SITUATING FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Ashton, Natalie Alana and McKenna, Robin (2020) SITUATING FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY Episteme, 17 (1). pp. 28-47. ISSN 1742-3600, 1750-0117

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Abstract

Feminist epistemologies hold that differences in the social locations of inquirers make for epistemic differences, for instance, in the sorts of things that inquirers are justified in believing. In this paper we situate this core idea in feminist epistemologies with respect to debates about social constructivism. We address three questions. First, are feminist epistemologies committed to a form of social constructivism about knowledge? Second, to what extent are they incompatible with traditional epistemological thinking? Third, do the answers to these questions raise serious problems for feminist epistemologies? We argue that some versions of two of the main strands in feminist epistemology – feminist standpoint theory and feminist empiricism – are committed to a form of social constructivism, which requires certain departures from traditional epistemological thinking. But we argue that these departures are less problematic than one might think. Thus, (some) feminist epistemologies provide a plausible way of understanding how (some) knowledge might be socially constructed.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	13 Sep 2018 08:06
Last Modified:	01 Mar 2026 11:56
DOI:	10.1017/epi.2018.11
Related Websites:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3026167
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