Clifford and the common epistemic norm

McKenna, R (2016) Clifford and the common epistemic norm American Philosophical Quarterly, 53 (3). pp. 245-257. ISSN 0003-0481, 2152-1123

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Abstract

This paper develops a "Cliffordian" argument for a common epistemic norm governing belief, action, and assertion. The idea is that beliefs are the sorts of things that lead to actions and assertions. What each of us believes influences what we act on and assert, and in turn influences what those around us believe, act on, and assert. Belief, action, and assertion should be held to a common epistemic norm because, otherwise, this system will become contaminated. The paper finishes by drawing out the relativistic implications of the Cliffordian argument.

Item Type:	Article
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	13 Sep 2018 07:39
Last Modified:	24 Jan 2026 01:48
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URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3026183
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