, the construction of policy such as Prevent specifically identified Muslims by framing Islamic terrorism as the ‘greatest’ threat to Britain. Both the former Home Secretary Theresa May and the independent reviewer of the policy Lord Carlisle, by mentioning Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism in their opening statements alongside arguably the most notorious Muslim terrorist of the twentieth century, Osama Bin Laden, linked counter-radicalisation policy, from the outset, with Muslims.

The respondents in no way underestimated the human suffering due to the loss of life from terrorism, nor did they discount the actual threat from acts of terrorism. But coming from a city which historically had a sectarian split, they were aware that threats have to be placed within context and not blown out of proportion through paranoia. The negativity towards Islam and Muslims was not being tempered or challenged by enough facts about Islam and Muslims. Often people did not know any Muslims, and ignorance regarding faith groups or other minority communities was seen as problematic. James suggested that information was key to challenging discrimination:
The problem is people don’t know about Islam and all they hear is Islam is bad. So I think it’s the same as discrimination but I think it’s so bad at the moment because of the hype. I think a lot of the stories we hear in the papers and such we don’t actually get to hear the whole story, we don’t get the whole truth, just the bits that are sensational and so we are placed in a position of unknowing. We don’t know enough to make an informed decision on whether we should be scared. Saying that it’s like scaremongering.

If one considers James’ opinion in relation to Cohen’s work, we can see that he is linking the definition of a threat (Islam) to the distortion and exaggeration of a problem. Since the London bombings over a decade ago, Britain has managed to avoid any other mass terrorist attack, the killing of Lee Rigby and Jo Cox being attacks on individuals rather than mass civilian attacks. Recent mass attacks in Europe have once again highlighted the danger from extremism, but we do need to place them within context. As I mentioned in Chapter Two, terrorism accounts for a very small minority of deaths both in Britain and abroad. Nonetheless, the fear of terrorism seems to have been a constant over the last two decades in the media, with lung and heart disease (Britain’s biggest killers) receiving, in comparison, relatively little attention.

The second stage of Cohen’s development of moral panic was prediction. Prediction can be examined through a build-up of concern, and the response from the media and authorities (for example, the creation of counter-radicalisation/terrorism policy, including pre-crime laws). Megan suggested that Islam, of course, was not the first group to be targeted by legislation based on moral panic, and that
the implications of framing an enemy through folk devilling could last for generations. The lessons from the past are seemingly ignored, and a reproduction of past policy mistakes potentially creates deeper divisions in society:

*My view is you just can’t tar everyone with the same brush, that’s dangerous look at what happened when they did that with other minorities. We are still feeling the effects now.*

Edward, James, Isabella, Airyana and Saakar also suggested, regarding those individuals or groups government had negatively framed, that they were bearing the brunt of policy constructed to protect them from themselves. The arrogance of policy makers in the way in which they presented lower socio-economic communities as somehow less than moral mirrored the representation of Islam within Western discourses (Said, 1981; 2008). Those groups/individuals who were seen as being targeted were, in their opinions, targeted due to the government’s need to control them. This control was believed to be especially critical during a period of austerity. The respondents linked the cutting of public services and social benefits, which the poorest sections of society rely upon, with the need to maintain order and control through the fear of terrorism.

**8.3 Policy, Protection, Presentation and Effect**

When considering the effect of policy, Edward, James, Saakar, Isabelle, Megan, Airyana and Drew considered the way in which communities were constructed as criminal, and how this representation was fed down to the public. They challenged the way in which statistics proffered by government bodies were spun to a wider social audience. Megan considered this misdirection, and suggested that it was used
to link criminality to those parts of society who are labelled as ‘other’. The presentation of criminality, she suggested, was seemingly more important than the criminality itself. The class of the criminal plays a large part in the way in which they were represented:

*Now my point is look at Harold Shipman, middle class doctor, no-one knew he was a mass murderer. If people started dying round here the area would be swamped with police. Even if they didn’t find Doctor Shipman they would have found something that would to them, justify their over policing and justify their treatment and attitude towards local people. It’s like Muslims they are being looked at looked at looked at so sooner or later they will find something and it all starts again.*

Although one may contest that policy is not deliberately constructed by government in order to label inner-city and minority communities as criminal, we must refer back to the wording within Prevent. The drivers identified within the policy, alongside the factors determining if one is ‘vulnerable’ to radicalisation, read as determiners: negative experiences, real or imagined, with police, young people, and faith groups (Muslim) and mistrust of government, all of which are possible aspects of life within an inner-city community. But alongside the construction of the policy itself was a rejection from all of the respondents of the way in which policy was presented. They believed that the way information concerning extremism and public safety was presented by government to the public was a way to spin information regarding radicalisation. This was to present specific areas and sections of the community, such as the young, as problematic by not fully sharing all the information available and using ‘national security’ as an umbrella to withhold facts.
When considering radicalisation, and subsequently counter-radicalisation measures, Saakar suggests that spin (described as the way in which the government constructs policy, frames the policy, implements policy and then presents it to a wider social audience to explain its actions) was crucial to the way that people understand a policy:

> When you hear about it, it’s all Islamic radicalisation, reading the Prevent strategy on the link you sent us [respondents were given access to Prevent online in case they were unaware of what it was] it’s all Islamic radicalisation. Well if you say it long enough people will jump to conclusions and the conclusion is Islamic radicalisation is the big threat. I don’t agree with that but that’s the way it’s spun. There are far worse things happening here now.

Saakar implied that policy, as the basis for policing strategies or counter-radicalisation programmes, had to be constructed ‘for the public interest’, as without public support its successful implementation would be untenable. Having public support was needed, not only for any successful implementation, but also to justify actions that may otherwise seem unjust, the creation of policy in effect giving legitimacy to actions. Legitimacy, as I have previously mentioned, played a huge role in the acceptance of any action by the respondents. Concerning radicalisation, this has meant it has been constructed as a huge problem. The respondents believed that there were far more dangerous aspects of daily life for many members of their communities that were more important to address than the risk of terrorism. Racism and ‘misinformation’ were identified as being far more problematic, both now and historically, than terrorism ever had been, just like the lack of employment
opportunities, lack of housing and educational opportunities. Talking about his experiences of racism, Sakaar related it to the historical radicalisation of white extremist through ‘misinformation’.

According to all of the respondents, racism and racist behaviours had been a constant challenge for the BMR community in Liverpool. Edward, Saakar and James, for example, believed that racism was not worse now, it was just reported more now due to advancements in technology and the facilities to report it (Norris, McCahill and Wood, 2002), which was a good thing. However, the growth in technology was not all good, as the expansion in surveillance technology, such as mobile phones and CCTV, could also help to blow events out of proportion, such as suspected radicalisation. Postings on social media, events and comments by individuals that may not have been reported prior to the advancement in technologies, such as young people ranting about extremism to impress their friends, were now taken very seriously, and often out of context. Youthful posturing or venting could create misinformation about sections of the community if taken seriously. Talking specifically about social media, Saakar emphasised this point:

>This is what I mean about information, kids see a police man doing something now it’s all over YouTube, police see a kid doing something stupid saying the wrong thing maybe for effects, it’s all over YouTube and then it’s all taken a bit too seriously as it’s taken out of contexts. So information good but it’s gotta be placed within a context to understand it properly or you suddenly get misinformation.

How policy was implemented, and the effect on local communities at a street level, was also an area for concern throughout the responses, and related to
racism/discriminatory practises. The criminalisation of inner-city communities, through a marginalisation and a polarisation of space, was criticised as a form of social control. Winchester and White (1988), when discussing the change in areas and the processes of gentrification, suggested that the way in which policy makers perceive poorer inner-city communities allowed the justification of aggressive housing policy to enforce the improvement of areas holding a stigmatised population:

Such social controls given legitimacy by political forces and then operationalised through such mechanisms as allocation in systems in the housing market, result in certain subgroups of the population becoming stigmatised as socially unacceptable as well as economically weak. This phenomenon then takes on a spatial dimension, with the residential areas of these inhabitants becoming similarly characterised. Which consequently reinforces the image of both area and people in the minds of those exercising power and social control (Winchester and White, 1988: 37).

The framing of inner-city communities and the profiling of individuals based on specific identity characteristics, arguably their master status, was another constantly criticised theme throughout the interviews. For example, Jazmin suggested that there was an intersectionality of facets of identity constructed as negative. She contended that age as well as race played a role in targeting by the police on a day-to-day basis. Identified as one of the drivers within Prevent, youth has been constructed throughout the policy as being a factor of vulnerability, as I examined in Chapter One.
Similarly, Isabella suggested that this left poor young minority individuals doubly discriminated against, via the intersection of their race and age due to two observable facets of their identity which had been constructed as problematic. Jazmin suggested that when considering the behaviour of the police, she faced constant harassment, specifically when in a vehicle, because of her age and race. Jazmin was an individual who had never been arrested or charged with any criminal offence, is in full-time employment and comes from a household environment that also has no criminal convictions (these facts are mentioned to illuminate that there seemed no rationale for her to have been stopped by the police over twenty times). Jazmin contended that the police stop her and her friends in their vehicles simply because they were young, in nice cars and are minorities:

As soon as me mates an I get in the car, even me mum’s fiesta we get tugged for no reason. Well the reason is we have Black faces and we are young in a car together so we must be up to summit. It’s the bullshit police are racist dickheads round here mate I’m tellin ya.

Jazmin could not provide evidence to support her claims of victimisation. However, as we have previously mentioned, this research is interested in the perceptions of the communities under study. These perceptions may not marry up with official statistics, but they do represent the influences that help mould the realities of the respondents. In a similar vein to Jazmin, Saakar and Isabella, James suggests that discrimination was systemic within authority structures and that acceptance of such had become common within his own community. Luckily, through generationally-learnt behaviours, the younger generation within his community had become resilient towards the negative attitudes. This resilience was a facet of community
identity shared by not only BMR people but also other non-minority groups which had been targeted because they came from an inner-city area, such as young whites. The targeted individuals became the focus of policy, and this negativity was then ingrained through policy construction and enforced through policing strategies. James contends:

*Right so round here [PPW] it used to just be anyone with a Black face got pulled [stopped and questioned by police] but now it’s anyone who is younger. So any of the boys, Black, White, Brown them all getting pulled for walking down the street yeah, I seen the Babylon [police] pulling some kids the other day girls in fact, not even boys, yeah and the shit they were talking to these girls especially the police cuntstable [emphasis on section of the word] was rude man.*

Indicated throughout the interviews was the opinion that there was a shared community resilience born out of necessity that had flourished in Liverpool. The resilience shown by BMR people in Liverpool is, one may suggest, similar to the resilience shown by Muslim communities regarding current counter-terrorism legislation and its implementation which has constructed them through risk amplification as dangerous (Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009). Multiculturalism was seen by the respondents as successful within Liverpool. Every respondent considered themselves to be either a product of multiculturalism, having two or more genetic backgrounds, and/or a member of a multicultural community.
Multiculturalism – A Radical Solution

In the last section of this chapter I will examine the concept of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism emerged through the data as a dominant secondary theme, as many of the respondents came from a mixed heritage and a mixed racial background. Linked to their own historical narratives, multiculturalism was seen as a success by the respondents, as they themselves were, in the words of Airyana, products of multiple cultures.

But alongside terminologies of equality, social mobility and fairness, multiculturalism was highlighted as a way to level the playing field, for many respondents, in Britain’s white-dominated landscape. It seemed that from the moment the FPM David Cameron gained control of government in 2011 in what was, then, a coalition government, he began to attack the very nature of British multicultural policy. Signalling a radical departure from the previous government’s strategies, Cameron stated in his Munich security speech (2011), which I previously discussed in Chapter One, that Britain, in his opinion, must adopt a policy of ‘muscular liberalism’ to enforce British values of equality, law and freedom. He blamed the previous thirty years of multicultural British policy for contributing to home-grown terrorism by fostering extremist ideologies. But why was multiculturalism to blame for extremism? FPM David Cameron previously suggested that multicultural policy had failed to unite the British population and had created deep divisions, arguing:

We have failed to provide a vision of society [to young Muslims] to which they feel they want to belong…We have even tolerated segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values.
All this leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for something to belong to and believe in can lead them to extremist ideology (Cameron, 2011).

This attack was not only on multiculturalism; it singled out one section of British society based on their membership or historical family membership of a faith group, and placed British Muslims, and anyone misidentified as a British Muslim, at the centre of a controversy about multiculturalism. Cameron directly blamed the doctrine of ‘state multiculturalism’ for encouraging different cultures to live separate lives, and directly devalued the strides in cultural equality made in Britain. The last mass migration by workers from British former commonwealth countries during the 1950s and 60s was a time when many of the parents and grandparents of the respondents came to Britain. Hansen (2000: 3-4) draws reference to Churchill’s belief in 1954 that migration into Britain from former Commonwealth countries during the 1950s would produce a ‘magpie society which would never do’. He further contends that over twenty-five years later, in 1981, Britain was firmly occupying a multicultural space on the global stage, the magpie, in a sense, never taking flight:

The United Kingdom began the post-war years with a non-white population of some 30,000 people: it approaches the end of a century with over 3 million whose origins extend from Africa, the Pacific Rim, the Caribbean and the Indian Subcontinent. Together with France and Germany it has among the largest ethnic populations in Europe and it shares with France the largest ethnic-minority citizenry… a wide range of political issues are linked one way or another with the
experience of Commonwealth migration; the enquiry into the botched murder of Stephen Lawrence, a black Londoner: The Rushdie affair and ensuing debates about the role of Islam in British politics and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism (Hansen, 2000: 3-4).

The government’s underestimation of the influence of migration into Britain during the post-war period, and the blending, often within family groups, of different races and cultures, could be considered naïve. At a time when diversity seems crucial to the successful implementation of any policy, such as Prevent, an embracing of British diversity seems an intrinsic part of the self-monitoring of ‘vulnerable’ groups. This self-monitoring, which asks communities to work alongside government to reduce the risk of radicalisation, is threatened by the negative representation of those same communities within policy. The denial of multicultural success by Cameron (2011) within Britain seems essentially linked to a rejection of the idea that different cultures can retain their cultural uniqueness at the same time as embracing their Britishness. Kundnani (2012: 155) argues:

Attacks on multiculturalism from across the political spectrum reduce the complex history of settlement and interaction in the UK to a simple narrative of excessive British tolerance and increasingly disruptive immigrant communities.

For instance, Thomas (2011) suggests that the British government as a whole has seemingly rejected multiculturalism, choosing instead to prioritise the new ‘community cohesion’ policy, which is much more focused on one singular British identity rather than an embracing of British diversity. He further contends that this focus shift has been arguably controversial, as it has downplayed the reality of
racism without specifically identifying what ‘Britishness’ was, and therefore what ‘British community cohesion’ was. Drawing on empirical research with young people to discover what community cohesion meant, Thomas contended that, rather than being the death of multiculturalism, community cohesion was simply a new branch of the older policy of multiculturalism.

Edward, James, Jazmin, Brima, Isabella, Airyana, Grace, Drew and Megan all directly rejected the failure of multicultural policies, and argued that the mixed-race community in Liverpool was proof of that. They suggested that for at least three hundred years a blending of races and a blending of cultures within Liverpool showed that multiculturalism, whether endorsed or promoted by government or not, was, and still is, part of British culture. They also suggested that the rejection of multiculturalism by government could be seen as a way to reject the product of multiple cultures, and a way to label those productions as in some way inferior and less than British. By labelling individuals and communities as less that British, the government was directly constructing them as ‘the other’. This, more than any action, had the capacity to encourage communities to separate from mainstream society, which was identified within government policy (Prevent) as a driving force in extremist radicalisation, making it a somewhat counterproductive counter-radicalisation approach.

Talking about multiculturalism and the change in the government’s position, they suggested that instead of the government rejecting minority communities by constructing them as something less than British, they may be better served addressing the disparity in social mobility and the marginalisation of communities. It was also suggested that the targeting of young people or minority groups was a
simplistic approach, constructing a ‘them and us’ attitude throughout policy. These type of ‘them and us’ attitudes in government had been the root cause of much social disparity throughout British history, and was based on a rejection of the poor through an antiquated class system. I would suggest that by rejecting cultural diversity within communities, the government is in a sense rejecting poor communities, as that is where cultural diversity is more apparent. This point was highlighted by Saakar, who suggested:

They love their labels don’t thee [talking about government] Em I think it’s just one of those ‘yes it’s them’ situations. Make the poor people the bad guys and then we can blame them. I think like the point about young people, it’s down to individuals... I think if the government spent less money on alienating people and more on helping them, a lot of these problems could be solved with an increase in a kind of social mobility.

There was a belief throughout the interviews that strong community cohesion due to a proud multicultural heritage afforded communities a protection of sorts, and a shared resilience born from shared experiences. Liverpool was attacked by central government for over three decades, through forced austerity in the 1980s, through framing of Scousers as problematic by government ministers like Geoffrey Howe and Margret Thatcher, to the disturbances in the 1970s and 80s, and the way in which the Liverpool fans were vilified throughout the events at Hillsborough. This, however, in the opinions of the respondents, had drawn the city together in a rejection of negativity through a shared multicultural identity. This is not to say that there was a rose-tinted approach to the issues of racism within Liverpool, or the challenges of class division within Liverpool. However, from the perspective of the
respondents, Liverpool had become resilient to negative framing by outside forces due to a shared identity as Scouse. Scousers may attack themselves, but that did not mean anyone else could. Grace emphasises this point by suggesting that Liverpudlian resilience was born from its history:

*I think a lot of it has to do with our background* [talking about resilience]. *No one likes a Scouser, we have been slagged off for many years, government hates Scousers, Thatcher fucking hated us, I was hoping in the 1980s we could actually kill the bitch off by giving her a heart attack. So I think the fact that Liverpool is made up with poor people, the Africans, Irish, Indian, Chinese, we are made from the people everyone else didn’t like so it gives us a unique identity for defo yeah.*

In Chapter Three I discussed the history of Liverpool’s resistance to central government, and it was this resistance that the respondents suggested was important within a modern context. It had given the city, in their opinions, a strong cultural identity. A fortress mentality established through repeated attacks from both central government and the media had seen Liverpool detach itself from dominant political landscapes by retreating somewhat into a common, shared, insular and city-wide identity. However, this study questioned a small sample pool, within small areas, in a small city. In no way does this research believe the respondents have only positive things to say regarding the city or their experiences as a part of the city. The stories of racism, both historical and recent, recounted by the respondents show that the city is in no way a utopian society. Racism, sectarianism and discrimination in all its forms have been a problem in Liverpool, as in other cities. As I discussed
in Chapter Three, from the sectarian troubles in Liverpool (Neal, 1990), to the race riots in 1919 (May, 1974) and the troubles throughout the 1970s and 80s, Liverpool has had its share of conflict within its own communities.

Nonetheless, the pride in the city was obvious throughout the interviews, and a shared belief that, although Liverpool might not have been perfect, it was better than many other cities in Britain due to the fact that the city embraced its history, both the good and the bad. Liverpool did not forget its links to slavery, nor did it forget the fact a large percentage of the historical population arrived through immigration. Again, as I discussed in Chapter Three, 25% of the city has links to Irish settlers, plus a large historical Chinese community and a BMR community that spans over three hundred years. This, I would suggest, has in some ways meant that Liverpool has been forced to embrace multiculturalism. Liverpool, as a place built from immigration, had in a sense given Liverpudlians a ‘vision of a society they were proud to belong to’, unlike the British government which had ‘failed to’.

**Conclusion**

Language and the need for specifics concerning language to determine meaning was once again a dominant theme throughout the data. The importance of understanding the history of communities was also considered, alongside the influence of ‘generational tale telling’ in shaping people’s realities. Challenging assumptions using specifics and facts was one way the respondents believed past mistakes could be avoided, such as labelling, stereotyping and the framing of enemies. Embracing a multicultural approach to policy was also proffered as an idea that would challenge the representation of some communities as somehow less
than British, and give voice to communities to challenge government in a positive way, without being labelled as radical. Finally, concerning the impact of policy, there was a belief that by identifying some parts of society, rather than considering all of society vulnerable to radicalisation, the government created a greater problem. First, by creating divisions in society which were used to subjugate communities, and second, by missing opportunities to heal divisions which could lead to radicalisation. Identifying communities already economically marginalised was considered a self-defeating approach to counter-radicalisation, as it lost support from those groups and individuals needed to construct positive dialogue.
Chapter Nine: Methodological Reflections

From its inception, the research has maintained a fluid dynamic, which has allowed me to shift focus, rather than sticking rigidly to the parameters of the original research questions. In its most basic form, this research was designed to mirror the pilot study, which asked Muslims in and around Liverpool their opinions of Prevent and the drivers identified in the policy document (see Appendix 10). The methodology for the pilot study was the same as this study, as was the justification for the need of a study such as this. Throughout the phase one data collection, I was aware from the information provided from the gatekeepers that there were a number of design adaptations needed (this reflects Hamersley’s approach: information informing design, leading to adaptation). In this chapter I will consider the adaptations I have needed to make, some methodology rethinks and possibilities for research expansion.

9.1 Adaptations

I decided after the analysis of the phase one data and advice from my supervisors to create an information sheet that would give the respondents the opportunity to go and investigate Prevent for themselves. As I discussed in the methodology chapter, this was given to each of the respondents at least seven days before I made contact with them again to arrange an interview. This sheet was written in simplistic language again on advice from my supervisors, as another problem identified by the phase one data collection was the literacy limitations of some of the respondents. Reports from the gatekeepers indicated that some of the respondents were unable to fully read and/or understand the wording used in the policy document. On reflection, the limitations in literacy was not something I had considered. I should
have considered this, given my own limitations before returning to education nine years ago. Back then, I would not have been able to read let alone understand the language in the policy.

*Gatekeepers*

Reflecting on my choice to use gatekeepers in two specific areas, this was decided for a number of reasons: first, to access a ‘hard’ to reach community, second, to make sure that there was no interviewer bias, and third, to remove the likelihood of demand characteristics and to avoid the researcher knowing any of the respondents. However, one of the problems with utilising this type of collection strategy was that the participants were all from one subsection of the localised community, i.e. those people that used the specific facilities. This meant that rather than getting a general opinion of the areas from multiple sources, opinions were restricted to those locations. It would therefore be interesting to repeat the research with a much wider and more diverse section of the local communities, to see if the results would be the same or similar.

*Communities*

The choice to separate the two geographical areas and to construct communities based on geographical location is also something that, on reflection, I would change if this research was expanded. Next time, I would allow BMR respondents from across the city to give their opinions, to get a wider spread of opinion.

I knew at the start of this process that ‘community’ was a contested term, meaning many things to many peoples. As Ewart suggests:
A community comes to recognise and hence know itself through its representation in local media. Part of this recognition process involves the establishment of a set of ‘norms’ for behaviour, appearance and characteristics, which are applied to both those within and outside the community. These ‘norms’ are played out through the texts of regional newspapers. Those who abide by them are included in the conceptualisation of ‘the public’ constructed by the media in applying these norms, while those who do not are excluded (Ewart 2000: 1).

The view that the media play a central role in the construction of community is shared by Hall (1992) and Carey (1985). What is less clear is how this occurs in any empirical sense. My choice to determine community via geographical location assumed that a shared space would facilitate a shared narrative, which, in part, it did. But the variations within those geographical communities was limited due to the sample size. Again, further expansion would require an increase in sample size, as well as a broadening of the sample area.

**The Respondents: Colour Coding Identity**

A further aspect of the research which may be worth greater reflection was the respondents themselves. All but one of the respondents were from mixed heritage, and as such considered themselves mixed race. Although not by design, this aspect of the research has flagged up a number of issues, such as multiculturalism and the term ‘brown’ as a descriptive. Throughout this thesis I have rejected the colour coding of identity: the terms ‘Black’ and ‘white’ were considered by a number of the respondents, as I talked about in Chapter Six, as not sufficient as a descriptive. This was due to a shared identity of both ‘Black and white’ within one individual.
Although this aspect of the research was not in the original remit of the research plan, its consideration has facilitated a much more varied approach to understanding the complexities of racial identity, and the intersectionality between class and race.

9.2 Research Expansion

There is very little information on the number of conversions to Islam within Britain, since prior to the 2001 census religious affiliation was not recorded. So a base judgement regarding faith was obtained based on ethnic group, which of course did not take into account the diversity of race within religious groups and/or conversion to Islam from the ‘white’ population. In 2001, there was an optional question added to the census which opened up the possibility of identifying ethno-religious groups for the first time, and allowed some data to be gained regarding ‘white’ ethnic converts. Data from the 2001 census showed that there were 63,042 Muslims who identified themselves as ‘white’ British. In a report for Faith Matters (2011), a calculation of converts taken from figures from the 2001-2010 census estimated that 55% of converts to Islam were from the dominant ‘white’ British ethnic group. It is also suggested that there are over 100,000 converts to Islam within Britain, with that number set to rise.

Islam is one of the fastest growing faiths within Britain, but the reasons for the high conversion rates to Islam from within the ‘white’ population of Britain have not been explored in depth, nor has the conversion from within the minority mixed-race population. Concerning this research, some interesting points were made by two of the respondents who had spent time in prison, regarding the premise of safety through conversion. When talking about his experiences in prison, Edward had
suggested that within the prison population conversion to Islam offered more protection from the non-Muslim population within the prison. The idea that minorities perceive that they need protection in a prison environment is both interesting and worrying. This research has exposed that racism is still a feature in the respondents’ lives, and as such a more integrated and protective approach may be better placed to tackle the anxiety faced by minority groups in the UK, based on inclusive rather than exclusionary policy.

Throughout the analysis, the research has exposed a number of issues that, taken individually, could lead to developments for future investigation. I would suggest that although the research answered the initial questions posed at the start of this process, the research questions themselves have served as a way to open dialogue with the respondents which have yielded many more. Questions regarding race relations and the perception of race within modern-day Britain have been identified as important, not only to the respondents in this research, but also in the pilot study this research was based upon. The racialisation of Muslims and the recategorisation concerning the ethnicity of non-Muslim minorities has indicated that race is no longer simply based on the colour of one’s skin. The intersection of race, class and faith indicated that, as a construction, it is poor Muslims and poor minorities who are facing the brunt of punitive legislation. However, due to the class of the individuals one may suggest that poor whites are also faced with an intersection between race and class, effectively being negatively re-racialised.

I considered the work of Moosavi (2015) and his research into white Muslim converts. It may be interesting to examine how far the intersection between faith, race and class goes alongside the growth in white Muslim converts. If, as Edward
suggested in his interview, protection through faith is significant in the consideration of conversion, how can we as a society change the situation for communities who feel they need protecting? As such, an area for research expansion may be to examine the perceptions of Islam from within the ‘white’ Muslim community, in order to explore if conversion is simply a matter of faith or if there are other pragmatic elements involved.
Chapter Ten: Discussion of the Data

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to critically draw together the main themes identified during the analysis and explore how these themes link, in order to examine their intersectionality. This chapter will be organised around the original research questions in order to illuminate the original aims of the research set out in the introduction. This research has aimed to explore the lived realities of non-Muslim minorities in Liverpool in relation to counter-radicalisation policy, specifically the identification of drivers and vulnerability within that policy. It aimed to explore those groups considered as vulnerable, and to understand their perceptions of policy.

To recapitulate, the questions for this thesis were:

- How much do non-Muslim minorities know about the Prevent (2011) strategy and counter-radicalisation policy in general?
- What do the respondents in the two areas under consideration think about the identification of drivers within Prevent policy?
- Do the respondents believe they have ever been affected by counter-radicalisation policy such as Prevent, and if so, what impact has that had on them and their communities?

10.1 What did the Respondents Think?

Although aware of changes in policing since 9/11 and 7/7, most of the respondents in this study were unaware of counter-radicalisation policy prior to the information being given to them. This was not true for the Muslim respondents in the pilot study,
who were all aware of Prevent. The more mature respondents, once aware of the policy, expressed concerns that the same people were being targeted by counter-radicalisation policy that had historically been targeted by police. They suggested, as I have previously discussed, that the justification for this targeting had simply shifted from crime prevention to terrorism/radicalisation. The fact that the respondents believed they were members of a suspect community (Hillyard, 1993) due to their racial heritage only fed into their beliefs about an increase in security concerns surrounding them and their families. The majority belief throughout the interviews was that since ‘Islam became an issue’ there had been an increase in suspicion directed towards minorities as a whole, not just Muslims, due to the fear of terrorism. It was also suggested that ethnic/racial profiling concerning anti-terror surveillance was increasingly focused on less economically salient individuals and communities who were considered suspect. As an answer to the first research question, in essence, the respondents did not know what new policy had affected them, but they were aware of a change in legislation that constructed them and other members of their community as suspect based on their ethnicity or race, more so than pre-7/7.

Croft and Moore (2010: 821) contended that the events of 9/11 did not simply change the reality of terrorism within the United States but changed the whole of Western society’s thinking around terrorism. It changed the way that terrorism was presented, and it was the fear created around brown bodies that the respondents were aware of, rather than specific policies.

25 This was a term used by Drew during his interview.
26 Edward and James both suggested this specifically, although there was a shared consensus throughout the interviews of an increase in surveillance post-7/7.
Question two examined the drivers identified within Prevent to see if those people who actually fitted the criteria presented in Prevent felt vulnerable. The identified drivers were rejected by the respondents on the basis that they were deterministic. All the respondents considered themselves to adhere to one or more of the aspects of ‘vulnerability’, whether their age, the area in which they lived, their interaction with the police service, their race/ethnicity or their deep-seated mistrust of government. As they adhered to those elements, they were in a unique position to consider if the drivers outlined in Prevent could or would push them into radical action. Prevent contends that it is not an Islamic/Muslim focused counter-radicalisation strategy, and therefore these same drivers and factors of ‘vulnerability’ should, then, in theory be relevant to non-Muslim individuals and groups. None of the respondents believed that any drivers would remove their moral compass, and allow them to be capable of violence towards their own community/country. They believed that the drivers outlined in Prevent, alongside the factors which determined a person’s level of vulnerability, were simply a way to criminalise sections of the community in order to control them. It was a way for those in power to apply a label of ‘deviant’ to communities that have remained resilient to systemic racism. As Becker suggests, ‘the deviant is one to whom the label has been successfully applied’ (1963 :4). The respondents rejected not only the label of deviant, but also the need for labelling per se. The overwhelming opinion throughout the data was that the language used in the policy was ambiguous, and therefore open to interpretation, leaving communities vulnerable to targeting through social stereotyping as suspect and labelling as deviant.
The third original research question asked if the respondents felt like they had been affected by policy and if so, how. A dominant theme throughout the interviews was that identifying drivers within policy alongside identifying vulnerable communities had framed anyone who fitted the criterion as deviant. This in turn created a moral panic, which fed into an already established mistrust of minorities and of economically-challenged communities. The fear that targeting sections of society would itself alienate individuals that were already over-policed and pressured by existing policing strategies, leading to an increase in radicalisation, was also identified within the data.

As groups previously targeted by racism/racisms, the respondents were all aware of the subtle shift in their position within British society, most feeling that they were constructed as outsiders more than pre-9/11 and 7/7. Ahmed (2015: 1) suggests that the emotionalisation of the ‘war on terror’ had led to a linking, within the context of fear, of risk and insecurity, which then legitimised measures created to maintain national security. Ahmed also suggests that, in relation to Muslim communities, this has translated into an exacerbation of the feelings of insecurity, vulnerability and helplessness. The findings of this research would indicate that, like the targeted Muslim community, the BMR communities are also facing a similar disassociation from the protection of the state and, in this sense, the respondents did believe that the policy had not directly but indirectly affected them.

10.2 Main Themes

Throughout the analysis there were a number of recurrent themes which shifted between the identified concepts, due to their intersectionality. I would suggest,
however, that the two most recurrent themes were race and class. These two concepts were present throughout the data, and linked through language, policy and the construction of identity.

Social Sorting and the Construction of Race

When considering race, it seems that there is, amongst academics, an agreement that race is a social construction, more so than a genetically based differentiation (Morris, 2007: 409). This research suggests that the complex way in which race and ethnicity are determined by common practices within society, alongside the representation of some sections of society as minorities, has lacked descriptive diversity. In phase one, this was observable through self-classification that allowed the respondents to describe how they saw themselves rather than adhering to preset categories.

The importance of terminology emerged from the data quite early in the research process, when the respondents in phase one were allowed to self-describe their race/ethnicity and faith. The variations in description, along with an oscillation between race and ethnicity, indicated that both are not psychologically distinct categories. Often individuals used terminology to present themselves that would not have been present on, for example, the current census forms. This may have been due to a number of reasons, generationally changing terminology being one of them. The presentation of racism was also considered as generationally dependent when considering language. Understanding the current politically correct, acceptable language was influenced by the generation the respondent grew up in. For example, one respondent classified herself as half-caste. This is no longer an acceptable form of language, similar to the term coloured, but as the respondent
said, she can call herself what she likes, and it was up to her. It was therefore
important for the respondents to share understandings about meaning and intention
to avoid confusion and misunderstandings

Linked to the importance of understanding language was, throughout both phases
of the research, a rejection of identification through colour coding. The limitations
of the terms ‘Black’ and ‘white’ were considered problematic, for example, with
the phase two respondents, as all but one was mixed-race. The respondents in both
phases chose a more nuanced descriptive of themselves. This multi-varied
descriptive approach to identity labelling would seem more appropriate within a
multicultural society such as Britain. Britain has seen a national rise from 9% (2001)
to 14% (2011) in its minority population, with the largest single rise coming from
people who describe themselves as mixed heritage. This equates to 660,000 people
in 2001 who described themselves as mixed heritage, and 1.2 million in 2011. This
number itself is set to rise, as there were 2.3 million people, 9% of the British
population, who identified themselves as living within an inter-ethnic relationship,
up two percentage points from 2001 (ONS: 2011).

An Oversimplification: Colour Coding Race

A colour coding of identity was considered too simplistic for the respondents, and
it was described as ‘not fit for purpose’ when trying to describe the diversity of
British minority cultures. The majority ‘white’ population was also considered
within this rejection, as the term ‘white’ was considered a simplification of race in
the same way as ‘Black’ was. As pointed out throughout this study, I also reject the
terms that colour code people. I believe they are inappropriate, as they oversimplify
people’s often complex cultural and racial identities. The term Black is limited as a
descriptive to fully describe those members of the minority population who do not ascribe to the historical Black identity (African/Caribbean) within British society. The term ‘white’ is also an inappropriate descriptive for people who may not come from a minority race, yet face discrimination due to their cultural heritage, such as Polish settlers in Britain. I would suggest, therefore, that trying to colour code a country or world, rich in racial/ethnic variations, is inappropriate and far too simplistic. Regarding census data, the term ‘mixed ethnic’, for example, was only included in census forms from 1991. Until that point it was assumed that people from a mixed-racial background would choose to associate with one or the other of their racial backgrounds (Bradford, 2006: 4). But this research has identified that, within this sample at least, this is a simplistic view. Identities are complex, and so a simple choice between identifying with a ‘white’ or ‘Black’ culture, which are interwoven within the individual’s identity and within the fabric of British society, may not be a possibility for some people.

When considering race in relation to the initial research questions, the data indicated that race/ethnicity does play a role in how individuals are considered and policed. It also plays a part in how people feel about their treatment, and how they perceive policy as it relates to them. Race becomes an important factor in social control if it is used as the primary identifying factor (PIF) or master status to categorise communities. Morris (2007: 410) suggests that it is pointless to consider the biological origins of race, which have very little phenotype basis (see Graves, 2001) when used within the typical racial categories. Race can be placed more within the realms of political, social and ideological relations (Miles 1982: 42). However, within sociology Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992: 5) suggest that ‘race’ denotes ‘a
particular way in which communal differences come to be constructed’ and therefore ‘should not be erased from, the analytical map…’.

I suggest we may be wiser to look at the intra-\textsuperscript{27} rather than inter-\textsuperscript{28} variations within ‘distinct’ racial groups, as there is more variation within groups than between them. I also suggest that it may be more productive to consider the concept of race from an interactionist perspective, considering that race is not a fixed concept but a fluid concept which, dependent on one’s position at the point of interaction, can be shaped by extraneous variables, such as social class. A key aspect of this research was the identification that class played a large role in the ability of minority members to thrive within British society. This also adhered to an interactionist’s perspective regarding the fluidity of one’s master status in relation to economic salience. As I have discussed previously, the term master status was used to describe the way in which race is used as a PIF. The fluidity of the term, however, is another aspect of the research that has posed a number of interesting questions regarding the link between an enforced master status and a chosen status.

The linking of race/ethnicity and class was clear within this data, as there was an overwhelming assumption throughout the phase two interviews by the respondents that wealth afforded a person a higher class status which, in turn, gave the person an opportunity to choose how they were presented publicly. Although only one of the phase two respondents had felt they had been granted ‘positive’ re-racialisation due to their position as a police officer, all the other respondents believed that wealth and power afforded an individual a choice regarding their racial

\textsuperscript{27} Within groups.
\textsuperscript{28} Between groups.
classification. This opportunity to choose how one was presented had implications for the individual, above and beyond a simple categorisation. The link between race and ‘opportunity’ within British society has been well documented, and has been linked economic opportunities (Creegan, Colgan, Charleworth and Robinson, 2003), housing opportunities (Mullins, Murie and Leather, 2006), health and wellbeing (Smith, Chaturvedi, Harding, Nazroo and Williams, 2000) and criminalisation (Bowling and Phillips, 2002). The opportunity to choose the way you are presented and considered would then give the individual, theoretically, more options.

In the first findings chapter I discussed the re-racialisation of Muslims into a minority race category. The association between skin colour and faith is seemingly interwoven within the public consciousness, to a point that not only were Muslims being ‘brown bodied’ (Patel, 2012), but non-Muslim minorities were in a sense being re-categorised as ‘Muslim’ as a term of ethnicity. As Patel (2012: 216-217) suggests, the problem lies with how categories of deviance are constructed, and one could suggest it is this which is being used to racially order society and construct groups as ‘dirty bodies’. As Patel suggests, the use of skin colour or dress is being used to identify the body and construct it as somehow deviant, with the deviant sitting further down the racial hierarchy than the conformer.

Within the first phase of the data collection, the respondents had the ability to self-categorise, which indicated that ethnicity, race and class were concepts that were interwoven within the mind-set of the respondents. The term Black, which is commonly used to describe people of African or Caribbean heritage, was never used
as a descriptor by itself by any of the respondents in this study to describe people of mixed heritage.

**Brown Bodying: The Racial Hierarchy**

The terminology of race, as I discussed in Chapters Two and Six, was considered by the respondents throughout this process. The mixed-race respondents’ self-categorisation as ‘brown’ or ‘mixed’, rather than singularly ‘Black’, I would suggest, was a way to show their diversity by embracing both races/cultures present in their families, as well as separating themselves from the dominant black political, historical and cultural narratives.

Patel (2012: 223) discussed that individuals of South Asian, Middle Eastern and Arabic features were constructed as ‘hyper-visible’ (Khoury, 2009) and could be prone to a ‘browning process’ (Bhattacharyya, 2010). This browning could then leave them at risk of social sorting (Lyon, 2003), and therefore a categorisation within a suspect community. I suggest that a re-racialisation occurred within the dominant consciousness of this sample group, as members of the Islamic faith had been racialised within a minority race descriptive. As I discussed in the analysis chapter, an assumption of Muslims’ minority race status was dominant throughout the data. The respondents considered that most Muslims in Britain and globally were people of colour, and that this was a common sense approach. However, the linking and re-racialisation of Muslims, and the re-categorisation regarding the ethnicity of non-Muslim BMR minorities, was an occurrence that was very dependent on the economic position of the individual involved.
I would suggest, therefore, that a class-based xenophobia has been framed through Islamophobia, and is being delivered through a ‘new popular racism’ discourse (Kundnani, 2001). The way in which Muslims and/or ‘prospective terrorists’ are presented alongside the ‘risk of terrorism’ was something criticised significantly by the respondents, alongside the media and the representation of colour. The negative representation of people of colour was blamed for the fear created around the ‘risk’ of terrorism, especially the threat associated with the non-‘white’ population. Again as mentioned by Patel (2012: 218), brown bodying seeks to separate the ‘good from the bad’, points which are dependent on one’s position, of course. I would suggest that the members of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ population of the UK can be determined by whether one is racialised ‘positively’ or ‘negatively’. Racialisation determining one’s PIF in turn determines if one is considered ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and one’s position within the hierarchy of race.

Race was perceived by the respondents to be a determiner of interactions with and protection from the state. The intersectionality of race, as PIF, with class was described throughout the interviews as being the root of much social inequality. Concerning mixed-race individuals, the creation of their master status based solely on the Black aspects of their race was considered to ignore their inherent multicultural identity. A study by Shih et al. (2007: 125) found that multi-racial individuals were far more aware of race as a social construction than mono-racial individuals. Their study found that mono-racial individuals were far more likely to show stereotypical inhibition in relation to race salience than multi-racial individuals. This may explain how and why people from targeted groups, such as Muslims and BMR individuals, often notice when they are mentioned in the media.
or in legislation more than their ‘white’ counterparts. Again, I would argue that it is the perception of society which shapes understanding, and ultimately determines one’s acceptance of society. If alienation is a driver of radicalisation, would it not be better to consider a multi-cultural approach, concentrating on shared aspects of society, by promoting similarities rather than differences? Could not radicalisation be considered a form of exploitation? Within exploitation legislation, anyone is considered vulnerable to exploitation given the right set of circumstances. Would this not be a better approach?

**New Class Considerations: New World, Old Targets.**

Throughout the data, another dominant theme was class. As I have previously discussed, the respondents believed that race was seemingly ‘overlooked’ if a certain economic status was achieved (positive re-racialisation). Most of the respondents (Saakar, Raymon, Molly, Edward, James, Isabella, Grace, Brima, Jazmin and Drew) considered that, rather being determined by one’s status at birth or ones ‘breeding’, class in a modern context was determined by one’s economic position. Those individuals or groups who were considered economically successful were considered by the respondents to belong to a modern-day upper class. Capitalism was described (Edward, James, Brima, Saakar, Isabella) as driving the categorisation of minorities, race seemingly becoming an irrelevant concept when one was a successful capitalist. I would suggest that faith, like race, can also be ‘overridden for consideration’ once a certain financial success level is reached, giving choice to the individual to identify themselves using other descriptors. I also suggest that this choice was denied to the less affluent population.
In the same way that Said (1978) spoke of the Western superiority and the occidental representation of the East, one may suggest that this is true concerning wealth and class. The representation of poorer communities as somehow less moral and unable to determine right from wrong due to a lack of moral understanding is seemingly present throughout legislation. The data suggested that the representation of poor communities was a top-down production of policy which translated into punitive policing strategies due to negative labelling. This, as an answer to an original research question, meant that whether they were aware of the specifics of policy, the respondents would still, in some ways, feel its effect.

The labelling of BMR minorities alongside the labelling of other members of poorer communities was identified in the data. The way in which Irish communities had previously been targeted in Britain is highlighted by the work of Hickman and Walter (1995), who challenged the assumption of homogeneity within a ‘white’ community, and criticised it, considering it misplaced. They suggest:

The Irish are largely invisible as an ethnic group but continue to be racialised as inferior and alien others… Most historians have assumed that a framework of assimilation is appropriate and this outcome is uncritically accepted as desirable. Sociologists on the other hand have excluded the Irish from consideration, providing tactical support for the ‘myth of homogeneity’ of ‘white’ people in Britain against the supposedly new phenomenon of threatening (Black) ‘immigrants’ (Hickman and Walter, 1995: 5).

Hickman and Walter (1998) also suggest that focus on the paradigm of colour has limited the range of racist ideology, suggesting rather that racism in Britain has
excluded the Irish due to the dominant paradigm being based on a Black/white dichotomy. I would suggest that, like the Irish population, who it was assumed did not face racial discrimination due to their categorisation as ‘white’, there was an assumption that BMR communities have not faced Islamophobic discrimination due to their non-Muslim status. However, the racialisation of Muslims has left the BMR community also vulnerable to Islamophobia, based on an identity through skin colour. This in itself has allowed them to be constructed *en masse* as suspect, leaving them vulnerable, once again, to targeting.

### 10.3 Poor Whites: The ‘Poor White’ Burden

Throughout this research, specifics in language have been highlighted as imperative in the blending of social and political understandings of meaning. The idea that everyone has the same understanding of language in order to effectively work from the same page has been examined. However, the negative framing of communities based on economic position was also a dominant emerging theme. The perception that ‘poor white’ people were being targeted in much the same way as ‘poor brown-bodied’ people was identified within the narratives. As I previously discussed in the analysis chapters, many of the respondents were mixed-race. They believed that the ‘white’ members of their families, living in the same areas as them, faced the same criminalisation by the authorities as they had. The only difference identified by the respondents was that their negative profiling came wholly from their economic status, rather than from a combination of race and class.

Webster (2008) suggests that often poor communities are under-represented within discussions of racism and exclusion:
White ethnicity is generally invisible and unexamined in racism, crime and justice debates. Serving mostly as a default comparator to describe visible minority experiences of crime and criminal justice processes, white ethnicity is seen as unproblematic as an ethnicity except as a potential source of racism (Webster, 2008: 293).

Webster further contends that there is, within society, a hierarchy of ‘whiteness’ in which often poor ‘whites’ or ‘white’ migrants can experience racism based on their class, similar to the criminalisation of visible working-class minorities. I would suggest this may be evidence of a negative re-racialisation occurring. The stereotyping of economically-challenged communities as a whole included both minorities and non-minorities. For example, in Prevent, the ‘vulnerability’ of youth, one could surmise, suggests the ‘vulnerability’ of ‘poor youth’ rather than ‘affluent youth’ to radicalisation. The construction of policy was, in the opinion of the respondents, complicit in liberal ‘white’ systemic discrimination, towards not only ‘non-whites’ but poor ‘whites’.

This complicity was focused towards the ‘poor’. Race was considered an aspect of class, as it is in part shaped by a consumerist capitalist culture. Poor ‘whites’ are considered ‘somehow less than’ more affluent ‘whites’ due to their limited spending potential. Nevertheless, the re-classification of economically-challenged ‘whites’ then shifts them into the category of minorities with regard to power. This is in polar opposition to the re-classification of rich minorities to a ‘rich white’ category, in which their cultural differences are overlooked due to wealth being a priority within a system of government based on the production of wealth.
Nonetheless, the idea that in some way the ‘poor’ are less moral than more affluent members of society is, of course, nothing new. Chunn and Gavigan (2004: 219) suggest that there has long been a criminalisation of poverty, which has raised questions regarding regulation and control. They suggest that if we consider poverty within a post-modern framework, we can observe the linking of moral control with financial control. One may suggest that, indeed, it is poorer communities that are in some way being held to ransom by the government, with the enforcement of ‘morals’ and the presentation of the poor as criminal in discourse (Morley, 2009). A study by Piff et al. (2011) found that the truth may, however, be the polar opposite. Their study in the USA indicated that the higher the income bracket, and therefore modern-day ‘class’ of the individual, the more unethical their behaviour. Once again, this demands the question: are the right people being identified and targeted, or is current policy just a reproduction of past mistakes?

**10.4 Policy Implications, Challenging Past Mistakes**

Throughout this research, policy and policing have come under sustained criticism from the respondents. Concerns over race relations in Liverpool, both historical and within a modern-day context, have coincided within the respondents’ narratives of the construction of risk concerning terrorism. The police, arguably at the forefront of any government policy that involves the public, are often the point of first contact with local communities. Police involvement with counter-radicalisation programmes was criticised by the respondents, due to an ingrained mistrust of the organisation. The fear of accusation, as I discussed in the analysis, made the police themselves suspect. An interesting point to consider is both the respondents in this study and the pilot study (see Appendix 10) considered police involvement in
counter-radicalisation strategies to be problematic due to fear from community members. The idea of being flagged by the police and security services was worrying to both Muslims and non-Muslim respondents. Given the need for community engagement for Prevent initiatives to be successful, this research would suggest that a less formal approach may be needed to fully engage with those communities framed as suspect.

I would also contend that any involvement with the police is automatically suspect, which suggests that there has to be an improvement in dialogue between the police and ‘suspect communities’. I further suggest that the sharing of information, not just with some sections of a community but with society as a whole, is critical in bridging the gaps between communities, and in security knowledge. As Klausen (2009) suggests, building trust between organisations is not the same as building trust within the general population:

Collaboration with Muslim partners has helped to build confidence within government agencies that Muslim leaders are keen to curb terrorism, but has failed to build trust among the general Muslim public (Klausen, 2009: 403).

I identified a strong historical fear of the police, and a fear of greater police powers, that were not helping ease community concerns. All of the respondents, including Airyana, an ex-police officer, were critical of the increase in police powers, as they felt that it served to justify fear amongst some sections of their communities. The more mature respondents also considered that the increase in stop and searches as targeting the ‘same type’ of community members as during the early 1980s. The assumption was that, once again, it was BMR young men, including young minority
Muslim men, who were enduring the most police stop and searches. This assumption by the respondents seems justified, given that Black and Asian men are more likely to be stopped and searched in England and Wales than any other group. The figure released by the Ministry of Justice (2013) suggested that a Black individual was six times more likely to be stopped and searched under section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, with Asian and mixed-race males twice as likely to be stopped. The reproduction of past mistakes under the guise of counter-radicalisation/terrorism was creating a culture of mistrust and, in a sense, challenging the gains made in society for an integrated multicultural approach to society, security and policing.

**10.5 Future Research**

As alienation and social deprivation have been highlighted as drivers of radicalisation, alongside a mistrust of government and government agencies such as the police, it would seem prudent to investigate the impact of labelling on the ‘poor white’ communities, and their perceptions surrounding the ‘problem’ of radicalisation. Far-right radicalisation has been highlighted by Europol as an area for serious concern, with a growth in far-right hate attacks across Europe and a rise in the success of far-right political parties in Western Europe. The fear represented by the growth of far-right extremism, Wodak (2015) suggests, can be explained by the way in which fear is invoked and legitimised by far-right parties:

Right wing populists seem to offer simple and clear-cut answers to all fears and challenges… for example by constructing scapegoats and enemies – ‘Others’ which are to blame for our current woes - by
frequently tapping into traditional collectives’ stereotypes and images of the enemy (Wodak, 2015: 4).

The Institute for Strategic Dialogue also considers that far-right extremism is such a credible threat across Europe that in 2014 they published the findings of a report from a two-year pan-European project. The project aimed to enhance the understanding of what works in preventing far-right extremism in ten countries, including the UK, Sweden, Poland and Norway. The author of the report, Vidhya Ramalingam, was the lead on the programme and also runs a cross-European study aimed at tackling far-right extremism across Europe. She suggests that, like other forms of extremism, tackling far-right extremism is often hindered by a lack of clear definitions, poor data and a lack of awareness by front-line responders, specifically police services. This, I would suggest, is the same as tackling any form of radicalisation with the current British counter-radicalisation policy. When considering the impact of public debates on immigration and national identity, Ramalingam (2014) suggests:

The issue of far-right extremism is embedded in and impacted by a wider public discourse on immigration, integration, diversity and national identity. Given sensitivities to these issues, politicians are sometimes reluctant to speak out (Ramalingham, 2014: 9).

Racism directed at sections of the poor ‘white’ population, such as the historic Irish population or, within the modern context of a city such as Liverpool, the now substantial Polish community, might also be another area to investigate in order to get a clearer picture of how policy and the presentation of policy can affect people’s lives. With a strong Polish community making their home in Liverpool, Liverpool
has ‘publicly’, at least, embraced a new wave of immigration. Nonetheless, with a reported rise in hate crimes against ‘white’ Polish people, this may make an interesting point for research expansion. Minority status visibility, or visibility as different from the dominant ‘white’ majority, has been blamed for the targeting of individuals. An example of this visible targeting is to compare visible Muslim women’s experiences to non-visible Muslim women’s experiences of Islamophobia (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010: 39). 29

In conclusion, identity as a complex multi-layered construction has been identified throughout the data as influencing a wide range of opportunities for individuals in society. How a person is categorised and how that individual categorises themselves often do not correspond. The fluidity of race status, and the way in which race status can be influenced by economic position, is an area for research expansion. Again, linking these concepts to counter-radicalisation and the original research questions, if race categorisation is fluid and not necessarily determined by the individual, then discrimination must also be fluid. If discrimination drives alienation, which, in turn, can drive radicalisation to either the far-right or the far-left of centre, then the groups classified as vulnerable must also be fluid, in order to fully embrace the challenge of countering radicalisation.

29 ‘Visible’ Muslim women means someone who wears some form of traditional/cultural dress, such as the Hijab. ‘Non-visible’ means women who do not.
Chapter Eleven: Conclusion and Final Word

Throughout the research I was keen to search for data that was relevant to my own research topic, as any researcher may be keen to do. However, as I analysed the data I realised that rather than this research simply looking at Prevent and the impact of Prevent on communities within Liverpool, it had become a much broader project. In particular, the data raised important issues regarding racism within Britain. The majority of participants in the study were of the view that racism was being used either consciously or unconsciously through policy to maintain ‘privileged white’ focused power within society, and to exclude sections of the British population which did not conform to that stereotype. The intersectionality between race and class was not just problematic for non-white minorities, but also for poor ‘whites’.

The idea that the respondents felt that they were still members of a suspect community (Hillyard, 1993) due to multiple factors, such as their race, immigrant heritage, socio-economic status or their place of birth/residence (Liverpool), was not something I had expected to find. In addition, surprising for me was the development of a new-old suspect community paradigm, which was based on old suspicions and accusations, which fed into moral panic (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2009; Cohen, 1972). This new/old panic cognitively linked into the fear of the foreign (Said, 1985) and developed over decades of mistrust. Based on the labelling of new-old suspect communities (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009), the cognitive linking of accusations through the presentation of vulnerabilities within Prevent gave credence to ingrained fears within society, which then fed a negative presentation within the imagination of wider society.
There has never been any denial within this research that radicalisation is a problem. The literature and data presented show that the policies and practices government has taken to tackle radicalisation are problematic. This research suggests that, rather than singling out sections of society for security consideration, the government might be better placed addressing enduring social problems such as poverty, unemployment, racism and exclusion. A fracturing of society caused by a ‘have and have not’ culture, intensified by the excesses of neoliberal capitalism, fuels radical ideology by promoting the disparities between the rich and the poor.

This research has also expanded current knowledge about race, radicalisation and identity by identifying new knowledge areas concerning the fluidity of race status and how that status presents within a capitalist society. The concepts of positive and negative racialisation within a capitalist society have been created to explain the way in which race is used as a tool to control populations within postmodernity.

This research has added to the existing knowledge regarding the levels of state targeting and the perceptions of that targeting, from those groups focused upon by policy and legislation. The thesis highlights a perception of top-down state framing of poor minority communities as ignorant, immoral and, to a large extent, criminal. This research would suggest that the intersection between class, faith and race has left communities ‘vulnerable’ to policy assumptions, and vulnerable to being constructed as suspect. Those assumptions add fuel to a deep-seated resentment, developed through cultural alienation. Regarding Prevent, the identification of vulnerable communities and drivers was seen as feeding radicalisation through an alienation process, and therefore counterproductive.
This research project has expanded current knowledge concerning the (re)presentation of cultural diversity. It identified that Orientalist attitudes still affect not only individuals and groups identified through faith, but also other minorities. These Orientalist attitudes are based on imperialistic values of race and class within British culture. The multiple economic deprivations faced by minority communities in Britain, and the effect of the racialisation of poorer Muslims as minorities (or the re-classification of poorer non-Muslim minorities as Muslim), has led to an intersectionality of suffering, not only through the negative psychological presentation of communities as criminal, but also through blanket surveillance and targeting. This has accentuated a distrust of the state by those suspect communities considered crucial in the nation’s defence against terrorism and radicalisation.
Bibliography


Aspinall, P. J., and Song, M., 2013. Is race a ‘salient…’or ‘dominant identity’ in the early 21st century: The evidence of UK survey data on respondents’ sense of who they are. *Social science research*, 42(2); 547-561.


Bakker, E., 2006 Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined the Jihad; An Exploratory Study. The Hague; Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Clingendael.


Bean, R. 1980 Police Unrest, Unionisation and the 1919 Strike in Liverpool-
Journal of Contemporary History, vol 15

Belchem, J., 1999 The Liverpool Irish Enclave. Immigrants and Minorities: 
Historical Studies in Ethnic, Migration and Diaspora. 18(2-3):128-146

Belchem, J., 1994 “Freedom and Friendship to Ireland”: Ribbonism in Early 

Ben-Tovim, G., 1988 ‘Race politics and urban regeneration: Lessons from 
Liverpool’ in Parkinson, M., Foley, B and Judd, D (ed’s). Regenerating the Cities. 
Manchester. Manchester University Press.141-155.

Benyon, J and Solomos, J., 1988 The simmering cities: urban unrest during the 

Berger, R., 2015. Now I see it, now I don’t: Researcher’s position and reflexivity 
in qualitative research. Qualitative research, 15(2), pp.219-234.

Bettiza, G., 2015 Constructing civilisations: Embedding and reproducing the 
‘Muslim world’ in American foreign policy practices and institutions since 9/11. 

Bhattacharyya, G., 2008 Dangerous Brown Men: Exploiting Sex, Violence and 


Costello, R., 2001 *Black Liverpool; The early history of Britain’s oldest black community 1730-1918*. Liverpool. Picton Press


European Network of Experts on Radicalisation, 2008 *The relationship between right wing extremism and Radicalisation into violence based upon an abusive*
interpretation of Islam. European Network of Experts on Radicalisation, an initiative managed by The Change Institute.


Fekete, L., 2009 A Suitable Enemy; Racism, Migration and Islamophobia and Britain. London. Pluto Press.


Githens-Mazer, J and Lambert, R., 2010a Why conventional wisdom on radicalisation fails: the persistence of a failed discourse. *International Affairs*. 86 (4); 889-901


Goode, E. and Ben-Yehuda, N., 2010 *Moral panics: The social construction of deviance*. John Wiley & Sons


Hancock, L. and Mooney, G., 2011 ‘Saints and scroungers’: constructing the poverty and crime myth, Criminal Justice Matters, 83(1): 26-27

Hansen, R., 2000 Citizenship and immigration in postwar Britain. Oxford University Press, USA


Herschinge, E., 2013 a Battlefield of Meaning: The Struggle for Identity in the UN Debates on Definition of International Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence.25 (2); 183-201.


Holdaway, S, and O'Neill, M.,2007 "Where has all the racism gone? Views of racism within constabularies after Macpherson." *Ethnic and racial Studies* 30 (3): 3


Moosavi, L., 2012 British Muslim Converts Performing ‘Authentic Muslimness’Performing Islam 1 (1); 103-128. Monahan, J., Applebaum, P. S.,


Newburn, T., 2007 *Criminology*. Cullompton, Devon, Willan Publishing.


Omand, D. 2010 *Securing the State*. London. C. Hurst and Company


Pantucci, R., 2011. What Have We Learned about Lone Wolves from Anders Behring Breivik? *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 5(5-6).


Breivik? *Perspectives on Terrorism. 5*: 5-6.


Richards, A. 2011 The Problem with Radicalisation, the remit of Prevent and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK. *International Affairs. 87* (1): 143

Rio Ferdinand Interview available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/31574503


Sedgwick, M., 2010. The concept of radicalisation as a source of confusion. 


and National Security: Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century (pp. 129-150).


Thames Television Documentary Accessed 14th August 20914 available at http://www.voice-online.co.uk/article/rare-footage-1972-toxteth-race-riots-be-shown


Europe.aspx


Tyler, T. R., 2011 Trust and legitimacy: Policing in the USA and Europe. European journal of criminology, 8(4); 254-266.


Appendices

Appendix 1: Phase One Ethical Approval

Date: 20th November 2013

Dear Elizabeth Peatfield

I am pleased to inform you that the Ethics Committee has approved your application for ethical approval. Details of the approval can be found below.

Ref: SLSJPhd13/1401
PI: Gabe Mythen
Title: Radicalisation: Comparing the Views of non-Muslim Minority Groups
School: School of Law and Social Justice
Department: Sociology and Social Policy
Date of Final review: 05/11/13
Date of Approval: 15/05/13

This approval applies for the duration of the research. If it is proposed to extend the duration of the study as specified in the application form, the SLSJ Committee should be notified. If it is proposed to make an amendment to the research, you should notify the SLSJ Committee by following the Notice of Amendment procedure outlined at http://www.liv.ac.uk/researchethics/application/forms_and_templates/. If the named PI / Supervisor leaves the employment of the University during the course of this approval, the approval will lapse. Therefore please contact the RGO at ethics@liverpool.ac.uk in order to notify them of a change in PI / Supervisor.

Yours sincerely,

Prof. Barry Godfrey
Director of Research
Acting Chair,
SLSJ Ethics Committee
Eleanor Rathbone Building
Bedford Street South
LIVERPOOL
L69 7ZA
Tel: 0151 794 2795
Email: SLSJethic@liv.ac.uk
Dear Elizabeth Peatfield

I am pleased to inform you that the Ethics Committee has approved your application for ethical approval. Details of the approval can be found below.

Ref: Phd1213/08
PI: Elizabeth Peatfield
Title: Identity and Perception (comparing the views of non-Muslim Minority Groups regarding the causal factors of and risk from radicalisation)
School: SLSJ
Department: SLSJ
First Reviewer: Dr Nicole Vitellone
Second Reviewer: Dr Karen Evans
Date of initial review: 18th May 2013
Date of Approval: 31st May

This approval applies for the duration of the research. If it is proposed to extend the duration of the study as specified in the application form, the [Insert Name] Committee should be notified. If it is proposed to make an amendment to the research, you should notify the [Insert Name] by following the Notice of Amendment procedure outlined at [http://www.liv.ac.uk/researchethics/application/forms_and_templates/](http://www.liv.ac.uk/researchethics/application/forms_and_templates/). If the named PI / Supervisor leaves the employment of the University during the course of this approval, the approval will lapse. Therefore please contact the RGO at ethics@liverpool.ac.uk in order to notify them of a change in PI / Supervisor.

Yours sincerely

Louise Ackers

Professor Louise Ackers
Chair
SLSJ Ethics Committee
Eleanor Rathbone Building
Bedford Street South
LIVERPOOL
L69 7ZA

Tel: 0151 794 2025
Email: lawhla@liverpool.ac.uk
Appendix 3: Phase One Questionnaire

PARTICIPANT No ______

Please answer the following, before you fill in the questionnaire:

Female ☐ Male ☐ Non Gender Specific ☐

Please tick the box which applies to your educational standard:

☐ School ☐ College ☐ University

I describe my ethnicity as;

_______________________________________________________

I describe my religion as;

_______________________________________________________

First of all, thank you for taking the time to fill in this questionnaire it is very much appreciated. The questions on this paper are designed to find out what people think are the greatest risks facing Britain. Most of these statements are taken directly from the Prevent Counter-terrorism Strategy (2011) produced by the British Government, we would like to know what you think about the statements.

You will shortly be asked to read and give your opinion on ten statements by marking either:

Disagree strongly   Disagree   Don’t Know   Agree   Agree strongly

Please take your time to read the statements fully, if you do not understand any of the statements please do not mark the box, simply move on to the next.

Once again thank you for your help all questionnaires will be kept in strictest confidence, you are guaranteed full anonymity and all data will be kept in accordance the 1998 data protection act. Your participation in this questionnaire assumes consent.
1. The UK faces a range of terrorist threats. The most serious is from Al Qa’ida, its affiliates and like-minded organisations (section 5 Prevent).

Disagree strongly Disagree Don’t Know Agree Agree strongly

2. The threat from terrorists in Northern Ireland has increased significantly over the past two years (section 5.6 Prevent).

Disagree strongly Disagree Don’t Know Agree Agree strongly

3. Support for extremism is significantly associated with a perception of discrimination and the experience of racial or religious harassment. It is also associated with a negative view of policing (section 5.26 Prevent).

Disagree strongly Disagree Don’t Know Agree Agree strongly

4. Radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process, it is possible to intervene to Prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-related activity (section 3.29 Prevent).

Disagree strongly Disagree Don’t Know Agree Agree strongly

5. In the UK, evidence suggests that radicalisation tends to occur in places where terrorist ideologies, and those that promote them, go uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate and challenge (section 10.1 Prevent).

Disagree strongly Disagree Don’t Know Agree Agree strongly

6. Approval of violent extremism is higher amongst young people and from people from lower income and socio-economic groups (section 5.18 Prevent).

Disagree strongly Disagree Don’t Know Agree Agree strongly

7. Radicalisation occurs as people search for identity, meaning and community (section 5.22 Prevent).

Disagree strongly Disagree Don’t Know Agree Agree strongly

8. Over the last decade relationships between minority groups and government agencies, such as the police, have improved.

Disagree strongly Disagree Don’t Know Agree Agree strongly

9. Islamophobia is not the same as other forms of discrimination or racism.

Disagree strongly Disagree Don’t Know Agree Agree strongly

10. A person’s faith determines their treatment by State agencies such as the police, more so than their skin colour or economic class.

Disagree strongly Disagree Don’t Know Agree Agree strongly
First, I would like to say a big thank you to you for helping with this research.

The interviews will be recorded, but your identity will be anonymous and your information protected in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). This will be an informal interview and I will be asking you your opinion on a number of issues related to radicalisation and behaviour. Below is some information about the government’s counter-radicalisation strategy Prevent (2011). I will be asking you what you think about some aspects of this policy.

For your Information:

The government suggests, intelligence indicates that a terrorist attack in our country is ‘highly likely’. Experience tells us that the threat comes not just from foreign nationals but also from terrorists born and bred in Britain. It is therefore vital that our counter-terrorism strategy contains a plan to prevent radicalisation and stop would-be terrorists from committing mass murder (2011:8). The government further suggest that, all the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalise and recruit people to their cause. But the percentage of people who are prepared to support violent extremism in this country is very small. It is significantly greater amongst young people (3.3). Radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process, it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-related activity. There are some analogies between this work and other forms of crime prevention (3.29). Causal factors have been identified as playing some part in an individual’s choice to engage in antisocial, radical behaviour such as:
1. A perception of discrimination and the experience of racial or religious harassment. (5.26).
2. A negative view of policing (5.26).
3. Being a young person and people from lower income and socio-economic groups (5.18).
4. A search for identity, meaning and community (5.22).

Remember we are interested in your opinions regarding radicalisation, there are no right or wrong answers and this is not a test.
Appendix 5: Phase Two Consent Form

Title of Research  Risk, Race and Radicalisation: Exploring the impact of Counter-radicalisation Policy on non-Muslim minorities in Liverpool.

Researcher:  Elizabeth Peatfield (researcher)

Dear Sir or Madame, you have been invited to participate in the second phase of a research study investigating the impact of legislation. In this phase we will be asking you to participate in a voice recoded, semi-structured interview with the researcher. Involvement in this research is purely voluntary and as such, you are free to withdraw at any point. As a participant, you will have full anonymity within the research and any information that could be used to identify you will be removed from the study before analysis of the data.

Once you interview session has been transcribed you will be afforded the opportunity to read it, exclude anything you are unhappy with and withdraw from the study. A period of 21 days will be given for you to amend your statement and withdraw, after which the researcher will assume that you are happy to continue and will begin the analysis.

If you have any questions regarding the study, please ask the researcher who will be happy to take the time with you to explain the nature of the study.

If you are happy to continue, would you please read and sign the attached consent form.

Once again, thank you for your participation.
Appendix 6: Phase Two De-Brief Sheet

De-Brief Sheet

Thank you for your participation in this study. Your views, as a member of a non-Muslim minority living in Britain are paramount to our understanding regarding the impacts of laws and policies made to counter-radicalisation. Once transcribed, your interviews will be sent to you to read. If at any point you would like to be removed from the study, please inform the researcher and I will accommodate this request immediately.

If once you have read the transcribed data if you wish to query any parts of the transcript again, please inform us as soon as possible and we will do this for you. There is a time limit on the omission of data from the study from the date of the e-mail sent, we will allow 21 days so you can make any alterations you would like. After which we will assume you are happy for all the information to be used. Your responses recorded during the interviews will be anonymous and all information will be held in accordance with the 1998 Data Protection Act.

Once again you are free at any time to request a copy of that information and/or to withdraw from the study without your rights being affected.

If you have any further questions regarding the study or you would like a copy of the finished report, please ask and we would be glad to help with your queries.

Once again,

Thank You For Your Participation.
Appendix 7: A Tale from the Past

My First Experience of a Racist Attack.

I was walking to school with my best friends. One came from a Black African household although her family had lived in Liverpool for three generations, the other was mixed-race West Indian/White British, but was also born and raised in Britain. My mixed heritage friends farther had come to England from the West Indies after World War two at the request of our government as he was a skilled engineer to fill the skills gap left by the war.

We met before school and were excited to be getting the bus to school by ourselves for the first time as we were now senior school girls. This was a huge event as we were being trusted by our parents. As we were sitting on the bus another gang of older girls from a different school got on and immediately started whispering. One of the girls turned round and asked me “don’t you mind dat smell?”

“What smell?” I replied.

She replied “The smell of dem Niggers sitting next to ya, thee f*cking stink?” The girl and her friends began to laugh.

In fairness I was confuse and slightly frightened these girls were bigger than me and my mates but I knew I had to say something. However, my two best friends just said to ignore her, but I asked the girl what her problem was. The big girl suddenly shot up, walked straight over to me and slapped me hard in my face, it was at this point I began to cry.

She then screamed in my face “If you want to hang around with monkeys, you’ll get treated like a f*cking monkey”.

My two friends grabbed me and we bustled off the bus a few stops from school. When they had calmed me down both of them asked me why I had said anything. Of course I said the
girl was in the wrong and that she couldn't get away with saying things like that to us. My friend just said that she didn’t say it to us, she said it to me about them and that they had said ignore her. For many years I was angry at my friends for not sticking up for me and running away. But as I got older and saw more and more of my family and friends racially abused I realised that their coping strategy was to ignore ignorant words so as not to give them power.
Appendix 8: The Terrorism Act 2000 Definition of Terrorism

(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where-

a) the action falls within sub section (2).

b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and

c) The use or threat is made for the purpose advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

(2) Action falls within this subsection if it-

a) Involves serious violence against a person,

b) Involves serious damage to property,

c) Endangers a person’s life, other than the person committing the action,

d) Creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or

e) Is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.

(4) In this section—
(a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom,

(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated,

(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and

(d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.

(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation
Nine: Report Justifications

These justifications are briefly documented below.

- The first problematic issue was “oppressive policing over a period of years; and in particular the harassment of young blacks on the streets of Brixton” (This was also taken to include Liverpool as the report had been extended to include Liverpool after the disturbances). Scarman did however conclude by saying that these young men targeted, were anti police.

- The second problem was that the disorders, like so many riots in British history, were a protest against society by people deeply frustrated and deprived who saw in a violent attack upon the forces of law and order their one opportunity of compelling public attention to their grievances.

- The third was that a multicultural community was living in a deprived inner city area where unemployment, especially among young black people was high and hopes were low.

- Fourth there was a requirement for police to maintain law and order of a diverse community, however there was little understanding of their needs and as such it was impossible to set standards for successful policing but did contest that they may have been "ill considered, immature and racially prejudiced actions of some officers” or an “unwitting discrimination against Black people
Appendix 10: Pilot Study in Brief

Pilot Study in Brief (2012)

The pilot study was conducted as the dissertation element of a Masters of Art at the University of Liverpool in 2012. The research engaged Muslim and non-Muslims in and around Liverpool and Northwich in Cheshire. The first aim of the research to investigate how much Muslims and non-Muslim new about and understood the governments counter-radicalisation program Prevent (2011). The second aim was to examine how those groups felt about some of the assumptions within the document, specifically the drivers of radicalisation.

The three-core research questions where:

1. How much do Muslim and non-Muslims know about the PREVENT (2011) strategy and counter-radicalisation policy in general?

2. What do the respondents in the two areas under consideration think about the identification of drivers within PREVENT policy?

3. Do the respondents believe they have ever been affected by counter-radicalisation policy such as PREVENT and if so what impact has that had on them and their communities?

Methodology:

The master’s research was the same as the current study the only difference being the subject pool. The research employed a mixed methods approach using Hamersley’s (1996) facilitation approach. The Qualitative first stage (S1) was used to inform the qualitative second stage (S2).
S1 employed a Likert styled questionnaire with a five point grading system which let the respondents grade ten statements from strongly disagree, disagree, don’t know, agree, agree strongly. Seven of the statements were taken directly from Prevent (2011) and they contained both positive and negative assertions. The final three statements were constructed to investigate the integration of the respondents into the wider community. This element of the study was the same as the current study in order to keep consistency (see Appendix 3). The seven statements constructed from information taken from PREVENT sections 1.01, 3.29, 5, 5.6, 5.18, 5.22, 5.26) and three independent statements based on the literature review:

4) Over the last decade, relationships between minority groups and government agencies, such as the police, have improved.

5) Islamophobia is not the same as other forms of discrimination or racism.

6) A person’s faith determines their treatment by state agencies such as the police, more so than their skin colour or economic class.

The respondents where snowball sampled from a connection I had in the local Mosque, I knew none of the respondents personally before the research. Similar to this study gatekeepers were used to avoid research bias.

The age range was 18-72 with an equal balance of male to female respondent’s p = 60.

*Analysis S1:*

An analysis of the data was performed using the SPSS programme and four primary codes where identified Drivers, Power, Social control and Identity.
These codes were then subsequently divided into 16 further categories although not all of these were discussed in the dissertation due to a lack of time and the word count. The largest if the primary codes was the drivers, which was expected as the primary goal of the research was to investigate the impact of the counter-radicalisation policy specifically the drivers identified within it.

Core findings SI:

(a) The analysis found that both the Muslims and non-Muslims respondents rejected the idea of drivers as they met a number of the criteria themselves and did not feel that they were at risk of radicalisation.

(b) There was distinct separation between the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents as the non-Muslim respondents were far more likely to give a negative response. Such as, disagree or disagree strongly. The Muslim respondents were more likely to choose the do not know category, instead rather than give a negative response.

(c) It also showed that unlike the non-Muslim respondents, the Muslims respondent were all aware of the current counter-radicalisation process and they did believe that their faith was a driving factor in any interaction they had with state agencies, unlike the non-Muslims respondents.

(d) Another split in the narrative between respondents was that unlike the non-Muslim respondents, Muslims believed that relationships with the police had deteriorated over the last decade.
Based on the analysis of the data an informed second stage was then performed.

*Second stage:*

The second phase of this study was again, the same as the masters with a qualitative semi-structured interview phase. The questions based on the stage one findings and were constructed to delve deeper into topic of identity and the effect of the counter-radicalisation policy on people’s perceptions of their identity. In this phase, a new group of Muslims were asked their opinions. There was an equal male – female split and the age range was 18-42 p =12.

The findings suggested that there none of the respondents believed that the drivers identified in Prevent were not justified as they targeted only poorer Muslims. Class and faith were linked through the language of the responses and a negative view of targeting was criticised. An example of this was a respondent who suggested that the Arabic sheikh’s were not placed under as much suspicion as a poor Muslims immigrants even though they have been linked to supporting terrorist organisations. Also, that when a Muslims rose to fame such as Mohammed Farah they lost their Muslims identity somewhat, that being replaced with their status such as gold medal winner. This type of response then introduced a new category of identity, which was also explored.

Identity was also a consideration in the responses and included aspects such as racial linking to faith. All of the respondents believed that they were targeted because of their race, as this was the primary identifying factor, their master status (Hughes, 1945). An example of this was a respondent who
talked about her son who was mixed-race black being stopped when he wore baggy jeans and t-shirts like the other young people in his area. His skin colour being the factor that meant he was under suspicion and in her word’s his faith only being brought to light when he was asked his name. She did comment that this then did not help his situation. Another respondent simply said it made sense for race and faith to be linked given; most Muslims in the UK were from a minority background.

Summation

There were many other codes developed during this study but the two main ones that were used as a basis for this current study were Drivers and Identity. All the work was approved through the University of Liverpool ethics committee and I worked very closely with my supervisors who are the same for this current study.

Bibliography


Eleven: Abbreviations List

GAUS  Geographical area under study
PREVENT  The Prevent Strategy (2011)
BMR  Black and Minority Race
FPM  Former Prime Minister
BME  Black Mixed Ethnic
Twelve: Pen Portrait of Respondents.

Brief Portrait of the Respondents

Throughout the research, I was aware that my respondents did not want their identities made public, which I guaranteed. As such, I allowed them to choose their own anonymised names, review all the information I shared in the thesis and check the following information that gives a brief snap shot into who they are in the real world.

James.

James was one of my most vocal respondents.

Aged 57 he was a resident of L8 and had lived his entire life as such.

James’s genealogy was MR, his mother was British/Irish white and his father was British white/Jamaican Black. His father had married his mother in the 1960’s. His father was a merchant seaman and his mum was a cleaner who raised James and his three sisters almost by herself as his father was often away at sea.

James was not a member of any faith group, was in full time employment and had no criminal record. James had been involved in Liverpool with Anti-fascist movements and was also proactive in the Labour movement in Liverpool when he was younger.

As a younger child James had faced racism both in school from teachers and students, originally thinking of joining the army as a young man he had a negative experience at a recruitment office which forced him to change his mind. James still live in L8 but now works in Manchester.
James considers himself fourth generation scouser as four generations of his family have been born in Liverpool.

Megan.

Aged 45, Megan was also a resident of L8 for most of her adult life although she had been born in the North of the city.

Megan’s genealogy was MR British/white mother and Indian father. Her father had come to Britain to fill the skill gap in 1955 where he had met her mother and married. At a time when inter race marriage were frowned upon shortly after her birth her family moved to L8 in order to be with other mixed families in a more integrated area. Megan was subjected to systematic episodes of bullying when she was younger and after her father passed away when she was eleven, this intensified causing her to leave school at fourteen. Megan was in full time employment, had no criminal record and still lives in L8.

She does not belong to any religious organisations

Jazmin

Aged 20, Jazmin was a resident of Speke and had been all her life.

Jazmin’s genealogy was MR her mother was British/white and her father was British/Black Nigerian. Jazmin’s mother and father were both born in Liverpool and she considered herself third generation scouser as her grandparents on both her mother and fathers side were also born in Britain although her great-grand parents on her fathers a side were not.
As one of the younger respondents Jazmin experiences of racism in her words “had not been too bad”. She did suggest during the interviews this was because she had pale skin and so she felt this protected her from targeting.

Jazmin did not belong to any religious organisation and was in part time employment.

Edward

Aged 55, Edward was another very vocal respondent.

Edward’s genealogy was MR his mother was Irish white and his father was Black African/British. Edward’s father and family had been born in Britain for five generations but his mother and her family were not.

Edward had worker in the civil service for many years in Liverpool and for housing associations. He had been vocal highlighting Black community rights during the 1980’s and had worked with the socialist party. Edward had been in trouble as a child with the police and felt the consequences of this throughout his adult life as it had affected his employment status. Like many of the other respondents Edwards parents were together at a time when inter marriage was unacceptable in Liverpool and as such he and his family had suffered significant racist abuse, culminating in the hospitalisation of Edward after an attack. Born and raised in Liverpool Edward still lives there with his family.

Edward was a Catholic from a practising Catholic family.

Lilly
Aged 43, and a resident of L8, she had been living in the area for over 20 years although was born in the Wirral originally.

Lilly’s genealogy was MR her mother was Black British/African and her father was white British/Irish. Jazmin considered herself second-generation scouse as both her parents were born in Liverpool. Jazmin had faced racism throughout her life but had said that “it was just a ‘normal’ part of growing up if it isn’t her race they [talking about the abusers] would have picked on her for something else”

Jazmin was in full time employment and was a practising Christian.

Saakkar

Aged 59 Saakaar was originally born in India to Indian parents, however he came to Britain with his family when he was just one year old and so considers himself ‘born and bred’ [his term] in Britain. Saakar describes himself as Hindu British and has lived in L8 for over thirty years, his family originally settled in Birmingham.

Saakar was very involved in the arts in Liverpool for many years and has also been involved in many projects in L8 raising awareness of multiculturalism. A great believer in multiculturalism Saakar was another very vocal respondent. Saakar was passionate that multiculturalism was a success in Liverpool and contended that many other cities should follow Liverpool specifically L8

Saakaar was in full time employment and had no criminal record.

Airyana

Aged 50, Airyana is a married mum of four, and was my first respondent from Speke. Airyana was very vocal about her experiences.
Airyana described her genealogy as ‘quarter cast’ [her terminology] (MR).

Airyana’s mother was Black British/African and her father was white British/Irish. Airyana has lived in the Speke all her life and was one of the few MR police officers in Liverpool during the 1980’s. Due to a number of racist incidents within the police service she left and had a successful career as a paramedic until she left after the birth of her fourth child. She is now a full time mum.

Airyana is not a member of any religious organisation.

Isabella

Isabella was our oldest participant ages 72, a practising Christian and gave the longest interview of all the respondents.

Isabella described herself as MR, her mother was white Irish and her father was Black Nigerian. She is a first generation British born and was born in Scotland Road in the North end of Liverpool. Her father was merchant seaman and her mother worked behind the bar of local pub. Isabella was able to give me an in-site into Liverpool’s past more than any other respondent due to her age and her experiences.

Her family had moved originally to L8 when she was just nine years old with her mother, father, brother and sister. The family had to be rehomed by the city council as her parents had been arrested on numerous occasions for public disorder offences. Isabella told me this was due to her father returning from sea, each time to face violence and abuse from their neighbours. When Isabella got married in the late 1960’s she and her husband moved to Speke were she remains with her family.

Drew
Drew aged 23, was a MR man from Speke and a father of one.

Drew described his genealogy as MR as his mother was white British and his father was Black African/white British. A third generation scouser Drew described himself as working in an ‘unconventional field’. Drew has been in contact with the police on numerous occasions and is currently serving an 18 month prison sentence; he was sentenced a few weeks after the interview.

Born and raised in Speke, Drew was quite vocal in his criticisms of the police and policing practices. Drew was well informed of current legislation and was highly critical of what he described as “discriminatory policing practices in lower socio-economic areas.”

Drew was a very well read young man and out of all the respondents, he knew more than the other respondents about current policies including PREVENT.

Grace

Aged 52 and a practising Christian.

Grace described her genealogy as “Café Au Lait British” (MR).

Her mother was with British/Black African mixed and her father was White Irish.

Grace had lived in Speke her entire life and was the daughter of Isabella.

Grace was in full time employment working for large security company as a security manager. Grace was quite vocal on the subject of Muslims/Islam and was aware of the current counter-radicalisation policy PREVENT. She said this was due to her job.
Brima

Aged 24 was from Speke and described himself as an Agnostic.

Brima described his genealogy, as MR his mother and father were also MR. His mother was Black African/White British and his father was Black Guiana/White British.

Brima was in full time employment and worked as a personal trainer. He had no criminal record.

Raymond

Aged 27 year old from Speke.

He described his genealogy as MR, his mother was white British and his father was Black West Indian.

Raymond was a very vocal respondent on the subject of policing and racism. He was aware of current counter-terrorism legislation and policing practises. He spoke at some length about the shift from overt to covert racisms within his own community in Speke. Raymond was very vocal during his interview and passionate about discrimination which he believed was being led by government to keep communities from fighting against state led injustice.

Raymond was in full time employment, had no criminal convictions and lived in in Speke with his young family.