Normative scorekeeping

McKenna, R (2014) Normative scorekeeping Synthese, 191 (3). pp. 607-625. ISSN 0039-7857, 1573-0964

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Abstract

Epistemic contextualists think that the truth-conditions of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions depend in part on the context in which they are uttered. But what features of context play a role in determining truth-conditions? The idea that the making salient of error possibilities is a central part of the story has often been attributed to contextualists, and a number of contextualists seem to endorse it (see Cohen (Philos Perspect, 13:57–89, 1999) and Hawthorne, (Knowledge and lotteries, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004)). In this paper I argue that the focus on salience relations is a mistake. On the view I defend, the relevant features of context are facts about what error-possibilities and alternatives those in the context have a reason to consider, not facts about what error-possibilities and alternatives those in the context actually consider. As I will argue, this view has certain advantages over the standard view.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Contextualism, Epistemology, Edward Craig, Scorekeeping, Reasons, Philosophy of language
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	13 Sep 2018 08:13
Last Modified:	24 Jan 2026 01:47
DOI:	10.1007/s11229-013-0293-1
Related Websites:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3026180
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