Colour

Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480 (2014) Colour. Philosophy Compass, 9 (11). pp. 803-813.

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Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The view that physical objects do not, in fact, possess colour properties is certainly the dominant position amongst scientists working on colour vision. It is also a reasonably popular view amongst philosophers. However, the recent philosophical debate about the metaphysical status of colour properties seems to have taken a more <jats:italic>realist</jats:italic> turn. In this article, I review the main philosophical views – eliminativism, physicalism, dispositionalism and primitivism – and describe the problems they face. I also examine how these views have been classified and suggest that there may be less disparity between some of these positions than previously thought.</jats:p>

Item Type:	Article
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	14 Sep 2018 15:43
Last Modified:	02 Oct 2023 08:53
DOI:	10.1111/phc3.12173
Related URLs:	Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3026293