Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach

Mckenna, Robin (2013) Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach. PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 94 (1). pp. 101-123.

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Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>In his <jats:italic><jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">K</jats:styled-content>nowledge and <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">P</jats:styled-content>ractical <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">I</jats:styled-content>nterests</jats:italic> <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">J</jats:styled-content>ason <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">S</jats:styled-content>tanley argues that the view he defends, which he calls interest‐relative invariantism, is better supported by certain cases than epistemic contextualism. In this article I argue that a version of epistemic contextualism that emphasizes the role played by the ascriber's practical interests in determining the truth‐conditions of her ‘knowledge’ ascriptions – a view that I call interests contextualism – is better supported by <jats:styled-content style="fixed-case">S</jats:styled-content>tanley's cases than interest‐relative invariantism or other versions of epistemic contextualism. My main aim is to show that interests contextualism is a viable, if often over‐looked, alternative to the usual positions in the contemporary debate.</jats:p>

Item Type:	Article
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	13 Sep 2018 08:08
Last Modified:	13 Nov 2023 08:44
DOI:	10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01447.x
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3026182