Epistemic contextualism: A normative approach

McKenna, R (2013) Epistemic contextualism: A normative approach Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94 (1). pp. 101-123. ISSN 0279-0750, 1468-0114

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Abstract

In his Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley argues that the view he defends, which he calls interest-relative invariantism, is better supported by certain cases than epistemic contextualism. In this article I argue that a version of epistemic contextualism that emphasizes the role played by the ascriber's practical interests in determining the truth-conditions of her 'knowledge' ascriptions - a view that I call interests contextualism - is better supported by Stanley's cases than interest-relative invariantism or other versions of epistemic contextualism. My main aim is to show that interests contextualism is a viable, if often over-looked, alternative to the usual positions in the contemporary debate. © 2012 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2012 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	13 Sep 2018 08:08
Last Modified:	24 Jan 2026 01:47
DOI:	10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01447.x
Related Websites:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3026182
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