Assertion, Complexity, and Sincerity

McKenna, Robin ORCID: 0000-0001-5129-7850 (2015) Assertion, Complexity, and Sincerity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93 (4). pp. 782-798.

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Abstract

The target of this paper is the ‘simple’ knowledge account of assertion, according to which assertion is constituted by a single epistemic rule of the form ‘One must: assert p only if one knows p’ (where p is a proposition). My aim is to argue that those who are attracted to a knowledge account of assertion should prefer what I call the ‘complex’ knowledge account, according to which assertion is constituted by a system of rules all of which are, taken together, constitutive of assertion. One of those rules—which, following John Searle, I call the ‘preparatory condition’—is of the form ‘One must: assert p only if one knows p.’ All else being equal, simple accounts are preferable to complex accounts. I argue in this paper that all else isn't equal. While the simple knowledge account provides an elegant explanation of certain data, it is hard to see how to integrate the simple knowledge account into a more general theory of illocutionary acts. Because the complex knowledge account avoids this objection while explaining the same data as the simple knowledge account does, I conclude that the complex knowledge account is superior to the simple knowledge account.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	assertion, epistemic norms, epistemology, philosophy of language, speech acts
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	13 Sep 2018 08:14
Last Modified:	19 Jan 2023 01:17
DOI:	10.1080/00048402.2014.1003075
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3026174