Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Are Possibly Not Governed by the Same Epistemic Norm

McKenna, Robin (2013) Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Are Possibly Not Governed by the Same Epistemic Norm. Logos & Episteme, 4 (4). pp. 457-464. ISSN 2069-0533

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Abstract

This paper focuses on Martin Montminy’s recent attempt to show that assertion and practical reasoning are necessarily governed by the same epistemic norm(“Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2013). I show that the attempt fails. I finish by considering the upshot for the recent debate concerning the connection between the epistemic norms of assertion and practical reasoning.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	13 Sep 2018 08:10
Last Modified:	24 May 2025 11:18
DOI:	10.5840/logos-episteme2013446
Related Websites:	Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3026181