The Orange Order in Northern Ireland:
Has political isolation, sectarianism, secularism, or declining social capital proved the biggest challenge?

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy

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## Contents

*Dedication* 3

*Acknowledgements* 4

*Abstract* 5

*List of Abbreviations* 6

*List of Tables* 7

Introduction 8

Chapter One  The Orange Order in Northern Ireland: The State of Play 37

Chapter Two  From pre– to post–Agreement Northern Ireland: Political isolation and the Grand Orange Lodge 70

Chapter Three  Intolerance in a tolerant society? Parading, sectarianism, and declining middle–class respectability 106

Chapter Four  An Order Re–routed: Interface Orangeism in Drumcree and Ardoyne 135

Chapter Five  ‘The Biggest Threat’? The impact of secularism 167

Chapter Six  Parading Alone: The decline of social capital in Northern Ireland and its impacts on the Orange Order 195

Conclusion 228

*Bibliography* 239

*Appendix I*  
*Interview Questions* 266
For my mother

who, by the second Twelfth of July parade, started to enjoy them

and my uncle, Ian Buxton (1968–2018)

who never got to see it finished
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Abstract

The Orange Order remains one of the largest and most significant organisations within civic society in Northern Ireland. It provides an institutional focus for the distinctive social, religious, and cultural traditions associated with Protestant British unionism in the region. However, having gone from a commanding position at the outbreak of the Troubles in 1968 with sizeable political influence and approximately 100,000 members, the Order has been reduced to the margins within the new, post–conflict polity in Northern Ireland. The principal aim of this research is to assess why the Orange Order has suffered political and numerical decline in the region and clarify how this distinctly ethno–religious organisation has adapted (or failed to adapt) to the changed political and social contexts in which it exists. In order to do this, a qualitative, ethno–graphic study drawing upon interviews with Orange Order members is undertaken. This involves detailed examination of discourses, documents and events. This thesis tests four competing hypotheses of the primary causes of retreat: (1) loss of political power since the collapse of Northern Ireland Parliament in 1972; (2) marginalisation through the growing unacceptability and diminishing appeal of overt religious sectarianism; (3) secularism within society; and, (4) the decline in social capital. These hypotheses are tested in terms of their contribution to the marginalisation of the Orange Order in Northern Ireland.

The collapse of Northern Ireland’s devolved political structure in the early 1970s removed the Order’s capacity to wield political influence. Following the sidelining of local political actors thereafter, epitomised by the intergovernmental nature of the Anglo–Irish Agreement, unionism later found itself again in turmoil in the wake of the divisive Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The Agreement prescribed a parity of esteem between the two traditions and further – and irreversibly – changed the status quo in which the institution operated. The Order’s reputation for perpetuating sectarianism was already being challenged internally within and also beyond unionism and it has struggled for so–called middle–class respectability. Concurrently, an increasingly atomistic society and diminishing social capital has left the Orange Order with less relevancy or attraction for Protestant Unionists in the twenty–first century, especially when compared to earlier periods. Whilst this thesis upholds the argument that political and social marginalisation have been key causes of decline, the impact of secularism is found to have been of less – but far from negligible – significance. Amid its struggle for relevancy, the Orange Order operates in heavily reduced circumstances in which the institution attempts to retain its membership in an era when attracting new blood is difficult. Nonetheless, the thesis argues that Orangeism remains an important political and cultural strand of loyalism in Northern Ireland, adapting to become one closely associated with band traditions which show little sign of diminution.
### List of Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARK</td>
<td>Access Research Knowledge Northern Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARA</td>
<td>Crumlin Ardoyne Residents Association</td>
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<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
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<td>GAA</td>
<td>Gaelic Athletics Association</td>
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<td>GARC</td>
<td>Greater Ardoyne Residents’ Collective</td>
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<td>GFA</td>
<td>Good Friday Agreement</td>
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<td>GOLI</td>
<td>Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland</td>
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<td>GRRA</td>
<td>Garvaghy Road Residents Association</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>LOI</td>
<td>Loyal Orange Institution</td>
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<td>LOL</td>
<td>Loyal Orange Lodge</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Member of the Legislative Assembly</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NICRA</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association</td>
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<td>NILP</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Labour Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFMDFM</td>
<td>Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister</td>
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<td>PRONI</td>
<td>Public Records Office Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>PSNI</td>
<td>Police Service Northern Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUP</td>
<td>Progressive Unionist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>Royal Ulster Constabulary</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>Social Democratic and Labour Party</td>
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<td>UDA</td>
<td>Ulster Defence Association</td>
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<td>UUC</td>
<td>Ulster Unionist Council</td>
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<td>UUP</td>
<td>Ulster Unionist Party</td>
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<td>UVF</td>
<td>Ulster Volunteer Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWC</td>
<td>Ulster Workers’ Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables

Table 0.1 Sampling of Interviews 24
Table 3.1 Number of references to parades and parading in *Orange Standard*, 1994 and 2014 111
Table 3.2 Number of pictures of parading in *Orange Standard*, 1994 and 2014 111
Table 3.3 Number of references to topics in *Orange Standard*, 1994 and 2014 112
Table 5.1 Childhood Religious Identification by Current Religious Identification 181
Table 5.2 Childhood Religious Identity 182
Introduction

In September 2012, the Orange Order held a commemorative parade marking the centenary of the signing of the Ulster Covenant. Edward Stevenson, Grand Master of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, described the parade as, ‘not only an awesome expression of unionism but also a visible manifestation of the enduring strength of our Loyal Institution’ and the ‘unique and valued place’ the Order continues to hold in the Protestant community. Stevenson asked, ‘what other organisation could attract such support in such huge numbers?’ Indeed, the Order remains one of the largest and most significant organisations within civic society and represents an unyielding form of British Protestant unionism. The Order provides an institutional focus for the distinctive social, religious, and cultural traditions associated with the majority community in the province. However, having held a commanding position at the outbreak of the Troubles in 1968 with approximately 100,000 members, a place within the dominant party of unionism, and unquestioning adherence from many unionists, the institution has been reduced to fewer than 40,000 members, operates without formal political alignment, and often appears to struggle for relevance.

This doctoral thesis will explore and identify which factors have had the most detrimental effects upon Orange Order membership and the importance of the organisation since the Troubles. Through a qualitative study, this thesis will test four hypotheses. Firstly, to what extent and why has the Orange Order become politically isolated since the collapse of the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1972 and to what extent has that meant the Order has been of insufficient relevance to replenish brethren? Secondly, to what extent has the Order’s marginalisation been attributable to the growing unacceptability and diminishing appeal of overt religious sectarianism that the institution is alleged to

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promote? To what degree has secularism within society and the more general move away from religion – in practice and association – meant that individuals are less interested in joining religious or quasi-religious organisations? Finally, to what extent has a decline in social capital meant that the Orange Order has subsequently struggled to attract recruits amid a broader atomisation of society? By answering these question, the conclusions this thesis reaches will clarify understanding of how a distinctly ethno-religious organisation has attempted to survive amid metamorphosed socio-political and religious contexts. Furthermore, it will add to a growing body of literature that drives understanding of the role the Order has played – and continues to play – in Northern Ireland.

In the wake of the Troubles and resultant direct rule from Westminster, the Orange Order found itself on the outskirts of political power. Having enjoyed a unique role in the governance of the state prior to the collapse of the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1972, the institution found itself politically neutered and isolated. Since the restoration of devolution to the province in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA), the institution has attempted to adapt to the new politics of Northern Ireland. The Order formally severed the historic links with the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in 2005 and many of its members abandoned the party in favour of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), a political entity with whom the Orange Order had previously held a somewhat troubled relationship, in particular with its founder and former leader, the Reverend Ian Paisley. To what extent has the institution become politically isolated since the onset of direct rule from Westminster? And, latterly, has that isolation been magnified since its divorce from the UUP in 2005 when membership of the institution was no longer (effectively) a prerequisite for holding political office?

In addition to the changed political status quo, the Orange Order has had to contend with a growth of secularism that, despite being far less prevalent in Northern Ireland when compared to other western countries, has progressively increased over the past four decades. While some may consider the
gradual move towards a less religious society an inevitable process, the Northern Ireland case is exceptional because religion, in terms of belonging at least, stands at the epicentre of civic society. Religious affiliation remains high in the province, with 83.1 per cent of respondents in the 2011 census claiming to belong to a religion; the vast majority of whom aligned to a Christian denomination. Religious influences upon routine societal activities remain. Legislation to facilitate Sunday trading was not introduced until 1997 and shops are still prohibited from opening on Sunday mornings, distinct from the rest of the UK. Attempts to allow same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland have repeatedly failed to gain sufficient cross-community support in the Assembly, whilst abortion remains illegal in the province other than in the most exceptional circumstances. Has this growing alienation of religion and the alienation of the traditional role religious institutions played within society resulted in greater marginalisation of the Orange Order in Northern Ireland?

Society, more generally in the UK, has been seen as becoming increasingly atomistic. Communities have become increasingly socially fragmented since the 1970s and some voluntary organisations have seen a decline in membership. Northern Ireland has not been exempted from the trends experienced elsewhere in the UK. The Boys’ Brigade in Belfast, for example, has seen a gradual decline in members, with currently only half the number of young people it had in 1987, and has lost a quarter of its adult volunteer leaders over the same period. In Northern Ireland, alignment to the combative ethnic identities of Catholic Nationalist and Protestant Unionist remains extensive. The two identities are

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mutually exclusive and, consequently, opportunity within the social and political spheres to bridge identity across the divide is limited; voluntary associations are not immune from this division. However, as the number of those joining organisations declines, the Orange Order has to adapt to remain relevant. Has the development of social capital changed in Northern Ireland and, if so, has the Orange Order’s traditional methods of generating social capital also changed?

Yet amid this supposed atomisation, the Orange Order’s public demonstrations on the twelfth of July and at other points in the year remain huge gatherings, a source of pride but also sensitivity for the Order. For the institution, parading remains of vital importance to its operations but the Order’s insistence on using what it refers to as its ‘traditional’ routes has also provided challenges. The Order has found itself in conflict with Catholic residents’ groups along a small number of routes and criticised for inciting sectarian unrest. Critics have been vociferous within the Catholic nationalist community, but the Order’s image problem has extended to sections of the Protestant middle-class. The Order’s vocal opposition to Roman Catholicism has always rendered the institution vulnerable to charges of sectarianism. It steadfastly opposes what it sees as ‘the fatal errors and doctrines of the Church of Rome’ and it maintains a raft of institutional rules that forbid members attending Roman Catholic services (including baptisms, marriages, and funerals), cohabiting with Catholics, and marrying them, all of which fuel accusations of bigotry. Has this alleged sectarianism resulted in an image problem for the Orange Order and, if so, has this contributed to its social and political marginalisation? To what extent have the parading disputes in Drumcree and Ardoyne contributed to this image crisis?

Whilst the Orange Order was once rather neglected in academic circles, the recent growth of literature demonstrates both its historic importance and its significance as an indicator of attitudes and change.

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within unionism. The literature surrounding the Orange Order is examined in much greater detail in Chapter 1, but it is useful to offer an outline at this stage, indicating where gaps lie within the existing academic research. Both Haddick–Flynn\(^9\) and Jess\(^10\) have produced detailed histories of the Orange Order and offer effective introductions to the current state of the institution. The former looks primarily at the Order’s origins whilst the latter text, written by a journalist, commits a great deal of attention to the controversy surrounding the Drumcree parade and other sectarian issues that have plagued the Order. It is not however, an academic analysis of the societal and political changes which have provided problems for the Order. Ruth Dudley–Edwards’s *The Faithful Tribe*\(^{11}\) articulates some of the difficulties confronting the Order, whilst locating these mainly in the context of poor public relations strategies.

The first major critique of the Order came from within. *The Orange Order: A Tradition Betrayed*, by Brian Kennaway,\(^{12}\) offers the anguished account of a former senior member (for over forty years) of the Order. He laments the perceived changing nature of the Order from a religious institution to one unnecessarily involved in parading rows and criticises the internal management of the Order. Eric Kaufmann’s *The Orange Order: A Contemporary Northern Irish History*\(^{13}\) utilises data regarding Protestant identity to interpret the Order in various locations throughout in the province suggesting distinctions between urban and border, or rural, Orangeism; the former somewhat eclipsed by band culture and the latter still holding reasonably firm. Kaufmann’s work with Henry Patterson\(^{14}\) has expanded this research and also illustrates the variable geometry of the old UUP–Orange Order

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\(^{10}\) M. Jess, *The Orange Order* (Dublin: O’Brien Press, 2007)


\(^{14}\) H. Patterson and E. Kaufmann, *Unionism and Orangism in Northern Ireland since 1945: The decline of the loyal family* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007)
relationship. This text draws out the significant tensions that plagued the relationship for decades. Graham Walker’s book on the UUP further draws attention to the strain to which the UUP–Orange Order relationship was often exposed.\textsuperscript{15} The relationship between the two is also explored in Harbinson’s book covering the history of UUP–Orange relations until the 1970s.\textsuperscript{16}

A recent collection of publications has been produced, mainly by McAuley, Tonge and Mycock,\textsuperscript{17} which are of particular relevance to this thesis. Having completed the first quantitative study of Orange Order members, their data sets on Order membership illuminate contemporary sentiment amongst members and explain the motivations and beliefs which underpin the Orange Order’s brethren. However, despite the wealth of literature already published on the Orange Order, research to date has yet to fully assess why the Orange Order now finds itself marginalised. No research thus far has fully tested how political isolation has affected the Orange Order in Northern Ireland; examined how accusations of sectarianism has impacted upon the institution’s respectability, especially via the most recent parading disputes ranging from Drumcree to Ardoyne; tested how secularism has impacted upon the institution’s ability to recruit members; or examined the extent to which declining social capital within society has impacted upon the Orange Order.


This thesis will fill this aforementioned literature void. Through a qualitative, ethnographic study, this thesis will provide a full assessment of four, never before studied, hypotheses exploring the Orange Order’s recent history in Northern Ireland. Using qualitative data from forty-three interviewees, this thesis will be unlike all other literature in the area; making an original contribution to the field, it will be the first such study to analyse the four hypotheses: political isolation; sectarianism; secularism; and declining social capital, have impacted upon the Orange Order. Furthermore, this study will undertake the first content analysis of the Orange Order’s official publication, Orange Standard, and will track and examine the evolving discourse contained within. The conclusions this thesis comes to will clarify why the institution finds in the current, highly reduced social and political circumstances.

Methodological Overview

Despite the breadth of literature already published on the Orange Order, research to date has yet to fully test why the Orange Order has become marginalised within the socio–political arena. In order to do this, two broad schools of research might be harnessed to tackle this question: ethnographic and quantitative. A plethora of opportunities are offered in ethnographic research to properly test how the four aforementioned hypotheses have impacted upon the Orange Order in Northern Ireland. Spawning from the Chicago School of sociologists and with origins in anthropology, ethnographic research includes practices of participant observation and interviewing, at the elite level as well as the grassroots. This form of research has been widely used in sociology where symbolic interactionism has been an important theoretical approach. For symbolic interactionists, effective development of hypotheses can only occur and be properly tested through these means, as opposed to abstract theorising.
In Miles and Huderman, Fred Kerlinger is infamously quoted as stating: ‘there is no such thing as qualitative data. Everything is either 1 or 0’.\(^{18}\) Despite Campbell’s persuasive counter-argument that ‘all research ultimately has a qualitative grounding’\(^{19}\) and Dabbs’ insistence that ‘qualitative and quantitative [research methods] are not distinct’,\(^{20}\) Kerlinger’s comments are indicative of the oft-held assumptions argued by positivists of the qualitative school that ethnographic research is less worthy of accreditation than quantitative methods. Qualitative research involves a much longer timeframe, requires much greater clarification of goals during planning phases, and cannot be fully analysed by running computer simulations, models, or programmes. However, as Bogdan demonstrates, qualitative research has impacted upon the social sciences conceptually and theoretically, and qualitative methodologies have made a significant contribution to social understanding.\(^{21}\) Ethnographic methods are often criticised for being descriptive and insufficiently representative. This form of research assesses quality using words, images, and descriptions, in contrast with quantitative research that primarily uses numbers and mathematical formulae. Consequently, qualitative strategies can be derided by critics as less scientific than quantitative approaches. However, such critics tend to ignore the probability factor associated with quantitative methods and replace it with the assumption of certainty.

For Dabbs, the notion of quality is essential when considering ‘the nature of anything’.\(^{22}\) Quality refers to the essence and ambiance of something – the what, how, when, and where of something – and, thereby, ‘qualitative research thus refers to the meaning, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols and description of things’.\(^{23}\) On the other hand, quantitative practices involve

\(^{19}\) Words of D. T. Campbell, quoted in *Ibid* Page 40
\(^{21}\) R. Bogdan, *Participant Observation in Organisational Settings* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1972)
\(^{22}\) Dabbs, ‘Making things visible’ (1982) Page 32
counts and measures. Berg uses Jackson’s description of classroom odours in American schools to demonstrate this difference:

[The] odours of the classroom are fairly standardised. Schools may use different brands of wax and cleaning fluid, but they all seem to contain similar ingredients, a sort of universal smell which creates an aromatic background that permeates the entire building. Added to this, in each classroom, is the slightly acrid scent of chalk dust and the faint hint of fresh wood pencil shavings. In some classrooms, especially at lunch time, there is a familiar odour of orange peels and peanut butter sandwiches, a blend that mingles in the late afternoon (following recess) with the delicate pungency of children’s perspiration.\(^{24}\)

As Berg explains, it would have been impossible for Jackson to capture the odours of the school classrooms by any method of counting or measuring. Therefore, numbers cannot fully express some human experiences.

It is important to examine the reasons surrounding the claim that ethnographic research is unscientific. Schwartz and Jacobs demonstrate that, ‘There are many, in both quantitative and qualitative sociology, who advocate and bask in the value of science’\(^{25}\) and Borman, LeCompte and Goetz argue that criticisms of qualitative research arise from the ‘erroneous equation of the term ‘empirical’ with qualification, rather than with any real defect in the qualitative paradigm itself’.\(^{26}\) Thus, whilst different researchers are afforded the opportunity to employ a varied array of techniques, all are scientific, when science is defined as a systematic way of identifying and understanding how social realities arise, operate, and influence individuals and groups. Consequently, Berg contends scientific researchers may emphasise a more positivist view or may be principally interested in

\(^{24}\)P. W. Jackson (1968) quoted in *Ibid* Page 3


individuals, groups of individuals, and their life–worlds.\textsuperscript{27} The former uses empirical methodologies, arising from the natural sciences, to investigate. Such quantitative strategies produce rigorous and verifiable data and the statistical testing of empirical hypotheses. Those researchers concerned with life–worlds focus on ‘naturally emerging languages and the meanings individuals assign to experience’.\textsuperscript{28} Ethnographic strategies involve emotions, empathy, the meaning of symbols and other subjective aspects associated with the evolving lives of individuals, which may be evident in personal experiences, behavioural routines, and conditions that affect the natural setting. As many of these aspects are directly observable, they can be studied as objective evidence.\textsuperscript{29} However, certain aspects of symbolism and understanding inevitably require a subjective input on the part of the individual.

Loftland and Loftland define participant observation as qualitative research whereby:

\begin{quote}
The researcher becomes involved in a social situation for the purpose of understanding the behaviour of those engaged in the setting. The involvement can be intense or slight, open or covert, but extends over a significant period of time.\textsuperscript{30}
\end{quote}

Participant observation allows for proper assessment of individuals, measuring both the latent and highly visible elements that exist within the group. Observation allows the researcher to identify traditions, established norms, and rules that exist within groups of individuals and institutions, and permits a study of interaction between group members. With such close interaction however, there remains the potential for a conflict to arise between one’s role as a researcher and as a participant. The risk of ‘going native’, as it is colloquially known, is evident and Goode argues that all observation

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Berg, \textit{Qualitative Research Methods} (2007) Page 14
\item Ibid Page 14
\item Schwartz and Jacobs, \textit{Qualitative Sociology} (1979)
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
leads to the researcher becoming, at the very least, a quasi-participant, which has implications for the objectivity of the research.31

Crucially, observation provides the researcher with first-hand experiences and, as a result, heightens understanding. For such extensive and detailed access however, the researcher must establish a great deal of trust with the subjects being observed. This trust does not normally come freely and establishing acceptable levels of trust, such that would allow a proper observation, can often be time consuming, as too can the process of observation. Primarily non-static, the most effective observations occur over extended periods of time. Where access is made available, participant observation will be used to form a comprehensive understanding about the current context within which the membership of the Orange Order has declined. However, due to limits to time, finances, and access, this will not be the primary method of research and data collection.

Whilst ethnographic methodology is associated with the single practice of participant observation, the definition of qualitative research should be extended to include interviewing and other practices. Berg explains that the methods available to a researcher are much wider, including observation of experimental natural settings, historiography, photographic techniques such as videotaping, document analysis, and other unobtrusive techniques.32 At the heart of the ethnographic model of research is the emphasis on individual experiences, thoughts, and activities. If a researcher is to use interviews adequately to explore the situation and discover the participants’ meanings and understanding, it is essential for the researcher to develop empathy with the interviewee and win

32 Berg, Qualitative Research Methods (2007) Pages 4
their confidence. Furthermore, the researcher must be unobtrusive, so as not to impose one’s own influences on the interviewee.

Interviewing is an important methodological tool for exploring the interpretations, opinions, and experiences of elites and those at the grassroots in a way that other techniques would not allow. However, interviewing in ethnically divided societies does raise some important challenges. McEvoy contends:

The researcher must consider whether the identity and potential bias of both the researcher and the researched may have a bearing on the data. Even if the identity of the researcher is not disclosed, it is likely that the interview may have made an assumption and edited their answer accordingly.33

Arthur and Davies both suggest that, because of the aforementioned potential bias, a triangulation of research methods should be used, with interviewing ‘as a complement to the published material as one tries to build up as accurate and objective a picture as possible’.34 Because of the risk of mistrust fundamentally associated with divided societies, it might be difficult for the interviewee to express interpretations beyond those sanctioned by the ethnic party or grouping. The researcher should consider how recent political developments might have clouded the interviewee’s memory and narrative of past events and trends.35

In order to address these challenges, a researcher may use an unstructured interview model. In such models, the researcher has a list of prepared topics that should be addressed but the subjects are considered through the natural course of the discussion. This model ensures that the researcher does not ask leading questions or suggests possible outcomes, invalidating any objectivity. The researcher should appear natural (as opposed to possessing special or ulterior motives) and engages with the interviewee on a person–to–person basis. Interviews with a rigorous, formal structure are also an option for researchers where a much more focussed investigation is required. In the structured interview format, the researcher sets out with a list of predetermined questions and, as with systematic observation, this is less natural. Within the spaces, the same techniques as discussed above may be used, however there is, obviously, less scope for the interviewee to influence the agenda. For this reason, many researchers use a semi–structured interview style. The concept of a semi–structured interview model allows the researcher to pose direct questions to the interviewee, ensuring that the required discussion topics are considered and have ample time to be addressed. As the style is only semi–structured, it allows for the natural course of the conversation to dominate at times and gives both the interviewee and the interviewer enough room to move the discussion in a way not necessarily in–keeping with the list of prepared questions. An obvious disadvantage to a semi–structured interview however, is that unlike the strictly unstructured style, a researcher can begin to influence the thinking of the interviewee, potentially inhibiting the validity of the research.

Researchers engage in active listening, demonstrating to the interviewee that close attention is being paid to what is being said and keeps the interviewee focused on the topic of discussion, as unobtrusively as possible. Suitable arrangements should be made in preparing for the interviews and attention should be given to where the interview will be held, the arrangement of seating and the dress code of the researcher, all in the interests of equality. It may be appropriate for a researcher to use a range of different interview structures and formats. For example, during the initial stages of the
research, an exploratory and expansive approach might be taken. Later, when key issues have been identified and have been developed, a more focused interview model might be used. The range of interviewees requires careful consideration. In this research project, many at the elite level, in this case those active within the Grand Lodge of Ireland, at the head of the Orange Order, could share experiences and interpretations as to the strategic challenges faced by the Orange Order in Northern Ireland and how this has impacted upon its membership. Grassroots experiences and interpretations would provide this research with an understanding of what has led to the Order’s declining membership in the perceptions of those who have witnessed decline most clearly in local lodges. Interviewing participants – at both elite and grassroots levels – would, therefore, enhance this research. A semi-structured interview format was considered to be the most appropriate, giving the interviewee a level of influence over the topics of conversation, but with the relevancy of the discussion secured through a series of questions to guide the interview and test the research hypotheses.

Because of the large number and extensive geographic dispersal of Orange lodges in Northern Ireland, effective sampling of interviewees is important. The impact of political isolation, sectarianism, secularism, and declining social capital may be felt differently in, for example, areas of Belfast when compared with other urban lodge settings. Similarly, the effect may be different again when comparing urban areas with lodges in rural districts. The research therefore deployed numerous interviews with senior Orange officials, grassroots Order membership, and members of the Northern Ireland Assembly to ensure large-scale coverage, involving representatives from different areas of the province, in order to develop an appreciation for the different motivations and experiences of Orangeism in both urban and rural settings. In order to do this, obtaining access to contacts through cooperation with the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland was necessary. However, to ensure the widest possible range of views and not merely ‘top–down’ recommendations, it was necessary to access
interviewees not arranged by Grand Lodge. As such, secretaries of a random selection of Country, District, and Private Orange lodges were contacted by the author and invited to circulate details of this research amongst their lodge members. Furthermore, the author accumulated a number of contacts with a view to using snowball sampling techniques, whereby interview participants recruited further participants to engage with the research from amongst their acquaintances. This technique, especially helpful amongst hidden groups and examining topics with sensitive social significance, does however embody a particular bias: specifically, it is likely that recruiting participants from the same social networks as pre–existing interviewees will deliver an unrepresentative sample of a particular age, a particular social class, and/or a particular geographical proximity. Therefore, the snowballing technique was monitored carefully to ensure a sufficiently wide–ranging sample was captured.

In order to deliver an effective sample, the interviews included some participants from areas with a history of sectarian tension – specifically Portadown and north Belfast – as well as those from areas of more amicable communal relations. In addition, whilst considering the impact of isolation on the Orange institution, areas of marginalised Orangeism had to be adequately represented in addition to interviewees from areas of Orange strength. Truly representative sampling cannot be achieved in ethnographic research however, because of: the initially largely exploratory nature of the research; difficulties of negotiating access; lack of existing knowledge of the demographic and other characteristics of the group under study (although, in the case of the Orange Order, some recent research\(^\text{36}\) has helped overcome this); and the limits of finances and time in gathering and processing data using only one researcher.

\(^{36}\) McAuley et al., *Loyal to the Core?* (2011); Kaufmann, *The Orange Order* (2009)
In total, forty-three participants were interviewed during this research, the vast majority of whom were members of the Orange Order in Northern Ireland. Of the seven non-members who contributed directly to this research: four were members of Loyalist bands; former UUP MLA, Sandra Overend, and former UUP Deputy Leader, John McCallister, were both interviewed; and a member of the Parades Commission was also interviewed by the author. Turning to the Orange Order members who contributed to this research, great effort was taken to ensure an adequately representative and effective sample of members was delivered. Thirty-six members of the institution were interviewed. Only two-fifths of all interviewed members in this research were Grand, County or District Lodge officer bearers, Orange Chaplains, and/or unionist elected representatives. The majority of interviewees were grassroots members of the institution. Only 10 per cent of the interviews conducted were arranged by the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, protecting the integrity of the findings in this thesis from the possible vested interests of the Order’s leadership.

It is generally accepted that, in some rural communities, the Orange Order continues to play a role it played historically – a social opportunity to engage with members of the unionist community – whilst the experience of urban Orangeism has shifted somewhat more significantly towards band culture. Approximately a third of Orange Order members interviewed in this research were members of rural lodges, ensuring a wide enough field was achieved to engage in the differences between rural and urban institutional Orangeism and to test this assertion. The geographical spread of interviewees was monitored throughout the research to ensure an adequate representation was achieved of members from all Grand Orange County Lodges. Whilst it was necessary to ensure that the author interviewed members from areas with recent parading disputes – explicitly Portadown and north Belfast – the complete geographical spread of interviewed members can be seen below in Table 0.1. Across all interviewees, an adequate spread of ages was achieved in order to encompass opinions and narratives from more historic experiences for the institution, as well as more recent episodes in the Order’s
history. Furthermore, interviewees were recruited through different routes, as detailed above, which resulted in a sufficient spread of differing outlooks: somewhat more conservative members were interviewed, as were individuals with more liberal outlooks.

### Table 0.1 Sampling of interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County Grand Orange Lodge</th>
<th>Number of interviewees</th>
<th>% of all interviews conducted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antrim</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armagh</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Down</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fermanagh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Londonderry</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrone</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Order Members</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beyond interviews, a range of other materials were used. Documents can be an essential source of data in ethnographic research; but have to be treated with great care. An official document might contribute a great deal to a research thesis, but does not necessarily provide an objective truth. Documents have to be contextualised within the circumstances of their construction. A researcher must not take such documents at face value, but must find out how and why they were prepared and must develop an understanding as to how they should be interpreted. They can, therefore, contribute a great deal to other methods that have been employed. Documentation can tell a researcher much about the opinions, interpretations, and thoughts of an individual or groups at the time of writing. In one sense, personal documents (for example, dairies) are participant observations and interviews by proxy. Again, however, care is needed when interpreting personal material. The researcher must decipher the basis and motivation on which the documents have been compiled. To check validity,
completeness, and clarity, one could use a diary to form the basis of an interview with its writer or the writer’s contemporary. In this research project, documentation published by the Grand Lodge, including official histories such as *The Twelfth, 1795–1995: Bicentenary*,37 *Steadfast for Faith and Freedom: 200 Years of Orangeism*,38 and the official newspaper of the Grand Lodge of Ireland, the *Orange Standard*, were analysed, along with Orange policy statements and documents, in addition to assessment of contemporary and archival media coverage of the Order and analysis of interpretive academic materials.

Pennings, Kenmand and Kleinnijenhuis contend that ‘Political science is in our view an empirical science’ and tackling this question through quantitative methods should be considered thoroughly.39 One means of quantitative data collection would be questionnaires, whereby subjects respond to stimuli and, thus, are not acting naturally. Questionnaires are an effective way of collecting large amounts of data from a wide sample, something that would be more challenging for a researcher using an ethnographic method, albeit the information in a questionnaire is much more limited. It is possible to use questionnaires in conjunction with ethnographic methods. For example, where a set of clearly defined opinions or facts can be identified by other qualitative methods, a questionnaire can explore how generally they apply, if that is relevant to the research. Alternatively, a questionnaire could be used at the start of a research project, followed by ethnographic techniques to explore further findings of the questionnaire. However, using questionnaires would not be suitable for this research project, principally because finances would not allow it. McAuley, Tonge and Mycock undertook the only academic quantitative study of Orange Order members, published in 2011, involving 1,376 respondents and with a level of funding from the Economic and Social Research

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38 W. Kennedy (Ed), *Steadfast for Faith and Freedom: 200 Years of Orangeism* (Belfast: Grand Lodge of Ireland, 1995)
Council allowing such work to be successfully completed,\textsuperscript{40} in addition to various qualitative analyses.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, the quantitative analysis of the demographics of Orange Order membership and its attitudes to various key questions has already been completed. Without a similar level of resource and asking different questions anyway, this research will use a qualitative approach to make an original contribution to knowledge by developing some of the themes first highlighted in \textit{Loyal to the Core?}. Specifically, this thesis tests four hypotheses: loss of political power since the collapse of Northern Ireland Parliament in 1972; sectarianism; secularism; and the decline in social capital – in assessing what has presented the most fundamental challenge to the Orange Order in Northern Ireland.

The ethical debate over the ethnographic methodology of this project concerns the tensions between conducting research covertly and overtly, and conflict between the right of the population and the academic community to ‘know’ and the right of a subject to privacy. Interviews were recorded, with requests for anonymity respected in all cases. The principle of informed consent, whereby people agree to participate in research on the basis of knowing what it is seeks to investigate, was deployed throughout, with research interview techniques based upon what Soltis contends are the ‘non-negotiable […values of] honesty, fairness, respect for persons and beneficence’.\textsuperscript{42} Participants were provided with an overview of the research aims.

In summarising this section, the growing contemporary literature has yet to fully test why the Orange Order has found itself marginalised in post–Agreement Northern Ireland and, to assess this, this

\textsuperscript{40} McAuley et al., \textit{Loyal to the Core?} (2011)
research project had two methodological options to select from: ethnographic and quantitative research. The former, which uses behavioural routines, experiences, and natural conditions to identify emotions, the meaning of symbols, and subjective aspects associated with the naturally evolving lives of individuals and groups, has been widely thought of as less scientific than the latter. Yet, despite such condemnation from the most extreme positivist wings of social science, qualitative research is equally as scientific as quantitative research, a systematic way of identifying and understanding how social realities arise, operate, and influence individuals and groups.

Thus, this research thesis employed ethnographic research methods, utilising elite and grassroots interviews, deploying a semi-structured format in order to allow the interviewee to influence the topics of discussion but allow the interviewer to maintain relevancy throughout the conversation. A wide range of interviews were conducted with Orange Order members from rural and urban backgrounds. The thesis harnessed a substantive amount of secondary literature to supplement the ethnographic methods used and, whilst quantitative methods will not be used, findings of quantitative studies was considered as part of this project. Documentation published by the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland was used with care taken to ensure that the context and motivation of all documents was considered. A systematic content analysis of the Orange Standard over particular periods of time was also deployed.

**Ethnography**

Ethnography is a stylised research technique, encompassing a number of methodological approaches, in order to understand the social meaning of activities and communities, specifically within a distinct content or setting. It’s not merely one mythology of data collection but involves close association with and engagement within a particular setting. At its core, ethnography holds that the actions and
experiences of individuals and communities ultimately inform the outlooks and resultant actions of these individuals and communities. In order to do this, a number of techniques can all be deployed. Hammersley contends ethnography to be research that features the following: a critical analysis of the behaviour of a group of individuals in a naturally occurring setting (as opposed to behaviour within exceptional or unnatural circumstances); data is gathered through a variety of techniques, but most significantly participant observation; the collection of data is sufficiently fluid to avoid the imposition of pre–arranged categories; the analysis pertains to a single group and on a small scale; and the analysis of the data gathered critically assesses meanings of the behaviour under observation.43

The development of social anthropology in the early twentieth century became closely associated with British colonialism, to some extent in recognition of the British Empire’s need to understand the communities, cultures and customs it sought to hold dominion over following colonial conquest.44 This research involved close association, careful observation and, at times, participation within these pre–industrial cultures. Concurrently, techniques to observe and explore groups on the fringes of urban industrial societies were under development within the field of sociology in United States during the interwar period.45 Primarily focussing upon marginalised groups, such as prostitutes and drug dealers, and unfamiliar social worlds, including the Jewish Ghettos and the homeless, the close observation

43 M. Hammersley, Reading Ethnographic Research (London: Longman, 1990) Pages 1–2
and first-hand assessment that characterised this analytical style was titled ‘real research’ by Robert Park, a prolific figure in the Chicago School.\footnote{Words of Robert Park, quoted in J. D. Brewer, \textit{Ethnography} (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000) Page 13}

Whilst the Chicagoan sociologists called this methodology participant observation, the social anthropologists christened it ‘ethnography’ – despite both fields conducting their research in similar ways.\footnote{Berg, \textit{Qualitative Research Methods} (2007)} The differences between the two schools of approach have, however, become greater as the method has been transported to other fields within social science. Two general definitions have arisen: one which treats the term ethnography as synonymous with all aspects of qualitative research, otherwise referred to as ‘big ethnography’, an approach to research rather than a distinct, detailed method;\footnote{H. Wolcott, \textit{The man in the Principal's Office: an ethnography} (New York, NY: Rinehart and Winston, 1973)} and ‘little ethnography’, where ethnography is understood as a method of field research which observes participants within their particular setting. Brewer provides a succinct definition of ‘little ethnography’:

\begin{quote}
Ethnography is the study of people in naturally occurring settings or ‘fields’ by means of methods which capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving the researcher participating directly in the setting, if not also activities, in order to collect data in a systematic manner but without meaning being imposed on them externally.\footnote{Brewer, \textit{Ethnography} (2000) Page 10}
\end{quote}

Consequently, ethnography – defined in this way – requires researchers to determine what naturally occurring data is to be collected which has to be catalogued in such a way that doesn’t allow outside influences to affect the integrity of the research, the researcher’s role, and the object of the research. As a result, it would be inaccurate to reduce ethnography to one form of research technique and ‘little

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ethnography' uses several methods to assess, analyse and evaluate the meanings of values, customs and activities.

The principal critique of ethnography is premised on Giddens' proposition that mainstream social science is governed by the 'orthodox consensus', specifically that: the social sciences should address questions similar to those of natural sciences; the social sciences should seek deductive explanations in analysing human behaviour, searching for social causation throughout; and social scientists should deal with systems.\(^\text{50}\) This consensus however has lost considerable support, as Giddens himself concedes.\(^\text{51}\) Ethnography, unlike the natural sciences, requires the researcher to become close to the subjects of the research. Ethnographers are not detached observers but, depending upon the close proximity of association in the research, can become part of the study. Consequently, ethnography can be criticised by advocates of natural science models. Rigorous analysis can nonetheless deliver highly-credible, scientific results, meaning ethnographers operate as both storytellers and scientists; the practice is systematic and, resultantly, an accurate, scientific account is produced.\(^\text{52}\)

The ethnographic approach adopted within this research satisfies and fulfils Hammersley's five features,\(^\text{53}\) consequently producing a rigorous, scientific analysis of the Orange Order in Northern Ireland. Firstly, the methods, outlined within this chapter, will produce a critical analysis of the behaviour of members of the Orange Order within settings that naturally occur within Northern Ireland, specifically in their intra-group interactions, on parade and conflicting in parade disputes, and in their response to Roman Catholicism and its followers. Secondly, observation will form a significant part of the research deployed, along with other qualitative data collecting techniques that will result

\(^{50}\) A. Giddens, *Positivism and Sociology* (London: Heinemann, 1974) Pages 3–4


\(^{53}\) Hammersley, *Reading Ethnographic Research* (1990) Pages 1–2
from close interaction with the Orange institution. Thirdly, the methods that will be deployed are deliberately lacking prescribed categories for data collection in order to protect the integrity of the study. This chapter has already outlined the semi–structured format that will be used in interviews to ensure the data can be sufficiently fluid and interviewees can determine the data collected, but that format will also allow the researcher to ensure sufficient information is gathered is key areas. Fourthly, the study pertains to one group of individuals within Protestant British unionism within the six counties of Northern Ireland. Finally, the purpose of the research is to collect data through the various methods listed to critically assess meanings and values of Orange Order members’ behaviour.

Structure of the thesis

Chapter 1 provides a context to this research thesis, examining how the Orange Order operates as an institution. The chapter analyses the existing academic literature on the Orange Order in Northern Ireland in terms of its relevance to the key themes of political isolation, sectarianism, secularism, and declining social capital. Furthermore, the chapter explores the current profile of the institution’s members, assessing the role the British identity plays and the significance of parading within Orangeism.

In the second chapter, the thesis explores how the collapse of the Northern Ireland Parliament and the loss of political power from 1972 onwards affected the Order. Firstly, it assesses how the Order lobbied Members of Parliament (MPs), Ministers, and Senators before the collapse of Stormont and tests how widely the unionist political elite shared Craigavon’s 1934 conviction: ‘I have always said I

54 The term ‘Stormont’ will be used throughout this thesis in reference to the Northern Ireland Parliament, even though the Parliament did not move to Stormont Palace until 1932.
am an Orangeman first and a politician and Member of Parliament afterwards’. After having established itself as a political influence within the devolved government, the political status quo changed considerably as unionism fractured, Stormont was dissolved, and Westminster imposed direct rule on the region. From 1972 until 1998 (with the exception of the very brief interlude in the first few months of 1974), the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland carried out the tasks that, formerly, the Orange Order would have been able to influence. This chapter assesses whether the relationships that the Order had built prior to 1972 were redundant under direct rule and whether the Orange institution had any political influence or power during this period.

The GFA brought major political changes to Northern Ireland in the form of a consociational power-sharing agreement. Unionist division over the GFA led to a dramatic realignment, exemplified in the rise of the DUP from a bit player to a significant political actor. The chapter considers whether the Order has been able to wield any political power since 1998. As an estimated 35 of the 60 unionist members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) elected to the new Northern Ireland Assembly in 1998 were Orangemen, to what extent has this devolved political presence enhanced the Order’s role in shaping political events in the modern era? The chapter analyses how the severance of the historic link between the Orange Order and the UUP in 2005 further affected Orange political representation and answers the question: to what extent and why has the Orange Order become politically isolated as a result of the collapse of the Northern Ireland Parliament and has continued to be so following the return of devolved governance in 1998?

56 Ibid
In order to fully examine the extent to which the charges of sectarianism have contributed to the marginalisation of the Orange Order, two chapters are used to explore this hypothesis. Unlike this study’s other hypotheses, for which the author has dedicated only one chapter, two chapters are necessary to fully explore charges of sectarianism given religious and cultural aspects, in different manifestations and contexts. Thus, there is a need to cover attitudes, cultural expression, the nature of parading and the conflict that emerges from parading disputes. Therefore, Chapter 3 will explore contemporary attitudes towards Roman Catholicism and Chapter 4 will function as a case study of two recent parading disputes – Drumcree and Ardoyne. Chapter 3 assesses the Orange institution’s contemporary attitudes towards Roman Catholicism. Has there been any thawing towards the Roman Catholic Church and its ‘false doctrines’ and how successful is the Order in attempting to differentiate criticism of that Church from any disapproval of Roman Catholics as individuals? The chapter tests the extent to which sectarianism has impacted negatively on the Order’s public image, specifically in respect of controversies over parading. It examines what motivates members of the institution to parade, exploring the religious, political, and social roles of marches. The chapter assesses the development of band culture and explores the contribution this culture makes to the public perception of the Orange Order. It develops an appreciation of whether internal disputes and decisions – regarding sectarian issues – affected the retention of members.

Continuing to explore sectarianism, the fourth chapter functions as a case study, expanding the thesis’s assessment of parading culture by focusing on the two biggest parading disputes in recent decades, in Drumcree and Ardoyne, comparing the two experiences and their respective impacts on the Orange Order. Whilst few Orange parades are direct sources of intercommunal animosity, the bitter dispute in Drumcree that erupted in the 1990s saw a hardening of the Orange position, in the face of organised resistance from the local Catholic residents. In the case of the interface area of Ardoyne in north Belfast, sectarian violence over the return route of the Ardoyne Twelfth of July
parade was common for several years. The chapter assesses these two flashpoints, examining the impact each had on the institution and its public image. These two chapters answer the question: to what extent has the institution’s sectarianism, in attitudes, in behaviours and when conflicting over parading routes, resulted in an image problem impossible to remove?

As Christian church groups and religious organisations are seemingly in decline in the United Kingdom and Europe, Chapter 5 assesses the impact that secularism has had upon the Orange Order. In 1961, only 2 per cent of the population of Northern Ireland claimed to have no religion. That figure increased to 13.9 per cent in 2001, and to 16.9 per cent in 2011. The percentages of those belonging to each of the main Protestant churches fell in the opening decade of the twenty-first century, with the overall figure of Protestants falling from 45.6 per cent to 41.6 per cent. The Orange Order’s percentage pool in which to fish was thus diminished. Northern Ireland has always been more religious, in terms of affiliations, than her neighbours on the mainland but, as elements of secularism become visible in the region, has it contributed to the decline of the Order? In a society of falling church attendance, growing disillusionment with church leadership, and a gradually increasing number of people electing to define themselves as having ‘no religion’, this chapter assesses how a faith–based institution can hope to maintain its significance. To what degree, therefore, has

60 Presbyterian (which fell from 20.7 per cent in 2001 to 19.1 per cent in 2011); Church of Ireland (which fell from 15.3 per cent in 2001 to 13.7 per cent in 2011); Methodist Church of Ireland (which fell from 3.5 per cent in 2001 to 3 per cent in 2011); and Other Christian (which fell from 6.1 per cent in 2001 to 5.8 per cent in 2011).
61 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (2001) and (2011)
secularism within society and the move away from traditional religious institutions diminished the pool from which the Order can recruit new members?

In Chapter 6, the thesis analyses whether the decline in Orange Order membership can be attributed to the decline in social capital. The chapter explores the existing literature and the key debates pertinent to social capital theory, especially around the bridging–bonding dichotomy. Juxtaposed with the expansion of social networking, membership of political and religious organisations has fallen, as have levels of engagement in civic society. When considering social capital in the American experience, Putnam found that the amount of social contact in the USA fell by half in the final quarter of the twentieth century. If these findings can be applied to the Northern Ireland experience, to what extent does the broader decline in social capital account for the fall in Orange Order membership, built upwards upon ideals of local fraternities? The chapter assesses how the Orange Order develops social capital and the advantages it provides its members with, especially in light of the lack of political benefits to present–day membership and answers the question: to what extent has a decline in social capital in Northern Ireland contributed to the reduced circumstances in which the Orange Order finds itself?

In moving to the substantive chapters, it is worth briefly restating the core goal of this thesis. It constitutes an attempt to understand why the Orange Order, an organisation once dominant within the unionist community, has become increasingly marginalised. It has become subject to much criticism. As one example, Orange Order membership and service in the police force was once commonplace. Such joint membership has been discouraged by chief constables since the 1990s. Increasingly a peripheral organisation, one eschewed by many middle–class Protestants in particular,

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the Orange Order appears in decline, yet it will not disappear any time soon and it remains a source of considerable interest as well as controversy. This thesis aims to provide holistic explanations of Orange Order decline, enhancing understanding of the reasons for the institution’s retreat from the centre of the Northern Ireland polity towards a position where it remains a vocal but far less significant presence than was once the case. In this context, how can the Orange institution hope to remain relevant in the face of such challenge?
Chapter One
The Orange Order in Northern Ireland: 
The State of Play

Introduction

Despite the considerable fall in membership that the Orange Order has seen since the 1970s, the institution remains significant in informing the social, religious, and cultural experience of many Protestants in Northern Ireland. Orangeism’s shared social identity – developed by its collective historical narrative, its invented and perpetuated traditions, and its membership composition – is at the heart of the culture, politics, and social life of its adherents and has an influence more broadly among many within the unionist and loyalist communities. Norms, values, and beliefs are reinforced and perpetuated by association and interaction with the Orange tradition.

This chapter examines the current context within which the Orange Order operates as an institution. As such, the chapter scrutinises the current academic literature on the Orange Order, as well as broader literature pertaining to secularism in Northern Ireland and social capital theory relevant to this study. It identifies the key academic debates in the field and engages with them to assess the contribution this study can make. Finally, this chapter examines the current profile of the institution, its role, and its members. This will set up further assessment of how the Order has evolved and which of its roles have heightened controversy or damaged the institution.

Exploring the current academic literature

As a selective fraternity, the extent of the influence the Orange institution has been able to wield in shaping Northern Irish unionism and loyalism has been the subject of a growing body of historical and contemporary analysis. It is necessary at the outset to review the existing scholarly literature on the
The Orange Order in Northern Ireland

Perhaps surprisingly, there are few books exploring the Orange Order in Northern Ireland, with far greater academic focus having been placed on the region’s conflict. The Orange Order remains the largest non–church organisation in Northern Ireland and the limited extent of the literature on the institution offers further scope for academic inquiry. The absence of work on the Orange Order, with the exception of a small number of histories constructed by members,1 began to change in the 1990s as the issue over the right to parade came to the fore, most obviously in the Drumcree parade dispute.

The first serious investigations into modern Irish Orangeism were produced by Ruth Dudley–Edwards and Kevin Haddick–Flynn in 1999, but both suffer from the same weakness: they are both histories that sometimes trivialise some of the sociological complexities of modern Orangeism. Dudley–Edwards’s *The Faithful Tribe: An intimate portrait of the loyal institutions*2 does provide a substantive analysis of the loyal institutions. The author disputes the accusation that Orange parades are triumphalist and pays considerable attention (more than one–third of the book) to the dispute in Drumcree, highlighting the rise of nationalist and republican residents’ associations and their role within parade disputes at sectarian interfaces. This is a running theme throughout the book, which argues that the Orange institution has been unfairly represented and has been the target of nationalist propaganda since its inception, and the strength of nationalist public relations is juxtaposed against the inability of the Order to promote itself effectively. Dudley–Edwards imparts a considerable degree of empathy for the members of the institution, interpreting the parades and band culture as part of the outwardly visible culture of the majority of the Protestant unionist community in Northern Ireland. Her language is overtly positive, even affectionately referring to Orangemen as ‘chaps’ and ‘among the finest people I ever met.’3 Furthermore, the book considers why members join, citing – amongst others – a sense of religious tolerance as a factor, which will be tested later in this thesis. Dudley–

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1 For example, see: M. W. Dewar, J. Brown and S. E. Long, *Orangeism: A New Historical Appreciation*, 2nd Edn (Belfast: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, 1969)
3 *Ibid* Page xii
Edwards is intent on exposing the behaviour of the ‘enemies’ of Orangeism and is supportive of the communitarian sentiments associated with local lodges.

Haddick–Flynn has produced a detailed history of the Orange Order⁴ and offers an effective introduction to the current state of the institution. The author recognises that tradition is central to the character of the Order and the way in which that tradition is invented, but subsequently shows limited appreciation for the way in which tradition is crafted within a group identity and collectivist memory. When contemplating the question ‘what is Orangeism?’, Haddick–Flynn contends two contradictory assessments emerged: unionists defined Orangeism as Protestantism, patriotism, and freedom; whilst nationalists and republicans elucidated its definition as bigoted, triumphalist, and sectarian. In Aughey’s review of both Orangeism: The Making of a Tradition and The Faithful Tribe, he contends that Dudley–Edwards’s sympathies tend toward the former statement, whilst Haddick–Flynn’s argument seems to support the latter, suggesting Haddick–Flynn’s narrative contains ‘all the conceits, paraphernalia, caperings and ethos of a traditional nationalist parade through history’.⁵ Both texts – Haddick–Flynn’s narrative and Dudley–Edwards’s book – serve as an insight into modern Orangeism, but both were concluded as the socio–political impacts of an evolving post–conflict society and ‘parity of esteem’ political framework upon this social movement were only beginning to dawn.

Jess’s The Orange Order⁶ offers a history of the institution but, as a journalist’s – rather than an academic’s – account, is more descriptive in its narrative. The text commits a great deal of attention to the controversy surrounding the Drumcree parade dispute and other sectarian issues that have plagued the Order, offering a sympathetic portrayal of the institution. Based largely on interviews, the

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⁴ Haddick–Flynn, Orangeism (1999)
text offers a wide range of views on the character of modern Orangeism, although the historical experts he relies on are not always specialists within Orangeism, resulting in some errors.\textsuperscript{7}

*The Orange Order: A Tradition Betrayed*,\textsuperscript{8} by Brian Kennaway, is very different to the other literature surrounding the topic. Built around the question of whether the Order is a true reflection, at the start of the twenty-first century, of historic, traditional Orangeism, Kennaway discusses the perceived changing nature of the institution from a religious foundation to one unnecessarily and overwhelmingly embroiled in parade rows. Ultimately, he argues that the Orange Order has drifted away from its core values of faith and Biblical truths, and uses the book as a platform to criticise the internal management of the institution. Furthermore, Kennaway uses the text – he claims – to make the ordinary rank and file of Orangeism aware of what he feels is going on behind ‘closed doors’ in the Order, invariably enhanced by the fact that Kennaway himself had been involved in Orangeism for over forty years and served the Order’s governing body for twenty-five of those years. However, the familiarity that enhances the text should be treated with some degree of caution. Kennaway writes about personal experiences in his text and the personal frustrations the author has with individuals, as well as the institution and its leadership, and the personal agenda he pushes risks clouding scholarly interpretation; it is nonetheless the first authoritative inside account of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland. Kennaway argues that the conduct of some Orange Order members at Drumcree was abhorrent and un-Christian. His later acceptance of a role on the Parades Commission, regulating the routes of Orange parades, attracted further opprobrium from the Order.

\textsuperscript{7} Jess claims on Edward Sauderson was Grand Master of Ireland in the 1870s (on page 38) but was Grand Master of Scotland in the 1880s and Belfast County Grand Master between 1901 and 1903, and Jess claims the Black Institution has never been without ‘a political dimension’ (on page 72).

\textsuperscript{8} Kennaway, *A Tradition Betrayed* (2006)
Kennaway notes the changing demographic of the Order’s leadership, now drawn more principally from working-class elements rather than the landed gentry and then the business class, as was previously the case. In the first two chapters, the author places the institution within the historical context of Irish society and details the traditional role of religion and politics within Orangeism, contrasting the clear vision of the institution’s historic leaders with the modern, less-clear narrowmindedness. Principally, Kennaway argues that the Order has lost its way and that the current management fail to appreciate the traditional place of religion in the Order, claiming that sectionalism and sectarian interests stand in direct opposition to genuine Orangeism. The Order’s changing religious role has resulted – Kennaway argues – in the decline in membership and, furthermore, has weakened the Order’s socio-political influence.

Despite common assumptions to the contrary, Kennaway insists parading is not central to the Order but it has been fostered as such and has resulted in the departure of many members, as well as alienation from many elements of society, including many within the Protestant community. He contends that the widespread use of ‘blood and thunder’ bands has deleterious consequences for the Order’s respectability. The author condemns the institution for failing to take into account the demographic changes along traditional parading routes and argues that the establishment of the Parades Commission is the direct result of the Order’s inability to reach accommodation on parade disputes. In arguing that the Orange institution have moved away from its founding values, Kennaway might himself be criticised for offering a mythical vision of a golden age of Christian, charitable, non-sectarian Orangeism, whereas the Order has always been vulnerable to charges of sectarianism, anti-Catholicism, and parading militancy.
The Parading Tradition and its controversies

Extending the understanding of parades and their significance in Irish politics, Dominic Bryan’s 2000 work, *Orange Parades: The Politics and Ritual of Control* and Bryan’s PhD thesis, explore the way in which parades function as a ritual, commemorating and symbolising Orangeism in a dynamic way, and argues that the annual Twelfth of July commemorations should be interpreted as a political ritual rather than the accepted narrative of ‘tradition’. This informative work highlights the historic use of ‘respectable’ Orangeism by the middle–classes as a means of retaining and bolstering political power, parades being a useful – if unwieldy – resource for maintaining control. Bryan assesses the role of the Orange institution in modern Northern Irish politics, the structure of the Order, and the ideological purpose, and the author contends the history of Orangeism is marked by the elite’s use of parades and commemorative events to maintain Protestant unionist unity.

Bryan analyses the Drumcree parading dispute, which erupted in 1995, in a number of book chapters, and in work with Neil Jarman, exploring the sectarian interface that exists in Portadown and the long history of inter–communal confrontations that has occurred in the area. His work assesses how the claims of a right to parade are indicative of a relationship with the state and state bodies; how that acclaimed right tends to unite Protestant unionism; and how parades are used to

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legitimise the present by invoking collective narratives of the past. Furthermore, in his 1998 chapter, Bryan turns his attention to the presentation of the institution and its parading habits, opposing change because of the longevity of the event, supported by use of terms such as ‘tradition’ and ‘heritage’.

Despite its age, Desmond Bell’s 1990 study of loyalist youth culture and sectarianism still offers important insights into the way in which loyalist marching bands perpetuate an ethnic identity. It analyses the ritualistic function band culture plays in the formation of the Protestant loyalist identity. Bell contends that the erosion of unskilled employment opportunities resulted in an identity crisis amongst working–class teenage males. ‘Blood and Thunder’ bands, thereby, provided this cohort of marginalised, disaffected youths with an increasingly aggressive assertion of masculinity, as well as being a form of resistance to the alleged deterioration of the Protestant unionist culture. This outwardly evident bravado of the bands, commonly playing more enthusiastically at interface areas, and sectarian abuse is described by Bell as being as much a means of communal solidarity as intercommunal hostility. However, Bell limits his considerations to loyalist youth sub–culture, interpreting bands to be a localised expression of such, whilst Jarman sees them as something more fully embedded within the wider unionist culture. Both authors indicate the importance of bands but Jarman stresses that for the most part they operate outside of the control of the Loyal Orders. Jarman contends that the present lack of formal connection between the bands and the Orange Order results from a variety of factors: working–class disenchantment with the institution, especially amongst young Protestants; the belief that the Order was unable to appropriately defend Ulster with many turning to loyalist paramilitaries; and the fact that the Orange Order had become generally irrelevant.

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14 D. Bell, Acts of Union: Youth culture and sectarianism in Northern Ireland (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990)
to the interests of Protestant working-class youth. Jarman concludes that the rise of the marching bands has signalled the decline in prominence of the Orange Order within the Protestant community. These assertions will be tested.

The parading dispute in Drumcree is the subject of some scholarly work, part of which have been reviewed above. *The Orange Citadel: A History of Orangeism in Portadown District* provides an insightful history of Orangeism in the town. The work offers some discussion around the dispute in 1995 but is primarily a historical guide from the perspective of the Portadown Cultural Heritage Committee and is limited in its contribution to this thesis. The rector of Drumcree Parish Church, the Reverend John Pickering, compiled his reflections on the dispute, in which he argues the parade controversy represents a flashpoint for the Orange identity; for local Protestants to feel that identity is secured, the Drumcree parade has to be allowed to process. For critics, this finding is fairly predictable given Pickering’s close ties to the institution and the author’s narrative is heavily influenced by his partisan experience. However, it is a first-hand account of Drumcree written from a local perspective. Ryder and Kearney’s *Drumcree: The Order’s Last Stand* traces the origin of the dispute in Portadown and explores the political significance of contentious parades. The book argues that the dispute had a debilitating effect on the Orange institution, more significant than the Order itself realised. The nature of that impact will be tested.

The more recent Orange parade dispute in the Ardoyne area of north Belfast, with a resolution only having been struck in September 2016, has not yet been accompanied by a similar body of literature. However, a small number of works have assessed the level of intercommunal tension that exists within

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18 C. Ryder and V. Kearney, *Drumcree: The Order’s Last Stand* (London: Methuen, 2001)
the area. Shirlow and Murtagh’s 2006 work argues that the antagonism between the unionist and nationalist communities has endured, despite the 1994 paramilitary ceasefires, some evidence even suggesting the divisions have increased. Drawing upon a significant wealth of interviews and two earlier surveys, the authors contend that the nature of violence evolved post-ceasefires; shifting away from state and paramilitary assaults towards interface rioting and sectarian attacks on the symbols of tradition such as Orange halls, Gaelic Athletics Association (GAA) clubs, and church premises. These findings are consistent with Shirlow’s earlier work in which he argues residential segregation, a feature of the Ardoyne area, is a significant contributor to the reproduction of sectarianism, whilst the GFA itself stimulates sectarian competition by institutionalising difference and maintaining intercommunal resource competition. Similarly, the area’s demography and the context of intercommunal antagonism is explored in Cadwallader’s analysis of the 2001 Holy Cross dispute, a precursor to the parade dispute which broke out in 2013. The book brings together the experiences of local Ardoyne residents – specifically parents and students of Holy Cross Girls Primary School, and protestors, but also local politicians and police – to compile a competent narrative of the dispute, and explores the history of violence and disorder in north Belfast to understand the framework within which the protest spawned. That same context is relevant to understanding the most recent episode of disorder in the area: the Orange parade dispute.

The literature on the Orange Order and Politics

Eric Kaufmann’s The Orange Order: A Contemporary Northern Irish History draws upon important documentation from the Order’s archives. Grounded in political science, Kaufmann also utilises data regarding Protestant identity to interpret the institution in various locations throughout Northern

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22 Kaufmann, The Orange Order (2007)
Ireland. He argues that traditionalism cannot always be ‘trumped’ by modern liberalism, particularly when it takes the form of sectarianism and ethno-nationalism as so much does in the conflict in Northern Ireland.23 Kaufmann contends that the Order has undergone a fundamental shift in culture from deference to defiance. As Ulster Unionism has been politically undermined, the Order has moved towards militancy and rebellion in its assertion of the communal identity of Ulster Protestants. This argument is supported by social and geographic analysis that shows that the Order has become strongest in areas where Protestants are in the minority and in greatest need of a network of support. The text benefits the unprecedented access to the Orange Order archive, as well as to UUC Papers, and from Kaufmann’s statistical studies in relation to class and voting behaviour. Kaufmann argues a form of rebel unionism has existed within the Order for decades and concludes that uncompromising Ulster Protestantism is in the ascendancy within the institution, consistent with the findings of Kennaway. This resulted in a draining of support for the UUP after the Good Friday Agreement and the success of the DUP, despite the strained relationship between the Reverend Ian Paisley and the Order.

Kaufmann’s work with Henry Patterson24 illustrates the variable geometry of the old UUP–Orange relationship. Unionism and Orangism in Northern Ireland since 1945: The decline of the loyal family tracks the retreat of both unionism and Orangeism, using the archives of the UUC and the Orange Order. This journey climaxed in a split between the Orange Order and the UUP in 2005, ending a century of formal ties and political association. Patterson and Kaufmann chart the inadequacies of unionist and Orange responses to challenges posed to its political supremacy in the province by both the civil rights movement in the 1960s and the campaign of violence carried out by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). Leading the reader through this uneasy period in unionist history, the

24 Patterson and Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangism (2007)
book then provides an insightful analysis of intra–unionist political competition, moving from a one–party state to the uncertainty of a power–sharing administration with nationalists. The authors’ findings challenge the previously held conceptions that the Orange–unionist movement was homogeneous. Instead they contend: firstly, that division plagued Orangeism between urban, leftist, working–class members and more rural, conservative, middle–class and aristocratic Orangemen; and, secondly, a querulous relationship existed between the institution and the party.

As in the above literature, Graham Walker’s book on the UUP25 draws attention to the strain to which the UUP–Orange Order link was often exposed. Exploring the party’s association with the institution, Walker contends that the number of seats on the UUC set aside for Orange Order members signalled a willingness on the part of the party to accommodate religious sectarianism and militant ethnic politics, yet not all within the UUP leadership thought Orange interests should dictate the nature of governance. Walker also attempts to explore the multi–faceted nature of the Ulster Unionist identity, arguing that the identity remains ambiguous; on the one hand loyal to their British identity, yet intrinsically loyal to the form of regional identity developed of and within themselves, separated from the British mainland. As a result, a distinct form of Ulster nationalism was constructed as a subset of the British political and social infrastructure. The relationship between the two wings of unionism is also explored in Harbinson’s *The Ulster Unionist Party, 1882–1973,*26 although this draws less attention to internal tensions and more on structures and leaders. The notion of unionist unity and the omnipotence of Orangeism is also challenged in Aaron Edwards’ history of the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP).27 This explores Protestant working–class political fragmentation, which challenged UUP hegemony from the 1920s to the 1960s. There are also texts dedicated to the study

26 Harbinson, *The Ulster Unionist Party* (1973)
of the loyalist working–class which touch upon Orange and parading sub–cultures but are not central to those books.28

Whilst all meritorious, none of the above texts are dedicated to a dissection of how and why the Orange Order has retreated in recent decades, although Kaufmann’s analysis, in particular, comes closest to a holistic academic assessment. Moreover, there are gaps. Although Patterson and Kaufmann, and Walker all offer outstanding examinations of the Orange Order and the UUP as entities, their works are already more than a decade old and much has happened since – not least a startling DUP–Sinn Féin power–sharing agreement in 2006, its subsequent collapse a decade later, and a three–year parading dispute in North Belfast. Moreover, none of the above works use interviews with UUP MLAs for their judgements on the severance of the relationship with the Order. This thesis will examine these recent developments and utilise a series of qualitative interviews with members of the Orange Order and the UUP to fully test how political isolation, sectarianism, secularism, and declining social capital have affected the Order post–devolution.

The more recent collection of publications produced by McAuley, Tonge, Mycock, Evans and Jeffrey29 are all of obvious particular relevance to this research. Having completed the first quantitative study of Orange Order members, the authors’ data on the institution’s membership base illuminates contemporary sentiment amongst members and enhances understanding of the Order’s interpretation of the changing social, political, and religious contexts in Northern Ireland. In their

series of texts, McAuley et al. find that central to the Orange identity is the fusion of Protestantism and Britishness, a characteristic – the authors argue – that significantly differentiates it from other expressions of Britishness in mainland Britain. Members’ identity is a tangled labyrinth, combining Ulster, Ulster-Scots, Irish, and Northern Irish identities, all of which are nonetheless shrouded in Britishness. Whilst the Orange membership is largely working-class in its current form, the survey reveals a faction of young and often highly educated members cognisant of the Order’s difficulties in terms of image.

Whilst a majority of members are found to have cited religious reasons for joining the institution, McAuley et al. contend that the institution is principally sustained through families. This trend accounts for the endeavouring strength of the Order but does make it vulnerable to social change, meaning its social conservatism is bolstered rather than challenged. In *Loyal to the Core?*, the authors track the decline of middle-class membership, attributing political estrangement to the Troubles and numerical decline to the challenges of social and geographical mobility, inevitably limiting the base from which the Order recruits. In addition, the book highlights the indifference some members have to external criticism; it assesses Orange discourse around its central principles – the Protestant faith, loyalty to the British crown, and fealty to the state – and find that members’ difficulty to relate to outside critics leads to frustration. Furthermore, within new political framework of Northern Ireland, the authors seek to explore the role the Orange Order now seeks to adopt (having abandoned its formal links with the UUP in 2005) as an honest broker within unionist politics. This series of texts, as well as the authors’ landmark membership survey, will aid the examination undertaken within this thesis.

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30 McAuley et al., *Loyal to the Core?* (2011)
The 2014 publication charting the transformation of the Democratic Unionist Party by Tonge, Braniff, Hennessey, McAuley and Whiting\(^{31}\) offers the first assessment of the views of DUP members. Unlike other texts, the book goes beyond purely focussing on the life, personality, and work of the party’s late charismatic former leader, the Reverend Ian Paisley, drawing on more than one hundred interviews and focus groups with DUP members, including grassroots members and elite–level elected representatives. The research finds that most members are positively predisposed towards the Orange Order, if not already members,\(^{32}\) and illuminates the socially conservative views to which DUP members subscribe. Whilst the views of DUP members are not synonymous with members of the Order, the text does serve to illuminate views and conceptions held by parts of the unionist community and the context within which the Orange Order operates. Most strikingly, the book shows that it elected representatives within the DUP – MPs, MLAs and councillors (in that order) – who are most likely to be members of the Orange institution (more so than ordinary members). This suggests that the Orange Order might still have an indirect political outlet, a possibility considered in this thesis.

One final aspect of the literature needs to be acknowledged in any consideration of the decline of the Orange Order: the broader UK and international context. Whilst the Order has always been strongest in Northern Ireland, it is worth noting that it also held other pockets of strength, notably in Liverpool, parts of Canada, and the west of Scotland. In Liverpool and, most especially, Canada, decline has been on a scale far exceeding that in Northern Ireland. An analysis of causal factors in those locations is beyond the scope of this thesis. Keith Roberts’ analysis of decline on Merseyside,\(^{33}\) indicates that the downfall of sectarianism coincided with the emergence of a collective identity, not based on ethno–religious factors, but on commonality, a process abetted by the rise of secularism and the demise of

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\(^{32}\) The book finds 34.6 per cent of ordinary members are members of the Orange institution, although that level increases when considering all categories of elected representatives, in Tonge et al., *The Democratic Unionist Party* (2014)

sectarianism. McAuley and Nesbitt–Larking indicate how the Orange Order operates in vastly reduced circumstances in Canada, struggling to survive and reliant upon the dedication of a dwindling – but loyal – group of adherents.\textsuperscript{34}

Secularism

When considering the role of religion in the formation of identities in Northern Ireland, Claire Mitchell contends that is an essential ingredient in the construction of ethno–national identities.\textsuperscript{35} The author positions herself against a host of scholars who have tended to minimise the role of religion in the formation of contemporary Northern Irish identity or politics.\textsuperscript{36} Mitchell re–evaluates the category of religion, including what the author describes as ‘religious ideology’ – as well theology, belief, and symbolic ritual – which takes into account concepts of oneself and others, all informed loosely by religious doctrine. Consequently, Mitchell argues that religion continues to inform the identity of those socialised within a religious context, not just those who profess to a faith and practice their faith with any degree of regularity.

Mitchell explores the way in which religion reinforces community membership, marks out and maintains identity boundaries, and sustains and reproduces division. She argues not only that religion continues to be of relevance to the experience in Northern Ireland but it informs the identity and boundaries of non–church goers in their formation of ‘the other’. Resultantly, she contends, identities form around a variety of rationales. The way in which religion informs the creation of identity in Northern Ireland, explicitly Orange identity within unionism, is also explored by McAuley et al.,\textsuperscript{37} as is

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item For example, see: J. McGarry and B. O’Leary, \textit{Explaining Northern Ireland} (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995)
\item McAuley et al., \textit{Loyal to the Core?} (2011)
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
members’ view of faith and the nature of faith in a supposedly increasingly secular society. They find that Orange Order members observe a higher level of religious practice (specifically attending church) than is commonly found amongst non-members, a finding inconsistent with the reading of Kennaway who dedicates much attention to the way in which he interprets the Orange institution and membership to be evolving away from its Protestant foundation. These arguments will be assessed: how central is the Order’s religious mission, how much does it shape Orange identity, and how far is the decline of religion adversely affecting the institution? Is secularism impacting society in Northern Ireland and what is its effect on the Orange Order?

Roberts’ 1971 article on the Orange Order,38 which pre-dates the significant socio-political shifts that the Orange Order has withstood, explores the question of whether the Orange Order is a religious institution and what might be meant by ‘religious’ within the context of the institution. Roberts examines the Order’s Laws and Ordinances, along with symbols, regalia, and the lyrics of songs, to argue that Orangeism embodies an ideological belief structure consistent with a religion. Building upon Roberts’ analysis, Stewart’s 2015 analysis39 of religion within the Orange Order considers three factors: commitment(s); integrating foci; and intensive concerns with extensive effects. The author argues that the Orange Order should not be considered a form of implicit religion, nor a religious movement, but rather one that continues to intertwine Protestantism with a convoluted sense of Britishness, one so focused on this preservation that it impacts upon most of the Order’s actions. The utility of applying implicit religion to the Orange Order will be tested.

Social Capital

The utility of social capital theory in analysing Orangeism will be explored fully in Chapter 6. Whilst the concept of social capital is relatively new to social science (finding its origins in the works of Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam), the theory that greater associational life impacts positively on democracy and civic life is well established in scholarly literature. Bourdieu\(^{40}\) identifies the value of associational capital and Coleman’s 1988 article\(^{41}\) and 1990 book\(^{42}\) offers a useful theoretical framework. Coleman contends social capital can exist in one of three forms: obligations and expectations dependent on trustworthiness; as a means of information sharing; and the presence of collectively-accepted norms. These relationships are useful in building an understanding of the way in which social capital develops.

Putnam’s text *Bowling Alone*\(^{43}\) builds on the author’s earlier work with Leonardi and Nanetti,\(^{44}\) in which the authors explore the way in which civic organisations contribute to the strength of democracy in northern Italy,\(^{45}\) to offer an examination of the health of American social capital. The book provided an empirical investigation into American social fabric, grounded in history (an uncommon characteristic of many texts in behavioural science). A major contribution to the study of social networks and social cohesion, Putnam focuses on the apparent decline in the number and size of associational groups. His analysis of ‘bonding’ social capital (produced in dense networks that reinforce reciprocity, trust and exclusivity) and ‘bridging’ social capital (developed amongst inclusive


networks, connecting people across dissimilar groups), a response to criticism of the negative elements of association.

The explicit application of social capital theories to Northern Ireland has been surprisingly slight. However, Laura Graham’s 2016 monograph\(^{46}\) analyses the social capital function of victim support groups in Northern Ireland, arguing that the levels of bridging and bonding social capital within victim support networks are directly impacted by the types of leadership and levels of trust found within such groups. Furthermore, Leonard’s analysis of social networks in Belfast\(^{47}\) offers significant clarity to the way in which social capital develops in post–conflict Northern Ireland. Perhaps optimistically, the author contends that the diminution of the broader political conflict in the province has paved the way for the development of bonding social capital, whilst the GFA and peace process has provided the framework within which bridging social capital can further develop.

Social capital theories provide a potential starting point for examining the Orange Order. Bonding social capital may provide a framework for understanding the senses of comradeship and fraternity within lodges and explain fidelity to the institution. However, bridging social capital may be impossible for the Orange Order to develop, contributing to its confinement and growth incapacity. The capacity of the Order to develop both bonding and bridging capital will be assessed via exploration of its community functions and the extent of its inclusivity and exclusivity. Its potential bonding aspects are evident: unity among Protestants of different denominations and political parties. The Order’s rules mitigate against bridging aspects of social capital but to what extent is some intercommunal outreach possible?


The Orange Order’s profile

In developing a theoretical and empirical analysis of the reasons behind Orange Order decline, it is necessary to appreciate the current profile of the institution. This section necessarily relies upon the recent – and first – examination of the Orange Order membership undertaken by McAuley et al. who examined the membership’s demographics and their attitudes in terms of belonging – why join or remain? – and believing, their favoured forms of Protestantism and politics. It also utilises a range of membership interviews conducted by the author to understand why individuals joined.

Some 90 per cent of the Order’s members claim to be practicing Protestants and the institution is best described as interdenominational: just under half of members are Presbyterian (49.6 per cent), Church of Ireland worshipers comprise one-third of the Order’s membership (34.4 per cent), whilst Methodists make up 6.5 per cent and Free Presbyterians make up 4 per cent. The remaining minority of members belong to an array of other free Protestant movements. Whilst Free Presbyterianism has not historically maintained close relations with the Orange Order. When exploring why members join the Orange Order, McAuley et al. found nearly half (49.4 per cent) of Order respondents cited family tradition as their primary reason for joining the institution. Whilst the custom of sons following their fathers into the institution is well established – a practice eulogised in the Williamite ballad The Sash – such a finding doesn’t reflect the significance of faith in members’ decision to join. Eighteen percent of members claimed religion was their principal reason for joining, but all members interviewed as part of this research agreed that their membership of the Order was, to at least some extent, an expression of their personal Christian faith. One member explained:

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48 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Page 58
Oh certainly, membership of the Orange Order is certainly an expression of my personal faith [...] Yes, many members do follow their fathers, grandfathers, uncles, brothers and so on into the institution. There’s unquestionably a family element to this, some join for the parades and the social benefits, but I don’t know any member who wouldn’t consider their Christian beliefs to be a significant part of their reason for being here.\(^{50}\)

Not all members would share that absolute clarity but still acknowledge the contribution made by personal faith. Strangford DUP MLA and Orange Order member, Peter Weir elucidated:

I think there’s an element of [membership being an expression of personal faith], I think it’s multifaceted. I’m somebody who’s always been interested in history, from a young age, I suppose I would have strong resonance with the historical background of the Orange Order [...] Maybe I am different from most people in that regard because of that.\(^{51}\)

Furthermore, 34 per cent claim never to shop on a Sunday, and 45 per cent of respondents asserted that the main role of the Order was religious.\(^{52}\) Whilst slightly more respondents claimed the institution’s primary function was cultural, in Northern Ireland the two communities are so tightly entwined with Protestantism and Catholicism respectively that an institution promoting the Protestant unionist culture is perhaps also latently promoting the Protestantism. Whilst many members say they joined the institution primarily because of a family tradition this does not necessarily diminish the importance of religion for members.\(^{53}\)

\(^{50}\) David Brown, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Newtownards, 3 June 2015

\(^{51}\) Peter Weir MLA, DUP MLA for Strangford and member of the Orange Order, interviewed by author in Belfast, 17 June 2014

\(^{52}\) Data supplied by McAuley, Tonge and Mycock, Membership Survey (2011) Unpublished raw data

\(^{53}\) See: Chapter 5 for further exploration of members’ faith commitment
Former Ulster Unionist MLA, Danny Kennedy agreed that ‘faith is a factor, perhaps a strong factor’ in his personal impetus for Order membership, but adds the institution is ‘also cultural and historic and if I’m entirely honest, at the time I entered politics, it wasn’t unhelpful to me.’ Only a very small minority (1.9 per cent) consider the primary role of the Order to be political, and interviews with members chime with that finding. One member commented, ‘religion is far more important to the Lodge than politics. And that’s exactly how it should be’, and a lodge chaplain contends, ‘The Order doesn’t exist to get involved in politics, not at all; we’re a religious society first a foremost.’ Members tend to be highly politicised, however. A majority of members (84.4 per cent) admit to being interested in politics and 66 per cent claim to support a political party. The two – politics and religion – are not separate concepts in the minds of Orangemen.

The McAuley et al. study found working–class membership considerably outweighing that drawn from the middle–class (by three–to–one) in terms of self–identification although many members are drawn from skilled and semi–skilled professions; a slight majority of members (53.4 per cent) are employed in manual labour positions. The average income of members is modest, at between £15,000 and £25,000 and less than one–sixth of the membership possesses a degree–level qualification or higher. 30 per cent (double the number of university graduates) profess to having no formal educational qualifications. Perhaps surprisingly, the average age of a member is in the 45–54, range and in total nearly two–thirds of the institution’s members are aged under 55.

54 Danny Kennedy, former UUP MLA for Newry and Armagh and member of the Orange Order, interviewed by author, 16 September 2016
55 Member of the Orange Order from a rural setting, interview with author, 8 January 2017
56 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 12 August 2015
57 Data supplied by McAuley, Tonge and Mycock, Membership Survey (2011) Unpublished raw data
58 Income rates are generally 20 percent lower in Northern Ireland when compared with elsewhere in the UK.
59 Data supplied by McAuley, Tonge and Mycock, Membership Survey (2011) Unpublished raw data
The Order remains an entirely male fraternity. Operating parallel to the Order, the members of the
Association of Loyal Orange Women of Ireland cannot wear Orange collarettes, instead only allowed
to wear an orange ribbon sash. Whilst men have the opportunity of progress to from Orange to the
Purple and then to Black ranks (albeit, only by invitation), no opportunity for progress exists for
women and they are only permitted to parade if invited to do so by a male lodge. The role of women
in Orangeism is – broadly speaking – reduced to ‘making the tea’ and organising charitable works.
As a result, Stewart contends that the Orange Order ‘is therefore perpetuating [...] the dominant
paradigms that exist within Northern Ireland, especially those based on gender and patriarchal
norms.’

Orangeism and the British Identity

The Union, and Northern Ireland’s place within the United Kingdom, is paramount for Northern
unionism and the Orange Order stresses the salience of that relationship. Amid the protests over the
removal of the Union flag from Belfast city hall (other than on designated days) following a decision
supported by Sinn Féin, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and Alliance in 2013, the Grand
Master Edward Stevenson said:

Republicans are engaging in a cultural war to erode all symbols of Britishness [...] The
shameful decision to strip down the union flag from Belfast City Hall, following on from the
outrageous naming of a children’s play park in Newry after an IRA terrorist, are just
some examples of the so-called ‘shared future’ envisaged by Sinn Féin [...] I believe the

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60 The Orange Order only formally recognises two degrees of membership: Orange and Purple. Progression to the
Royal Arch Purple degree is awarded by the Grand Royal Arch Purple Chapter of Ireland, a separate
institution to the Order, but the Royal Arch Purple degree is seen as a natural progression within Orangeism and
is a prerequisite of entry to the Royal Black Institution. Similarly, the Royal Black Institution – commonly
referred to as the ‘most senior’ of the loyal order – is also a separate body to the Orange Order, but
membership is interpreted as progression. Members of the Royal Black Institution must have first been a
member of an Orange Lodge and many continue to be a part of both.

61 See: Chapter 6

flag protesters did this generation a great service by waking us from our slumber—apathy, pessimism and defeatism were walking us into a united Ireland.\textsuperscript{63}

The Order’s resistance to the alleged erosion of Britishness elsewhere in the UK is epitomised in the response to the Scottish independence referendum in 2014. The referendum was the most heavily covered political story in the Order’s monthly publication, the \textit{Orange Standard}, in 2014 (with thirteen articles dedicated to it) and 96 per cent of respondents to an \textit{Orange Standard} poll expressed desire for Scotland to remain in the UK. One member commented, ‘It’s shameful what’s going on in Scotland with the independence [referendum]. Our British identity – not just us here, but on the mainland too – our British identity is under threat from some many enemies.’\textsuperscript{64}

The Orange Order plays a significant role in reinforcing a particularistic British identity amongst members of the Protestant unionist community in Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{65} It provides for unionists an institutional focus for the expression of British Protestant unionism and links present day members to their historic forebears in the defence of the Union in the province. As a result, it has been significant in the shaping of collective narrative and discourse within unionism, linking the historical experience with contemporary socio–political circumstances. Furthermore, it engenders a particular perspective of history in which the relationship with mainland Britain is natural and organic, born of a common bond within the British Protestant crown.\textsuperscript{66} The Williamite battles including the Siege of Derry in 1688 and the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 (annually commemorated during the Twelfth of July celebrations), as well as the more recent experience of the contribution of Ulstermen in the First and Second World

\textsuperscript{64} Member of the Orange Order, interview with author, 11 September 2014
\textsuperscript{66} McAuley et al., \textit{Loyal to the Core?} (2011)
Wars, highlight the familial nature of the region’s relationship with the rest of Great Britain, legitimising the place of Northern Ireland in the Union.

This reinforcement of British identity by the Orange institution has been set against significant constitutional and political re–ordering. Furthermore, the programme of devolution rolled out by the British government saw the substantive transfer of political power to the Scottish Parliament, and – less substantive but still significant powers – to the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies. Built into the GFA in 1998 was specific provision for formal engagement with the Irish Republic in the form of the North/South Ministerial Council, co–ordinating all–island economic activity. The GFA also acknowledged the right of citizens from the province to identify as British, Irish, or both and hold both citizenships simultaneously.

Distinctions between ethnic and civic forms of nationalism have long been evident, despite features of both normally being present in its manifestation.\textsuperscript{67} Ethnic nationalism occurs as a result of shared ancestry, religion, culture, and ethnicity, often associated with a geographical motherland. Civic nationalism, on the other hand, is born of a legal framework, encompassing political practices and shared institutions. The construction of imagined communities is perpetuated by emphasising the importance of unifying symbols and rituals, supported through language, cultural discourse, and collective memories.\textsuperscript{68} Nationality and citizenship can therefore become confused despite being distinct. For the Orange Order, an institution that draws upon a shared historical narrative as well as shared religious and ancestral characteristics, nationhood and citizenship are less easy to disaggregate.


\textsuperscript{68} B. Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities} (London: Verso, 1983)
The multi–faceted political framework that exists within the unitary state of the UK encompasses a set of sub–national identities, engendering a fusion of social and political dynamics originating from each contributing nation state in order to achieve a holistic British national identity. In the midst of empire, an imperial, political consciousness developed which encouraged plurality of national identity provided they did not challenge the British transnationalism; that nationalism centred around the monarchy, Protestantism, and – more recently – the experience of war, drawing upon state institutions, cultural symbols, and ‘invented traditions’. The consequential political, social, and cultural interchange was to produce civic and ethnic identities that operated parallel to sub–national, multi–national, and transnational contexts, resulting in citizenship and British national identity being more pluralistic than was once the case.

The formation of the Orange Order – emerging as part of a sub–national identity, responding to the rise of Irish nationalism in the late eighteenth century – draws upon a longer–standing characteristic of Britishness, a commitment to the tenets of the Protestant faith, but one that is intrinsically tied to loyalty to the British crown as an essential component of British identity. Whilst the representation of the interests of the ethnically Protestant community was the Order’s founding doctrine, McAuley et al. contend other cultural markers were also significant in defining the culture and identity of the community. They contend these included the rituals and practices which stressed the significance of a collective, shared historical narrative, simultaneously British and yet also distinct in its presentation of Ireland’s, later Northern Ireland’s, place within the Union. British Protestantism is synonymous with loyalty, whilst Irish Catholicism is synonymous with disloyalty.

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72 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Pages 12–13
**Orangeism’s parading tradition**

As will be examined in detail in Chapter 3, parading (or walking as it is often referred to) is a central component to the culture of Northern Irish Protestants, and the way in which the Orange Order embodies this cultural custom is very much a public affair. Parading is the principal means by which Orangemen express their identity. The institution regards it as ‘a distinct part of [their] cultural, social and political heritage’, and members similarly regard parading as paramount to their experience as Orangemen, one commenting: ‘Parading is our culture, it’s what we do. We have a right to walk the Queen’s highway and it’s our solemn duty, as loyal subjects, to use that right to express our loyalty to the British Queen.’

Whilst members of the institution agree parading is a vital part of their mantra, clarifying it and what it stands for can sometimes bring about quite different explanations. One well-placed commentator summates:

> There’s sometimes a mixed message about what the Orange Order stands for: Is it to commemorate the Battle of the Boyne? Is it a religious organisation? Are they parading to protect their civil and religious liberties? What’s the connection between parading and those liberties? There is often confusion but parading is definitely vital to them.

The Order itself describes Orange parades as ‘commemorative [...] ranging from] solemn remembrance of the Fallen at the Somme to the cultural extravaganza that is the [Twelfth of] July commemoration of the Glorious Revolution.’ One Orange lodge chaplain shares this reading of parading, explaining, ‘for Orangemen, when they parade, they’re walking in the footsteps of their ancestors – fathers,

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73 Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, ‘The case against the Parades Commission’ [http://www.grandorangelodge.co.uk/The-case-against-the-parades-commission#WcEiP4xSyUK](http://www.grandorangelodge.co.uk/The-case-against-the-parades-commission#WcEiP4xSyUK) accessed 21 January 2014

74 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 7 September 2016

75 Member of the Parades Commission, interview with author, 24 August 2016

grandfathers and so forth – they’re connected to them, they’re following on commemorating the sacrifices many of them made for king and country.\textsuperscript{77}

The number of Protestant, unionist, and loyalist parades have plateaued somewhat in recent years, after a gradual annual increase, standing at 2,598\textsuperscript{78} between April 2016 and March 2017.\textsuperscript{79} Of these parades, differing forms exist and nine categories have been identified: the principal commemorative parades; local parades; feeder parades; Sunday church parades; arch, banner and hall parades; social parades; occasional parades; competitive band parades; and commemorative band parades.\textsuperscript{80} These parades reach their apex in July, at the annual commemoration of the victory of Protestant King William III over Catholic James in the late seventeenth century. On the twelfth of July,\textsuperscript{81} the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne, the principal activities consist of a large morning parade to ‘the field’ where speeches are given and the annual resolutions are voted upon, followed by a return parade with lodges marching back to their halls. One member from Belfast explained, ‘you start to hear flute music by 7 or 8 in the morning’,\textsuperscript{82} despite eleventh night festivities usually having gone on until late the evening before. The twelfth of July being a public holiday in Northern Ireland, the event attracts observers of all ages and often children can be seen playing with toy batons attempting to imitate the bandsmen throwing and twirling maces, considered a great skill within loyalist banding culture.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{77} Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 12 August 2015
\textsuperscript{78} That figure represents a 253 decrease on the number of parades from 2015–2016 principally as a result of the agreement between Ligoniel Orange Lodges and the Crumlin and Ardoyne Residents Association in September 2016, ending the nightly parades by the Ligoniel Lodges and the date on which Easter fell in 2017.
\textsuperscript{80} Jarman and Bryan, *Parade and Protest* (1996)
\textsuperscript{81} The celebrations occur on the Monday 13th July when the 12th falls on a Sunday.
\textsuperscript{82} Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 25 September 2014
\textsuperscript{83} James McKane, Bandsman, interview with author, 26 June 2014
Before the Twelfth, there is a great deal of expectation. One bandsman explained, ‘As [the Twelfth] gets closer, people get more excited; kind of like Christmas approaching’, and when the day arrives, those expectations are realised:

On the day, when you’re standing there in your uniform, your drum on, the hairs on the back of your neck begin the stand up; butterflies are going in your stomach; you feel yourself take deeper breaths and you’re sort of in a kind of daze, you’re not yourself right then and there. There’s just no feeling quite like it [...] The Twelfth is like nothing else.

Most Orangemen form up on the Twelfth in suits but only a minority wear the traditional attire, complete with white gloves and iconic bowler hat. All however do wear their collarettes, featuring their lodge number and the initials of any positions held or formerly held. Whilst no formal regulations determine the order of the parade, usually the bands marches ahead of the banner or flags – sometimes colour parties carrying symbolic swords – followed by the members of the lodge. Commonly, the bands themselves develop significant followings who accompany the band all day, walking with them alongside the parade route. Marshals support the parade and Bryan contends the somewhat militant behaviour of some marshals reflects a strong sense in which members of the parade take a personal responsibility for the integrity of the event, at least for the earlier part of the day.

To take the most recent example, in 2017, tens of thousands of Orangemen and supporters took part in the eighteen demonstrations across the six counties, claimed as ‘the biggest [Twelfth of July] in a generation’ by the Grand Master in the quin-centenary of the Protestant reformation. Whilst the Belfast demonstration was the longest (with participants marching over six miles), the largest

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84 Jordan Adair, Bandsman, interview with author in Liverpool, 2 August 2014
85 Ibid
A demonstration was held in Armagh – where the Order was founded – featuring eleven district lodges, as well as one hundred and fifty-four private lodges, and welcoming twenty-five thousand spectators.\footnote{\textit{Belfast Telegraph}, 12 July 2017, available at [http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/twelfth/twelfth-pictures-and-videos-belfast-bangor-banbridge-ballymena-beragh-cloughmills-cookstown-cullybackey-coleraine-annalong-kilrea-hillsborough-ballynahinch-richhill-lisbellaw-newtownabbey-ardoyne-35921916.html] accessed 19 July 2017} Described as ‘the most peaceful Twelfth of July for some years’ by the PSNI,\footnote{Words of PSNI Assistant Chief Constable Alan Todd, quoted in RTE News, ‘PSNI says Twelfth parades pass off peacefully across NI’ (2017) [https://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0712/889567-orange-order/] accessed 19 July 2017} the benign character of the demonstrations signals a recent shift. A member of the Parades Commission asserted that the body ‘isn’t gasping when the Twelfth of July is happening’,\footnote{Member of the Parades Commission, interview with author, 24 August 2016} explaining:

> On the twelfth of July there is a tolerance of parading that isn’t present on other days of the year. There’s a view, “This is the Orangemen’s day” although that tolerance doesn’t always work out. We find our problems come not on the twelfth of July, which draws all the attention, but it comes at smaller parades at other points in the year. The Twelfth of July is almost a “set piece” but the issues arise elsewhere, smaller parades where a different band is marching, for example, or something has been done new. […]

> The Twelfth, for the Parades Commission, is almost like the plane is landing. It’s everything that leads up to the Twelfth – the banner dedications, Easter services, other commemorations, Whiterock, the Tour of the North – that set the scene. The Twelfth is when your plane has hit the tarmac and is almost irrelevant; it’s going to happen how it happens. However, that is with huge policing on the Twelfth. There are 3,000 police out on the twelfth of July but the Twelfth happens as it happens and it’s not our biggest concern in any parading season.\footnote{Ibid}

Although sectarian rioting regularly accompanied the Twelfth in north Belfast until recently, the majority of complaints received across Northern Ireland by the Parades Commission regarding Orange
parading focus primarily on the noise, traffic disruption, and timing of parades.\textsuperscript{92} One bandsman sympathised with the growing intolerance of the inconvenience caused by parades, summarising: ‘What was the best route in the 1800s is now stopping people from getting to work or the gym. You can understand why people who aren’t involved would become irritated.’\textsuperscript{93}

An important factor in the experience of parades in Northern Ireland, is the conduct of the loyalist marching bands that widely support the demonstrations. The bands represent a critical element of the institution’s major public commemorations and celebrations.\textsuperscript{94} During the Troubles, a ‘blood and thunder’ band culture developed. Initially (and still in some corners) known as ‘Kick the Pope’ bands, these outfits grew significant followings of young, working–class Protestants,\textsuperscript{95} and their development has been described as the most development in loyalist political culture since the 1960s.\textsuperscript{96} They offer an alternative outlet for disaffected males in particular and engender a sense of male identity and comradery. The consequential sub–culture exists in opposition to much of mainstream unionism and may have little interest in religiously conservative traditional Orangeism. Within the context of the deindustrialisation of the 1980s, teenage working–class males were faced with a crisis of gender identity and ‘blood and thunder’ bands offer a form of defiant masculinity and an expression of ethno–sectarianism for these disaffected youths.\textsuperscript{97}

Members of marching bands perceive their contribution to the band and the experience of membership as a more authentic expression of their Protestant identity compared with membership

\textsuperscript{92} Parades Commission, \textit{Annual Report and Financial Statements} (2017) Page 5
\textsuperscript{93} Jordan Adair, Bandsman, interview with author in Liverpool, 2 August 2014
\textsuperscript{94} Bryan, \textit{Orange Parades} (2000)
\textsuperscript{95} Dudley–Edwards, \textit{The Faithful Tribe} (1999)
\textsuperscript{96} Bryan, \textit{Orange Parades} (2000)
\textsuperscript{97} Bell, \textit{Acts of Union} (1990)
of the Orange Order or other Orders. The challenge of accessing membership of the Order, including being proposed and seconded, proving oneself to be a church attender, and much of the ritualistic dogma, can be discouraging hurdles, especially for young men. The bands, on the other hand, cultivate a tight in-group identity, both as expressions of their Protestant Ulster identity and their district, recruiting members from a particular locality and using uniforms as a form of group brand. The bands organise and operate free of institutional constraint, they use a highly militarised style, and use aggressive, masculine, and often paramilitary insignia on their band uniforms, banners, and instruments. Jarman contends that the role of bands is ambiguous: on the one hand, they embody a consistent, comprehensive understanding of the expression of modern unionism, yet simultaneously they operate outside of the purview of the Loyal Orders.

Conclusion

The Orange Order been the subject of increasing academic attention. Despite being in its relative infancy, this growing body of literature has made significant inroads into understanding the social and cultural drivers that the institution embodies, exhibits, and encourages. A quantitative analysis of the institution’s membership has been undertaken, as has a scholarly assessment of Order’s archive of minutes and papers. Yet, as more knowledge of the Order’s cultural, religious, and political approaches has been acquired, a full explanation of why the Order has been increasingly marginalised remains missing.

The Order draws upon significant resources of loyalty, maintaining a significant degree of familial legacy and playing a part in localised socialisation (with more than four fifths of members joining

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through family or friends). This reinforces the ideological homogeneity of the institution. The collective Orange identity, developed and reinforced through the imagined, historical narrative, engenders a framework through which members articulate their sub-national identity. As a result of British Protestant unionism being interpreted as being relentlessly attacked, the erosion of what are seen as cultural symbols of Protestant Britishness in the region are resisted. Consequently, the physical expression of Protestant unionism – marching – becomes ever-more important.

Orangeism is ceaselessly ‘under attack’ according to many Orangemen. The alleged spread of secularism within wider society is challenging religion; disputes over parades and conflict with the Parades Commission are interpreted as attacks on Orange culture; the Order has been relegated to the margins of Northern Ireland politics and society; and the political growth of Sinn Féin in recent decades confronts the security of unionists’ Britishness, all serving to perpetuate the notion that contemporary Orangeism is under assault. Consequently, the defence of this cultural identity, Protestant Britishness, and robust unionism remains at the heart of the Orange Order’s mission.

This chapter has outlined the possibilities offered by viewing the Order’s decline using a theoretical framework and empirical analysis grounded in declining social capital, anti-sectarianism, and the growth in secularism to explain negative impacts upon the Orange Order. It has been claimed that whilst the past informs the perceptions of identity in the present, the contemporary socio-political circumstances impacts upon the way in which the past in perceived and collectively remembered. The Orange Order’s dealings with a problematic present are often informed by using lessons from a less difficult past. An internally shared and accepted – if sometimes imagined and mythical – historical

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100 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011)
101 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 25 August 2014; Orange Standard, August 2000
narrative, informs contemporary Orangeism. Identifiable threats cultivate and reinforce a common sense of identity that is besieged. This thesis now turns to the distinctive elements of the cultural, political, and religious isolation that the Order claims to now prevail. What were the triggers and how judicious have been the Order’s responses?
Chapter Two

From pre– to post–Agreement Northern Ireland: Political isolation and the Grand Orange Lodge

Introduction

This chapter explores the political isolation of the Orange Order. It examines how the collapse of the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1972 and subsequent direct rule from Westminster affected the political role of the Orange institution. The section poses a number of questions: Did the institution wield as much political influence as it was claimed to prior to the end of Stormont? What position did the Order hold in shaping the politics of the UUP? How did the onset of direct rule remove influence? Why did the Orange Order seek divorce from the UUP?

In order to address these questions, this chapter will first consider the extent of the political influence the Orange Order was able to lever during the era in which the devolved Northern Ireland Parliament was dominated by a single unionist party. It will assess how the Order lobbied Members of Parliament, Ministers, and Senators before the collapse of Stormont and test how widely the unionist political elite shared the 1934 summation of former Northern Irish Prime Minister, the Viscount Craigavon: ‘I have always said I am an Orangeman first and a politician and Member of Parliament afterwards’.¹ As the Troubles erupted, the political status quo changed considerably as unionism fractured, Stormont was dissolved, and Westminster imposed direct rule on the region. From 1972 until 1998 (with the exception of the very brief interlude in the first few months of 1974), the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland carried out policies that formerly the Orange Order would have been able to influence. This chapter will assess whether the relationships that the Order had built prior to 1972 were redundant under direct rule and whether the Orange institution had any political influence or

power during this period. Unionist divisions over the GFA led to a dramatic realignment, exemplified in the rise of the DUP from a bit player to a significant political actor. The chapter will consider whether the Order has been able to assert any influence over policy–making in the consociational, devolved power–sharing polity evident since 1998. With a number of current MLAs remaining members of the institution and Stormont having its own Orange lodge for Assembly members,² to what extent has this political presence enhanced the Order’s role in influencing policies?

The Orange Order and the Northern Ireland Parliament

Speaking in Belfast in 1933, the Prime Minster, Sir Basil Brooke (later Lord Brookeborough) described the stranglehold the Orange Order appeared to have over the politics of Northern Ireland, stating: ‘Some people have told me that we need fascism. We have the Orange Order […] What need have we of fascism?’³ Membership of the Orange Order represented deep loyalty to the British crown, commitment to the Protestant faith, and support for the preservation of the Union with Great Britain.⁴ Harbinson described membership of the Order as ‘irrefutable evidence of determination to maintain the Union and almost a prerequisite of anyone wishing to describe himself as a unionist in public life’. However, with one–third of the population national, the institution’s opposition to Roman Catholicism and exclusion of Roman Catholics was obviously divisive.⁵ The Order was a sectarian organisation that had adopted a specific attitude towards a contemporary political issue – Home Rule – and excluded a significant portion of the population of Northern Ireland. Consequently, the affiliation between the Orange institution and the UUP ensured that Catholics had little chance of holding political office.

⁴ M. W. Dewar, Why Orangeism (Belfast: Grand Lodge of Ireland, 1959) Pages 22–23
⁵ Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party (1973) Page 90
It is not the aim of this chapter to address in detail the background to the Orange Order’s place within the UUP from the time of the struggle against Home Rule. However, the strength of the link, with the Order firmly embedded in UUP structures, reflected a symmetry of interests and infused the UUP with an Orange outlook between 1921 and the 1960s: the Orange Order was given official representation on bodies integral to the UUP, including a hundred and twenty–two seats on the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) and 18 of the 300 seats on the Standing Committee. In addition to this, a sizable portion of delegates from local constituency unionist associations elected to these two bodies were members of the institution, effectively doubling the Orange representation on the UUC and quadrupling their presence on the Standing Committee. The vast majority of unionist members of the Northern Ireland Parliament were Orangemen. Excluding members representing the University seats where different selection procedures pertained, 149 unionists were elected to Stormont between 1921 and 1969, ninety–five of whom reached cabinet positions. Of these ninety–five MPs, eighty–six were members of the Orange Order. Over the same period, only three cabinet ministers were not Orangemen at the point of their election and a further three were member of the Order on election but their membership was subsequently terminated. A study of the Northern Ireland Senate demonstrates a similar concentration of interests. Every Senator between 1921 and 1969, with the exception of Marion Greeves, was a member of the Order and all but two of the 56 unionist Westminster MPs elected during the period were Orange Order members.

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7 Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party (1973) Page 90
9 The three Cabinet Ministers who were not members of the Orange Order at the time of their election include: Hugh Pollock (MP for Belfast South, 1921–1929 and Belfast Windsor, 1929–1937); Sir John Milne Barbour (MP for County Antrim, 1921–1929 and South Antrim, 1929–1951); and Harry Midgley (MP for Belfast Willowfield, 1941–1957 joining the UUP n 1947).
10 The three Cabinet Ministers whose Orange Order membership was terminated include: William Fitzsimmons (MP for Belfast Duncarn, 1956–1972) resigned from the Orange Order in 1968 when his daughter married a Roman Catholic; Phelim O’Neill, later Lord Rathcavan (MP for North Antrim, 1958–1972) was expelled in 1968 after attending a Roman Catholic ceremony as part of his public duty; and Dr Robert Simpson (MP for Mid–Antrim, 1953–1972) resigned in 1969 on his appointment as Minister for Community Relations.
11 Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party (1973) Page 90
In most areas of Northern Ireland, the local Orange Hall was the meeting place of local constituency unionist associations. Orange Halls provided a social–base around which communities could develop. This was particularly significant in border areas. One member stated:

In rural areas, [...] prior to the 1960s, the only places of entertainment would have been church socials and the Orange Lodge. [...] The rural base would have been attracted [to join the Orange Order] because, in the circumstances, young Protestants would meet and mingle and many marriages were made in local Orange Halls.\(^{12}\)

Orange Halls provided unionists with a meeting place, a dance hall for young people, and was an ideal fundraising forum for church and social enterprises. However, the growing affluence and gradual depopulation of the countryside left Orange Halls principally as meeting places for unionist associations that did not have premises of their own. Furthermore, at times of election, Orange Halls across Northern Ireland could be converted into local political headquarters, conveniently because of the Orange Order–UUP relationship. Individual lodges, at the base of the structure, equated readily to the local Unionist branch. A minimum of three lodges was required to form a district, which in turn correlated comfortably with UUP constituency associations, and districts would send delegates to the County Grand Lodges, which usually constituted two Westminster parliamentary constituencies. The County Lodges, in turn, sent representatives to the Grand Lodge of Ireland, governing the Order similarly to the way in which the UUC governed the UUP.

Despite estimating the Order to have a membership base of 125,000–130,000 in the late 1960s (a figure was later downplayed by Grand Lodge to a peak of around 100,000 in 1968), the Reverend W. Martin Smyth, later Grand Master, insisted that the institution was simply a pressure group, which sought to ensure the UUP remained true to the constitution.\(^{13}\) The right of the Order to have this

\(^{12}\) Member of the Orange Order from a rural setting, interview with author, 13 March 2014

\(^{13}\) Words of the Reverend W. Martin Smyth, in Harbinson, *The Ulster Unionist Party* (1973) Page 93
influence came from the fact that the UUP was born from the institution in much the same way the British Labour Party was born of the Trade Union movement. Danny Kennedy, former UUP MLA for Newry and Armagh, contends:

There was always a clear link between the politics and the Orange institution, particularly the Ulster Unionist Party. Historically, there were very strong links in terms of membership and it was quite an accepted route into politics, and membership of the Orange Order was seen as an important attribute to anybody’s CV. Tom Elliott, former leader of the UUP, former MP, and former Assistant Grand Master of the Orange institution, has interpreted the Order’s role in politics to be significant, arguing it played a considerable role throughout the period, affecting government policy by utilising its presence on the UUC.

At the time [of the Northern Ireland Parliament], there was only one unionist party of power and nearly all the members of it were Orange Order members; so much so that those who weren’t members would often go on to join the Order. […] With such a

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14 Danny Kennedy, former UUP MLA for Newry and Armagh and member of the Orange Order, interviewed by author, 16 September 2016
15 Harbinson, _The Ulster Unionist Party_ (1973) Page 93
The Orange Order in Northern Ireland

presence, the Orange Order did have an influence over the policy of the government during time period.\textsuperscript{16}

But, as a religious institution that sought to protect the interests of the Protestant Unionists, to what extent could the Order be a coherent political movement and affect government policy? Having served as Prime Minister, James Millar Andrews went onto become Grand Master of the Order and, in 1950, summarised the institution’s position to an audience in Newry:

While I agree that we are mainly a religious body, the Order has been in the front rank for generations in preserving our constitutional position. The Orange ritual lays it down that it is the duty of Orangemen to support and maintain the laws and constitution. It is fundamentally important that we should continue to do so, for if we lost our constitutional position within the United Kingdom “civil and religious liberty for all”, which we are also pledged as Orangemen to support, would be endangered.\textsuperscript{17}

Clearly an emphasis on the constitution was important, but the Order did not express overt official views or demands on general UUP policy matters. The Order never formulated a parliamentary programme and, despite retaining a formal link with the UUP, by the 1960s the Order was no longer requesting brethren to support UUP candidates in elections.

Andrews’ interpretation may be borne out by the fact that there exist only a handful of examples of the Orange Order bringing open pressure against the unionist government. One such example can be found in the Orange opposition to Lord Londonderry’s Education Act of 1923. The Act introduced three categories for school funding: controlled, in which the state ran the school; maintained, whereby the local authority and Church would run the school jointly; and voluntary schools that were under Church

\textsuperscript{16} Tom Elliott, former UUP MLA, former UUP MP and member of the Orange Order, interview with author, 2 July 2014

\textsuperscript{17} Newry Democrat, 26 June 1950
control. In the attempt to encourage more schools to be state–run, funding for the former category was considerably more than the intermediate, which in turn received greater funding than the latter.\(^{18}\)

However, Londonderry, a strong advocate for an integrated educational system, defied the recommendations of the Lynn Commission and included a secular element in the bill, which specified state–controlled schools would only be able to offer Bible classes outside school hours and only with parental consent.\(^{19}\) The great majority of Protestant schools transferred to state–control quickly as per the government’s encouragement, however the vast majority of Catholic schools elected to remain independent, still receiving the state payment of teachers’ salaries and retaining their own property and educational system. Orange opposition, centred on the limiting conditions placed on Biblical tuition and the perception that Protestants had conceded school property and control in contrast to the control the Catholic Church maintained, was such that the government was prompted to pass an Amendment Act in 1925, weeks before the Northern Ireland general election. Unionist unity was the priority for the government and it ‘bowed to Protestant Church/Orange Order pressure’.\(^{20}\)

In the 1950s, the UUP wished to discourage elements from within the unionist electorate from supporting independent unionist candidates in elections and the Orange Order was happy to promote this idea. In 1954, Stormont passed the Flags and Emblems Act, prompting one nationalist MP to ask ‘Is this the Orange Order Appeasement Bill?’\(^{21}\) The Act sanctioned the display of the Union flag whilst giving authority to the police to remove the Irish tricolour where its display may have led to a disturbance. Walker notes that throughout the debates that surrounded the Act, unionist MPs were accused of being in a state of servitude to their Orange masters and supporting the Order’s agenda.


\(^{20}\) Ibid Page 68

would only serve to further the careers of UUP back-benchers. There were occasional examples of the UUP leadership defying their Orange colleagues. In 1924, for example, the District Inspector of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) made a controversial political speech at an Orange lodge and was subsequently dismissed. When the Court of Inquiry overturned the dismissal, James Craig, then Prime Minister, had the Inspector dismissed by administrative order despite vocal Orange opposition to the move. Furthermore, in the immediate aftermath of the Flags and Emblems Act, the government supported the decision of the Home Affairs Minister, George Hanna, to prohibit a contentious Orange Order parade on Easter Monday that year. These occasions were rare, however. Lukes’ demonstrates how power does not have to be exercised solely through ‘concrete, observable behaviour’ but can involve latent aspects of influence. Therefore, ‘it is crucially important to identify potential issues which non-decision-making prevents from being actual’. As UUP policy was sympathetic to the institution’s desires, ambitions, and preferences, the Orange Order’s leadership had little need to overtly exert pressure on the government. The Order did not need to coerce politicians but merely make clear the preferred policy choice of the Order.

Lord Charlemont, Minister for Education, extended the role of the Orange institution claiming, in 1933: ‘Belfast would be largely Socialist tomorrow if it wasn’t for the unswerving opposition to socialism on the part of the Orange Order’. Unionists believed themselves to be in a state of siege with ‘an irredentist southern neighbour, an indifferent eastern neighbour and an internal minority who

23 Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party (1973) Page 94
regarded the state as illegitimate’. Consequently, consolidation of unionist political hegemony was prioritised. Yet electoral threats were posed not only from within the state, but also from within the Protestant rank and file, highlighting significant problems encountered within unionism. Unionism was a cross-class alliance, susceptible to fragmentation when exposed to socio-economic strain. The UUP’s strength at Stormont disguised an increasing level of Protestant working-class fragmentation at the polls, particularly during the economic depression of the 1930s. This, coupled with the formation of the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) in 1924 and its growing electoral strength in urban areas, illustrates a greater level of instability than is revealed by the existence of a perpetual UUP majority at Stormont.

Devolution of power to Stormont did not include full fiscal authority and the governing party was reliant upon fiscal aid from Westminster and Whitehall to assist Northern Ireland’s ailing economy. The Northern Ireland Parliament offered the UUP unbridled regional power but not the financial wherewithal for its successful exercise. Mulholland explains that unionist economic and fiscal insecurities led to some of the more unsavoury practices of the state. Discrimination against the Catholic nationalist minority was accepted to appease militant elements of loyalism and placate the loyalist working-class by attempting to offer (very) marginal advantages. However, ‘the fusion of party and state was disastrous for community relations in an already deeply divided society’.

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33 M. Mulholland, ‘Why did unionists discriminate?’, in S. Wichert (Ed), From the United Irishmen to Twentieth-Century Unionism (Dublin: Four Courts, 2004)
Independent Unionists and the NILP represented potential challenges to the hegemonic position of the UUP–Orange Order duopoly. Non–UUP Unionists often held labourist sympathies and tended to side with the NILP in parliamentary and council votes, but it would be a mistake to claim that these unionists were socialists. Thomas Henderson and John W. Nixon (both elected in 1929), in particular, were very vocal about their working–class loyalties, but only represented workers of the Protestant bloc. Class issues were sectarianised and Independent Unionists did not share the socialist reading of capitalist structures. Moreover, independents regularly competed for the same voters as the NILP in a narrow left–of–centre pool within the unionist bloc. In a series of political meetings in the late summer of 1926, the Independent Unionist and founder of the Independent Orange Order, Thomas Sloan, attacked the NILP denouncing socialism as disloyal. Sloan also criticised the UUP but such criticism ‘seemed muted next to his equation of socialism in Belfast with the “evil” of Bolshevism’.35 This form of ‘unionist labour’ offered by Independents may have hurt the UUP slightly but it also had a detrimental effect on NILP electoral fortunes in Protestant working–class areas, inhibiting a serious party challenge. Walker notes how starkly aware the NILP was of this, pointing to the amazement of the NILP’s leader, Harry Midgley, at the number of votes Independent Unionists were able to attract through appeals to a fusion of populist labourism and sectarianism whilst lacking credible, electoral organisation.36 Independent Unionism functioned as an important safety valve for the government as loyalist discontent with the UUP was transferred to the independents, hindering the growth of socialism within the Protestant rank and file and arguably having a greater impact than the efforts of the Orange Order during the same period.

In a reply to a questionnaire sent by the Belfast Telegraph in 1970, Stormont opposition MPs claimed that the formal link between the UUP and the Orange institution should be broken because,

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35 Ibid Page 436
principally, ‘no political party should tolerate an “underground” influence on its decision-making processes’.\(^37\) Whilst little evidence has been found of any overt, observable influence being wielded by the institution over the executive between the 1920s and 1960s, it has been identified that the Order had little need to exert pressure upon the unionist government because (with the exception of a handful of disputes) most aspects of UUP policy were in line with Orange interests. The Order’s presence in the politics of Northern Ireland – with its weighty representation within the UUP, on the UUC and Standing Committee, the almost universal Orange membership of unionist politicians, and the political usage of the Orange Halls – smoothed the quietly functioning, symbiotic relationship based upon subtle interplay. Whilst Charlemont commended the Order on its role in limiting the growth of socialism, the UUP’s greatest electoral rivals – Independent Unionists – appear to have had a more significant effect on limiting the growth of socialism and challenges to the existing order. However, after decades of alignment, the quiet partnership would become tested under the premiership of Terence O’Neill, amid a growing crisis of the state. That the *Belfast Telegraph* was asking questions of the Orange–UUP alliance by the onset of the 1970 spoke volumes.

**O’Neill, the end of Stormont and Direct Rule**

By the end of the 1960s, debates had arisen in unionism about the most effective way to address the civil rights concerns of the Catholic nationalist minority in the province. The Prime Minister from 1963–1969, Terence O’Neill, brought a reformist agenda to the state. The final election of the 1960s suggested that, in representative terms at least, the extent of the Orange presence within government and parliament might be in decline. Harbinson observed:

> It is interesting to note that the current (1970) position is that out of a total of 37 [unionist members of the Northern Ireland Parliament] no fewer than 7 are not Orangemen, and

\(^{37}\) *Belfast Telegraph*, 20 March 1970
of those three are members of the Cabinet. Whether this is due to a marked decline in
the influence of the Orange institution in the Unionist Party or to the peculiar
circumstances in which the 1969 general election was fought is too early to say.38

O’Neill and his supporters had recognised the scope for the introduction of more liberal governance
in Northern Ireland. As a member of the Protestant ascendancy, O’Neill did not envisage greater
pluralism in decision–making and power–sharing was by no means desirable. Essentially, ‘what was
seen as useful on the basis of unionist rational self–interest was the development of a more tolerant,
co–operative regime’.39 As such, O’Neill sought the granting of limited concessions to Catholic
Nationalists in order to achieve greater support for the state and consensus within society. O’Neill
believed Catholics could be ‘civilised’ by economic concessions and argued that Catholics had
demonstrated their readiness to accept the constitutional status quo by refusing to support the 1956–
1962 Border Campaign of the IRA.40 For O’Neill, the pragmatic basis for the link between Great Britain
and Northern Ireland was sufficient to convert even the most hardened cynic.41

Quinn contends that Northern Ireland had suffered three significant weaknesses: politically, a
substantial minority of its citizens questioned the legitimacy of the state; financially, those external to
the province determined the state’s revenues and expenditure; and, economically, Northern Ireland’s
major industries were unable to sustain the necessary levels of stable employment. These factors had,
consequently, ‘pushed people back into their communal redoubts’,42 and each side ‘looked after its
own’. By the 1960s however, a spirit of change was detectable. Northern Ireland remained a relatively
deprived region but, since the Second World War and the introduction of the welfare state, it had
seen significant improvement in housing provision, education, roads, and hospitals (albeit slightly

38 Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party (1973) Page 91
40 Ibid Page 36
more so within Protestant unionist areas). In politics, nationalism was becoming less abstentionist with younger leaders emerging, arguing that social issues and civil rights should be prioritised over partition. Whilst the growth of a middle-class was evident in some Catholic areas, nationalists were understandably concerned that prosperity had not been evenly spread but working-class Protestants, under economic threat and often also impoverished, were reluctant – equally understandably – to see new jobs go to their Catholic counterparts. During this period, O’Neill was ‘trapped on his left by the demands of the civil rights and scorned on his right by those who equated modernisation with treason’.43 This conflict of interests left O’Neill in the middle, ‘too liberal for his party, insufficiently liberal for his opposition’.44

Buckland contends that the structure of devolution created a grievance culture among Nationalist and continual demands for preferential communal treatment among unionists.45 Boal and Buchanan and Bew et al. lay more stress upon the importance of class differences within the unionist bloc. They demonstrate how moderate, pro–O’Neill unionists tended to come from suburban, middle-class areas and anti–O’Neill sentiment was found to be most prominent in working-class constituencies.46 Consequently, they have explained the fracturing of unionism under O’Neill as a series of disputes between the modernising, middle-class core and a backward-looking, working-class periphery over power distribution and resource allocation.47 Similarly, Walker argues that class was central to the dilemmas of unionism during this period. He contends that working-class Protestants tended to associate liberal unionists with indifference to their class interests and with an insufficient commitment to the Union.48 Most anti–O’Neillites tended to prioritise working-class interests

43 Tonge, Conflict and Change (2002) Page 40
44 Quinn, Understanding Northern Ireland (1993) Page 22
whereas liberal, pro–O’Neill unionists were largely out–of–tune with this section of the electorate. Walker draws attention to the Bannside by–election of 1970, where the Reverend Ian Paisley was able to beat his relatively liberal UUP opponent with this blend of social and economic agitation and uncompromising loyalism.\(^{49}\) The Reverend Martin Smyth emphasised the estrangement between the classes, explaining that O’Neill had ‘been abroad, an army office, came from a big house’ and described the Prime Minister as being ‘out of touch. His good points were there but he didn’t have an ounce of understanding about the Ulster people’.\(^{50}\) Furthermore, associating the Prime Minister with an insufficient commitment to the Union and unionist paradigm, Smyth argues that O’Neill had only been admitted to the Orange Order after either having lied or having convinced a local lodge to break Order rules and accept him, despite having already been refused membership by a sister lodge.\(^{51}\)

Smyth’s interpretation of O’Neill being ‘out of touch’ with the unionist grassroots was demonstrated in 1965 when O’Neill invited the Irish Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, to Stormont. Brookeborough had refused invitations from Lemass, demanding the Irish state relinquish its constitutional claim to Northern Ireland first. However, O’Neill was under considerable pressure from London to welcome what was seen as a pragmatic step by Dublin. Previous governments had asserted similar pressure but Wilson’s Labour administration had less tolerance for northern unionists, particularly as the government had only a small majority and the UUP Westminster MPs were voting with the opposition. The NILP also encouraged O’Neill to reform the social and economic structures of Northern Ireland.\(^{52}\) Although the Lemass visit received widespread support from the party elite (including a supporting statement from Brookeborough), signs of grassroots frustrations began to manifest, in particular from


\(^{50}\) The Reverend W. Martin Smyth, former Grand Master of the Grand Orange Lodge, interview with author in Belfast, 9 September 2013

\(^{51}\) *Ibid*

Edmond Warnock, former Attorney General, and Desmond Boal, MP for Shankill, who attacked O’Neill for having rescinded his earlier commitment not to meet with the Irish leader. The Orange Order began to experience similar discontent arising within its own ranks.

The Grand Lodge held a special meeting in February 1965 to discuss ‘the considerable controversy taking place throughout the Order on the Prime Ministers’ meeting’. Sir George Clark, Grand Master, defended the Prime Minister:

It was thought that if the invitation had come from Lemass and had been refused it would have created a wrong image of Northern Ireland. Our Prime Minister had seized the initiative and hoped for an act of recognition for Northern Ireland. It was believed that by coming to Stormont, Lemass had formerly [sic] recognised that the Six Counties was of the United Kingdom. He believed that the [Prime Minister] was completely sincere in his recent statement that Ulster would remain part of the UK and that his talks were non-political but purely explanatory ones on matters which were economic and beneficial to both communities.

Patterson and Kaufmann identify Clark as a personification of ‘the historically close confluence of interest between class interest, Orangeism and the Unionist Party’. Clark was a wealthy landowner, a keen horse trainer and was described by Brian Faulkner as ‘a country gentleman of the old school’. Having served as an MP for Belfast Dock in the early 1940s and as a Senator from 1951 to 1969, Clark was a ‘civilised segregationist’ but sought to minimise the anti–Catholic sentiment at the grassroots of the Order and fervently opposed the rise of Paisleyism. However, Clark also opposed the presence

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53 UUC Paper, D/1327/22/3, Meeting of the Unionist Parliamentary Party, 3 February 1965
54 Words of Sir George Clark, quoted in Patterson and Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangeism (2007) Page 69
55 Grand Lodge of Ireland, quoted in Ibid Page 69
56 Ibid Page 70
58 Patterson and Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangeism (2007) Pages 70-71
of Catholics within the UUP as not a place for them. Grassroots opinion was hardening in the face of O’Neill’s liberalism, which was also associated with a trend towards ecumenism amid inter–church thawing following the Second Vatican Council in 1965 and the Archbishop of Canterbury’s visit to the Vatican in 1966.

As more lodges invited Paisley to speak, Clark attempted to halt the move toward militant Orangeism in his speech at the meeting of the Grand Lodge of Ireland in June 1966. He claimed many had been ‘misled by militancy’ and the general dissatisfaction had ‘given heart to a former member of our institution – Mr Paisley – and he has gathered around him a considerable number of militant Protestants who are perfectly entitled to their views’, but he also found a ‘considerable number of Orangemen who feel the same way’. Later that month, in a letter to the Most Reverend James McCann, Archbishop of Armagh and leader of the Church of Ireland, Clark requested church leaders to play a guiding role in persuading the more ‘extreme’ members to support the Order, writing: ‘I would welcome the presence of our more distinguished and learned clerical brethren so that they can take an active part in our debates, for I fear […] without their participation more misunderstanding will inevitably follow’. Clark’s letter referred to two recent events: firstly, the failure of the government to heed the Order’s request for a ban on celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the 1916 Easter Rising, which led to great criticism of O’Neill and the Grand Lodge for failing to assert its influence; and, secondly, the Paisleyite–led picket of the Presbyterian General Assembly in Belfast in June 1966, where the Governor of Northern Ireland and his wife were jostled by the mob.

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60 Belfast Telegraph, 8 June 1966
61 Letter from Sir George Anthony Clark to the Primate of All Ireland, 22 June 1966, PRONI D/4234/B/6
O’Neill applauded Clark’s ‘great courage’, but the emphasis the Order placed on a pan-Protestant hegemony was clearly under serious attack. Clark was able to stretch the acquiescence and deference of some, but by no means all, rank and file Orangemen who had grown distrustful of the O’Neill administration but this only served to enhance the popular interpretation of ‘dictatorial “modernisation from above” which threatened to undermine unionist control in the province’. Clark’s resignation as Grand Master in 1967 was a blow to O’Neill’s liberal unionism and was symbolic of the tensions that were rising within the Order. This friction was played out in the 1969 Stormont Election where the Orange Order was caught between its traditional position of support for the UUP in elections and the widespread anti-O’Neill sentiment amongst an anxious membership. The intolerance of O’Neill’s liberal agenda at the unionist grassroots, combined with Catholics asserting their anti-unionist, Irish nationalist identity in the ballot box and demanding further reforms of the state, resulted in failure for O’Neill’s liberal experiment.

After O’Neill’s resignation in April 1969, his successor, James Chichester–Clark, attempted to cool the political climate, which had been inflamed by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, but the political turmoil continued. The Order, whilst aware of the pressure having been exerted by London, was not sympathetic. Both James Molyneaux and the Reverend Smyth challenged the Prime Minister, the latter claiming: ‘the feeling abroad in the country was “We may as well not have a Parliament” […] Why let the minority dictate to the majority?’ Whilst the Order tried to maintain polite communication with Chichester–Clark while pointing out the consequences of damaging unionist hegemony, its interpretation of the government’s role was clear:

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63 Ibid Page 73
64 Notes of meeting of Orange Deputation with the Prime Minister, 21 October 1969, quoted in Patterson and Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangeism (2007) Pages 118–119
We believe that the Order has the right to ask the government, which it has loyally supported and whose laws its members are pledged to uphold, to see that sufficient forces are at its disposal to protect the democratic rights of the majority. [...] The government should execute its responsibilities and authority in a] demonstrably fair and firm manner, thus avoiding the most serious and even disastrous conflict of opinion that would arise should there be any further restrictions on the freedom of the law–abiding population.  

The Prime Minister claimed that banning Orange parades was the last thing the government sought to do but there did exist an ‘element’ – that of Orange supporters – on the pavements that were likely to cause disturbances. At the grassroots level, a parade ban proved a bigger issue than the government’s security concerns. Twenty–six private and district lodge resolutions were tabled protesting the parade ban, in addition to two from county lodges (Fermanagh and Tyrone), whereas only 20 lodge resolutions on the security situation were submitted. However, in 1970, the Order won the right to parade, suggesting Orange pressure was influential on the Prime Minister’s decision–making process. After all, ‘banning [...] parades would be political suicide’. Chichester–Clark was able to win some concessions however, in the form of amended routes for Belfast parades. A British delegation – including the Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling MP – met with and appealed directly to the Orange leadership, demonstrating the growing powerlessness of Stormont.

By March 1971, unionist pressure on Chichester–Clark had intensified surrounding the law and order concerns so much that the Prime Minister resigned and was replaced by Brian Faulkner, who would

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66 Notes of meeting of Orange Deputation with the Prime Minister, 21 October 1969, quoted in Kaufmann, The Orange Order (2007) Page 53
be the last Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. Faulkner faced further escalating violence and executed a poorly–informed internment programme in an attempt to control the terrorism that was taking lives and damaging property. After Faulkner’s government refused to accept the transfer of law and order powers from Stormont to Westminster, the British government dissolved the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1972 and announced direct rule for the province, initially for one year; a temporary arrangement which soon assumed an air of permanence.

With Order membership peaking in 1968, ‘a new pattern of slow numerical decline had set in’ already by the time of the collapse of the Northern Ireland government. In terms of political influence, Tom Elliott understands the collapse of Stormont to be a crucial turning point for the Order:

The collapse of Stormont had a significant impact on the political influence of the Orange Order. Had the devolved government been returned to power quickly, the disruption would most likely have been minimal but, as it was for such a long period of time, the Order lost a great deal of political influence.

Similarly, Peter Weir MLA finds the demise of the Northern Ireland Parliament to have been significant:

In terms of the impact [of the collapse of Stormont], well, it’s probably a couple of things: first of all, it perhaps removed a feeling of the Orange Order being part of the establishment, probably with the end result that it has been less attractive to some folk in the middle–classes and it may be seen as a barrier to advancement more than anything else. I think you will see increasingly, down the years, a lot of the mainstream Orange figures have come less and less from establishment–type backgrounds. I think the other

70 Tom Elliott, former UUP MLA, former UUP MP and member of the Orange Order, interview with author, 2 July 2014
factor that is difficult to disaggregate, you had a situation in which – particularly in the early 1970s – you were very much at the height of the Troubles and, for example, the Orange Order in some cases acted as a degree of solidarity within a community. In other cases, perhaps, there was more reluctance to join because they felt they were making themselves a little bit more of a target.71

There was an attempt to restore a devolved government quickly. The Darlington Conference in 1972 and subsequent Sunningdale Agreement established constitutional government, using power–sharing between the political blocs. When the decision came before the UUC, Smyth, now Grand Master, directed Orange delegates to vote against the Agreement:

   Our solemn covenant signed by about 350,000 people pledged us to work for the restoration of our constitution without tie or bond should it be abrogated without the consent of the majority. That consent has not been sought much less given. Now is the time to go forward to achieve our object. I would ask you therefore to use your best endeavours to this end and exercise your vote accordingly.72

After the Agreement was defeated in the UUC, Faulkner’s rump of the UUP persisted and Faulkner headed the new administration in January 1974. However, he utterly failed to command unionism. In rare a display of loyalist unity, Smyth and the Order were crucial in establishing the United Ulster Unionist Council, which included anti–Sunningdale UUP members, the DUP, and the Vanguard Unionist Party, determined to end the power–sharing executive and seek a return to a majoritarian Stormont. The strength of Sunningdale’s opponents lay with the Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC), with its mass working–class membership in key industries across Northern Ireland. By March 1974, the

71 Peter Weir MLA, DUP MLA for Strangford and member of the Orange Order, interview with author in Belfast, 17 June 2014
UWC had gathered sufficient support to mobilise against the executive and, after an Assembly motion calling for an end of the executive was defeated, the UWC called an indefinite general strike in May, The Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s condemnation of sections of the loyalist community as ‘spongers’ only hardened support for the UWC.\textsuperscript{73} The strike contributed a great deal to the end of the Sunningdale experiment and loyalist politicians celebrated when the executive resigned on 28th May.\textsuperscript{74}

The success of the strike surprised the Orange leadership and the Grand Lodge was criticised for its apparent silence during the strike. The splintering within the UUP over Sunningdale led to some debate over the Orange–UUP link. The future UUP leader James Molyneaux, Smyth, and Captain Michael Armstrong (all Orangemen) were senior figures who argued in favour of the link but despite winning the argument, there was clear evidence that significant sections of the Order were questioning its utility.\textsuperscript{75} Without a devolved government in power however, the Order elite was able to disguise the growing estrangement between the institution and the UUP. The Molyneaux–Smyth leadership maintained anti–power–sharing, anti–North–South dimension UUP and Orange politics from the 1970s into the 1990s. Opposition to the 1985 Anglo–Irish Agreement, which allowed the Irish Republic a consultative say on Northern Ireland, hardened unionism and saw a brief period of pan–unionist unity.

In summarising this section, the Orange Order was caught between its traditional role of support for the unionist government and the mass opposition in the institution’s rank and file membership in terms of dealing with the civil rights protests. The resignations of O’Neill and Clark demonstrated the

\textsuperscript{73} Tonge, \textit{Conflict and Change} (2002) Pages 119–120  
\textsuperscript{74} Walker, \textit{The Ulster Unionist Party} (2004) Pages 220–221  
\textsuperscript{75} Patterson and Kaufmann, \textit{Unionism and Orangeism} (2007) Pages 174–176
tensions that plagued northern unionism. The pressure the Order was able to wield on O’Neill’s successors demonstrates political influence but when neither Chichester–Clark nor Faulkner could manage the province effectively in the face of growing violence, direct rule was imposed upon the state, instantly removing the Orange Order from access to power. Whilst the Orange–assisted UWC strike contributed to the collapse of the Sunningdale Executive in 1974, the 1985 Anglo–Irish Agreement forced unionists to face the stark reality that a return to a unionist–dominated Stormont was impossible. Throughout the period of direct rule, the Molyneaux–Smyth axis helped maintain some level of continuity amongst the membership and, as one Orangeman suggested, the Order ‘acted as a glue’ for northern unionism. However, the GFA would tear the UUP asunder and Paisley’s form of ‘no’ unionism gathered pace.

**Orangeism in post–Agreement Northern Ireland**

Porter contends that three forms of unionisms exist: cultural, liberal, and civic. Cultural unionism offers an exaggerated sense of Protestant Britishness; two identities that Bruce argues are intrinsically linked. This is because ‘beyond evangelical Protestantism, no secure identity is available’. Such an argument suggests that Protestants within Northern Ireland are a distinctive, ethnic grouping whilst Catholics are an integral part of the Irish nation. Some within unionism (including some within the Orange Order and the DUP) would encourage this association between politics and religion, as they would consider it their religious duty to oppose a united Ireland. However, others argue that unionism and Protestantism are not intrinsically linked and, if unionism were to shed its religious connections, it would ‘develop as a political creed centred upon the principles of liberty and justice’.

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76 Member of the Orange Order from a rural setting, interview with author, 13 March 2014
Liberal unionism presents a rational case for the Union, based upon the principle of majority consent for the status quo. The United Kingdom, it is argued, offers an appropriately liberal and enlightened society for all the citizens of Northern Ireland, although the superiority of British citizenship is assumed rather than necessarily proven. Civic unionism attempts to reconcile the staunch defence of the Union with an acknowledgement of the rival claims of Irish nationalism. It endorses and celebrates the plurality (or at least duality) of identity and political ambitions in Northern Ireland, endorses political institutions which enshrine that plurality, and accepts the need for a limited Irish dimension, making it an ambitious unionist project. Civic unionism was recognised in unionism’s (narrow majority) support for the GFA in April 1998.

When the Grand Lodge of Ireland discussed the GFA on 15 April 1998, ahead of the UUC vote on whether to support the deal, it was evident that the Order’s leadership did not support the Agreement, with senior brethren from across the province condemning its content. Despite having not yet publicly aligned himself with the anti–GFA platform, Lord Molyneaux was far less ambivalent at the meeting and announced that he was ‘totally opposed to the Agreement’, seeking action to ‘disarm the mechanism of the GFA’. Reverend Smyth similarly denounced the GFA and, citing Sunningdale, cautioned that there would be ‘no democracy’ under the deal and claimed the unionist people were being ‘led like a lamb to slaughter’. Molyneaux proposed a resolution:

The Grand Lodge of Ireland takes note of the acceptance by the participants to the talks process of the document of 10th April 1998 but failing clarification of certain vital issues cannot recommend it to the people of Ulster.\footnote{Minutes of the Grand Lodge meeting, quoted in Patterson and Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangeism (2007) Page 228}
Whilst some pro–Trimble delegates supported the pragmatism that the GFA offered, Molyneaux’s resolution was endorsed 76 to 10 with one abstention, clearly signalling the condemnatory position of the Grand Lodge.

The Order had always sought a return to a pre–1972, unionist–led parliament and had consistently rejected all post–1972 constitutional initiatives based on a role for the Irish government or internal power–sharing; even though, by 1993, 70 per cent of the population claimed they were willing to accept power–sharing. The position of the rank and file membership was just as significant as that of the Orange leadership in terms of opposition to the GFA. Only 28.9 per cent of Orange Order members claimed to have voted for the GFA in 1998, compared to the 57 per cent of Protestants overall that supported it. By 2004, only 12 per cent of Orangemen remained supportive of the accord. In the 1960s, Sir George Clark had underestimated the militancy that existed within Orange membership; the Grand Master of the GFA era, Robert Saulters, was cognisant of the views of his members.

David Trimble was still popular among Orangemen immediately prior to the GFA, due to his crucial involvement in the Drumcree parading dispute. The Provisional IRA ceasefires of 1994 and 1997 brought greater optimism to many unionists and, during the campaign, the UUP warned that a ‘no’ vote would bring about further bloodshed. Bew et al. have stressed the significance of Tony Blair’s personal involvement in the GFA and his frequent visits to Northern Ireland in the final two weeks of

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84 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Page 143
85 See: Chapter 4
86 Patterson and Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangeism (2007) Page 224
The historic nature of the vote was further highlighted by the endorsement of a host of British politicians and international figures, such as Nelson Mandela.

Patterson and Kaufmann believe that majority support for the GFA among unionists, whilst narrow, ‘reinforced a trend toward unionist liberalism’. This was most evident in the religious sphere although political attitudes were also softening. Protestant Unionists were becoming more likely to support mixing with Catholic Nationalists in the workplace, education, and residential environments and those opposed to inter-faith marriage declined by a third between 1989 and 1998. The number of unionists and members of the security services killed by republican violence decreased significantly. However, soon after the GFA referendum, unionists turned against the Agreement. Patterson and Kaufmann argue that symbolic issues caused such a negative response. Opposition to the GFA was centred on: firstly, Sinn Féin in office without IRA decommissioning; secondly, the swift release of paramilitary prisoners; thirdly, in 1999, the Patten Commission called for a reform of the RUC. GFA supporters clearly did not have a full understanding of – or did not wish to fully contemplate – exactly how these measures would be carried out and what effect they would have on unionists. In 1998, the pro–Agreement unionist and future UUP leader, Sir Reg Empey, ridiculed suggestions of having Gerry Adams in government, comparing it to ‘Hitler in a synagogue’.

The extent to which this was a sincere belief of Empey is open to debate, but demonstrates the kind of assumptions then present within unionism.

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88 Data from ARK [http://www.ark.ac.uk/], quoted in Patterson and Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangeism (2007) Pages 224–225
90 Patterson and Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangeism (2007) Pages 224–226
Tonge argued:

The basic choice for unionists lies between a “no” unionism that is heavily reliant on cultural expressions of a distinct Protestant Britishness, and a pragmatic “yes” unionism that is prepared to overlook the imperfections of an emotionally difficult political deal with historical enemies.\(^\text{91}\)

Tonge and Evans defined the schism between pro- and anti-Agreement unionists as one between ‘rational civics’ and ‘Orange sceptics’.\(^\text{92}\) ‘Rational civics’ are those who believe the GFA offered the most beneficial and realistic way forward for unionism. They stressed the consent principle and accepted the all-Ireland dimension, preferring it to Anglo-Irish intergovernmentalism. Tonge and Evans argue that this group sought to bring about civic unionism and move away from ethnic intolerance, essentially combining ‘political pluralism with pragmatism’.\(^\text{93}\) ‘Orange sceptics’, by contrast, were concerned with the constitutional implications of the GFA and the internal reform agendas it introduced. They resented anything that could be interpreted as a change to their British identity, such as changes to policing and an Irish dimension to governance. Whilst Tonge and Evans accept that such concerns were not confined to the membership of the Orange Order, they assert, ‘the Order’s role as a religious, cultural and political organisation means that membership may provide an institutional focus for the expression of such fears’.\(^\text{94}\)

To demonstrate their argument, Tonge and Evans contend that the true extent of post-GFA unionist division was illuminated when Reverend Smyth challenged Trimble for the UUP leadership in March 2000. In 1995, Smyth had been the first candidate eliminated from the leadership election. However, in 2000, Trimble was only just able to hold off his challenger with 457 (56.8 per cent) to 348 (43.2 per

\(^{93}\) Ibid Page 112
\(^{94}\) Ibid Page 113
British identity was pervasive. 92.4 per cent of Trimble voters and 96.9 per cent of Smyth supporters identified themselves as ‘British’ indicating an ‘overwhelming unity of British identity, transcending internal Unionist party divisions’. Therefore, the faultline in unionism arose from ‘different readings of how the GFA challenges or strengthens Northern Ireland’s long-term future in the United Kingdom and on the existing securities unionists associate with their overwhelming sense of British identity’. For opponents of the GFA, the deal was an affront to aspects of their British identity. Trimble’s supporters welcomed the GFA’s features of parallel consent in decision-making and accepted the North–South dimension, whilst Smyth’s ‘Orange sceptics’ refused to support these measures. Both sets of supporters were opposed to the Patten Commission and early release of paramilitary prisoners, but much stronger opposition existed amongst the Smyth voters.

It would be wrong to suggest that the 2000 Trimble–Smyth leadership contest was simply a challenge between ethnic Orangeism and civic and liberal unionism in terms of the future direction of the UUP. There existed a section of the party whose Orange Order membership did not hinder them from supporting the GFA but Smyth and Trimble, to a large extent, did represent two broad schools of thought regarding the Order’s role in the UUC. The Orange Order – represented by Smyth’s challenge and the ‘Orange sceptics’ – essentially offered a different form of Ulster unionism, resistant to change and, therefore, arguably closer to the form of unionism offered by the DUP. Whilst the UUP had been actively involved in the negotiation of the GFA, the DUP had opposed the deal, adopting stances which soon favoured the latter. The initial support for the deal within the wider unionist bloc quickly drained. Hostilities grew and, as the institutions began to struggle in 2002, unionist support for the GFA fell to 33 per cent. The DUP’s continued condemnation of the GFA allowed them to argue too much had

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97 Ibid Page 127
98 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Pages 137–140
been forfeited to nationalists and DUP support for the 2006 St Andrews Agreement came only after the IRA had decommissioned its arms in 2005. The Order, however, still held considerable influence over the attitudes and positions of the UUC. When controlling for gender, age, occupation, and Christian denomination, McAuley et al. found that Orange membership yielded a significant effect on issues such as opposition to power-sharing, the early release of paramilitary prisoners and the Patten reforms on policing, support for the right to march through nationalist areas, Orange voting rights within the UUC, and transfer of the unionist vote to the DUP. The authors conclude, ‘Orangeism was more influential [on the UUC] than the other characteristics which might have been expected to influence political attitudes’.  

McAuley et al. found only one other variable that had a significant impact on more than one issue; that of age. Patterson and Kaufmann note the significance of a generational factor within unionism and, sourcing data from Sanders et al., found that in 2001 the strongest predictor of UUP support – irrespective of class – was age. Younger Protestants, who had grown up with the Troubles, were already disaffected by the UUP. In Tonge and Evans’ 2004 survey, a majority of participants had already aligned to the DUP by 2001, despite the historically bad relations between the Order and the Reverend Paisley. Patterson and Kaufmann note, however, that those over the age of 55 were far less likely to support the DUP than those under 35. Tonge et al. consequently illustrate that those most resilient to the DUP are unionists who have politically ‘socialised in a less troubled era of Northern Ireland [...] in which mostly cordial relations between the Orange Order and the UUP

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100 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Page 140  
101 Sanders et al., 2001 Northern Ireland Election Study (UK Data Archive Study no. 4622, 2002), quoted in Patterson and Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangeism (2007) Page 244  
103 Patterson and Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangeism (2007) Page 244
prevailed, with party and religious–civic organisation combining to preside over the [...] governance of the state.\textsuperscript{104}

Within the UUP, the debate that surrounded ending the historic link that existed between the party and the institution grew. Some Orangemen were known to cause trouble: some Orange delegates to the UUC appeared to be DUP supporters and the structure of the UUP, run by the overlarge council and with little remit over autonomous constituency organisations, gave the leader insufficient centralised powers.\textsuperscript{105} Having described the affiliation between party and Order as historically a ‘major link’, the former UUP Assembly representative for Mid Ulster, Sandra Overend, argued formal Orange representation on the UUC had become illogical:

\begin{quote}
We had a lot of representatives at the [Ulster Unionist] Council meetings that were there from the Orange Order [...] They came and had their say but might not have voted Ulster Unionist; they might have supported the Democratic Unionist Party or someone else, so it was strange to have those representatives there as they weren’t really representing anybody or contributing to the Ulster Unionist Party.\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

Whether it was part of the UUP’s considerations or not, severing the link might allow the party to reach out to Catholic voters and encourage moderate Catholics to embrace a rational, ‘civic’ form of Ulster unionism, as Trimble desired.\textsuperscript{107} However, at the 1995 UUP conference, Smyth argued that risking 160,000 Orange votes in the pursuit of a maximum of 50,000 Catholic votes was ‘bad mathematics’.\textsuperscript{108} Whilst Smyth’s figures are likely to have been an exaggeration, in an ethnically divided polity, maximising vote share within the bloc is a main priority for any party. By the time of the separation with the Order however, the UUP would have gladly welcomed all unionist voters –

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[104]{Tonge \textit{et al.}, \textit{New Order} (2010) Page 17}
\footnotetext[105]{McAuley \textit{et al.}, \textit{Loyal to the Core?} (2011) Pages 140–142}
\footnotetext[106]{Sandra Overend, former UUP MLA, interview with author, 1 July 2014}
\footnotetext[107]{Godson, \textit{Himself Alone} (2004) Page 182}
\end{footnotes}
Orange or not – because ‘while the existence of the Orange Order may have helped modernise a hitherto ethno-religious party, it did not improve the UUP’s electoral fortunes’. After Trimble established the UUC–Orange Commission to consider reforming the link in 1998, the strongest supporters for retaining the connection were anti–GFA UUP Orangemen. Tonge and Evans found that UUC delegates who supported Smyth in the 2000 leadership election were most likely to favour retention of the link. At a meeting of lodge masters in 1995, 369 voted for a divorce, 484 to retain the link and 71 abstained. In 1996–1997, the Loyal Orange Institution (LOI) Commission found that 65 per cent of the rank and file membership favour disaffiliation. Despite this finding, the LOI Commission supported the lodge masters, ignoring the clear will of the membership.

The Orange–UUP link was formally severed in 2005, following a resolution proposed by Edward Stevenson, later to become Grand Master, which called for the ‘severing of all links’ between the Grand Lodge and the UUC. The resolution passed by 82 to 16 votes, with 11 abstentions. It was the Order, ‘which had feared being pushed from the UUP that in the end jumped’. By 2007, 60.3 per cent of Order members believed it was right that the institution no longer had voting rights in the UUC, but this did not extend to the severance in all aspects, with an equally high majority (60.1 per cent) supporting the continued use of Orange Halls for UUP meetings. Peter Weir MLA, who defected from the UUP to the DUP, contended:

You probably had a situation that was coming for a long period of time, arguably in one sense, for both sides on the ground that the Ulster Unionist Party wanted to essentially be fully seen to be standing on its own two feet. Probably, some within the UUP resented

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109 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Page 142
110 Tonge and Evans, ‘Faultlines in unionism’ (2001)
113 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Page 143
114 Ibid Page 144
some within the Orange Order and resented the level of influence the Orange Order had. I think it was an old saying that the Ulster Unionist Party had become less and less the party of choice for members of the Orange Order.  

Former UUP MLA, Danny Kennedy, contends of the divorce:

It probably had an impact on the then membership of both the UUP and the Orange Order; I’m not sure it resonated very much in the wider community. I think there were political differences that boiled over and it became inevitable that the two organisations would separate. The argument hinged on those who supported the [Good Friday] Agreement and those who didn’t. That debated was reproduced, in some cases, in lodge meeting rooms and that led to the ending of the direct political links but it also had an impact on some members who felt they wouldn’t continue for either reason: because some were in support of the [GFA], sometimes life was made a bit uncomfortable for them; others were opposed to the [GFA], and that strained some relations, even in lodges.

The Order’s affiliation to the UUC and its rebellion against the leader, Trimble, undermined pleas for unity within the UUP, although concerns over the GFA extended beyond the UUP’s Orange constituency. However, the 2006 St Andrews Agreement and the return of devolved government to the province afforded the Order – now no longer affiliated to the UUP – the opportunity to promote genuine unionist unity. Many Orange Order members appear to accept that the Order has to be aligned to unionism alone, aiding unity on key unionist issues. One Orange member claimed the Order is now ‘unionist with a small lowercase “u”’ and ‘able to influence politics as much as any other

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115 Peter Weir MLA, DUP MLA for Strangford and member of the Orange Order, interviewed by author in Belfast, 17 June 2014
116 Danny Kennedy, former UUP MLA and member of the Orange Order, interviewed by author, 16 September 2016
community group’. Tom Elliott argued that the Order should now focus ‘more on social and cultural issues’ than political positioning.

The Orange Order historically never sat comfortably with the DUP, especially within the context of Paisleyite Free Presbyterianism. The Order tended to be seen as insufficiently religious and excessively cultural by hardcore Free Presbyterians. For its part, the Order refused to recognise Free Presbyterianism as a Protestant denomination until 1998, meaning those practicing Free Presbyterianism were prohibited from serving as chaplains. That historic disharmony however seems to have been overcome. More than a third of DUP members belong to the Order. A majority (58.3 per cent) of DUP members support unfettered parading rights, standing opposed to the Parades Commission, with only one in twenty members advocating restrictions on parades skirting nationalist areas. Electorally, the relationship continues to flourish. Amongst younger Orange Order members (between 18 and 35 years old), the DUP was four times more popular than its closest electoral rival by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, whilst older brethren socialised politically in an era of UUP dominance were more likely to remain loyal to the UUP.

The changes within post–Agreement unionism have been exemplified in the rise of the DUP from a bit player to the main unionist political force. These changes spawned from the immediate mobilisation of hostilities towards the GFA and from a younger generation of Protestant Unionists who had not politically socialised in an era of UUP electoral dominance. ‘Rational civics’ believed the GFA offered a reasonable assurance on securing the constitutional position of Northern Ireland, whilst containing its

117 Member of the Orange Order from a rural setting, interview with author, 13 March 2014
118 Tom Elliott, former UUP MLA, former UUP MP and member of the Orange Order, interview with author, 2 July 2014
119 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Pages 162–164
120 Tonge et al., The Democratic Unionist Party (2014) Page 149
121 Ibid Page 152
122 Ibid Page 174
opponents, and understood it to be the most progressive way forward. Anti-GFA unionists opposed aspects of the civic and liberal forms of unionism underpinning the deal as too concessionary and believed the GFA undermined the Union and the unionist position within Northern Ireland. The Orange Order’s opposition to the Agreement was an accurate representation of the will of the rank and file membership. Whilst Orange Order membership remained an influential variable in respect of the attitudes of UUC delegates, younger Orange members were quickly disaffected by the UUP, rejected Trimble’s new civic form of unionism, and ‘relied upon instrumentalism rather than nostalgia in determining their party of choice’. The Orange–UUP link was formally severed in 2005 and the non-aligned position of the Order appeared to meet with approval of its members. Without the affiliation to a political party, the Order has the opportunity to promote genuine, cross-party unionist unity and secure the best possible resources for unionists in the province.

**Conclusion**

The circumstances in which the Orange Order in Northern Ireland functions have changed considerably since the dissolution of the unionist-dominated parliament in 1972. With a strong membership base at the start of the Troubles (almost 100,000 members), the Order had been instrumental in maintaining the cross-class alliance upon which unionist political hegemony was based. However, since, the Orange Order has faced cataclysmic divisions within the Protestant bloc over power-sharing governance and extensive political reforms. This chapter has asked the question: to what extent and why did the Orange Order become politically isolated in the aftermath of the collapse of the 1921–1972 Northern Ireland Parliament and to what extent has that meant the Order has been of insufficient relevance subsequently to replenish brethren? It has explored how the collapse of the Northern Ireland Parliament and the aforementioned, subsequent political

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developments affected the Orange institution and it has been able to track how the Order’s role in the Northern Ireland polity has changed.

Between the formation of the northern state and the 1960s, there is little evidence of any overt, observable influence being wielded by the Orange Order over government policy. However, during the period, the institution had little need to exert Orange pressure upon the UUP government because (with the exception of a small number of disputes) most aspects of UUP policy were in line with the Order’s interests. The institution’s presence in the politics of Northern Ireland – with its overrepresentation on the UUC and Standing Committee and the near universal Orange membership of unionist politicians at Stormont – ensured a symmetry of UUP and Orange interests.

The ability of the Order to uphold its desires within unionist politics came to an end under the premiership of Terence O’Neill. The Orange Order was caught between its traditional role of public support for the UUP government and the unease of the institution’s grassroots over UUP reformist agendas under O’Neill. O’Neillites were confident that Catholics could overcome their rejection of the state and accept the olive branches on offer, but many working–class and rural Protestants – themselves suffering similar structural conditions and for whom talk of marginal Protestant advantages seemed illusionary – identified civil rights protests as an immediate, constitutional threat and felt vindicated when armed republicanism arose. O’Neill was trapped by the demand for liberal governance from the unionist ascendancy and Westminster, opposition from the UUP grassroots, and militant Paisleyism from outside the party. The resignations of O’Neill and Clark, as UUP and Orange Order leaders respectively, demonstrated the tensions that plagued unionism. When neither Chichester–Clark nor Faulkner could manage Northern Ireland effectively, Westminster imposed direct rule. Whilst the Orange–assisted, UWC strike contributed to the collapse of the Sunningdale Executive in 1974, unionism was to evolve throughout the following decades and the 1985 Anglo–Irish
Agreement forced all unionists in the province to face the harsh truth that a return to a unionist, majoritarian parliament was not possible. Throughout the period of direct rule, the Molyneaux–Smyth axis helped maintain some level of continuity amongst the Order’s membership and the institution ‘acted as a glue’ for northern unionism. However, the GFA would tear the UUP asunder and Paisley’s form of ‘no’ unionism would gather even greater pace.

Post–GFA unionism has witnessed the rise of the DUP from a bit player to a main political actor. These changes lie in the immediate mobilisation of hostilities towards the Agreement and in younger Protestant Unionists who had not politically socialised during an era of UUP dominance. ‘Rational civics’ believed the GFA offered a reasonable assurance on securing the nation whilst containing its opponents and understood it to be the most pragmatic way forward. Anti–GFA unionists opposed civic and liberal forms of unionism and believed the Agreement undermined the Union and unionist paradigm. The Orange Order’s opposition to the GFA was an accurate representation of the rank and file membership, which was fiercely opposed to modernising political change. Whilst Orange Order membership remained an influential variable on the attitudes of UUC voters, younger Orange members were quickly disaffected by the UUP, rejected Trimble, and aligned themselves to the DUP. The historic Orange–UUP link was formally severed in 2005 and the Order’s non–aligned position appears to meet with the approval of its members. Without the affiliation to a political party, the institution’s new role in northern politics is one that promotes cross–party unionist hegemony, resists change to the unionist paradigm, and secures the best possible resources for unionists in the province.

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124 Member of the Orange Order from a rural setting, interview with author, 13 March 2014
When, in 1934, Craigavon claimed, ‘I am an Orangeman first and a politician [...] afterwards’, the two positions were synonymous and no obvious contradiction existed between them. When unionist division grew in the 1960s however, the Order divided between supporting the unionist ascendancy and government and maintaining the support of the Protestant grassroots. When, after over twenty-five years in the political wilderness, the Order accurately read and represented the sentiments of its membership on the 1998 GFA, its affiliation to the UUC, and its rebellion against the UUP leader rendered untenable a continued formal presence within the UUP. As the UUP has become more marginalized in the politics of Northern Ireland, so too has the Orange Order. It now operates as a prominent pressure group within its politics, albeit one of the largest and one enjoying more indirect representation in terms of MLAs belonging than other groups.

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Chapter Three

Intolerance in a tolerant society?
Parading, sectarianism, and declining middle-class respectability

Introduction

Having contextualised the Orange Order within Northern Irish society and assessed the extent to which growing political isolation has challenged institutional Orangeism, this chapter – the first of two testing this explanatory variable – will examine the extent to which criticisms of the Orange Order as a sectarian organisation have impacted negatively the Order and its public image. Have its – to critics – supposed displays of bigotry and prejudice damaged its integrity and capacity to attract members, particularly middle-class Protestants. How apposite is Kennaway’s contention that ‘in an age when the only acceptable intolerance is an intolerance of intolerance, there is no real place for the Orange institution’?¹

Kaufmann notes the oddity of the Order’s problems having appeared to have increased during a time when ‘[r]epublican guns had largely fallen silent with the IRA ceasefire negotiated through back-channel diplomacy between Dublin, London, the SDLP, and Sinn Féin’; a period that should not have necessarily presented the Order with a threat.² Yet the decline of republican and loyalist paramilitary violence was replaced by conflicts over marching. Dudley–Edwards argues that this was due, in no small part, to Sinn Féin mobilising Catholics into community residents’ groups to oppose Orange parades.³ Whilst this shift did occur in republican strategy, it must be noted that Catholics had never supported Orange marches and marching had always been an area of contention in residential areas.⁴ Kennaway argues that ‘most thinking people within and without the institution knew very well that to

¹ Kennaway, A Tradition Betrayed (2006) Page 256
⁴ Bryan, Orange Parades (2000)
say that we would “walk out traditional routes” was simply nonsense’ and explains that routes had evolved over time in line with the limits of police protection. As Kennaway questions: ‘Apart from the megalomania of some Portadown leaders, what was so special about the Garvaghy Road, itself a re-routing?’

Disputes over Orange parade routes in areas like County Down or Dungiven in 1953, or Londonderry in 1959 and 1971 did not significantly differ from the conflict that emerged in Portadown. Kaufmann contends that, ‘[i]n all cases, nationalist mobilisation against the Order’s parades did not occur spontaneously, but required organisation’. This organisation, Kaufmann claims, came through the Catholic Church, the SDLP, and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) whilst the Provisional IRA offered support to Nationalist opponents from 1970. This had resulted in a changing balance of power between unionists and nationalists, beginning in the early 1950s, because parades ultimately follow power. In their examination of nationalist and republican parades, Jarman and Bryan contend that the ‘development of particular forms of cultural “tradition” is dependent upon political power’. One can only parade when one is safe to and this safety is ultimately sourced from the state’s willingness to provide protection. Under Stormont, the government controlled nationalist parades through acts such as the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Act in 1951 and the 1954 Flags and Emblems Act. At the same time, Orange Order parades continued to follow their chosen routes because of their status of ‘traditional processions’. There remain a multitude of reasons for parading and demonstrating. Jarman and Bryan phrase it: ‘Orange parades are not simply a manifestation of “croppies lie down”

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5 Kennaway, A Tradition Betrayed (2007) Pages 99–100
6 See: Chapter 4 for full discussion of Drumcree and Ardoyne parading disputes
7 Kaufmann, The Orange Order (2007) Page 150
9 Ibid
and republican commemorations are not in themselves a demand for “Brits out”. Instead they are complicated happenings that engage a nexus of symbolic and sociological stimuli.

However, access to political expression within the public domain, and the development of the ‘traditional’ status in Northern Ireland has been dictated by access to power. Jarman and Bryan contend: ‘Rarely, if ever, have there been attempts to offer the right of public political expression as a right held equally by all regardless of public political expression as a right held equally by all regardless of political and communal affiliation’. Since the 1960s, a combination of pressure from Westminster, republican frustration, and IRA violence had ensured the expansion of nationalist parading, along with some counter–demonstrations against Orange parades in nationalist areas. Republican activity did not affect the number of loyalist parades. Between 1985 and 1997, RUC statistics reveal that the number of republican parades increased from 223 to 230 whilst loyalist marches went from 2,120 to 3,314.

This chapter explores how the Orange Order’s public demonstrations may have created a reputation of aggressive sectarianism. It will explore how the institution uses parading as a cultural expression and the detrimental impacts it can have when seen as threatening or mired in controversy. The chapter considers the impact of band culture in Northern Ireland and assesses specifically the impact this has had on the Orange Order’s respectability amongst the middle–class. Finally, it will consider how the Orange Order has attempted to manage the controversies in which it has found itself embroiled.

11 Jarman and Bryan, From Riots to Rights (1998)
12 Ibid
Parading

The ‘timelessness’ of certain parades, their quasi–religious structure, their relationships to a host of historical events, and their cultural symbolism all contribute to the importance of the Orange parading tradition. The Twelfth of July celebration is the pinnacle of a full programme of activity that occurs annually from March until the winter months. Bryan argues that the pageantry of the Twelfth commemoration is designed and executed in a way befitting a religious ritual or rite. The position of lodge officials in the parade formation, the design of the banner, the procession of ornamental swords or pikes to symbolise protection of the lodge, all contribute to creating an experience of reverence. The onlookers are expected to remain within certain behavioural boundaries, not crossing between ranks or even in close proximity to them; ‘[t]here is a strong sense of integrity to the parade which is broken at a spectator’s peril’.\(^1\) Even in light of this revered integrity associated with the parade, the behavioural constraints upon members of lodges parading can vary significantly from lodge to lodge, from parade to parade. Some lodges, particularly those at district or county level with military connections, will ‘march’ their route, composed and may even refrain from interacting with the gathered crowd. Other Orangemen ‘walk’ in regular files, waving at spectators. In its extreme, the latter groups may even dance down their routes, shouting and singing *The Sash* and other ballads. This however often occurs later in the day and can be associated with alcohol consumption, particularly amongst younger members. Some lodges declare themselves ‘temperance’ and many more would frown upon such carnival–esque activity.\(^5\) Nevertheless, particularly in parts of Belfast, many Order members drink heavily on the Twelfth, leading to many members to refer to factions as ‘the blue bag brigade’, alluding to the alcohol they bring in bags from off–licences.\(^6\)


\(^{15}\) Brian Courtney, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014

\(^{16}\) McAuley, *et al.*, *Loyal to the Core?* (2011) Page 74
A member of the Parades Commission, anathema to many Orange Order members, acknowledged the significance of marching for the Orange Order, agreeing that, for the institution, parading ‘is vital; the Orange Order consider [parading] a vital part of their heritage and a vital part of what they do.’\(^1\) A means of measuring the significance the institution places on parading is assessing the coverage of parades in the Order’s official monthly publication: the *Orange Standard*. The number of references to parades, parading, and its variations within the *Orange Standard* over the course of two years – 1994 and 2014 – can be seen in Table 3.1. Fairly predictably, the August edition of the publications contained the most references to parades in both years, reviewing the summer parading season and annual Twelfth commemorations. A key finding however, demonstrated by the graph below, is the dramatic increase in the number of references to parades in 1994 and 2014. Over a period of twenty years, the Order has shifted the focus of its official newspaper, bringing parading to the fore for its members.

Between 1994 and 2014, the *Orange Standard* increased the size of each edition by four pages; perhaps, therefore, it is predictable that a topic of such significance to the institution is covered more than at a time when space was at a premium. As can be seen on Table 3.2, the number of pictures of parades in the publications has remained consistent; it is the textual coverage that has increased. Table 3.3 demonstrates how recent *Orange Standards* have offered greater coverage of parading. Parading is the most significant topic discussed in 2014 editions of the *Orange Standard* and there more than three times as many references to the subject matter in 2014 than there are in 1994. Therefore, it can be asserted that, even accounting for the increased space of the 2014 editions of the

\(^1\) Member of the Parades Commission, interview with author, 24 August 2016
*Orange Standard*, the contemporary Order is discussing parades more and is keeping parading at the forefront of the minds of its members and readers of its main publication.

**Table 3.1 Number of references to parades and parading in *Orange Standard*, 1994 and 2014**

![Graph showing number of references to parades and parading in *Orange Standard* from 1994 to 2014.]

**Table 3.2 Number of pictures of parading in *Orange Standard*, 1994 and 2014**

![Graph showing number of pictures of parading in *Orange Standard* from 1994 to 2014.]

The increased focus on parades is thus an internal aspect of the Orange Order as well as an external development. The Order is often viewed through the prism of its parades, placing considerable responsibility on organisers for these demonstrations to portray the Orange institution in a favourable light. Parading is impacted by a changing political climate and vested interests in the present. In the collective Orange consciousness, participants may feel they are walking in the footsteps of their Williamite forebears, but parades are open to evolution and development. Debates over the components and outlook of parades are most apparent over the main day of Protestant celebration, the twelfth of July. Here, discussions have concerned the difficulties of accommodating inclusivity without dilution of key religious, political, or cultural messages. The Twelfth is the showcase for the

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18 Category titled ‘Victimhood of the Order’ includes: coverage of attacks on Orange Halls; alleged hate crimes and sectarianism committed against the institution and/or its members; and activity of the Provisional IRA.

Alderman Thomas Haire, a former County Grand Master of Belfast, said that he saw the attempt by the Grand Lodge to rebrand the Twelfth of July ‘Orangefest’ as helpful in attracting new members to the Order and in engaging more positively with the public. Alderman Haire explained:

I was instrumental along with others in starting what we have called “Belfast Orangefest” … We engage with the city centre management; we have banners put up pre–Twelfth; we have had street entertainers out and so forth; and these past two years we have extended that to use the City Hall grounds for a thing called a “Taste of Ulster”. On the twelfth, there are burger bars and so forth and they do a roaring trade. It was so successful two years ago that last year there was an even greater demand for it.20

Whilst noting the conflict in thought between urban and rural lodges, Haire notes ‘we have seen [Orangefest] as a success […] It is a big puller’21 accepting that evolution can be helpful in a celebration marked by continuity.22

**Band Culture**

But Orangemen only represent one aspect of parades. The band is perhaps the most obvious part of the parades and the role they play is significant in the presentation of parading. Loyalist marches in Northern Ireland are often accompanied by a musical element; bagpipe or ‘kilty’ bands are fairly common across Northern Ireland, although maintaining a much greater presence in the country districts of the province. They provide a clear link to the Ulster Scots heritage and the contemporary Scottish brethren. Silver bands are less common due to: firstly, the expense of purchasing and

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20 Alderman Thomas Haire, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014
21 Ibid
maintaining such instruments; and, secondly, the necessary musical ability on the part of the band members. Previously, silver bands may have been connected to a local factory but the decline in industry communities has asphyxiated their existence. Silver bands are rarely seen parading in Northern Ireland and by far the most common marching band in Northern Ireland is the flute band. Bryan notes that three distinct types of flute band can be identified: a full music flute band; the slightly less skilled melody or ‘part music’ band; and the ‘blood and thunder’ or ‘kick the pope’ flute bands, which include some members with limited or no musical knowledge at all.\(^{23}\)

Setting up a ‘blood and thunder’ band is common, as is band fragmentation. Bryan explains: ‘Splits in bands are not uncommon and bands come in and out of existence as the number and compatibility of the membership dictate’.\(^{24}\) Senior band members lead music tuition and many form comprehensive infrastructures, including committees, with secretaries and treasurers. In some bands, these officials, along with senior band members functioning as marshals, set up disciplinary procedures for poor attendance of members and regulate discipline, even imposing fines or using fixed term exclusions in serious cases. Bell’s examination of loyalist bands in Londonderry outlines the life–cycle of bands:

Band suits and their accompanying accoutrements, lanyards, badges, leather belts, and plumes are expensive and it took the band considerable time and effort to raise the money needed to purchase these items. Sammy assured me that it cost over £100 to “put a flutter on the street”. Though the lads paid a weekly subscription of 50p, most of the money had to be raised by street collections, by holding discos and collecting during the band’s annual parade.

The drive to raise money, in turn, made the band, or at least its leaders, more responsive to community social control. As the bands get established and the average age of the

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\(^{23}\) Jordan Adair, Bandsman, interview with author in Liverpool, 2 August 2014

members tends to rise, the bands become smaller as those less interested in the purely musical developments tend to drop out. At this point the bands either tend to fall apart as they abandon their subcultural functions or continue to evolve into a more established “competition” outfits.25

What often begins as an expression of defiance, with a large teenage membership more interested in combative solidarity, matures into a more mainstream competition–orientated group of musicians, creating the opportunity for a small group of members to defect and establish their own ‘blood and thunder’ band and begin the process once more.

Jarman’s general study of the development of bands,26 Jenkins’ assessment of working–class youth culture and the transition from school to work in Belfast,27 Bryan’s examination at bands in the context of the Orange parading tradition,28 Radford’s assessment of gender identity within Protestant marching bands,29 and Bell’s study of loyalist bands as part of youth culture in Londonderry30 all indicate that ‘blood and thunder’ bands have a common social setting, rooted in working–class, urban areas, or housing estates in rural districts. The parading of colours in band uniforms gained traction throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Prior to this, Orange lodges had retained a monopoly of carrying colours on parade. With this dramatic presence – created by uniform, regalia, and insignia – the ‘blood and thunder’ bands lent Orange marches a visual spectacle, popular with many Orangemen. Similarly, band names and loyalist insignia were painted on the bass drums. Titles such as ‘Defenders’, ‘True Blues’ and ‘Volunteers’ provoke popular shared cultural memories in addition to the feeling of defensive battle. Some reference loyalist paramilitary groups.

28 Bryan, Orange Parades (2000)
30 Bell, Acts of Union (1990)
In response to the onset of band culture, the Grand Lodge has taken measures to, as it sees it, best protect its interests and introduced a band contract in 1986. The eleven–clause contract specifically prohibited alcohol consumption, shouting whilst on parade and ‘dancing or jig time step’. It insisted that only hymns and recognised sacred music could be used on church parades and, in order to retain control, bands must be under the jurisdiction of a private, district or county lodge and members expelled from the institution or from band membership were prohibited from taking part.\textsuperscript{31} McAuley, \textit{et al.} argue that most Orange members see these regulations as positive, proactive attempts at bringing bands into line with mainstream Orange thinking. They also contend that because many associate loyalist bands with paramilitary activity, specific clauses limiting the flags used on parade are helpful at divorcing the claimed affiliation between the bands, the Order, and paramilitarism.\textsuperscript{32} Opinion is divided over the links between loyalist paramilitarism and the ‘blood and thunder’ bands. Bell sees such activity as ostentatious; youthful, masculine defiance directed towards the sobriety and formality of the Loyal Orders.\textsuperscript{33} Dudley–Edwards contends that ‘blood and thunder’ bands have functioned as a ‘safety valve’ for the Protestant community, recruiting young people who might otherwise have joined paramilitary organisations.\textsuperscript{34} However, Jarman argues the bands have a far closer relationship with paramilitary groups,\textsuperscript{35} presented most prominently in the flags, colours, and bannerettes paraded by the bands. Most commonly, Orange parades carry the Ulster cross, the flag of St Andrew and the Union flag, however many bands carry flags commemorating the UVF, the Young Citizens Volunteers and, in recent decades, the unofficial Independent Ulster flag. Mainstream Orange parades carry banners referencing historical events or Biblical figures, or in some cases commemorate members killed in the recent conflict (but even in these cases the circumstances surrounding the death are largely ignored). Jarman notes that young working–class males make the least subtle references

\textsuperscript{32} McAuley \textit{et al.}, \textit{Loyal to the Core?} (2011) Pages 75–76
\textsuperscript{33} Bell, \textit{Acts of Union} (1990)
\textsuperscript{34} Dudley–Edwards, \textit{The Faithful Tribe} (1999) Page 97
\textsuperscript{35} Jarman, ‘For God and Ulster’ (2000)
to the Troubles and even openly support paramilitary groups.\textsuperscript{36} Even if the connection isn’t intrinsic in all examples, ‘the association of some of the bands and their symbols with paramilitary groups is problematic for “respectable” Orangeism’.\textsuperscript{37}

Bryan contends the development of these loyalist bands ‘has been, without question, the most distinctive development in loyalist political culture since the 1960s’.\textsuperscript{38} The bands are to loyalist responses to their perceived marginalisation and displacement.\textsuperscript{39} Amid de–industrialisation, many young, working–class Protestant males became socially and politically marginalised, resulting in an identity crisis. In response, the development of ‘blood and thunder’ bands and subcultural gangs – associated with tartan scarves, short hair, and tattoos including loyalist symbol – are expressions of defiance and an attempt to retain a collective, working–class identity. Loyalist youths are key players in the sectarian landscape and the development of ‘blood and thunder’ bands forms ‘the pivotal link between the formal institutions of Orangeism and the street–based sphere of youth culture’\textsuperscript{40}.

For young Loyalists, the experience of marching bands can help fill this identity void and can often be understood as a more genuine expression of the Protestant unionist identity, compared to membership of the Orange Order.\textsuperscript{41} Consequently, this makes bands a more attractive social outlet for disaffected loyalist youths at the expense of the membership of other cultural organisations.\textsuperscript{42} One bandsman commented: ‘Some of my friends are members [of the Orange Order], my age some of them; they’ve tried to get me to join. I say to them “there’s no point”. I’m in the […] band – I’ll be

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid} Page 127
\textsuperscript{39} Bell, \textit{Acts of Union} (1990) Pages 124–126
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid} Page 181
\textsuperscript{41} Radford, ‘Drum rolls and gender roles in Protestant marching bands in Belfast’ (2001)
enjoying the Twelfth more than you will.” Band membership makes an obvious and welcome alternative to the formality of social expression through membership of the Orange Order. McAuley et al. found that there exists a generational divide between those attracted to band culture and those who express their Protestantism through Orange membership. However, the bands retain their own social dynamism and encompass cultural practices. This may conflict with the Orange Order’s mission to bring about solidarity across the Protestant unionist bloc.

Many lodges enlist bands to parade with and, the bands that do, are as much a part of the Orange Twelfth celebrations as a lodge’s membership. As young loyalists find band culture appealing, young working–class males are able to express their Protestant unionism without negotiating the religious and social demands of Order membership. The parades of the Orange Order bind together these ostensibly socially separate wings of Orangeism and loyalism, brought together in celebration of events and articulating a collective unionist memory. The pageantry of the parades: the flags and banners; the collarettes and massed ranks; the warlike sound of drums, all serve to present the Orange Order, to both its own community and those beyond, as fulfilling its role of creating and nurturing unity within the Protestant unionist bloc.

**Contemporary Orangeism and sectarianism**

Conscious of the need to try and dilute its image as a sectarian organisation amid parading controversies, the Orange Order has attempted to communicate its key messages to the public in a more coherent fashion. Restructuring ensued and, whilst some traditional members of the Education Committee (which was due to be altered) – including its chairperson the Reverend Brian Kennaway –

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43 Jordan Adair, Bandsman, interview with author in Liverpool, 2 August 2014
44 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Pages 73–74
resigned in 2000, a drive to craft a new ‘Orange brand’ commenced. In the same year, a public relations team was established, as was a team for publications.⁴⁶ Ahead of the 2002 marching season, the Order engaged with media consultants to train its spokesperson in media management and how to hold press conferences. Furthermore, it brought in a public relations company, a package it has continued to buy into in subsequent years.⁴⁷ The Orange Communications Committee set about developing a means by which it could respond to, or even try and shape, media agendas twenty–four hours a day. Kaufmann notes that the institution was conscious, during this rebranding period, that it had seldom fundraised for external, much more consensual, causes and so the Order donated one thousand pounds to Cancer Research UK, encouraging its members to ‘develop a reputation as a respected and responsible organisation’.⁴⁸

As part of this new, (somewhat) outward–looking attitude, the institution amended its thinking towards government funding. The Education Committee initiated a process of applying for many grants⁴⁹ and the institution participated in cultural exhibitions, like the Waterfront Festival in Belfast. In recent years, the Order has been successful in securing peace funds from the European Regional Development Fund to develop young leaders and community development, the latter part containing a cross–community dimension.⁵⁰ Such awards indicated how the Orange Order was far from a pariah organisation. Nonetheless, it was still an outfit which at times appeared to possess problems of image and ill–discipline. Inevitably, for any organisation establishing discipline is no easy feat, particularly in an organisation that operates with voluntary membership. Furthermore, the Order’s long–standing disciplinary structure, in which members must first be expelled from their private lodge before the Grand Lodge can remove the individual, aided the protection of aggravators from exclusion for

⁴⁷ Kaufmann, The Orange Order (2006) Pages 300–301
⁴⁸ Grand Lodge of Ireland documents, quoted in Kaufmann, The Orange Order (2007) Page 301
⁴⁹ Kennaway, A Tradition Betrayed (2006)
decades. Within an historical context whereby membership of the Orange Order was once seen as a useful basis from which to enter employment and politics, expulsion held a greater sanction than is the case today. The Order’s principles and rulings were synonymous with the behavioural expectations of the Protestant majority; hence, exclusion was seen as a disgrace.

Grand Lodge has been ineffective at disciplining brethren and the cases of Gusty Spence and Robert Williamson are examples of this mismanagement. Founder members of the reformed UVF unit in the 1960s and convicted of the murder of a Catholic barman from the Shankill Road, their lodge in Clifton District included multiple family members and sympathisers who resisted disciplinary action. Seeking not to ‘ruffle feathers’, the response of the Central Committee was to prevaricate and it took over a year and pressure from the then Belfast County Grand Master, the Reverend Martin Smyth, for the pair to be removed.\textsuperscript{51} It was as late as 2001 that the Grand Master was given the power to directly suspend or expel deviants who commit an offence. Since this new power has been introduced, it has rarely been used. Indeed, not only has this new power not been put to effective use, but the Order has gone to lengths to protect its members in court. In 2002, fifteen men (a number of whom were Orangemen) were convicted of riotous assembly when stone throwing broke out during Drumcree parade demonstrations, receiving suspended sentences at Belfast Crown Court. Several of those charged had admitted guilt, but the Order remained supportive of the men. The Grand Secretary, Denis Watson, attended the trial and the Grand Master, Robert Saulters, even accused the police service and judicial system of setting up the men.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{51} Kaufmann, \textit{The Orange Order} (2006) Pages 286–288
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Belfast Telegraph}, 22 November 2003
Prior to the trial, Saulters had declared that ‘troublemakers will be thrown out of Order – if proven guilty’, and Watson had made the Grand Lodge’s stance clear earlier: ‘Anyone convicted of a criminal offence is automatically expelled from the institution’. When the men entered guilty pleas and these positions were not adhered to and the men were not disciplined, Brian Kennaway displayed his outrage in the *Belfast Telegraph*: ‘It is unprecedented in the two–hundred–year history of the Orange institution that the leadership should support criminals, and self–confessed criminals at that’. In response to the resignation of the moderate Deputy Grand Chaplain, the Reverend Denis Bannerman, who had protested over the Order’s disregard for biblical teaching which required obedience to the legally–appointed authority and respect for the law, Saulters was dismissive. Claiming it was up to individual lodges to determine whether brethren were to be subjected to disciplinary action (even though the aforementioned 2001 amendment empowered the Grand Master to intervene), Saulters reasoned that ‘not recognising the Parades Commission could also be defined as not recognising the lawful authority’. In December that year, the Grand Master went on to accuse Bannerman and other of too readily forgiving ‘IRA murders’ and further justified his actions, claiming: ‘the day that the Grand Master did not stand up for his members was a time when something was going wrong’.

However, when considering the institution’s effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) at maintaining order, it is important to condition that observation with its resolute rejection of paramilitary activity. The Orange leadership has always encouraged its members to join the state security services, which until the end of the conflict contained a sizeable number of Orange Order members and oppose paramilitary groups. Indeed, the leadership has consistently condemned organised political violence

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53 *News Letter*, 6 August 2003
54 Words of Denis Watson, speaking on ‘Spotlight’ (BBC Northern Ireland Programme, First broadcast: 17 October 2000)
55 *Belfast Telegraph*, 29 November 2003
and has prided itself on its respectability by not being affiliated to such groups, in contrast with what it comprehends as a more sympathetic attitude to paramilitarism amongst the nationalist community. Despite this strong position on paramilitary activity, the earlier evidence would demonstrate that the Order has never been effective at isolating and disciplining political rebels within its own ranks, and is further substantiated by the multiple cases of disorder amongst members recorded in Kennaway’s book, who logs the disciplinary action – or lack thereof – taken against members. The number of expulsions has never exceeded twenty for Northern Ireland in any one year.

**Upholding Protestantism or Sectarianism: Attitudes to Roman Catholicism and its ‘errors’**

Half of all expulsions from the Order between 1964 and 2005 were in response to poor discipline; the remaining 45 to 50 per cent of exclusions, documented in Kaufmann’s analysis, were for members marrying or cohabiting with Roman Catholics and attending Roman Catholic services, including funerals and baptisms. The Order has declined to provide details of any expulsions since 2005. In its promotion of the Protestant faith, Orange Order members are required to adhere to a religious behavioural code as well as a general behavioural code of conduct, in which members must denounce the doctrines of the Roman Church because Protestants see ‘major theological differences between the two faiths’. As one member from Belfast explained: ‘We don't agree with their [Roman Catholics’] views on things, obviously on a biblical standard, justification by faith and faith alone, in

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58 Some Orangemen may have had contact with paramilitarism through association with the Orange Volunteers during the 1970s, a group (formed in the same period) that had an active role in the Ulster Workers’ Council Strike of 1974 and aided the loyalist strike of 1977. There is no evidence that the Orange Order leadership supported their establishment or supported them. This group remains distinct and separate from groups of the same name that emerged in the 1990s in late 2000s, both of whom targeted Catholic-owned property.

59 McAuley et al., *Loyal to the Core?* (2011) Page 70


62 The Grand Lodge of Ireland does not provide more recent figures.

63 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 25 August 2014
Christ alone, and not through any intermediary; and therefore we don’t agree with the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church’.  

64 George Chittick, County Grand Master of Belfast Lodge, summarised the differences between the two faith groups when asked why a Roman Catholic can’t be a member of the Orange Intuition:

It’s as simple as this: transubstantiation […] That’s the celebration of Mass. They believe the priest can turn the wine into blood and the bread becomes the body of Christ. A Protestant doesn’t believe in that […] and the other thing is there’s only one intermediary between God and man, and they believe you go through the saints and all this so therefore they couldn’t comprehend being a Protestant.  

65 Viewing Catholicism as idolatrous, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church is rejected by the Order and Papal visits to the United Kingdom (in 1982 and 2010) have been opposed by the institution. When joining, Orangemen are required to make an ‘unambiguous rejection of the themes of the Roman Catholic Church’.  

66 On the Grand Lodge’s website, the Reverend Canon Long, Senior Grand Chaplain, advises Orangemen to be ‘committed to the Christian faith with its Reformation emphasis on a personal relationship with Jesus Christ’  

67 and, furthermore, in the Qualifications of an Orangeman, the Order expects members to ‘strenuously oppose the fatal errors and doctrines of the Church of Rome, and scrupulously avoid countenancing […] any act or ceremony of Popish Worship’.

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64 Alderman Thomas Haire, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with the author in Belfast, 17 January 2014

65 George Chittick, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014


67 Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland [http://www.grandorangelodge.co.uk] accessed 1 September 2014

Despite its resolute rejection of the Catholic faith, the Order demands its members respect individual Roman Catholics. One member contends:

I've never seen it [anti–Catholicism], hand on heart, as an Orange member, I've never heard an uncharitable word said about Roman Catholics. The Orange Order, in its constitution, it is no secret that it has major problems with the Catholic Church, how it operates, that is the nature unfortunately, and that is the reason for Protestantism and reformation generally, but our rules specifically prohibited against uncharitable words or anything against Catholics or any other non–reformed faiths. 69

Orangemen are expected to abstain from discourteous remarks and disrespectful acts toward Roman Catholics and even ‘in the opening ritual of the Order, we pray for all Roman Catholics’. 70 It is expected that members honour a citizen’s right to freedom of religious expression and ‘toleration of all others.’ 71 One member articulated an example:

There was a wee reservoir, the pipes had burst and washed the road away, and [a Roman Catholic woman] lived up the Divis Mountain and she come to me and she says, “How am I getting down to Mass?” I said, “Get on my back.” I carried her down [...] and she couldn’t thank me enough and I said, “The District Master of Sandy Row [Orange Lodge] carried you up [sic] to go the Mass because it’s a civil and religious liberty as far as I’m concerned.” 72

Indeed, at times the Order has come under fire from some Loyalists for its engagement with Catholics. In 1997, Robert Saulters, then Grand Master, was subject to severe criticism for being ‘out of touch with the grassroots membership’ when he visited the Harryville Roman Catholic Church in Ballymena.

69 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014
70 Alderman Thomas Haire, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014
71 Brian Blair, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 10 November 2013
72 George Chittick, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014
to support local Catholics whose chapel was being picketed by loyalists. Similarly, then UUP leader and former County Grand Master of Fermanagh, Tom Elliot MLA and his former deputy leader, Danny Kennedy MLA, faced some criticism when they attended the Catholic funeral of Ronan Kerr, a police officer killed by dissident republicans in April 2011. Reverend David McCarthy, part of the short–lived Orange Reformation Group who sought to ‘put Protestantism back into Orangeism’, claimed the group was ‘greatly dismayed’ and called, unsuccessfully, for Elliott and Kennedy to be expelled. Furthermore, the Grand Lodge has been consistent in its condemnation of attacks on Catholic churches, maintaining the distinction between the individuals Roman Catholics who have a right to religious expression and heinous evils associated with ‘popery’.

The charge of anti–Catholicism is rooted in both the historical context in which the institution emerged and the way that context forms aspects of its contemporary activity. Formed in the immediate aftermath of Protestant victory at the Battle of the Diamond in 1795, the Order’s primary annual celebration – the Battle of the Boyne – is a celebration of an earlier Protestant victory. The Order celebrates that period in history because, it claims, it brought about an era of ‘religious tolerance, freedom of speech and press, liberty of the subject, independence of judges to interpret the law and the development, both at home and overseas, of parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy’. Opponents, however, see the celebrations as sectarian triumphalism and religious antagonism. Similarly, other critics have interpreted the Order’s historic use of anti–Catholic

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73 Belfast Telegraph, 14 January 2014
75 Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, ‘History of Orangeism’ [http://www.grandorangelodge.co.uk/History] accessed 3 September 2014
sentiment as constructed for political as well as religious purposes, but remain convinced of the Order’s sectarian foundation and practice.

Generally, members tend to reject the stigma of being against individual Roman Catholics. In McAuley et al.’s membership survey, 72 per cent of members disagreed that the Order was anti–Catholic and consistently, in interviews with the author, members have rejected the tag and were keen to make the distinction between the Roman Catholic Church and those who practice that faith. One member responded: ‘No, I don’t think [the Orange Order] is [anti–Roman Catholic…] we are not against the Roman Catholics’, and another commented, ‘this idea that we wake up and think “How can we do down the Catholic Church?” is nonsense’. One member contends:

There is no doubt that the perception of some Roman Catholics is that the Orange Order is anti–Catholic. The reality is somewhat different. It is true that membership of the Order is confined to people of the Protestant faith, but then the Order is a Protestant organisation. The Orange Order is certainly against union between the Protestant churches and the Roman Catholic Church and the Order contends that this is because the Roman Catholic Church is not reformed. The Qualifications of an Orangeman, which all recruits to the Order must promise to subscribe to is that an Orangeman must not cause offence to people of the Roman Catholic religion by word or deed.

There is however a greater readiness on the part of members to identify the Order as ‘anti–Roman Catholic Church’, with 57 per cent conceding such a label in McAuley et al.’s study. Although 35 per

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78 Data supplied by McAuley, Tonge and Mycock, Membership Survey (2011) Unpublished raw data
79 Councillor William Leatham, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 28 August 2014
80 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 25 August 2014
81 Brain Courtney, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with the author in Belfast, 27 November 2013
82 Data supplied by McAuley, Tonge and Mycock, Membership Survey (2011) Unpublished raw data
63 per cent of Orange Order members oppose ecumenical projects, only 21 per cent agreeing that ‘there was no harm’ in them. As McAuley et al. note, ‘given the stridency of the Order’s rejection of Rome there may be little surprise that one in five members do not mind such projects’.84

Orange Order applicants must show that they were educated within the Protestant faith and do not now have, nor have they ever had, any connection to the Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, the Constitution, Laws and Ordinances states specifically, ‘No person who at any time has been a Roman Catholic […] shall be admitted into the institution’.85 This preoccupation with members’ association with Catholicism has only become of an issue for the leadership in the last century or so. It was certainly not the case for Doctor Patrick Duigenan, a Catholic who converted to Protestantism in youth, who was appointed the second Grand Secretary of the Order in 1801,86 neither for the Reverend Mortimer O’Sullivan, a Catholic convert, who was raised to the Grand Chaplaincy.87

Similarly, the Order’s admissions process requires candidates to confirm that their wife is Protestant or that they are not married.88 Whilst Kennaway notes that there are a handful of records of expulsions for ‘marrying a Papist’ immediately prior to the introduction of the ruling, the prohibition on marrying

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83 Peter Weir MLA, DUP MLA for Strangford and member of the Orange Order, interview with author in Belfast, 17 June 2014
84 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Page 166
85 Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, Constitution, Laws and Ordinances of the Loyal Orange Institution (Belfast: Grand Orange Lodge, 1967)
88 Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, Constitution, Laws and Ordinances of the Loyal Orange Institution (1967) Appendix
Catholics was only introduced in 1863, which meant the Order sustained nearly seventy years without such a rule.\(^89\) It is a law that the Order takes seriously and no one appears above it, exemplified by the Grand Master from 1996–2010, Robert Saulters, when he accused the then Leader of the Opposition, Tony Blair, of having been disloyal to faith by ‘marrying a Romanist’ (Cherie Booth) and even claimed: ‘He would sell his soul to the devil himself’.\(^90\) Whilst avowed tolerance of close relatives marrying outside of the faith has gradually been growing in recent years in Northern Ireland – with two thirds of the population advocating more interfaith interface (still below that elsewhere in the United Kingdom)\(^91\) – the level of interfaith marriage has only increased marginally in recent years.\(^92\) Amongst Order members, tolerance remains much lower than the population at large with 81 per cent of respondents claiming they would not be happy if their son or daughter married a Roman Catholic.\(^93\) For some members, the low level of interfaith marriage is merely pragmatic and is not necessarily anti–Catholic but common to all denominations, even with Protestantism: ‘You take the Baptist church in Northern Ireland; you’ll find most of the Baptists intermarry. It’s the same with the Presbyterians or Church of Ireland […] so it goes a lot deeper than just that even Protestant/Catholic’.\(^94\) Another commented, ‘I am an Orthodox Protestant […] You ask an Orthodox Roman Catholic, would you want your child to marry within the faith […] the answer is yes.’\(^95\) However, this doesn’t explain why the Order has specifically prohibited marriage to Roman Catholics.

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\(^89\) Kennaway, *A Tradition Betrayed* (2006) Page 22; Marc O’Callaghan, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Liverpool, 20 January 2015
\(^90\) Words of Robert Saulters, said prior to his election as Grand Master, quoted in *Independent*, 16 December 1996
\(^93\) Data supplied by McAuley, Tonge and Mycock, Membership Survey (2011) Unpublished raw data
\(^94\) Desmond Brownlie, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014
\(^95\) Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 25 August 2014
In part, the Order vindicates its rationale by quoting the Catholic Church’s *Ne Temere* decree that came into effect in 1908 (some forty–five years after the Order’s rule banning intermarriage). The decree legislates that where children are born into Catholic–Protestant marriages, they should be raised and educated within the Roman faith. McAuley *et al.* note that Orangemen often highlight the impact *Ne Temere* had on reducing the Protestant population of the Irish Republic in the early part of the twentieth century, as well as being fond of pointing out other forms of discrimination suffered by Protestants.  

Indeed, one member interviewed, who agreed most Orange members would prefer their children not to marry a Catholic, referenced the *Ne Temere* decree and argued: ‘if you make a stand here, you’re a bigot; but if you make it somewhere else you’re not, you’re maintaining your faith and whatever you believe in’. Other Orangemen, however, interpret the Order’s prohibition on mixed marriage as having a greater biblical emphasis.

The Bible says about being unequally yoked and that it is better to marry someone who shares the same beliefs as you and is also a Christian: a practicing, born–again Christian. That’s what I believe myself as well. So you can’t limit that to the Orange Order. That is a fundamental Christian principle [...] I know what the Bible says about it and I know that many, many Orangemen would term themselves “born–again Christians” so naturally a very high percentage would feel that a daughter or son marrying someone who was not of a reformed faith (that could apply equally to any other religions: Jewish, Muslim, whatever), would be termed unequally yoked and that would be problematic for them if that’s what their interpretation of the Bible is.

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96 McAuley *et al.*, Loyal to the Core? (2011) Page 167  
97 Alderman Thomas Haire, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014  
99 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014
Whilst a number of theological scholars have interpreted St Paul’s text to refer to Christians and non–Christians, as opposed to interpreting it with reference to the reformed or non–reformed variations of that faith, it demonstrates the Biblical foundation from which the Order finds its origin.

For critics, the historic legacy of laws, observances, and rules all serve to reinforce the sectarianism of the Order and the anti–Catholicism basis upon which it operates. Whilst insisting the portrayal is unfair and unwarranted, perhaps even a product of ‘demonization [...] of the Orange Order by the media’, members do appreciate that the perception of anti–Catholicism exists, but only some of the members interviewed believed that amending or removing the Catholic–related laws was necessary and some were strongly opposed. One member insisted: ‘We’re not different in terms of Orthodoxy in terms of other faiths [...] We’re simply reflecting the beliefs of the Protestant Churches’. Another merely wanted greater clarity in the application of Orange rules: ‘I think the rules [...] are alright, although the application of them sometimes – to me – leaves a lot to be desired [...] I do see it as black and white: either you cross that line or you don’t’. Those members more agreeable to amendments to the rules saw the value in terms of the institution’s image: ‘I think it would be a good idea from a [Public Relations] perspective [...] I’ve no issue with them dropping that one [the ban on marrying Roman Catholics] as well’. There appears to be a correlation between a member’s perception of the Order’s religiosity and their readiness to welcome change. Where members said that they’d joined the Orange Order for religious purposes and said that their membership was entirely or predominantly an expression of their personal Protestant faith, there was a greater likelihood that they were opposed

101 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 7 September 2014
102 For example: Brian Blair, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 10 November 2013
103 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 25 August 2014
104 Alderman Thomas Haire, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014
105 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 7 September 2014
to changes to the institution’s laws and observances. Members who saw the organisation’s role as primarily cultural and joined both for that reason and in continuation of a family tradition tended to be more open to the idea of amendments and, in some cases, stated explicitly that changes were needed.

The negative impact upon public perception, particularly that of the middle-class, that the Drumcree parading dispute caused, inspired the Grand Lodge to think creatively about how it was perceived and how it related to the community at large. It has attempted to improve its community interaction and received state support for this project. However successful or otherwise this public relations rethink, Order’s reputation is also conditional upon the upholding of its behavioural code, which appears to have been used more to target members transgressing prohibitions of participation in Catholic worship than those engaged in violent or provocative conduct.

The charge of anti-Catholicism is rooted in the principles underpinning the organisation’s historical founding. Most members accept that the Order has this reputation, but see the organisation as more pro-Protestantism than anti-Catholicism and certainly do not accept the anti-Catholic charge. It is difficult, when promoting a faith group, cultural identity, or political stance, to do so without appearing to exclude those of a contrary persuasion and, whilst multiple members make that point, it is not always necessary to promote one’s own position by legislating against those of an opposing creed. Despite being keen to note their respect for Roman Catholics, the Order includes within its rules a number of measures prohibiting attendance at Catholic service and marriage or cohabitating with Catholics, as well as barring membership to Catholics and anyone associated with the Roman Church. The rationale for these rules varies amongst members, some finding a scriptural basis for the laws and

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106 See: Chapter 4 for examination of the Drumcree Parading Dispute
others simply seeing them as ‘club rules’. With the highest single category of expulsions being infringements of the anti–Catholic laws, members are divided as to whether the rules should be ‘honoured more in the breach than in the observance’, or indeed removed altogether.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored how the Order’s public demonstrations and anti–Catholicism lead to regular criticisms of the institution as sectarian and, as sectarianism is challenged ever more, this has impacted upon the image and previous supposed ‘respectability’ of the Orange Order, potentially impairing recruitment, especially among liberal Protestants. The first of two chapters to test the sectarianism the Order is accused of promoting, it has explored the question: to what extent is the Order’s social and political marginalisation a consequence of the growing unacceptability of overt religious sectarianism that the institution’s rules promote? As the section has shown, members are divided over whether the Orange Order should dilute its rules. To those beyond the Orange institution, the Order’s rules, such as the prohibition on marrying Catholics or participating in acts of Roman Catholic worship, convey an image of a body as concerned with what it is against – Catholicism – as what it is interested in promoting Protestantism. These rules have been quietly dropped by Orange institutions beyond Northern Ireland and their centrality to the Order’s mission can be contested. Dilution might not mean dissipation of the Order’s mission, but could help convey a less sectarian image. Yet for some members these rules are important to the Order’s defence of Protestantism.

Parading is an extraordinarily significant aspect of civic heritage and ritual in Northern Ireland, especially for the Orange Order and the Protestant community at large, and many parades, commemorating historical events such as wartime sacrifice, cannot be perceived as overly sectarian. The principal discourse used to legitimise parades is that they are ‘traditional’ and, as such, contribute
to the unionist collective identity. Associated loyalist band culture has been as valid an expression of the Protestant unionist identity as traditional Orange church parades, although to outsiders these demonstrations are conflated into a single, often critical, identification of ‘Orange parades’.

Indeed, the nature of parading has changed as bands are often a more attractive social outlet for disaffected loyalist youths at the expense of the membership of other cultural organisations. Whereas most Orange lodges require members to be regular church attendees and members have to be proposed, seconded, and voted in prior to becoming a member, band membership has no such religious strictures. Thus, what really exists is a loyalist marching culture of which Orangeism provides the predominantly religious–cultural aspect whilst loyalism might be seen as its cultural–political arm, although this distinction is not an absolute. Loyalist band culture is distinct and largely outside the jurisdiction of the Orange Order, although loyalist bands can become as much a part of the spirit of the Twelfth and other major parades as a lodge’s membership. Parades are much more than expressions of gratuitous sectarianism although in contested interface areas they may adopt that flavour. Parading is an expression of a cultural grouping, one which fosters a collective consciousness to celebrate heritage; a timeless tradition and a distinctive identity, one of Protestant British and unionist unity. The parades bind participants and spectators with a collective memory of significant community events.

Those who seek to criticise the Orange institution see rules preventing marriage to Catholics or participation in ‘Roman’ worship as reinforcing the sectarian basis of the Order and its anti–Catholicism foundation. Orangemen tend to appreciate that the perception of anti–Catholicism exists, an inevitable perception given the Order’s founding mission to oppose the ‘false doctrines’ of Rome.

However, few agree that amending or removing the Catholic–related laws is necessary for the institution to move forward effectively. The most religious members are most opposed to change and the lack of consensus over ‘modernisation’ remains a problem. Yet almost all Orange Order members are anxious to stress their healthy relationships with individual Catholics and some concede that ‘Romanism’ is no longer the main threat. As one put it, ‘The biggest threat to [Protestantism] today is secularism, by far and away the biggest [...] How do [Protestants] actually influence society as a faith–based organisation and that is becoming more and more difficult. And that is the challenge to Orangeism today.’

The significance of secularism will indeed be explored later in this thesis. First though, it is necessary to examine in more detail the possibly deleterious effects of parading controversies upon the Orange Order by examining the Drumcree and Ardoyne disputes.

The Orange Order has been challenged to reflect on its purpose; can the promotion of Protestantism justify such a strong opposition to Roman Catholicism? For some within the Order, the stigma of being seen as sectarian in being so opposed to Roman Catholicism is an unfortunate by–product: ‘I’ve never known [the Order] to be anything other than pro–Protestant [...] if that naturally conflicts faiths that are non–Protestant, non–reformed faiths, well unfortunately that in itself is the nature of being for one group’.

Chapter 4 will continue to assess the accusations of sectarianism and will explore two such episodes within the Order’s recent history: the parading dispute in Drumcree; and the conflict in Ardoyne.

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108 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 25 August 2014
109 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014
Chapter Four

An Order Re-routed:
Interface Orangeism in Drumcree and Ardoyne

Introduction

The importance of parading to Orangeism is evident in the large number of religious, commemorative, and cultural demonstrations that take place each year. Between April 2016 and March 2017, 2,598 Protestant, unionist and loyalist community parades were convened in Northern Ireland. The figure has barely changed in recent decades. In 1995, for example, 2,581 unionist parades took place. Not all of these parades are organised by the Orange Order, but most are and lodge demonstrations are regular events each spring and summer.

Whilst Orangemen parade to demonstrate their political and religious commitments, or as historical tributes, some parades are unpopular among sections of the Catholic nationalist population. This problem is most acute when Orange parades occur in close proximity to Catholic areas. From the 1990s onward, controversies and conflict over Orange marches have become more prominent. In part, this was due to the effort by Sinn Féin and Catholic residents’ groups to exacerbate sectarian tensions and ‘transfer the theatre of conflict with unionists to the local level’ by resisting Orange parades. Whilst there is evidence to suggest a shift did occur in republican strategy, it must be noted that Catholics had never supported Orange marches and marching had always been contentious in some residential areas. The annual cost of policing such a quantity of public demonstrations, and the

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conflict that can result from them, can stretch into the millions annually\(^5\) and, following Patrick Mayhew’s July 1996 commitment to an independent review of parading and the publication of the North Report in January 1997, the Parades Commission was established in order to ‘promote and facilitate mediation as a means of resolving dispute concerning public processions’.\(^6\) The quasi–judicial body has responsibility for negotiating routes and managing the behaviour of particularly contentious parades. Limitations have been imposed regularly upon a minority of parades, mainly where the procession skirts a predominantly Catholic population. The Commission publicly acknowledges its inability to ban processions;\(^7\) but it has the power to re–route, a restriction which many Orange Order members see as tantamount to prohibition.

Few unionist parades are direct sources of intercommunal animosity. Of the 2,581 unionist parades between April 2016 and March 2017, only 13 per cent were considered politically and socially sensitive by the Parades Commission.\(^8\) However, demographic change is an important aspect of understanding decisions to limit parades. Firstly, as the Catholic population increased, it encroached on some routes that the Order had traditionally marched. Falling Catholic migration in the 1950s and 1960s, combined with (until recently) the relatively higher birth rate amongst Catholics has led to more nationalist districts in areas, such as those adjacent to the Garvaghy Road in Portadown.\(^9\)

There have also been restrictions on republican parades, with Easter Rising commemorations having been prohibited from entering loyalist areas, creating a ‘conflict equilibrium [...] between competing

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\(^8\) Parades Commission, Annual Report and Financial Statements (2017) Page 8
\(^9\) P. Doherty and M. Poole, *Ethnic Residential Segregation in Belfast* (Coleraine: Centre for Study of Conflict, University of Ulster, 1995)
communities’. However, when applied equally between the two ethnic groups, restrictions upon the routes of marches disproportionately affect unionist parades, ten times more frequent than their nationalist counterparts. A member of the Parades Commission explained:

There is a long–standing antagonism [with the Orange Order] about having conditions imposed [on parades], part of which is due to there being about 2,500 unionist and loyalist parades (albeit, not all of them Orange Order parades) compared with about 160 [Catholic, nationalist and republican] parades. It’s easy, therefore, for the Orange Order to claim that these regulations have a disproportionate impact on their community.

Between April 2016 and March 2017, there were eighteen Protestant, unionist and loyalist parades for each Catholic, nationalist and republican parade, and the Parade Commission consider the same percentage of nationalist parades (13.5 per cent of the 140 parades) to be sensitive. Nonetheless, the comparative myriad of Orange and loyalist band parades result in a greater number being re–routed or prohibited.

Furthermore, conditioning and limiting freedom of expression, specifically parading, by the state and its bodies (including the quasi–judicial Parades Commission) is a well–established practice. The authorities have a balance of interests to contend with over parades and, for both political and economic stability, have actively sought to limit public disorder. Prior to the Government of Ireland Act 1920, Orange parades were limited extensively, as were nationalist and republican demonstrations. Although the UUP and the Orange Order enjoyed a symbiotic relationship under the Northern Ireland Parliament, some modest re–routing of Orange Order parades did occur despite the

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12 Member of the Parades Commission, interview with author, 24 August 2016
unionist domination of Stormont, much to the frustration of the Grand Lodge.\textsuperscript{14} The right to march has never been absolute for the Orange institution but, by the late 1960s, UUP reformers like James Chichester–Clark were already discussing more significant, unprecedented bans on parades. Limiting freedom of parading and right to expression – orange and green alike – has been justified by authorities as protecting public order.

In response to the adjudications of the Parades Commission, the Orange Order has taken a defensive position against the perceived threat to the cultural bedrock of Protestantism. The mentality of being under threat and in a ‘state of siege’ is one synonymous with unionism, a theme numerous scholars have identified.\textsuperscript{15} The ‘siege mentality’ was maintained throughout the period of the Northern Ireland Parliament to better consolidate unionist political hegemony\textsuperscript{16} and it has permeated unionism such that, in 2013, it led the then First Minister, Peter Robinson, to appeal to unionists to end the mindset, claiming, ‘When we were being besieged it was the right response. But when we are in a constitutionally safe and stable position it poses a threat to our future development.’\textsuperscript{17} Yet constitutional stability was accompanied, in the view of concerned Orangemen, by a hollowing out of Britishness, with Orangeism as an expression of that Protestant Britishness, forced into retreat. These concerns have been manifest throughout the peace process, with the Drumcree dispute of the 1990s the most visible confrontation between the Orange tradition and its opponent and regulators.

This chapter, the second part of the study’s analysis of sectarianism, continues the theme of sectarianism as a hindrance to the status of the Orange Order assessed in Chapter 3 but specifically

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Walker, \textit{The Ulster Unionist Party} (2004) Pages 120–121
\item \textsuperscript{15} See: Follis, \textit{A State Under Siege} (1995); A. Aughey, \textit{Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo–Irish Agreement} (London: Hurst, 1989)
\item \textsuperscript{16} See: Chapter 1
\end{itemize}
explores two cases at which the Order’s aforementioned parading culture comes into conflict with the region’s Catholic Nationalist communities. The chapter analyses how these conflicts over parades emerged, and how the institution – both at Grand Lodge level and at a local level – has responded, amid criticisms of its values and practices. Furthermore, it will explore the relationship the institution has built – or has failed to have built – with the Parades Commission in Northern Ireland. In continuing to explore the extent to which the Order’s social and political marginalisation is a consequence of the growing unacceptability of overt religious sectarianism, the chapter assesses the extent to which is the Orange Order faced with an image problem as a result of its response to and involvement in parading disputes?

The Drumcree dispute

The crisis at Drumcree had been building for some time but the 1996 decision by the RUC, in the wake of loyalist violence, to reverse a ban on the Orange Order marching gave the institution hope that its mobilisation would invariably force a right to march. The 1996 reversal allowed the Portadown District Lodge to march through a nationalist area, despite organised protests from the local Catholic community. As Ryder and Kearney note, until 1972, the Portadown lodges paraded under a railway underpass, known locally as the ‘Tunnel’, en route to the Church of the Ascension, which led the Orangemen into Obins Street and the predominantly Catholic nationalist area. In 1972, some residents organised as the Portadown Resistance Council and demanded a re–routed march. However, following threats of repercussions from the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) towards the nationalist residents, the RUC, military, and a local detachment of the UDA escorted the Orangemen and ensured the parade passed, albeit only being able to clear the route fifteen minutes before the parade arrived. The episode was followed by a significant degree of violence and several murders. From

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1972 to 1985, the parade was able to march, although amid heightened tension and periodic violent outbursts.

However, by the mid–1980s, the growing cost of policing the marching season more broadly in Northern Ireland (1,450 unionist and 450 nationalist parades in 1985 alone) became a concern and the RUC Chief Constable, Jack Hermon, set about limiting or re–routing a number of parades. Whilst the number of flashpoints was identified to be about 50 parades – comparatively small when considering the number of parades across Northern Ireland – ‘the emotional and political background to them that was a real danger of any RUC action resulting in hardliners resisting re–routing, tempers rising and trouble spreading elsewhere throughout the community’.  

Some lodges amended parade routes as requested to whilst others resisted, but the goal of the police and security forces was to quell any resistance and create a regular parading pattern, reducing the security concerns surrounding the marches. The level of disobedience became significant. If unionists could pose a substantial threat to public order in the event a parade was re–routed, the authorities could be persuaded not to amend the route. Within the nationalist community, Catholics needed to demonstrate a similar level of unrest to ensure a march was banned. In such a situation, ‘both sides in the conflict have an incentive to cause as much trouble as possible so as to influence the police cost–benefit calculus’. Consequently, the conflict surrounding parades was focused more on force and which side could field the most feet on the ground. Unionists in Drumcree seized the moment in 1985 when the Portadown District Lodge was refused access to the ‘Tunnel’ for an annual parade. The United Ulster Loyalist Front was established and claimed in its circular that re–routing was ‘a first step

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20 Ryder and Kearney, Drumcree (2001) Page 80
towards a United Ireland’, calling for ‘outright rejection’ of the route negotiations. Similar pressure was placed on Armagh County Grand Master, Norman Hood, who was asked, ‘Do you lack the courage to stand up and be counted with all true loyalists?’ In the face of such pressure, the District had little alternative but to push for the parade to go ahead, which it did, heavily escorted.

The dispute surrounding the Drumcree parade settled down considerably from 1987 until the mid-1990s, but the growth of residents’ groups and, what Protestants saw as, Sinn Féin’s strategy of creating ‘proxy wars’ had begun to have an impact. Catholics are generally opposed to Orange parades through nationalist areas and in 1996 the Independent Review of Parading carried out by a British government agency found 93 per cent of the residents of Garvaghy Road were supportive of the views expressed by the Garvaghy Road Residents Association (GRRA) in opposing Orange marching rights, although conciliatory voices may have preferred to remain silent. These residents’ groups sought to direct their objections above the local politicians to the British government directly. Whilst the groups that flourished in contentious areas were significant in aggravating sectarian tensions, ‘it was Drumcree […] that was to become the centre of the IRA/Sinn Féin strategy’. Sinn Féin’s President, Gerry Adams, explained:

Three years of work in Lower Ormeau, Portadown, and parts of Fermanagh, Newry, Armagh, Bellaghy and up in Derry. Three years of work went into creating [the Drumcree parade dispute] and fair play to those people who put the work in […] they are the type of scene changes that we have to focus in on and develop and exploit.

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22 Quoted in Ibid Page 156  
23 Quoted in Ibid Page 156  
27 Ibid Page 290  
The Garvaghy Road area of Portadown had become predominantly Catholic and nationalist. Kaufmann contends that ‘discontent at Orange marching was certainly there’ but the Sinn Féin/IRA influence was a significant factor in mobilising the GRRA in 1995.29 Because of this rising tension and heated context, for Alistair Graham, the first chair of the Parades Commission, the Drumcree parade was ‘the litmus test’30 but, for unionism, the dispute had wider connotations. In 1995, the DUP Leader, the Reverend Ian Paisley, claimed: ‘If we don’t win this battle, all is lost. It is a matter of life or death. It is a matter of Ulster or Irish Republic, it is a matter of freedom or slavery’.31

The principal episode of the dispute centred on a church parade a week before the twelfth of July, setting out to the Drumcree Parish Church mid–morning, and returning in the early afternoon. At its height, the standoff between the RUC and Portadown District marchers (numbering around a thousand) evolved into an overnight impasse and went on into the next day, with 30,000 Orangemen and sympathisers joining the marchers from all over the region.32 Leading from the front was, among others, David Trimble, then UUP MP for Upper Bann and a County Down Orangeman. A noticeable absentee, however, was that of Martin Smyth, Grand Master of the Order and MP for Belfast South. Smyth claimed he ‘hadn’t been asked’ to attend the parade by the District and that pressing political business kept him in London.33 The authorities had little alternative but to allow the parade to pass down Garvaghy Road, but – following a last–ditch demand from the Garvaghy Road Residents’ Association – they could only do so without bands or supporters. The rioting that followed could be considered inevitable, but this ‘victory’ had wider ramifications, as ‘it made Trimble’s political career and broke that of Smyth’.34 Two months later Trimble was elected UUP leader. Smyth came last of the

31 Quoted in McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Page 78
33 Ibid Page 133
five candidates. He was criticised widely for his absence from Drumcree and there were even calls for him to retire.\footnote{Ryder and Kearney, Drumcree (2001) Page 126}

As the parade passed down the route in silence, marching six abreast to ensure a swifter conclusion, reaching the Orange Hall on Carleton Street marked success for the Orangemen and impromptu cheers and celebrations broke out with applause and shouting from their supporters. Trimble and Paisley raised their joined hands into the air and marched together for the jubilant crowd. As a symbol of united unionist hegemony having succeeded against a challenge to their perceived ‘tradition’, the gesture was acclaimed by many unionists but seen as triumphalist by nationalist residents and others angry as they believed the Order had defied the Mediation Network negotiations that gave all parties the right to ‘engage in dialogue without feeling that they have undermined their principles’.\footnote{Statement by the Mediation Network on their role in negotiations at Drumcree (1995), reproduced in full at CAIN Web Service – Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland [http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/parade/docs/mn13796.htm] accessed 25 June 2014} Insult was added to injury for the Drumcree Catholics when Harold Gracey, Portadown District Master, and others gave television and radio interviews detailing their uncompromising stance and Paisley claimed the event had been a historic success for Protestant unionism in Northern Ireland.

Brendan McKenna (Breandán Mac Cionnath), now General Secretary of the republican socialist organisation éirígí, declared: ‘People were furious when they saw Trimble and Paisley acting like they did and talking about a great victory for Orange Order and saying they would continue to walk down the [Garvaghy] road’.\footnote{Quoted in Ryder and Kearney, Drumcree (2001) Page 123} David Trimble, however, rejected that the ‘victory jig’ with Paisley was triumphalist, nor was it done in order to goad the nationalist residents. Instead, Trimble claims it was a tactic to control Paisley:
No, it was not planned in any way. The parade reached Carleton Street [...someone in the applauding crowd] called for me and someone called for Paisley. As I started to move forward I saw Paisley coming behind me. Now this was my constituency. I was the Member of Parliament for this area, he was not. I wasn’t having that man walking down Carleton Road ahead of me and I could see that was about to happen. So I grabbed his hand to keep him back so that he wouldn’t get past me and he couldn’t refuse to take it.38

Jeffrey Donaldson, actively involved in the talks and the standoff, similarly believes the linking of hands on Carleton Street was maliciously misinterpreted and was not a display of triumphalism. Donaldson and other senior Orangemen interpreted the action to be one of relief.39 Nevertheless, the image of ‘triumphant’ Protestantism, goading the ‘intimidated’ Catholic residents, was set and the images from the area were of Orange militancy and, in some cases, violence, unedifying even to those sympathetic to the principle of the right to parade. Violence accompanied the dispute for the rest of the 1990s. However, from 1998 onwards, the ban on the Orange parade’s route along the Garvaghy Road was upheld, not overturned. The Orange Order had mobilised thousands of supporters, alienated some moderates appalled by the violence and ultimately lost the battle.

For the Orange Order, the challenge from the nationalist residents posed a direct threat to the cultural heritage and traditions of the institution. The subsequent refusal of the Parades Commission to allow the Drumcree parade was proof, to the Order, of a determined attempt to marginalise Orangeism. The Order saw themselves as victims of the republican strategy to mobilise Catholic residents. Indeed, the Orange Standard summated: ‘having spent 35 years slaughtering members of the Protestant community [...] they have now moved into the next phase of the plan to break Protestant resistance so they can achieve their end goal – the destruction of Northern Ireland’.40 If Drumcree fell and the

40 Orange Standard, August 2004
Portadown Lodge were to succumb to the nationalists’ demands, no Orangeman was safe and a fear existed that it would set into motion a chain reaction, ultimately ending in a thirty-two county Irish Republic. Whilst many Orangemen may have interpreted the dispute to be one that could not be lost, other figures within the institution realised the aggression with which the Order fought and the uncompromising way in which the position was held would be ultimately unhelpful. McAuley et al.’s 2011 examination of Order membership found a slight overall majority (57.9 per cent) were in favour of the Order’s right to march through areas predominately inhabited by Catholic Nationalists. Nonetheless, the authors note Orangemen’s concern about the willingness of members to engage in direct confrontation with police and security services.  

Following his absence from the 1995 Drumcree dispute, Reverend Smyth co–hosted an ecumenical United Prayer Breakfast, with the Irish Teachta Dála, Mary Flaherty, sponsored by an international prayer movement. Both Catholics and Protestants were present at the breakfast and many Orangemen found the event unpalatable. After a review, the Grand Lodge declared the event to not have breached the Order’s code of conduct, but this did not convince many traditional brethren. Kaufmann contends that whilst the Drumcree dispute was serious, by attending the breakfast, Smyth clearly still ‘felt a certain latitude to take risks to further his political career’. Kaufmann interprets Smyth’s engagement in the ecumenical event as further evidence of a moderating of his views and a move away from his somewhat populist, former position in an attempt to retain the Order’s respectability and recruit from all sections of unionism. Smyth was confident in his position and in his standing with the institution’s leadership, but this move away from a hard–line approach allowed for

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41 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Pages 78–81
42 Letter from J. McCrea to A. H. Wilson, Secretary of Lower Iveagh District Lodge 1, County Down, 8 November 1995, quoted in Kaufmann, The Orange Order (2007) Page 162
the development of a splinter group that would come to play a significant role within the social changes of the Order, the Spirit of Drumcree.

It should be noted that the Order has seen a variety of manifestations of dissenting groups, including the Orange and Protestant Committee in 1954, as well as some brethren having no fidelity to the dominant UUP. The founding basis of the Spirit of Drumcree was not dissimilar from that of their 1950s predecessors, with demands including: a harder line from the Order’s leadership on matters of parade routes and republicanism; the need for greater accountability of the Grand Lodge; and the bringing to an end of the historic UUP–Orange link (allowing Orange inclusion of Paisleyites).

The social demography of the Order had changed. In 1954, the then Grand Master (and former Northern Ireland Prime Minister), John Miller Andrews was part of the landed gentry, whereas Smyth had risen from more humble origins; his ‘father’s uncle Ned was the first secretary of the Dockers’ Union in Belfast’. Similarly, the vast majority (nearly 75 per cent) of Andrews’ Central Committee were titled, but this figure had fallen to a quarter (admittedly, still a far from negligible figure) during Smyth’s tenure as Grand Master. Indeed, more widely, fewer from socially elite backgrounds were dominating district and county offices within the institution in the way they had previously. By the 2000s, the majority of members (53.4 per cent) were in manual professions (although less than a third are members of a trade union), and nearly two–thirds of members earn less than £25,000 a year.

It could be argued that these social changes created a catalyst for a more populist faction to emerge.

Certainly, frustration with the leadership was evident and Joel Patton, the leader of the Spirit of

44 The Reverend W. Martin Smyth, former Grand Master of the Grand Orange Lodge, interview with author in Belfast, 3 September 2013
45 Data supplied by McAuley, Tonge and Mycock, Membership Survey (2011) Unpublished raw data
Drumcree, and the Grand Lodge had engaged in a propaganda war with one another. When they arrived on the scene of the Drumcree standoff in July 1996, the group set about organising grassroots opposition, blocking key roads and junctions, whilst also expressing dissatisfaction with Smyth’s leadership.\(^{46}\) The group’s steering committee – consisting of William Bigger, John McGrath, Harold Price, Joel Patton and David Dowey – developed a relationship with the press and fed them information surrounding their objectives. Dowey was a radical Antrim Orangeman who made Patton ‘seem tame in comparison’. Identifying himself as a ‘sectarian bigot’, he claimed the Orange Order was not a religious body and instead was established to defend the Ulster Protestants. After having condemned the Grand Lodge as ‘old men’ and abused the Grand Master for having attended the United Prayer Breakfast, he asked what was to be done with Smyth. When an audience member called out, ‘Shoot him’, Dowey replied, ‘Now, no violence – not yet’. He went on to approve the burning down of Catholic community halls.\(^{47}\) Dowey’s attitudes seem to reflect the thinking of Orange belligerents at the time, predominantly found around working-class, urban areas of Belfast and containing large numbers of young loyalists.\(^{48}\) The underpinning religious emphasis of the Order was less relevant for this group, who interpreted the Order to be a communal defence organisation. However, Patton was a professed born-again Christian, a position that stands opposed to the interpretation that religion played little part in the loyalist mobilisation that occurred.

On 9 December 1997, three members of the Spirit of Drumcree entered the Dublin Road Headquarters of the Order. They refused to leave at the closing time of 5pm and were later joined by supporters. The Belfast News Letter declared a ‘Black Day for House of Orange’\(^{49}\) and the public’s perception of the affair was summarised by the Belfast Telegraph in the editorial the following day:

\(^{46}\) Ryder and Kearney, Drumcree (2001) Page 142
\(^{47}\) Quoted in Kaufmann, The Orange Order (2007) Page 169
\(^{48}\) P. Shirlow, The End of Ulster Loyalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012)
\(^{49}\) News Letter, 10 December 1997
The row in Orangeism is essentially between those in the Spirit of Drumcree faction who think confrontation is the way to defend one’s interests and those who prefer a reasoned argument [...] The Orange Order – and Northern Ireland itself – could not afford a return to the confrontational approach of the past, whipping up emotions on either side and endangering the fragile peace.\(^\text{50}\)

The impact of the Spirit of Drumcree was significant on the public’s perception of the Orange Order, and the occupation of the Dublin Road Headquarters only served to exacerbate that view. Contemporaries realised its damaging effect and Jeffrey Donaldson said, ‘Those who would profess to call themselves Orangemen have, by their actions today, clearly brought delight to IRA/Sinn Féin. They are doing the work of our enemies’.\(^\text{51}\)

The Grand Lodge, at a meeting in its temporary headquarters in the West Belfast Orange Hall, condemned the behaviour of the protesters, describing the occupation as abhorrent. Robert Saulters, who had replaced Smyth as Grand Master, said: ‘Unfortunately, [the Spirit of Drumcree protesters] are bringing the bad side to the fore. It’s only a small element that are causing this [...] they will] have to be dealt with’.\(^\text{52}\) As Kennaway points out, the immediate future would reveal that “dealt” was to become “deal”, for what was clear to the world was apparently not so clear to those in leadership’.\(^\text{53}\)

At a meeting on 16 January 1998, the Order took legal advice and decided to take no action against the protesters. In response to the growing controversies about the Order and those internal to it, Grand Lodge published a series of ‘Information Sheets’. The public mood however, was not welcoming of their last–ditch attempt at saving face. The *Belfast Telegraph* opined:

\(^{50}\) *Belfast Telegraph*, 10 December 1997  
\(^{52}\) *Belfast Telegraph*, 11 December 1997  
After a dreadful summer, in every sense of the word, the Orange Order is trying to redeem its tarnished image [...] but it will take more than fine words and moral high ground [...]

The Orange Order’s “full support” for the Northern Ireland Assembly is also somewhat mystifying when set against the institution’s original opposition to the Good Friday Agreement. To make matters worse, the Drumcree protest was hijacked by the No campaign, and once again the Orange leadership failed to assert itself [...] An organisation that purportedly embraces the concept of civil and religious liberty for all should indeed be at the forefront of the crusade to create a pluralist society. But this summer, once again, Orangeism has come to stand for “not an inch” politics [...] The longer the Drumcree protest is allowed to fester the greater will be the damage to the Order’s reputation. A resolution of that dispute would do more to help the Order’s image than any amount of fancy information sheets.⁵⁴

Davy Jones, a spokesperson for the Portadown District during the standoff, admitted the significant damage the violence at Drumcree inflicted on the institution’s reputation but explained:

I don’t think we could tell people to go away from the protest [...] We can’t call on people to support us, and then start turning them away [...] People were furious when the Order was banned from marching. Portadown is the birthplace of the Orange Order yet here we are in a situation where a group of Sinn Féin–backed people are telling us that we can’t march down the road.⁵⁵

Two decades on, the Drumcree issue remains unresolved but it is indicative of the powerlessness and marginalisation of the Orange Order that the mass mobilisations of the mid–to–late–1990s have long expired. Following the 2017 UK General Election and the confidence and supply accord struck between

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the Conservatives and the DUP MPs in order to facilitate Theresa May’s minority government, the Portadown District LOL released a statement (in the form of an iPhone screenshot of a typed message published on Twitter) in which it stated: ‘We trust that the [parading issue especially in Portadown will be high on the agenda of the new Government’, stating that the DUP has ‘the opportunity and responsibility to deliver for the people of Northern Ireland’. The DUP did not include the item in its negotiating list.

Parading problems in Ardoyne

The Ardoyne area of north Belfast encompasses a sectarian interface; one community of largely Protestant unionist and loyalist families living in close proximity to a community of almost exclusively Catholic Nationalists and republicans. The two ethnic groups live in segregated residential districts divided by a peace line, one of the first such established in 1971. In the 2001 Westminster election (immediately prior to the eruption of the Holy Cross dispute discussed below), Sinn Féin won 83 per cent of votes cast in Catholic Ardoyne, with unionist and loyalist parties polling 99 per cent of all votes in Upper Ardoyne. That high level of political polarisation endures in North Belfast, where Nigel Dodds was returned as DUP MP in 2017 with 46.2 per cent, whilst nationalist and republican parties also achieved 46.2 per cent of the vote, with Sinn Féin receiving 90 per cent of those votes parties.

In Ardoyne and Glenbryn, ‘fear and mistrust creates strong perceptions of socio-cultural besiegement [...] the majority of people living within each community reproduce their social activities through

56 Portadown District LOL 1 Twitter Account, ‘Statement on behalf of Portadown LOL 1’ [https://twitter.com/Portadownlol1/status/873638779910840320] accessed 17 August 2017
58 Since 2010, the UUP agreed they would not stand a candidate in the North Belfast Parliamentary constituency against the DUP’s Nigel Dodds MP.
59 Sinn Féin polling 41.7 per cent and SDLP polling 4.5 per cent in the 2017 Westminster elections.
operating within what they deem to be “safe” and “unsafe” places’. 60 Similar to experiences at sectarian interfaces in other parts of Belfast, people live separate lives; they shop, socialise, and go to school within their own communities. This behaviour is justified as a rational response to threat. One local resident in Ardoyne commented: ‘If you go over to a bus stop that’s not in your area, you’re kind of at risk; I mean anything could happen. There’s no definite thing that you’re safe’. 61 The Ardoyne area suffered some of the most intense political violence of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, with a quarter of all murders occurring within a one mile radius of the Alliance Avenue peace line. 62 Furthermore, Gilligan found Ardoyne residents were more than twice as likely to have had to move house prior to the 1994 ceasefires because of intimidation compared with the Northern Ireland average and were almost five times more likely to have suffered an injury as a result of a sectarian incident. 63

Since the peace process, fears around the ‘other’ community have not thawed. In 2003, Shirlow found the fear of attack at the hands of the contrapositive community was high in Ardoyne. 64 Cadwallader found members of the Protestant community talked about pensioners being intimidated at local chemists and Post Offices, and notes significant fear amongst the Protestant community that the peace lines were to be moved to encroach upon the Protestant Glenbryn area. 65 In 2016, a north Belfast Orangeman claimed Protestant schoolboys were being attacked in the area by Catholics and explained the continued importance of maintaining the peace lines to ensure communal safety. 66 One might expect that, since the 1994 ceasefires and delivery of a peace accord in the form of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, cross–community bonds may have developed. Shirlow and Murtagh note that state management of community resources has been to transform pre–existing resistance to the

61 Petrol Bombs and Peace: Welcome to Belfast (BBC Documentary, First broadcast: 5 August 2013)
66 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 7 September 2016
state by devolving funding downwards, enabling communities to resolve challenges at the local level. That model, however, falters when inter–ethnic sectarian disputes around parading and other issues emerge, bringing both communities into open hostility with institutions built around the state and the PSNI.\textsuperscript{67} They contend: ‘The nature of violence has shifted away from paramilitary and state assaults towards a more sectarianized and repetitive violence of interface rioting and attacks upon the symbols and traditions such as Orange Halls, GAA property and churches’.\textsuperscript{68}

The way in which the nature of violence has shifted in post–GFA Northern Ireland and the extent of the enduring sectarian tensions in the Ardoyne area were exposed dramatically in the Holy Cross School dispute. From September 2001 to January 2002, pupils of the Roman Catholic Holy Cross Girls Primary School in Ardoyne were forced to endure a torrent of abuse as they were escorted by their parents on their daily route to school, passing through the largely loyalist Glenbryn estate. Loyalist protesters from Glenbryn jeered at the students, spat on them, and displayed obscene pornographic content to the passing primary school children. Stones were thrown, as were fireworks and bottles filled with urine,\textsuperscript{69} resulting in half of the school children requiring professional counselling and many exhibiting stress–related behaviours in response.\textsuperscript{70} On one occasion, a pipe bomb was detonated, injuring two PSNI officers and a police dog. Scenes of frightened Holy Cross school girls featured heavily in the UK and international media.

Protestants from the Glenbryn estate maintained that the IRA was gathering intelligence by having schoolchildren and parents walk past their area.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{67} Shirlow and Murtagh, \textit{Belfast} (2006) Page 51
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Ibid} Page 3
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Petrol Bombs and Peace: Welcome to Belfast} (BBC Documentary, First broadcast: 5 August 2013)
\textsuperscript{70} Gilligan, ‘Insecurity and community relations’ (2009)
Unionist Party (PUP) MLA, condemned the Catholic ‘incursions into the area, using the school as a cover’, and community volunteer and Protest leader, Jim Potts, asserted: ‘we will not stand by any longer when some people are using the kids as cover for intimidation and attacks.’ Nigel Dodds MP defended the protestors, claiming they felt unheeded and unionist MLAs amended an Assembly motion supporting the right of the Holy Cross schoolgirls to an education. An alternative route was available for students to access the school but many Catholic parents refused to embark on a more circuitous journey. The Independent Unionist MLA for North Belfast, Fraser Agnew claimed: ‘For years, when using our Orange hall in what is now a Catholic area, we had to use the back door to avoid confrontation with local residents. And we didn’t complain, it was just what we had to do.’ The dispute was further compounded by loyalist insecurities; Catholic Ardoyne area was becoming overcrowded, whilst Glenbryn was numerically declining with many residents relocating to the city’s suburbs. That encroachment was rejected by Protestant Glenbryn: ‘we won’t allow [the Catholic Nationalists] to move into our community and push our people out.’ This frustration, however, was not confined to the loyalists. In Protestant Glenbryn, there were more houses than people to occupy them and, as a result, when the Housing Executive redeveloped parts of the area, they built larger gardeners with more room between the properties as volume was not critical. Consequently, Catholic Nationalists in Ardoyne contrasted the visible affluence and apparent state–gifted hedonism of the loyalist area with their own over–crowded conditions.

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72 Ibid
74 Guardian, 1 December 2003, available at [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/dec/01/northernireland.faithschools] accessed 5 February 2017; The Assembly Motion, introduced under Private Members’ Business on 10 September 2001, proposed ‘That this Assembly supports the right to education of school children attending the Holy Cross Primary School in North Belfast’, but Unionist MLAs instead amended the Motion to support the right of all school children to access education.
Whilst media coverage of the dispute initially expressed – predictably – significant sympathy for the parents and students of Holy Cross School, as well as indignation and outrage the protesters for targeting children; that was to be short-lived. After the first days of the protest, questions were raised about the parents’ motivations. The media began to speculate how a parent could expose their child to such experiences instead taking an alternative route, and whether the children were being used as ‘political pawns’.\(^78\) As a result, parents who refused to bend to intimidation were presented as irresponsible,\(^79\) but the parents – some of whom created the Right to Education pressure group in response – asserted their children’s right to travel to school using their chosen route.\(^80\) There was insufficient ‘political will to stop [the protests]’, and it was considered ‘better to tolerate the protest than to confront it head on’.\(^81\) The dispute was portrayed as a community relations issue and, instead of appearing to take sides, the government provided protection along the route, and funding for psychological support and infrastructure development after a tacit agreement to end the protests was reached. The lack of that political will from government, and the rigid political will of both the protestors and the parents, was born of the very particular needs and tensions of the Ardoyne sectarian interface. Given the context of strained relationships between the two ethnic blocs in Ardoyne, intercommunal disputes over Orange parades do not surprise. In Ardoyne, annual riots, from the mid–2000s for almost a decade (albeit to varying degrees each year), became a feature associated with the evening return Orange parade on the twelfth of July, which progressed up the Crumlin Road past the interface and back into loyalist territory.\(^82\)

Explaining the frustrations of the Catholic community, one resident of Ardoyne contended, ‘the loyalists can march three hundred and sixty-five days a year as far as I’m concerned, as long as they do it in their own area.’ For their part, some loyalists feel that the prevention, since 2013, of the return parade from passing the interface represents further retreat. One Orange Order member asserted, ‘when the [Parades] Commission stops us from walking up a road, a road that our fathers and grandfathers have walked for many years, when they stop us it’s a grinding down of our culture, of our very being [...] They are refusing to recognise our British heritage,’ and another predicated that Northern Ireland will be ‘under the [Irish] tricolour within ten years the way things are going.

Following more problems in Belfast and elsewhere over the removal of the Union flag atop Belfast City Hall in 2012, there was little optimism that the annual difficulties over the Ardoyne Orange parade could be resolved prior to the 2013 Twelfth. Then, three days before the 2013 Twelfth of July celebrations, the Parades Commission took the decision to prevent three Orange Lodges from parading along a part of Crumlin Road on their return parade demonstrations. Claiming equal consideration for ‘the human rights of other persons, to whom the Commission also owes a legal duty’, the ruling also applied specific conditions on the parade’s outward route, including limiting the number of supporters, the standards and flags that could be flown, and the times at which music could be played. In spite of describing the decision as ‘ludicrous’, the Orange Order urged members and supporters not to respond violently. Whilst the Commission’s conditions on the outward part of the parade were observed (albeit, with some police intervention), the decision to stop the return parade

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83 Words of Anne Robinson on ‘Northern Ireland’, Ross Kemp: Extreme World, Series 3, Episode 3 (Sky 1 Documentary, First broadcast: 14 February 2014)
84 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 25 September 2014
85 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 6 June 2016
86 Parades Commission, ‘Determination made in relations to the Ligonel True Blues LOL 1932 Parade notified to take place in Belfast on Friday 12 July 2013’, Ref: PAR\55759 (Belfast, 9 July 2013), reproduced at [https://www.paradescommission.org/viewparade.aspx?id=42422] accessed 17 August 2017
from passing the Ardoyne shops was met with fury from many Protestant Unionists. Characterised as ‘animalistic’, violence from the Ardoyne dispute spread to east and south Belfast, as well as to Portadown in County Armagh, and resulted in seventy police officers being injured in the four consecutive days of rioting. The PSNI deployed water cannons and plastic bullets to re-establish order. One Orangeman asserted, ‘the spark had been lit. We’d been pushed too far and it was all about to come out.’

Whilst violence was directed towards the police enforcing the decision, blame was centred on two groups: the Catholic Nationalists of Ardoyne for challenging the march and the Parades Commission for seemingly supporting the nationalist grievances. A member of the Shankill Protestant Boys Band, a contributing band to the halted parade, contended:

> The message the Parades Commission is sending out, and sending it out loud and clear, if you’re law-abiding and do what you’re told, we will take your parade away from you. If you riot, shoot at police, and drop concrete blocks on police heads, then you’ll get what you want. That’s the message that’s being sent out.

Another bandsman commented, ‘We don’t want violence, we just want to finish our Twelfth [...] and I don’t understand how [the Parades Commission] can give into the Catholics for rioting year after year. They’re winning.’ This position received support from unionist politicians; DUP MLAs sought for the Assembly to be recalled to ‘allow for the expression of opposition to a decision which many see as rewarding riotous behaviour by dissident republicans last July [2012].’ Furthermore, Chris

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89 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 7 September 2016


91 Tyler McAuley, Bandsman, interview with author in Belfast, 2 June 2015

McGimpsey, the UUP Belfast councillor, speaking at the Twaddell Avenue protest camp in 2014, claimed: ‘We are losing everything in this city. We are now in a society where the Protestant unionist and loyalist community is suffering, they are being treated like second class citizens not only by the police, and the courts but by the whole government.’

Tensions between the two ethnic blocs in Northern Ireland were heightened in response to the parade dispute in Ardoyn. In January 2014, Martin McGuinness – then Deputy First Minister – described the leadership of the Orange Order, the UVF, and the PUP as ‘one and the same thing’, and claimed his unionist colleagues ‘dance to the tune of extremists within their own community’. In October 2013, the Parades Commission refused the ‘Twelfth Initiative’ put forward by unionists, and the Belfast County Grand Orange Lodge expressed significant frustration for so quickly disregarding what it considered was a genuine attempt to resolve the dispute:

It is shameful that the Parades Commission – who created the situation at Woodvale – choose to consistently deny civil and religious liberty for all in north Belfast, and blatantly ignore a commitment by the institution to full and open dialogue with Ardoyn residents following the completion of this long–held and traditional parade […] However despite this setback, the Orange family and our Unionist partners involved in the Civil Rights Camp remain determined to peacefully and resolutely maintain the ongoing presence at Twaddell Avenue.

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93 Address by Chris McGimpsey to the at Twaddell Avenue Protest Camp, 19 April 2014, reproduced at [https://www.1src.com/video/t_N1Fjho9m4aE] accessed 17 August 2017
Ahead of the 2014 summer parading season, the Orange Order, along with unionist party leaders and loyalist community representatives, announced a series of peaceful protests in response to the Commission’s decision to once again forbid the return Ardoyne parade from using its traditional route past Ardoyne shops on the twelfth of July. The protests included a six–minute pause at all Orange marches on the Twelfth, representing the length of time it would take the Ardoyne parade to return home to highlight the triviality of the prohibited route.97 The plans were heavily criticised by the Crumlin Ardoyne Residents Association (CARA) and the Greater Ardoyne Residents’ Collective (GARC). ‘Orange–bashing’ as it was described by one Belfast Orangeman, was, he claims, an attempt to distract attention from the fact that the Ardoyne’s Catholic residents were moving away from Sinn Féin towards more dissident elements within republicanism:

It’s political in as much as if they can get people to look that way [at the conflict with the Orange Order], that means people aren’t looking at their own faults within Sinn Féin. They have problems too on the electoral front because, where the protest is up on Twaddell Avenue in Ardoyne, Gerry Kelly the leading Sinn Féiner in that area, it used to be whatever he said went but, this last couple of years, I would see a move towards more sympathy for the dissidents and, as a result, some people have told Gerry Kelly where to go, to put it bluntly.98

When, in July 2016, a further attempt to broker a deal between the Ligoniel lodges and the Catholic residents had failed, the GARC rejected it as a ‘Sinn Féin/UVF deal’.99 It wasn’t until September 2016 however – over three years on from the original Commission prohibition, costing £21 million in

98 Alderman Thomas Haire, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014
policing\textsuperscript{100} – that a deal was reached in Ardoyne, welcomed by First Minister Arlene Forster as a ‘significant step’, whilst Martin McGuinness commended the use of dialogue in resolving the dispute.\textsuperscript{101} The accord, which established a voluntary moratorium on applying for a return parade in future, as well as a local community forum, brought an end to the loyalist protest camp established on Twaddell Avenue. The deal did not allow the local Orange lodges the right to return past the Ardoyne shops in the evening and as such represented another reversal for the Order.

**The Orange Order and the Parades Commission**

Drumcree and Ardoyne have both represented significant defeats for the Orange Order. Whilst this thesis has documented previous restrictions on Orange parades in earlier eras, including that of the Stormont era of unionist majoritarianism, these were invariably temporary and were not preceded by reputational damage to the Order caused by rioting and disorder. The regulation of the Parades Commission, however, represented a permanent reversal for the institution, emphasising its powerlessness in the face of a determined quasi–judicial body. In an attempt to better mediate marching in Northern Ireland, the Parades Commission was established in 1998 with the objective of conditioning parades (and, where appropriate, restricting them from accessing certain roads and routes). Restrictions have included, but are not limited to, a prohibition of paramilitary uniforms or paramilitary symbols on flags, banners, or instruments, and a ban on ‘sectarian’ songs and anthems. Hostility towards the Commission is rife within the Order with 87 per cent of members desiring immediate dissolution, interpreting engagement with the body as wasted time, and believing it to be fundamentally anti–Orange.\textsuperscript{102}


\textsuperscript{102} McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Pages 82–83
The Portadown District Master and a leading Orangeman within the Drumcree dispute, Darryl Hewitt, commented: ‘sack the Parades Commission’, including the chairperson – Anne Henderson – in his remarks.\(^{103}\) Other members have shared similar views, one member describing the Commission as ‘recklessly incompetent’,\(^{104}\) and another summatting:

The Parades Commission is a failed political project, on all sides of the political spectrum, whether you’re Protestant, or Catholic, or none – the Parades Commission is a waste of time and money. In all my years, I’ve never known a body to squander resources and actually cause more conflict, even though they’re supposed to avoid it. I’ve never known anything like it.\(^{105}\)

The Grand Lodge itself holds that the body is ‘an unelected quango allegedly accountable to no one for the decisions it makes […] which is] incapable of abiding by its own procedural rules […] and is] not representative of the community’.\(^{106}\) The Order’s opposition, however, is not merely concentrated on the body’s mechanics or on its perceived bias, but also on the rationale for its establishment. Most Orangemen believe it remains their absolute right to walk the Queen’s highway, a right that is beyond equivocation and negotiation. Parity of esteem includes the esteem of Orangemen in their view. McAuley et al. found the absolutism of the Order to be at odds with mainstream unionist opinion, where 61 per cent of mainstream Protestants agreed that the religious diversity of an area should be taken into account when considering right to march.\(^{107}\)


\(^{104}\) Jonathan Aubrey, member of the Orange Order from a rural setting, interview with author, 19 April 2017

\(^{105}\) Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 2 June 2015


\(^{107}\) McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Page 83
However, McAuley et al. also noted that around one-third of Orange Order members surveyed were ‘reasonably pragmatic’, agreeing that the institution should engage positively with the Parades Commission and there was some cognisance of the damage to credibility suffered as a result of the long parade disputes.108 As parades are disproportionately Protestant, unionist and loyalist, and most involve the Orange Order, the extent to which the institution conflicts with the body is greater than any other formal institution. However, a member of the Parades Commission argued:

The Grand Lodge is usually a little bit disconnected to what actually happens on the ground. On the ground, the defiance isn’t there in the same way it is in the public statements made by the Grand Lodge [...] The high level of compliance of notifications and nearly 100 per cent compliance of conditions is a fact that’s very often overlooked.109

The stress on compliance is of course juxtaposed with the violent protest that has involved some Orangemen following Parades Commission determinations. The Orange Order has no representation on the Commission, and similarly its membership is bereft of Order working–class loyalists. It has seen most of the parades which the Commission deems contentious subject to restriction and in some cases, effectively banned, albeit under the label ‘re–routed’. The Commission is accountable only to the Secretary of State, not the people whose adjudications it affects. It is perhaps little wonder that the Commission attracts the opprobrium of many Orange Order members. The Order clings to the hope that the two main unionist parties, neither of which endorses the Parades Commission, may offer an alternative, but the DUP’s attempt to introduce one floundered in 2010 amid Orange concerns and, in any case, would have received negligible nationalist support.

108 Ibid Pages 83–84
109 Member of the Parades Commission, interview with author, 24 August 2016
Despite the depth of opposition to the Parades Commission, there is cognisance within the Orange Order that non-compliance would be a disastrous strategy, further tarnishing perceptions of an Order whose basic unity has been disrupted by parading disputes. The aggressive response from the Spirit of Drumcree and the populist support which it was able to wield proved embarrassing for Grand Lodge but what was of an even greater challenge to the institution’s credibility was its failure to adequately deal with the dissenting protesters. Whilst the Order may now be demonstrating some policy learning and trying to regain lost ground, the damage caused by that dispute and the losing battle in Ardoyne is hard to repair.

Whilst the conflict in Drumcree may have been a turning point in middle–class respectability for the Orange Order, the institution appears to have lacked sufficient vigour in response to the dispute in Ardoyne to maintain the support of some grassroots loyalists. The deal allowed the 2017 Twelfth of July parades in the area to pass peacefully, but the arrangement was an accord which bypassed militants on both sides. Representatives of the GARC made it clear that they did not support the September 2016 agreement. Furthermore, the concessions put in place were not welcomed by some local Protestants, and the nature of the resolution was treated with suspicion. The Pride of Ardoyne Flute Band, which supports the Ligoniel Orange parade through Ardoyne, expressed disquiet when the deal was struck, informing its members and supporters ‘As a band we weren’t involved in the talks, as it is an Orange Order parade’, and some supporters expressed their frustration more directly: one challenging the ‘we [sic] secret dealings’ and another attacking the institution directly:

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112 Pride of Ardoyne Facebook Page, ‘Statement the band has received’ (2016) [https://www.facebook.com/POACP/posts/1181105658624021] accessed 2 September 2017
Whether this deal is right or wrong but the [O]range [O]rder need to have a big look at themselves. They need to wake up to the fact the bands don't need the [O]range [O]rder to survive but they need the bands. The [P]ride of [A]rdoyne should be proud of what they have done. They were let down by [Orange Order] and politicians.\footnote{Words of David Paterson on Pride of Ardoyne Facebook Page, ‘Statement the band has received’ (2016) \url{https://www.facebook.com/POACP/posts/1181105658624021} accessed 2 September 2017}

In an April 2014 speech at the Twaddell Avenue protest camp, UUP Councillor Chris McGimpsey condemned leaders that betray their Protestant brethren by talking to nationalist opposition groups.\footnote{Address by Chris McGimpsey to the at Twaddell Avenue Protest Camp, 19 April 2014, reproduced at \url{https://www.1src.com/video/t_N1Fjho9m4aE} accessed 17 August 2017} A reference to the ominous Lundy leadership is an essential element of any crowd–pleasing, ‘blood and thunder’ speech to the loyalist faithful but it exposes the breadth of scepticism grassroots loyalism holds for the leadership within unionism, and that scepticism can sometimes be extended to the Orange leadership. One Orangeman commented, “‘No surrender’ that’s what we say and the leadership have just turned on us. Sure, it’s great to be finally walking home but giving away what they have, no; they’ve turned their back on us,”\footnote{Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 25 April 2017} and a supporter of the Pride of Ardoyne Flute Band contends the band are entitled to refuse the terms of the agreement, predicting ‘you’ll never parade that route again you’ve been sold out’.\footnote{Pride of Ardoyne Facebook Page, ‘Statement the band has received’ (2016) \url{https://www.facebook.com/POACP/posts/1181105658624021} accessed 2 September 2017}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The violence and disorder of the dispute at Drumcree during the mid–to–late–1990s represented a watershed for the Orange Order’s respectability amongst the Protestant middle–classes and it has been unable to stem the tide of middle–class alienation, an increasingly proletarianized movement.
Yet achieving the correct strategy in responding to parade restrictions and re-routing is difficult. Drumcree was marked by intra-Orange disputes, whilst the Order’s ultimate willingness to negotiate and compromise over the parade conflict in the interface area of Ardoyne angered some local Orangemen and loyalists. This chapter has explored the extent to which the Orange Order has faced an image problem as a result of its involvement in parading disputes and has continued – in addition to the findings of Chapter 3 – to explore the extent to which the Order’s social and political marginalisation is a consequence of the growing unacceptability of overt religious sectarianism that the institution is alleged to promote.

The Drumcree dispute was the last major mobilisation of the Orange movement, reminiscent in some ways of the mass gatherings of miners during the last UK industrial showpiece dispute in terms of scale, determination, confrontation, and – ultimately – defeat for those mobilised. Whilst many unionists maintained a benign attitude to the Order, the attendant violence of that dispute damaged the institution’s standing among moderates. What incentive to join the Order could possibly be presented by the confrontations involved? Within the UUP, David Trimble’s appearance and success were to be the platform from which his UUP would be launched, evidence that, among the politically committed at least, militant Orangeism still had mileage. For the Reverend Martin Smyth, the inability to lead would cost him any chance of the leadership of the UUP. However, whilst Orange support was useful, Trimble’s political project was to scorn the base degrees by which he did ascend. His attempts to modernise the UUP left scant room for an Orange presence within.

The parade dispute in Ardoyne that came to a head in 2013, following a number of years of annual violence around the Twelfth of July celebrations, also ended ultimately in defeat for the Orange Order; another ‘traditional’ parade prohibited. The dispute was finally resolved with an agreement to compromise – with the Orange Order doing the compromising. This left many loyalists in the area
feeling forsaken by the Orange Order. Appreciating the significance of parades in Northern Ireland and the difficulty of managing them, the Parades Commission has attracted the opprobrium of the Orange Order with its re-routings, restrictions, and (effectively) outright bans. Many Orangemen believe it to be fundamentally anti-Orange;\textsuperscript{117} its members drawn from an uncomprehending narrow middle-class background unfamiliar with the religious and cultural traditions of Orangeism. The cultural contestation continues but there are no questions which of the two – the Commission or Grand Lodge – is winning.

Grand Lodge has begun to demonstrate an awareness of the Order’s contentious public image and has attempted to respond by instituting an educational programme, with a fulltime educational outreach officer, and the rebranding of the Twelfth as ‘Orangefest’, despite meeting with some internal resistance from members.\textsuperscript{118} The Order may be demonstrating some degree of policy learning in an attempt to regain lost ground. The evidence in Ardoyne demonstrates that the lessons learned in Portadown have resulted in a changed approach to parade conflicts. Dialogue with Catholic residents’ associations – even if behind closed doors whilst publicly maintaining disagreement with the Parades Commission – was ultimately unavoidable. Yet the overall outcome of more than two decades of a mixture of violent confrontations, boycotts of the Parades Commission, refusal (until recently) to negotiate with local residents’ groups, and insistence on maintaining traditional routes has been hugely unsatisfactory for the Order. It has lost territory, in terms of parade routes; members, alienated by internal schisms; potential members, difficult to quantify numerically but who have found the Order’s approach unappealing; and credibility, obliged to accept more restrictions and regulations than ever previously in the organisation’s history. Whilst political organisations in Northern Ireland

\textsuperscript{117} McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Pages 82–83
\textsuperscript{118} Varying views disclosed in interviews, see: Chapter 5 for more detail
have also been obliged to compromise, the difference has been that such compromises have arisen as a product of negotiations. The Orange Order has never negotiated with the Parades Commission.
Chapter Five
‘The Biggest Threat’? The impact of secularism

Introduction

The 2011 census revealed that 82.3 per cent of the population in Northern Ireland identify as Christian, just over half aligning to a Protestant denomination. These figures represent a slight fall since the 2001 census, where 85.8 per cent identified as Christian and 45.6 per cent of the province (a slight majority of all Christians) professed a Protestant faith. Other faiths groups made up only 0.8 per cent of Northern Ireland in 2011; most of the non–Christian population did not align to a faith. Among Christian respondents in Northern Ireland, there has traditionally been higher levels of church attendance compared to elsewhere in the UK, attributed to a variety of factors, not least the persistence of the historic conflict as religion has formed part of the contest between Unionism and Irish Catholic nationalism. Steve Bruce anticipates a more secular Northern Ireland to emerge as the conflict recedes and processes of modernisation and globalisation permeate. Clearly movement away from the Protestant faith and a decline in interest in religion is potentially damaging for the Orange Order, diminishing the pool of potential recruits. Secularism represents more than a decline in the number of religious adherents. It involves the separation of religion from the political sphere and policy–making.

 Whilst the Orange Order, committed to liberty, might conceivably welcome this, the Order is supportive of the religiously–infused social conservatism that prevails in Northern Ireland. The

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1 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 25 August 2014
5 S. Bruce, Religion in Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
province continues to veto same–sex marriage and prohibit abortion other than in the most exceptional circumstances. Stricter controls on Sunday trading exist. Other faith–based groups, such as The Boys’ Brigade are more prominent than in England and coverage of the churches is greater in the Northern Irish media compared to religious coverage in the English media. If the local state is reformed to the point where it appears as irreligious as other western liberal democracies, that would be a further marker of the Order’s irrelevance, appearing an antiquated body bypassed by new social norms.

Protestantism in Northern Ireland is wide–ranging in terms of the denominations it encompasses and includes a varying assortment of theological perspectives. Whilst mainstream Protestant denominations have been declining numerically in Northern Ireland in recent years, there has been some growth in conservative evangelical movements, for example Baptists and Free Presbyterians, and in less traditional, liberal house churches.6 Catholicism has also seen a decline in those regularly attending worship but attendance patterns remain significantly stronger in the province that elsewhere in the UK or in the Republic. The eschewing of religion is acknowledged as a significant potential challenge to the Orange Order. As one member said:

What is the biggest threat to your faith today? The biggest threat to your faith today is secularism, by far and away the biggest. The issue today for anybody of any Christian faith in the United Kingdom is how you safeguard and promote your faith because at the moment it is, at best, frowned upon and, at worst, people in our society are openly hostile to it. So, the threat of that faces [Protestantism] is not what the Roman Catholic Church does or does not do, the challenge that faces us as Protestants is how do we actually

influence society as a faith–based organisation and that is becoming more and more difficult. And that is the challenge to Orangeism today.\(^7\)

Growing disillusionment with the church and its leadership, irrespective of religion or denomination, and movement away from faith have seen an increase in the number of people electing to define themselves as having ‘no religion’ on census forms, begging the question of how can a faith–based organisation maintain its significance?

Thus far, this thesis has explored, in exploring the Order in a quasi–religious context, the negative impacts of accusations of sectarianism in terms of the Order’s image, attitudes towards it and the haemorrhaging of membership. This chapter considers a different aspect of the importance of religion to the Orange Order and answers the question: to what extent has secularism within society contributed to the Order’s marginalisation and, ultimately, reduced the pool of perspective new members? To do so, it assesses whether the decline of religion and growth of secular tendencies is limiting the appeal of the Orange Order beyond its own, still largely religious, membership. In so doing, however, it is necessary to firstly explore the centrality of Protestantism to the institution and assess the relationship the Order maintains with the Protestant churches, before examining how religious decline may be impacting upon the strength of Orangeism.

**Protestantism and the Orange Order**

The Orange Order describes itself as ‘unashamedly Protestant, for the protection of the Protestant people and property […] and […] rooted in the scriptures of truth’.\(^8\) The promotion of the Protestant faith remains the Order’s primary mission. After family tradition, religious drivers are the most important

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\(^7\) Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 25 August 2014

motivation for joining. The standards to which the Orange Order expects members to adhere are expressed within a religious context, requiring members to behave as ‘good and worthy Protestants’. As such, meetings open with prayers, bible readings and teachings are commonplace, and charitable works are organised regularly by local lodges. On parade, the spectacle is crafted and managed to showcase Protestantism. The insignia on collarettes reflects ‘a belief in religion and a way of life based on Bible Truth’, and banners and colours use biblical imagery and emblems, as well as bible verses. Bands that support church parades are usually required to attend the church service and the Order requires hymns to be played. Submission and commitment to the principles of the reformed faith are expected to frame the experience of a member. The religious mission and the drive for the Order to play a religious role within the fabric of Northern Ireland’s civic community remains strong amongst members. As one interviewee put it, the Order has a responsibility to ‘bring brethren into churches and away from secularism’ that is ‘devastat[ing]’ the unionist community at large. Another member insisted that the Orange Order ‘absolutely [...] has a religious role to play in Northern Ireland, a role that for too long it has been steering away from and instead becoming obsessed with Twaddell Avenue and the like’.

Religious observances have remained a key feature of the Order’s activities and expectations of adherence to the Protestant faith remain membership requirements, even if there is no explicit sanction within the Order’s rules for non-attendance at Protestant worship once a member. In order to join the Orange Order, an individual must – perhaps unsurprisingly – be a Protestant believing in God with ‘a humble and steadfast faith in Jesus Christ’ and opposing ‘the fatal errors and doctrines of

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9 Data supplied by McAuley, Tonge and Mycock, Membership Survey (2011) Unpublished raw data
10 Although within a content analysis the Orange Standard, there is less reporting of charitable work in recent years.
11 G. Montgomery and J. Whitten, The Order on Parade (Belfast: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, 1995) Page 8
12 D. Bryan, T. Fraser and S. Dunn, Political Rituals: Loyalist Parades in Portadown (Coleraine: Centre for Study of Conflict, University of Ulster, 1995)
13 Brian Blair, Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 10 November 2013
14 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 12 August 2015
the Church of Rome’. He must demonstrate obedience to the scriptures and respect for the Sabbath, as well as his country and his Sovereign; and should refrain from taking the Lord’s name in vain.\(^\text{15}\)

Applicants to the Order must satisfy their local lodge that they meet these religious preconditions, however, across the institution differences in interpretation exist about some of the entry criteria. Some local lodges apply quite a loose set of criteria, in some cases there already being a familiarity with the candidate. As one interviewee noted:

> Many of the people we get applying are sons or friends of existing brethren. They can vouch for the character of the person applying and that’s held in high regard. If we know they’re a Protestant and they believe in a reformed faith then they have satisfied us that they are able to move forward to join.\(^\text{16}\)

In 2003, the then then Grand Secretary, Denis Watson, chastised lodges for ‘gloss[ing] over’ the regularity of worship of new recruits and advised ‘church attendance should be taken [...] over a regular period rather than just a few Sundays before’.\(^\text{17}\) Some lodges demand attendance at particular church and anniversary services\(^\text{18}\) and others require local parish clergy to confirm that the applicant is a practicing Protestant, considering the individual’s regularity and longevity of church attendance.\(^\text{19}\)

The definition of a ‘practicing’ Protestant is however somewhat disagreed upon amongst members. Brethren who stress the Order’s religiosity often look with disdain upon members who appear to be merely Protestant in their political and social attitudes, identifying their Protestantism as their ethnic category. When asked if regular church attendance was important to be a Protestant, one member said, ‘It is essential that Protestant men, women and children attend their church each week.


\(^{16}\) Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 25 September 2014


\(^{18}\) McAuley et al., *Loyal to the Core?* (2011) Page 159

\(^{19}\) Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 25 September 2014
Absolutely essential.\textsuperscript{20} Another member recalled being unable to contain his frustration with fellow brethren who did not attend church:

On parade once, I remember calling out one guy I recognised, he must have been early twenties. He used to come to my church as a lad. I knew he and his family had stopped coming and I knew they didn’t go to church anywhere now. There he was standing in his collarette waiting to parade and I said, “What right have you to be wearing that? You’re no Protestant.” In my view none of them should be allowed in. You have to attend church. It’s not even up for question.\textsuperscript{21}

The value of regular worship and the extent to which it is an essential component of Order membership seems absolute for some. Officially, members are required to attend a church service – of a denomination recognised by the Orange Order as ‘holding to the tenets of the Reformed Faith’ – regularly,\textsuperscript{22} yet it has been claimed – disputed by several interviewees – that many do not have a ‘credible Church connection’ or even a ‘nominal membership’ of any denomination.\textsuperscript{23} In 2011, ninety per cent of Orange Order members claimed to be practising Protestants, with more than half (60 per cent) of those surveyed claiming to attend church at least weekly. A further 28 per cent attend church at least monthly and less than 2 per cent said they never attended.\textsuperscript{24} This figure is significantly higher than the Grand Lodge’s internal survey in 1997, where only 42 per cent of the nearly twenty thousand respondents claimed to attend church services with any degree of regularity.\textsuperscript{25} Following attendance at church on Sundays, members are expected to refrain from activities such as organised sports and games, as well as entertainment and parties in order to ‘keep the holy the Sabbath day’.\textsuperscript{26} The extent

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 29 September 2014
\item Ibid
\item Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, Constitution, Laws and Ordinances of the Loyal Orange Institution (1967) No. 24 – Eligibility for Membership
\item Kennaway, A Tradition Betrayed (2007) Page 253
\item McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011)
\item LOI Commission, quoted in Kaufmann, The Orange Order (2007) Page 281
\item Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, Constitution, Laws and Ordinances of the Loyal Orange Institution (1967), No. 24 – Qualification of Candidates
\end{thebibliography}
to which members observe these rigorous conditions however has been questionable for a number of years. McAuley et al. found 65.7 per cent of members said they shop on a Sunday, albeit just under 10 per cent admitted to doing so ‘often’, and the research found that over 55s were the least likely to do so.

**Relationships with the Protestant Churches**

A survey in the late 1980s found that Northern Irish clergy made up 12 per cent of members of the Orange Order (mainly Church of Ireland and Presbyterian clerics rather than Methodists), but that appears to be less so the case today, one member contending: ‘So few clerics join the Order now. The positions this institution has taken on some things [...] has meant membership has become very inhibiting. Ministers just can’t afford to be part of the Order’. As middle-class respectability declines, so too does the Order’s clerical membership, the clergy being a mainly middle-class profession and increasingly a group eschewing the fairly militant cultural Protestantism offered via Orangeism. Kaufmann has similarly identified the number of clergy joining the institution to have fallen significantly over recent years, contending the figure in 1997 to be as low as 0.5 per cent of the entire Order membership. The Order has allowed laymen to stand as chaplains for private and district lodges since 1975, a recognition that the exodus of clergy has been taking place for decades, part of the numerical decline since the onset of the conflict. The move away by many clerics was justified by the Anglican Archbishop of Dublin in 2007 when he said that the association with the Orange Order had led to the Church of Ireland and the clergy being ‘compromised very seriously’, but – despite the

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28 McAuley et al., *Loyal to the Core?* (2011) Page 160
30 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 7 September 2016
32 Ibid Page 285
frustration caused to the Order by the Archbishop’s comments – most Orangemen (58 per cent) believe a good or excellent relationship is enjoyed with the churches in Northern Ireland.34

Over a number of decades, the Church of Ireland has become more distant from the Orange Order, seemingly not because of matters of theological doctrine but rather elements of sectarianism associated with some Order members. The aversion of clerics to such elements has been common across a number of denominations. Several high–profile chaplains within the institution in recent decades played key roles as moderates, especially over matters pertaining the Order’s approach to the Roman Catholic Church. Notably, Canon S. E. Long as well as the Reverends John Lockington, Brian Kennaway, Warren Porter, and William Bingham all encouraged a moderate approach. Yet it is significant that the latter three resigned their positions within the Orange Order, and Porter and Bingham even received death threats in 1997 for repudiating abusive behaviour exhibited towards Roman Catholics and police officers at the Drumcree standoff.35 Even the significant minority of traditionally conservative chaplains have been known to support more moderate stances than the grassroots. For example, in 2016, the Reverend Mervyn Gibson, now Grand Secretary but then Assistant Grand Master, publicly challenged the Order’s position on members attending Catholic worship.36 The general advocacy of the clerical membership is moderate.

Religious tensions have also arisen between different Protestant denominations. Kaufmann explores rivalries between different Protestant traditions.37 Presbyterians tend to be more militant and less deferential than Church of Ireland Orangemen. McAuley et al. note however how those Presbyterians,

34 Data supplied by McAuley, Tonge and Mycock, Membership Survey (2011) Unpublished raw data
37 Kaufmann, The Orange Order (2007)
once the most indifferent to Grand Lodge leadership, now fill many of those leadership positions, indicative of the shift in gravity in Grand Lodge.\textsuperscript{38} Church of Ireland and Presbyterians alike were suspicious of the Reverend Ian Paisley’s Free Presbyterian Church, not officially recognised by the Order until 1998. Whilst Paisley had become a district chaplain by the 1940s, the refusal to recognise Free Presbyterians meant Paisley could progress no further within the Order.\textsuperscript{39} Denomination has become less significant, with age, political socialisation, and the time period in which the member joined the Order being more significant indicators of opinion.\textsuperscript{40}

**The nature of Protestantism**

The nature of Protestantism within the context of Orange Order membership has been under–researched. Roberts’ 1971 analysis is very dated, exploring what is meant by ‘religious’ within the Order and contending:

Any specific definition [of religion] must be wide enough to cover the range of beliefs and practices socially regarded to be religious. A supernatural element within the beliefs appears to be essential to some, but, for practical purposes, insights gained from the study of religious institutions – study avoiding the metaphysical – can be applied fruitfully to secular institutions such as parties which are without this element. If “supernatural” is replaced by “super–empirical”, the Orange Order, which also supports the Protestant Churches which have unequivocal supernatural elements, contains its own myths and values which are above any possible empirical proof […] An organisation such as the Orange Order, not exclusively religious, can perform adequately and support functions usually belonging to a more exclusively religious body.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38} McAuley et al., *Loyal to the Core?* (2011) Pages 162–163

\textsuperscript{39} E. Moloney, *Paisley: From Demagogue to Democrat?* (Dublin: Poolbeg, 2008)

\textsuperscript{40} McAuley et al., *Loyal to the Core?* (2011) Chapter 5

\textsuperscript{41} Roberts, ‘A Religious Institution?’ (1971) Page 270
Roberts assesses the Laws and Ordinances of Orangeism extensively, as well as symbols, regalia, and the lyrics of songs, to structure his argument, finding that ‘Orangeism has the ideology of religion, although it is not exclusive, and a large proportion of the beliefs are concurrently upheld by complementary institutions’ being that of the Protestant churches.42 Building upon Roberts’ work, Stewart applies the analytical tool of implicit religion to the Order.43 Stewart contends the three cornerstones of the institution – faith, the crown, and the Union – constitute the integrating foci necessary for Implicit Religion.44

The scope of the influence and impact a religion has must be able to have some bearing on the life of a follower. It cannot be claimed that religious beliefs have value unless they have an impact the actions and interactions of an individual’s life, even if only periodically instead of daily.45 For Orangemen, the wording of oaths undertaken at the time of induction and the preconditions of membership are imbued with religious content, requiring members to:

Have sincere love and veneration for his Heavenly Father, a humble and steadfast faith in Jesus Christ, the Saviour of mankind, believing in Him as the only Mediator between God and man [...] he should love, uphold, and defend the Protestant religion, and sincerely desire and endeavour to propagate its doctrines and precepts; he should strenuously oppose the fatal errors and doctrines of the Church of Rome.46

The Orange worldview is that their Protestant faith is a guide to living. This faith is seen as a guarantor of liberty. Constraints upon the expression of religious fidelity and the cultural and political associations with that faith are seen as affronts to liberty. Restrictions upon Orange activities or

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42 Ibid Page 270
46 Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, *Constitution, Laws and Ordinances of the Loyal Orange Institution* (1967), No. 24 – Qualification of Candidates
criticism of the organisation by outsiders are seen as assaults upon the Protestant Unionist identity by secular liberals acting in an illiberal way, with no understanding of the deep-seated religious and political sentiments underpinning the parading tradition and scant cognisance of Protestant aspects of Britishness. Thus, one member said:

> The Parades Commission go out of their way, out of their way, to ensure we [Orangemen] cannot have our parades. We’ve walked the Queen’s highway for generations but now we, who’ve always been loyal to the Protestant faith – which is the faith of this country – and to the crown, are under attack in our own land. It’s unlike ever before.  

Political interpretations of events are seen through the prism of the Protestant religion by the Orange Order. This produces defensive interpretations and fears that policy-makers are unconcerned with possible threats to the British Protestant identity and beliefs. A clear example can be found in the Orange Order’s response to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The Orange Standard claimed that this was a deal that ‘No Protestant in good conscience could support’, and the majority of Orange Order members (60 per cent) voted against the Agreement. The Orange negative interpretation of the Agreement, whilst expressing constitutional concerns over the role of ‘Eire’, was much more preoccupied with what Grand Lodge perceived as the immorality of an agenda of prisoner releases, terrorist of government, and substantial changes to a loyal and dedicated police force. As far as the Orange Order was concerned, the terrorists were unrepentant and therefore the Christian requirement for forgiveness did not pertain.

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47 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 25 September 2014
48 Orange Standard, April 1998
Processes of secularism

Secularism involves the ‘process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions, lose social significance’. 49 Within the political dimension, ‘secular’ references the official policy – often of national governments – to specifically disassociate (or maintain non-association) with particular religious traditions or organisations. ‘Secularism’ is also the ideological framing of political projects, attitudes, and behaviours bereft of religious input. 50 Religious groups are represented to a significant level within the UK polity, even though the state is not seen as a religious one and certainly is some distance from constituting a theocracy. Twenty-six bishops sit in one part of the legislature – the House of Lords – and the Catholic Church is routinely consulted by governments on educational provision, to cite two examples.

The concept of the secular, however, can be problematic. Baker and Smith contend that ‘protracted conceptual and polemic debates have hindered the development of an empirical account of secularity’. 51 They suggest three dimensions to classifying the secular: religious affiliation, theistic belief, and practice. 52 The religious affiliation measurement is perhaps the most straightforward, usually calculated as the percentage of people who choose not to affiliate with any established religious grouping and describe themselves as having no religious affiliation. Belief however is more complicated. Whilst some religious non-affiliates will be wholly devoid of belief, not all of these individuals are without faith or spirituality, nor can their opposition to any form of religion be assumed. Rather, these individuals profess to not identifying with an organised, public religion. In

50 C. Calhoun, M. Juergensmeyer, J. VanAntwerpen (Eds), Rethinking Secularism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)
52 Ibid Page 14; The three dimensions can be used – as is used here – to demonstrate distance from religion and religious institutions, but can also conversely be applied to demonstrate commitment and engagement to religion as well.
terms of religion, ‘believing without belonging’ has been the focus of academic attention.\textsuperscript{53} The third religious dimension, of practice, is also difficult to assess in terms of implications. Although a fall in religious observance is easy to measure, does absence from church categorically symbolise the diminution of religion? A decline in membership of political parties might not necessarily indicate the demise of interest in politics.

There are individuals who profess a theistic belief and affiliate themselves with a religious tradition or denomination, but who thereafter choose not to practice religious observance with any measurable frequency. These ‘culturally religious’ individuals understand religion to be part of their self-consciousness and retain the emotive significance of some religious symbols, but actively disengage from practising the religious rituals surrounding that identity.\textsuperscript{54} It then falls to researchers to arbitrate the parameters of ‘practising’ and ‘non–practising’; the thresholds for this varying depending on geographical location and denomination. Beyond believers, there are two broad categories: atheists, who do not believe in a god and may claim proof in support of their non-belief in a deity,\textsuperscript{55} and agnostics, who contend merely that belief in God is unverifiable and the existence – or nonexistence – of a deity is beyond human comprehension.\textsuperscript{56}

There are other categories. Some regular worshippers, observing the rules of a particular faith such as regular church attendance, may be – in spite of their apparent religiosity – agnostic, engaging in the rituals of a religion but little more. Similarly, there may be some people who do not profess to a belief in a god but who not feel comfortable with the atheist label because of possible social or political

\textsuperscript{55} For a full discussion on atheism, see: K. Walters, \textit{Atheism: A Guide for the Perplexed} (London: Continuum, 2010)
\textsuperscript{56} It is noteworthy that there may be many believing and/or practicing agnostics in society at large, those who find theistic arguments unverifiable/unconvincing but chose to believe and/or their faith regardless.
stigma, or even isolation (at least until recently). Looking at secularism in the American experience, Baker and Smith found that 30 per cent of people who claimed not to affiliate with a religion at the time of the survey realigned themselves with a faith group within a year. The authors also found that around 5 per cent of people who claimed to identify with a religion would de-align within the same time period.\textsuperscript{57} Whilst one would not expect to see the same levels of fluctuation in Northern Ireland, movement in or out of faith by some individuals is likely.

Movement away from religion in Northern Ireland

Religion remains deeply embedded into the fabric of Northern Ireland’s civic society and, whilst changes in religious patterns can be complex, high levels of religiosity remain evident in the region. In the 2011 census, only 10.1 per cent of Northern Ireland’s population declared themselves to have no religion; however, that figure has increased nearly 3 per cent since 2001.\textsuperscript{58} Most of the religious identify themselves as either Protestant (41.6 per cent in 2011) or Roman Catholic (40.8 per cent). 48 per cent of the population ‘belonged to or were brought up in Protestant, Other Christian or Christian–related denominations’ and 45 per cent were raised as Catholic.\textsuperscript{59} Mitchell notes that, since the 2001 census, Protestants no longer maintain their absolute majority in the region and the figure for those self-identifying as Catholics has risen steadily, given that Catholics were little over one–third of the population in 1961.\textsuperscript{60} In the 1961 census, only 364 people of the then 1.5 million population of Northern Ireland claimed to be atheist, humanist, or freethinkers. Compared to England and Wales

\textsuperscript{57} Baker and Smith, American Secularism (2015) Pages 19–20
\textsuperscript{60} Mitchell, Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland (2006) Pages 22–23
(25.1 per cent professing no religion in 1961) and Scotland (36.7 per cent), both of which have seen significant increases in no religion (by 10.3 per cent and 9.2 per cent respectively by 2011), Northern Ireland’s decline in religiosity must be viewed in context as small and beginning from an extremely high base of religious affiliation. Nonetheless, there has been a rise in the non-religious, standing in 2011 at one in ten, and findings from the annual *Northern Ireland Life and Times* Surveys have confirmed this trend.

Whilst Protestants no longer have an absolute majority in Northern Ireland, Protestantism is still the bigger of the two main religious groupings. Protestantism is made up of three principal denominations – Presbyterian, Anglican, and Methodist – with the vast majority of ‘Other Christian’ identifiers being smaller Protestant groups. Those without a religious affiliation have become a gradually more significant grouping encompassing, in 2014, 16 per cent of the region’s population. Indeed, after Roman Catholic (44 per cent) and Presbyterian (17 per cent), those of no religion are the third largest group in the province, having recently overtaken Anglicans who represent one seventh of the Northern Ireland.

When comparing childhood religious identification with current identities, family transmission of faith occurs most strongly amongst Roman Catholics, aided by a separate education system. Irrespective of

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The faith tradition a child is brought up in, the greatest likelihood is they will continue to identify with that faith grouping in later life. However, after Catholics, the second most significant fidelity to family identity is amongst those claiming to have no religion whatsoever (see Table 5.1). When considering the reverse, comparing childhood religious identification with current identity, the significant level of transition away from childhood faiths towards no religion is quite stark (see Table 5.2). Of those who claimed to have no religion in 2014, more than half were raised with some faith, most commonly a Protestant faith. Those without religious affiliation are growing and being added to by individuals who were raised within religious households. If this trend continues, one would expect exponential growth in the number of people professing to have no religion at the particular expense of Protestantism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Religion</th>
<th>Current Religion (%)</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
<th>Church of Ireland</th>
<th>Presbyterian</th>
<th>Methodist</th>
<th>Other Christian</th>
<th>No Religion</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Church of Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: Childhood Religious Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Religion</th>
<th>What religion if any were you brought up in? (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2014*

Church Attendance and Membership

Northern Ireland has also witnessed a decline in church attendance, especially amongst Roman Catholics, 95 per cent of whom claimed to attend Mass weekly in 1968. Nonetheless, the practice of religion still remains commonplace and the region has always enjoyed higher levels of church attendance than elsewhere in the UK. In 2014, just under half of the population (45 per cent) attended worship at least two or three times a month, with just under a third attending weekly. The 45 per cent figure represented a fall of 4 per cent over the previous decade. Amongst Protestants, the number of people who claim never to attend church (outside of the special occasions such as weddings, funerals, and baptisms) was only 14 per cent in 2014 and churchgoing overall remains more common than exceptional.

Setting Northern Ireland’s experience within the context of the rest of the UK, the British Humanist Association found (in 2011) that only 15 per cent of respondents in England and Wales claimed to

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66 *Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, ‘In what religion, if any, were you brought up?’* (2014) [http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2014/Background/FAMRELIG.html] accessed 3 June 2016
67 *Northern Ireland Loyalty Survey* (1968)
68 *Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, ‘Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals, baptisms and so on, how often nowadays do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion?’* (2014) [http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2014/Background/CHATTND2.html] accessed 6 June 2016
69 *Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, ‘Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals, baptisms and so on, how often nowadays do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion?’* (2004)
have been to church within the last month, with one in five claiming never to have been to a church with the exception of weddings, baptisms, and so on.\textsuperscript{70} Despite the possible bias of those commissioning the research, and the relatively small sample size,\textsuperscript{71} the findings are not dissimilar from other polls taken. A British Social Attitudes survey, taken in 2012, found only one in six respondents in England, Scotland, and Wales attended church at least once a month, a decline from 21.3 per cent in 1983. Including all respondents who claimed in the survey to have attended church at all, there had been a decline from 44.1 per cent in 1983 to 32.3 per cent in 2012. The portion of respondents who never attend church (with the exception of special occasions) rose from just over half in 1983 to around two-thirds in 2012.\textsuperscript{72} In the rest of the UK, frequent attendees at church services were very much in the minority in 1983, and that has declined still further by 2012. Northern Ireland’s experience, whilst seeing some albeit marginal decline, is clearly unlike the rest of the UK. In 2010, 7 per cent of England’s population were members of a Christian church, 7.3 per cent of the Welsh population, and 14.7 per cent of Scots could be counted as church members. In Northern Ireland, 45.9 per cent of the province were formally members of churches.\textsuperscript{73} Whilst Brierley predicts a decline in the number of churches in Northern Ireland and the number of ordained clergy by 2020, the relative position of faith in the province compared to the rest of the UK is clearly very strong.

In the Republic of Ireland’s 2011 census, over 84 per cent of the population professed to have a Roman Catholic faith. All other Christian denominations together made up only 5.4 per cent of the


\textsuperscript{71} It should be noted that the sample size for this poll was 1,896. This should be taken into consideration when reviewing the results.


\textsuperscript{73} P. Brierley, \textit{UK Church Statistics Number 2: 2010–2020} (Tonbridge: ADBC Publishers, 2014)
respondents and only one in twenty adults said they had no religion.\textsuperscript{74} Whilst the figure for Catholics is a drop of around 4 per cent since 2006, it represents an increase of around 170,000 in the actual number of Catholics. Church attendance has dropped in recent years. In 2006, 48 per cent of Irish Catholic adults attended church at least weekly, a figure which has fallen from 81 per cent in 1990.\textsuperscript{75} In 2012, the Association of Catholic Priests claimed weekly Mass attendance was at 35 per cent, but that figure included Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{76} A study in 2010 broke down the difference in regularity of practice between Northern Irish Catholics and those in the Republic. 45 per cent of Roman Catholic respondents in the Republic of Ireland attended church at least weekly, compared to almost three–fifths of Catholics in Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{77}

Whilst both church membership and attendance remain relatively high in Northern Ireland, it is important to take account the impact of different factors on these figures. In Britain in 2012, 71.9 per cent of 18–24 year olds claimed never to attend church, compared with 59.4 per cent of 65–74 year olds. Whilst the 18–24 and 25–34 year old age groups demonstrated little change in terms of non–attendance since the 1980s, other age groups have seen increases in non–attendance.\textsuperscript{78} In Northern Ireland, in 2014, those attending church services several times a week were overwhelmingly aged over 55.\textsuperscript{79} Those over 55 were more than twice as likely to attend church services weekly than their 18–35

\textsuperscript{78} British Social Attitude Surveys (2012) [http://www.natcen.ac.uk/our-research/research/british-social-attitudes/] accessed 16 May 2016
\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Northern Ireland Life and Times} Survey, ‘Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals, baptisms and so on, how often nowadays do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion?’ (2014) [http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2014/Background/CHATTND2.html] accessed 6 June 2016
year old counterparts. In 2008, only one in ten 18–24 year olds claimed to be ‘very’ or ‘extremely religious’, compared to one in four of the over 65 age group. In the 2016 British Social Attitudes Survey, 70 per cent of adults aged between 18 and 24 claimed to have no religion.

Beliefs and orthodoxy

Declines in Protestant religious identification and churchgoing add to the pressures on the Orange Order in that it needs a replenished pool of committed Protestants to thrive. But what about the tenets of Protestant belief? Asked about their commitment to the centrality of the Bible and other core features, Boal et al. placed Protestants in one of three groups: ‘conservative’, ‘liberal–conservative’, or ‘liberal’, and found half of Protestant churchgoers in Belfast were ‘conservative’. The other half being split about equally between the two latter groups. Comparing the study with their 1983 work, the authors, surprisingly and certainly counter–intuitively, contend that conservative Protestantism has not only continued to thrive in the city, but has even made some gains and ‘theories assuming the decline of either fundamentalism or evangelicalism with the progress of the industrial modernism must be questioned’. It should be noted that the second Boal et al. study is itself becoming dated, completed two decades ago. In his 1994 study, Casanova argues that, in the American experience, ‘both religious “fundamentalists” and fundamentalist “secular humanists” are cognitive minorities’. Instead, the majority of Americans are humanist, ‘who are simultaneously religious and secular’. Applying that learning to the British experience generally, and specifically to

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82 F. Boal, M. Kean and D. Livingstone, Them and Us: Attitudinal Variations among Churchgoers in Belfast (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, 1997) Page 96
Northern Ireland, it could be argued that the absence of religious practice and religious identity are not necessarily indicators of secularism.

Although less than one in five people in the UK say they attended church at least once per month, in the 2011 census over 66 per cent of the population aligned themselves to a religion (most being Christian) with only 26.1 per cent saying they had ‘no religion’ and a further 7.2 per cent not stating a religion at all.\textsuperscript{84} A 2015 YouGov/\textit{The Times} Survey found two–fifths of respondents stating they had no religion.\textsuperscript{85} However, the same 2015 Survey found that 52 per cent of people believed in a god or in a higher spiritual power, albeit not necessarily a god. 14 per cent said they didn’t know.\textsuperscript{86} In a 2015 YouGov Survey, 36 per cent of respondents said they definitely or probably believed in life after death. 15 per cent said they were not sure.\textsuperscript{87} Assessing a range of different religious indicators from a range of surveys between the 1940s and 1990s, Gill et al. found some decline in tradition Christian beliefs (especially the belief in God) but that belief had held up relative to church attendance and as such the latter needed to be treated with caution as a definitive marked of movement from religion.\textsuperscript{88}

Nonetheless, in the absence of clearer measurements of shifts from religion, church attendance retains a proxy value. The extent of religious belief in Northern Ireland remains considerable. In a 2008 \textit{Northern Ireland Life and Times} Survey, only 7 per cent of respondents said explicitly that they did not attend church at least once per month.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{85} YouGov/\textit{The Times} Survey, ‘A third of British adults don’t believe in a higher power’ (2015), available at \url{[https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/02/12/third-british-adults-dont-believe-higher-power/] accessed 1 June 2016}
\bibitem{86} Ibid
\bibitem{87} YouGov Survey, ‘Survey Results’ (2015), available at \url{[https://d25d2506sf94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/zcui1w66ie/Copy%20of%20Opi_Internal_Results_150817_Death_R_W_2.pdf] accessed 1 June 2016}
\end{thebibliography}
believe in a God, with 69 per cent saying they believed in God, with either few or no doubts about it.\textsuperscript{89}

In an earlier survey, just under one–fifth reported praying daily.\textsuperscript{90} Albeit based on somewhat older data, Hayes and McAllister did find a strong correlation between levels of belief and propensity to attend religious services.\textsuperscript{91}

**Countering the onset of secularism: dilution of the Order’s religious messages?**

The strong intertwining of national and religious identities may act as an antidote to the declining importance of religion, which remains a key ethnic marker for both of the main communities. As Tonge contends, ‘segregation rather than reintegration has been the norm’ in terms of housing, education and sport.\textsuperscript{92} Membership of community organisations, such as the GAA, or support for certain soccer teams reinforces the sense of communal difference. For so long as those divisions are perpetuated, the Orange Order may act as an important communal marker, but this further emphasises its shift from its avowed status as a predominantly religious organisation to that of an ethno–national associational club.

On the eve of the Troubles, Poole and Boal estimate that 32 per cent of the Belfast population lived on streets that were to some extent mixed.\textsuperscript{93} That figure fell rapidly, partly due to increased pressure and sometimes intimidation of residents to relocate. It should be noted that Belfast remains more segregated than other parts of Northern Ireland, and commonly neutral, unaffiliated areas are often


\textsuperscript{92} Tonge, *Conflict and Change* (2002) Page 109

middle-class, pricing lower income families out, meaning working-class tend to stay within their own urban territory. In the most deprived areas of Belfast, territorial separation has not decreased at all.

The vast majority of Catholic schoolchildren attend faith schools controlled by the Church. Non–church schools have overwhelmingly Protestant student populations. In 2013–14, 66,394 children were educated in the ninety-four secondary level Catholic schools.94 Establishing a separate system of schooling, the Catholic Church aspires to nurture those within the faith and, whilst there are officially no Protestant schools, these non–church schools are not closed off from religion. Most have Protestant clergy as part of their governing bodies and management boards. Only seven per cent of school pupils in Northern Ireland attend integrated schools.95 The integrated schools movement, formed in the 1970s, opened the first integrated school, Lagan College, in 1981 with 28 students.96 Sixty–two integrated schools now operate across Northern Ireland, forty–two primaries and twenty colleges in the secondary sector.97 Proactively seeking to achieve an even balance between the percentage of Protestant and Catholic students, integrated schools legislate limits between 35 per cent and 50 per cent for each denomination so as to create a genuinely shared environment for students to engage with children from another religious background.

The Orange Order may need structures of difference to perpetuate its mission. A more integrated Northern Ireland might lead to further questioning of the role of segregationist bodies. If the role of separate Catholic schooling comes under ever–greater scrutiny, as so too may the role of a body which

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94 Data taken from 2013–14 School Census, collected by the Department for Education; Only 22,150 students in Post–Primary Schools with a Roman Catholic Character in 2013–14 were declared as Roman Catholic. A significant portion of Roman Catholic schools did not release data relating to the denomination of its students. [https://northernireland.foundation/sharedfuture/research/integrated-education/] accessed 1 November 2016
96 Ibid
The Orange Order in Northern Ireland

forbids its members from marrying the products of those schools. Amid the questioning of religion and its attendant societal divides, an issue for the Orange Order has been whether to hold true to austere Protestantism or try and broaden its appeal by modernising and diminishing the religious component of its mission. This dilemma remains unresolved but it has seen a growth in outreach and a broadening of the annual culmination of the Orange experience: the Twelfth of July celebrations.

The vast majority of Twelfth of July participants are non–members of the Order and many wish to celebrate in a manner which has little in common with Protestant strictures. Opponents of Orange parades, and the Twelfth, dislike what they see as aggressive, provocative displays of tribal superiority instead of religious observances. The difficulty for organisers lies in bringing about a broader, non–sectarian event when there is the lack of agreement over what the event communicates, not merely between rival communities but also within a Protestant population with varying levels of sympathy towards the Order. The event encompasses religious elements, as well as constitutional and political ones; it commemorates an historic event and can mark a victory of civil liberties; the Twelfth is a festival, as well as a tradition long observed in the province. It also contains rallies at which religious resolutions are passed – rarely differing – encouraging members to live pious, Protestant lives. Whilst the turnout for the speeches and acceptance of the resolutions is generally low, often between fifty to two hundred people, some of these events are broadcast on television on the Twelfth highlights programmes and reported quite widely within the press. McAuley et al. rightly note the danger in too readily labelling the religious aspects of the celebrations, the rally, and religious resolutions included as sectarian rather than the profession of a faith.

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98 See: Chapter 3 for discussion of band culture and parading
100 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Page 174
The Grand Lodge has worked with the Northern Ireland Tourist Board to rebrand the Twelfth as an inclusive ‘Orangefest’. Whilst aspects of this have involved the promotion of better conduct of followers – such as (rarely policed) restrictions on street drinking – Orangefest represents the dilemma confronting the Order. Does it dilute the Protestant aspects of the Twelfth in favour of greater inclusivity, diminishing what some see as sectarian, or does it maintain the pursuit of a celebration of Protestantism, which – however respectable – cannot truly be inclusive given that there are nearly as many Catholics in Northern Ireland as Protestants? Of course, there can be some dilution of sectarian rawness and Grand Lodge has argued that it cannot be held accountable for ‘hangers on’, whose Protestantism is a purely tribal identity although the level of autonomy afforded to local lodges and their associated bands means that Grand Lodge can seem somewhat powerless to intervene in some circumstances.

The short–lived Orange Reformation Group viewed the Grand Lodge as actively seeking to soften the Protestant element of the institution, especially by broadening the inclusivity of the Twelfth, telling its leaders: ‘Hands off our Twelfth’. Established in 2009 to ‘put Protestantism back into Orangeism’, the Group claimed to want to reinvigorate the Order’s biblical, Protestant roots and argued, ‘the Orange Order can only be at its best when it stands firm for the great truths of the Protestant faith’. Their sentiment hasn’t been universally shared however. In 2008, only 10 per cent of members viewed the Twelfth of July platform as very appropriate and religious, whereas 28 per cent claimed they only attracted older people and 41 per cent said the platforms don’t attract many people in proportion of the numbers on parade. When asked about other activities on the Twelfth, only 15 per cent said ‘Things are fine the way they are’, with the vast majority of respondents wanting a greater variety of stall and children’s entertainment to be included, indicative of the fact that the majority of members

101 News Letter, 7 September 2009
102 Larne Times, 27 August 2009
103 Data supplied by McAuley, Tonge and Mycock, Membership Survey (2011) Unpublished raw data
are supportive of a changing the Twelfth, recognising the nominal status of the Protestantism of many Protestants today.

Conclusion

Even though the extent of religious practice and belief has declined, across different indicators, Northern Ireland has high levels of religiosity. Clearly the country has seen some secularisation but it is a small and slow change, especially when compared to the rest of the UK and indeed the Republic of Ireland. Braniff contends that, ‘secularism is not a word that sits easily’ when describing the Northern Irish example. People remain open to religious ideas and a faith, even if that faith isn’t practiced in the traditional, ritualistic (and quantifiable) way. Braniff suggests instead the term ‘unchurched’.104

Continuing communal differences, the legacy of conflict, mean life experiences are defined within the framework of two rival religions and the association with a religious ‘brand’ is still part of the cultural makeup of these two ethnic groups. Religion informs and contributes to both communities. In segregated communities, faith groupings are still of importance in framing identities in Northern Ireland. In the education sector this separation continues. Even as Northern Ireland shows greater levels of secularisation on some indicators, being Protestant or Catholic is still important and the social significance of religion endures, despite changing levels of religious practice.

Secularism and the decline of religion are slow processes in Northern Ireland and they cannot be seen as primary causes of Orange decline. The actual numbers identifying as Protestant, as distinct from

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percentages, are not vastly different from four decades ago. However, as religious differences begin to matter less and fewer people feel the need to join an organisation to defend themselves against ‘expansionist Romanism’, the displacement of religion may be beginning to exacerbate recruitment problems.

The necessity to see unionism as intrinsically linked with the Protestant faith is less clear for many unionists, who instead see their unionist identity in more civic or liberal forms. Orangeism however sees Protestantism as inalienably intertwined with unionist and British identity. Amid the divides that have existed within unionism, the Protestant faith has provided a shared identity. Today, that has become far less so the case. According to Grand Lodge, ‘today defending Protestantism is not so literal as it was in 1795, but it requires us to take a stand for truth in an age of secularism and in order to defend our culture and traditions.’

Despite the claims of some critics and even the Order’s leadership challenging the practices of its lodges to better scrutinise the church attendance of new recruits, Orangemen – on the whole – do value regular church attendance and the majority of them claim to attend church weekly. The ‘majority of members [...] are “well–churched”’ and, amongst the current membership, religion remains strong. Many members of the Orange Order consider belonging to the institution an expression of their faith which they wish to express on a communal, as well as personal, basis. Practices or beliefs associated with a religious grouping provides the basis of a social nexus for those

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106 McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011) Page 169
107 Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, ‘What is the Orange Order’ [http://www.grandorangelodge.co.uk/what-is-the-orange-order#.WJx7hWZXWUK] accessed 14 February 2017
109 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 7 September 2016
within the group. Whilst many of the customs associated with being of a faith are performed in private, religion is seldom a private experience. A follower’s personal beliefs are constructed within a specific context and in relation to others. Morrow et al. found that church members take their religious beliefs into their roles in the public domain, via youth and uniformed organisations, sports teams and fellowship groups, impacting via their social lives upon the non-practicing.\textsuperscript{110} Yet, as Davie contends, beliefs are becoming more fragmented and personalised, with less social significance, commonly without the necessity of religious practices or membership of formal religious association.\textsuperscript{111}

Defending Protestantism today may not, as the Order claims, be as literal as the eighteenth century, nor is defending the constitutional position quite as literal as it was a few short decades ago. The question for Orange Protestantism is, as intercommunal religious antipathy diminishes, will it continue to provide the basis for a unionist bloc, the glue bridging the economic and social divides within the unionist community as it once did?

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\textsuperscript{110} Morrow et al., \textit{The Churches and Inter–Community Relationships} (1991) Pages 11–15
\textsuperscript{111} Davie, \textit{Religion in Britain since 1945} (1994)
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Chapter Six
Parading Alone:
The decline of social capital in Northern Ireland
and its impacts on the Orange Order

Introduction

The Orange Order has suffered declining membership for the past forty years. Members project culpability outwardly: at the media and its presentation of the institution’s activities; at a Parades Commission which is anti–Orange; at nationalists waging a ‘cultural war’; at political deals which have allowed nationalists and republicans into prominent positions in Northern Ireland’s government and on local councils; and society at large, charged with moving away religion. This chapter considers an alternative explanation: that of the decline in social capital. This argument is a more general explanation of Orange decline than those previously analysed, one which has afflicted other, less controversial groups. It suggests a reduction in participation and networks as atomisation diminishes collective action and solidarity. Whilst Orange Order members did not use the term ‘declining social capital’, there is cognisance of its presence and impact. One member contended:

People behave completely differently now than how they used to. They aren’t joining organisations in a way they once did, religious or otherwise. It’s often talked about kids not going outside and mixing with friends and groups and organisations like they once did and, sure, it might be a bigger thing amongst younger people but I don’t think it’s just them. You see plenty of adults not signing up and getting stuck in like a few decades ago. That is why the Orange Order, just like the Boys’ Brigade and Scouts\(^1\) and Freemasonry and of the like, are seeing their numbers decline.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Scouting UK has reported a growth in membership figures across the Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

\(^2\) Marc O’Callaghan, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Liverpool, 20 January 2015
Within civic society, social capital theory highlights the salience of spheres of mutual trust, cooperative participation, and active citizenship develop through voluntary association. Groups establish and accumulate social capital, trading it as a resource. Social capital is the social norms and trust that enables a society to function effectively. Countries rich in social capital enjoy, the theory claims, the wholesome outcomes attached to vibrant civic societies. In societies that are divided however, the development of social capital along social cleavages, both reflects and, to critics, encourages division, intolerance, and civil unrest along lines of identity. Instead of favourable outcomes, such societies can contain disharmony, disunity, and sectarianism.

This chapter will explore the utility of declining social capital as a means of explaining Orange retreat by answering the question: to what extent has a decline in social capital meant that the Orange Order has struggled to attract new recruits amid a broader atomisation of society? It explores the theoretical and methodological richness – and problems – associated with the models presented by Putnam, Bourdieu and Coleman. The chapter explores whether societal trust can operate in the same way in Northern Ireland as in a less socially and politically divided polity? If not, does social capital operate in a different way? The chapter assesses the value of the theory in terms of understanding why civic and fraternal organisations may struggle for members and relevance.

**Defining social capital**

Social capital theory asserts that greater associational life is linked to the enhancement of democracy and civic wellbeing. Core values associated with the concept are those of trust, camaraderie, 

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association, and public spiritedness. Writing on the American experience, Jacobs, for example, identified the importance of informal networks of shopkeepers and their customers in particular neighbourhoods. He contended that this social capital was needed to develop trust and communication amongst a relatively unchanging population in order to generate local civic wellbeing.

Bourdieu drew on classical economic theory to explain social capital, focusing on rational choice theory as a means of demonstrating cooperation. Bourdieu maintains that social capital exists and is developed to serve the self–interests of the participants, contending: ‘the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutional relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition [... provide] each of its members with backing of collectively–owned capital’. For Bourdieu, social capital is ‘actors engaged in struggle in pursuit of their own interests’. Virtuous broader societal outcomes are merely welcome by–products. Largely accredited with popularising the theory because of his clear and concise definition, Coleman explores social capital within an educational context and similarly uses rational choice theory to explain participants’ behaviour and what motivates the cooperation found within social capital. Expanding on the work of Coleman, Putnam explored the way in which civic organisations contributed to stronger democracy in northern Italy, and then examined the decline of social capital and civic society within the American experience.

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5 The concept gained popularity in the 1990s and 2000s following the works of Robert Putnam, James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu. 
7 Bourdieu, ‘The forms of capital’ (1986) 
8 Ibid Page 248 
Social capital has been defined and interpreted in a number of different ways, but core themes can be extracted. Social capital is a resource, vital to creating self-sustaining communities and ‘[makes] possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible’.\(^\text{13}\) It is a resource individuals and groups exhibit through trust and social norms that participants accumulate within a social network, and is made available through those same networks and the social activities associated with them. These resources establish implicit expectations, obligations, and trust. As a result, social capital is a similar resource to physical capital because individuals and groups can accumulate it and exploit it for their personal benefit.\(^\text{14}\) However, just as there are similarities, there are also differences.

As with other forms of capital—such as economic or human—social capital is a resource but, Bourdieu differentiates social capital from its resource counterparts because, unlike economic or cultural capital, social capital is made up of obligations and social trustworthiness that is convertible into economic capital. Through voluntary association, social capital is shared by the participants contributing to that group. Even though the capital is being harnessed by the self-interest of participants, the aggregation of self-interest means that social capital is a collective phenomenon.\(^\text{15}\) Coleman’s argument differs, however, with Bourdieu’s here. Whereas Bourdieu gave great emphasis to economic theory, Coleman defines social capital purely in terms of its function, contending:

> It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors whether persons or corporate actors within the structure [...] Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors.\(^\text{16}\)

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Coleman’s definition stresses that social capital exists between people in the form of social relationships. By definition, this cannot be developed by a lone individual and can only exist within a structure of relationships between and amongst social participants. At a basic level, social capital exists amongst – for example – office workers of a small firm who enjoy each other’s company and encourage and support one another to work better. As a result, the team as a whole becomes more effective than if each of the employees worked in isolation without the social contact of others. This example would be in keeping with Jacobs’ micro-level analysis of social capital found amongst people familiar with each other but the theory can be expanded to a macro-level to describe relationships between wider populations who do not know one another well, if at all. In Putnam’s analysis, the theory of social capital is the ‘norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement’.

At both micro and macro–levels, a salient element of social capital theory is that social networks have value, producing cooperation and bridging, and thereby providing the basis for social cohesion. Social networks provide the necessary framework within which participants can operate and exploit. Putnam contends that a well–connected individual in a society with poor levels of social connectivity will not benefit as significantly as the same well–connected individual in a well–connected society.

Social networks allow participants to interact with and influence individuals within that structure who have relationships across a range of other social networks, providing the opportunity for all

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participants to accrue, develop, and exchange social capital. It is impossible, therefore, for social capital to prevail without the necessary social networks that frame its existence.

In addition to the significance of those social networks, Putnam offers two further features of social capital theory, which he claims to be equally as important, remain: norms of reciprocity or obligation, as well as social trust. Reciprocity relies upon a *quid pro quo* mentality existing between individuals and within groups; one participant will do something – an act of charity, beneficiation, or gift – for another, in the expectation that another participant (or someone acting on their behalf) will return the patronage. Putnam extends the definition: ‘more valuable, however, is a norm of *generalised* reciprocity: I’ll do this for you without expecting anything specific back from you, in the confident expectation that someone else will do something for me down the road.’\(^{20}\) Putnam has however been accused of interpreting reciprocity is purely benign terms, failing to take account of social capital development that undermines effective local governance or good conduct and ignoring competition and attrition within and between groups. To that end, Chambers and Kopstein contend reciprocity requires recognition from other citizens, including from opponents with whom one strongly disagrees.\(^{21}\) As a demonstration of this reciprocity, Graham uses the example of the 1947 film *It’s a Wonderful Life*, in which the protagonist – George Bailey – faces ramifications following the loss of a significant sum of money only to find the local residents of Bedford Falls, to whom he had previously shown great selflessness and generosity, had raised funds to support him in this dire situation in repayment of his altruism.\(^{22}\) As in *It’s a Wonderful Life*, ‘reciprocity acts as a glue bringing together social, economic and political relationships […] not just based on trust; they ultimately depend on individuals being trustworthy’.\(^{23}\)

\(^{20}\) *Ibid* Page 21, original emphasis


Fukuyama’s describes trust as ‘the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms’. In his attempt to categorise that trust, Putnam draws the distinction between ‘thick’ (or particularised) trust and ‘thin’ (or generalised) trust. The former is found embedded in strong, personal relationships, often developed over time amongst associates within a social network; trust in someone an individual knows well, such as a family member or a close friend. The latter – thin or generalised trust – prevails in newer relationships, like a new acquaintance from the market or gymnasium, a professional colleague, or fellow parent at a child’s school. Less well–established, generalised trust is still born of a shared social network with an implicit social contract of reciprocity. Putnam contends a thinner form of trust ‘is even more useful than thick trust, because it extends the radius of trust beyond the roster of people whom we can know personally.’ Fukuyama contends both forms of trust aid the growth of and accrual of social capital within a social network.

Therefore, social capital operates as a form of capital; a resource born of social networks, the norms of obligation and reciprocity that are generated within voluntary associations of such networks, and trust shared and exchanged between actors within a network. Just like human, economic, and cultural forms of capital, social capital is a resource. It can be accumulated and can be traded as a commodity in order to accrue personal or collective advantage. Social capital operates within the framework of civil society, born of voluntary associations, like the Orange Order, and maintained by social interactions between individuals. In order to supplicate and develop positive interplay and exchanges between actors, generalised trust is nurtured, as is particularised trust – stronger than the former largely amongst colleagues, friends, and family – and both have a role to play in the generation of social capital.

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26 Fukuyama, Trust (1995)
Bonding and bridging

In response to criticism about the negative elements of association, Putnam draws distinction between two forms of social capital: bonding (or exclusive) and bridging (or inclusive) social capital. Whether by choice or necessity, social networks can be focussed inwards, reinforcing an exclusive, restrictive identity amongst homogeneous groups. The Orange Order provides such an example. Other forms of social capital turn their attention outwards and include within the social network individuals from across a diverse range of social and cultural backgrounds.\(^{27}\) The first form Putnam refers to – bonding social capital – develops within relationships of (usually) smaller groups, with high levels of particularised trust and reciprocity, in the context of a strong, unifying commonality or shared cause; it could develop, as examples, amongst a family unit, amongst a circle of close friends, or group of co-workers that socialise together and enjoy each other’s company. These groups reinforce exclusivity invoking a distinct or segregated identity, and serve to solidify homogeneity. Bridging social capital, by contrast, develops amongst often larger social networks that rely upon interactions with less familiar acquaintances. More significantly based on a more generalised form of trust, the commonality unifying these actors is looser; perhaps amongst distant professional contacts, visitors and stakeholders of a local community park, or supporters of a particular sports club. These networks are wide-scoping, inclusively bringing together people overcoming different social cleavages.\(^{28}\)

Putnam’s distinction draws on the earlier work of Granovetter, who explores the importance of ‘weak ties’ and ‘strong ties’. In his analysis of how information about employment opportunities was accessed, Granovetter found individuals had more often found out about the position they were currently in through an acquaintance – perhaps an individual they had met on briefly on a handful of occasions – rather than a close friend. As such, Granovetter contends the weak ties that exist between


acquaintances are more productive than the strong relationships built between friends, because a small group of close friends tend to know the same people and access the same information. As a result, such associations don’t tend to yield new opportunities or knowledge. By contrast, however, more distant acquaintances tend to socialise with a wider network of individuals and possess different information, potentially proving more useful in accessing different opportunities. 29 Embodying the Carnegie logic of ‘winning friends and influence people’, 30 bridging is therefore critical for ‘getting ahead’, whilst bonding social capital is useful for ‘getting by’. 31

Despite the negative social connotations around the exclusivity of bonding social capital and the necessity to manipulate other social network members of bridging social capital, Putnam defends the two, arguing both can have a positive influence. Bonding social capital is helpful for ‘undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilising solidarity’. 32 Whilst creating strong in–group fealty, it can also generate strong out–group animosity. Putnam argues it can bring about a positive social impact, delivering social and psychological support for its struggling members, providing financial contingencies for one another, and reliable forms of labour, along with many other advantages. 33 Furthermore, bridging social capital helps form broader identities and brings with it wider definitions of reciprocity and can be less an experience of manipulation, and more one of sharing resources benefiting all members.

30 D. Carnegie, How to win friends and influence people (London: Simon & Shuster, 1936)
33 Ibid Pages 22–23
Moreover, it is inaccurate to contend that the two forms of social capital are wholly mutually exclusive. Bonding social capital may aggravate inequalities, given that associations that primarily develop bonding social capital promote their own interests not the common good. However, the strong in–group ties of bonding provide security that groups focussed purely on bridging across differences may fail to develop as holistically, despite the advantages of forming broader, social, cross–cutting connections. A third form of social capital spawns from the bonding–bridging dichotomy in which individuals in a particular network can bond on some social elements and concurrently bridge across others, and connects associations, governments, and the market: linking social capital. Arguing the merits of linking bridging social capital and bonding social capital, Edwards contends when a group or organisation, strongly bound, cuts across different networks and social lines, they bring together dissimilar individuals who can affect change more holistically by adding a new dimension to their cause or mission.\(^\text{34}\) Linking social capital, therefore, allows groups to develop a strong grassroots base by forging alliances across class, race, and/or religion, as well as others. The Masonic Lodge, for example, would claim to bridge social capital across generational, social, economic, and political faultlines but bonds via a tightly–disciplined, secretive formal membership with distinctive rules and a suspicion of outsiders. Social capital involves linking up and bonding similar interests, people, or communities, or reaching out to organisations.\(^\text{35}\) Hence, bonding social capital is not synonymous with the bad, nor bridging social capital the good, but rather the two are distinctions of social capital, both of which can bring about a positive influence.

The bridging–bonding dichotomy, however, is not without its critics. In Putnam’s work, bridging social capital is a forerunner to the development of other forms of capital, explicitly economic and cultural,


and both Putnam and Coleman give equal status to these forms, alongside social capital. Bourdieu however gives primacy to economic capital because well–financially resourced individuals have the funds to develop cultural capital and can generate social capital as a result of their advantaged position. Economic capital, Bourdieu contends, accesses social and cultural capital. The defence of Putnam is predicated upon the argument that the development of social capital can compensate for the economic and cultural capital or create them independently. Leonard argues this optimism is misplaced, and multiple studies have found that areas abundant in social capital are consistently economically weaker than in other areas. Putnam’s theory might imply that it is those communities that under–perform financially where one would expect to see high levels of social capital develop, as Matthew’s and Richling’s studies find: poor and struggling people have limited economic capital so social capital becomes critical to their livelihood. However, Leonard argues:

Firstly, in Putnam’s analysis, bonding social capital is unequal because it excludes those outside the community residing in other communities but at the local community level it is inclusive. This conclusion is debatable. Secondly, Putnam implies that making the transition from bonding to bridging social capital benefits the community as a whole rather than perhaps some individuals in the community […] this is too simplistic.

Chambers and Kopstein draw distinctions between good and bad forms of social capital. They use examples of hate groups developing social capital amongst their own followers, developing that capital to inspire acts of terror as examples of, what they refer to as, ‘bad civil society’. By promoting

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37 Bourdieu, ‘The forms of capital’ (1986)
42 Chambers and Kopstein, ‘Bad Civil Society’ (2001)
racism, bigotry, xenophobia, and sectarianism, these ‘uncivil’ groups challenge the characteristically positive qualities of reciprocity. However, Chambers and Kopstein found examples of ‘bad civil society’ tend to encourage in–group altruism, developing cognitive dissidence quite significantly in the minds of its members who – on the one hand – exhibit trust, co–operation, and civility towards one another, but – on the other hand – exhibit negative attitudes diametrically opposed to outsiders.43

Civic societies with high levels of trust amongst individuals are predisposed to higher levels of social capital. Trust is an inalienable component of social capital growth within a society.44 That position has not gone without challenge, however. Field contends trust is a consequence of social capital, rather than a necessary element, and should be treated as a separate, independent variable given that its relationship to reciprocity is uncertain.45 Woolcock, on the other hand, argues trust is the product of social capital that comes with time.46 Trust is abstract as a concept ultimately resulting in debate as to whether trust generates, is an essential element is the creation of, or the result of social capital. The question therefore arises: what creates trust?

Trust may be a rational choice.47 An individual determines their counterpart is trustworthy and therefore decides to place trust in them. Invariably, there is a significant element of risk involved in generalised trust given the small amount of information used to make such a determination.48 In spite of that risk however, these companionships exist within the framework of the social network, allowing the members’ relationships to flourish by providing ‘more opportunities for positive experience with

43 Ibid
44 Fukuyama, Trust (1995)
45 Field, Social capital (2008) Page 72
others under the “controlled” circumstances of shared interest’. 49 Graham notes, however, that this reading ‘fails to explain how trust is generated through civic groups when particularised trust is high, but generalised trust is low’. 50 Graham challenges attempts to articulate social capital in terms of its outcomes: the difficulty in defining trust. On the one hand, trust appears ‘diffuse and over–generalised, yet at another [level] uni–dimensional and highly specific characterising trust as an emergent property of face–to–face interactions’. 51

Critiques of social capital

Social capital theory is not, however, without its critics. In response to Putnam’s initial arguments, 52 a number of criticisms were raised. Putnam’s thesis has been challenged for identifying decline where – it could be argued – evolution is occurring and point to the fact that Putnam tracks these changes over a single generation, despite his earlier 1993 work 53 demonstrating social capital theory to be heavily rooted in the past. 54 Critics have asked: was the acclaimed fruitful historic level of social capital a result of, or a contributor to, the quality of political organisation? 55 Equally, should such a decline in social capital have occurred as Putnam claims, should this be examined as the consequence of exogeneous factors, resulting from economic restructuring, neoliberalism and broader processes of societal atomisation rather than failings of the social organisations themselves? 56

50 Graham, Beyond Social Capital (2016) Page 27
52 Putnam, Bowling Alone (1995)
Further criticism has been mounted in terms of the conceptualisation of the theory. Portes and Landolt, as well as Durlauf, have questioned whether social capital has a consistent and universally positive impact on all of society, given its potential failure to encompass all participants within a community; whilst social capital can actually be harmful in terms of divisiveness.\(^{57}\) The sequential issue of whether associative membership produces trust or whether trust is needed to allow participants to become associative isn’t clarified\(^ {58}\) and whether this is measured by behaviours or perceptions is also unresolved.\(^{59}\) However, despite the extensive and varied criticisms of his 1995 article, Putnam addresses none – with the exception of the ‘dark side’ of social capital (which is heavily minimised in the face of the potential positive outcomes) – in his 2000 book, neither engaging with nor even mentioning any of the critical challenges.

Putnam’s theory of the creation of bridging social capital cannot emerge from intra-group interactions as it only results from intergroup interplay. There are also issues of how social capital can be measured with precision. This issue is a critical one for Putnam because he claims that falls in social capital are demonstrable and measurable. The measurement Putnam uses involves five intuitive elements, assessing: community organisational life; engagement in public affairs; community volunteerism; informal sociability; and social trust,\(^{60}\) potentially useful measurements for an assessment of the Orange Order. Putnam correlates the high level of social capital in the northern US states with the generally better education system, lower crime rate, better standards of health, and greater happiness, when compared to the southern states. This reading however too readily trivialises other contributing factors including racism, union density, and economic infrastructure. Durlauf satirically

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contends that if a scholar were to conclude an analysis of the horrors of war by ‘recommending that governments act to ensure world peace, [they] would be understandably derided’. Neither social capital nor its impacts can be accurately measured in comparable ways and those who have sought to compare have used oversimplified measures. Putnam’s 2000 data has been accused of being inconclusive and Fischer further demonstrates that the relationships between the variables Putnam links to social capital are subsequently not supported by the data.

This challenge is compounded by methodological limitations. Despite various attempts to quantify attitudes, norms, and trust at a national level, Foley and Edwards found no data as to which groups had accrued social capital at a level that could be exchanged or transferred. Attempting to develop a standardised unit of analysis, sufficiently small to properly capture the effects of social capital, has only limited the collection of data, resulting in a general over-reliance on questionnaires, which further limit scholarly capability to differentiate the social capital outcomes from the indicators of its presence. Durlauf contends that social capital can be researched but cannot be analysed with the precision that social capital advocates claim:

The empirical social capital literature seems to be particularly plagued by vague definition of concepts, poorly measured data, absence of appropriate exchangeability conditions, and lack of information necessary to make identification claims plausible. These problems are especially important for social capital contexts as social capital arguments depend on underlying psychological and sociological relations that are difficult to quantify, let alone measure.

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These criticisms have demonstrated the weaknesses in the social capital model but, whilst Putnam’s unwillingness to engage with them seems to confirm his inability to overcome them, this does not render social capital theory redundant, rather one that should be treated with caution as both an explanation or even mere description of change.

**Social capital in Northern Ireland**

In Northern Ireland, many individuals align themselves to the two broad ideological and political identity blocs. They are mutually exclusive and, as a result, limited opportunity is offered within the political sphere to bridge across the divide. Voluntary associations are far from immune from the communal divisions experienced in the province. Before individuals can reap the benefits of a social network, they may need to access a network based within their own ethnic group. Northern Ireland’s civil society is characterised by significant levels of particularised trust and significantly low levels of inclusive, generalised trust in the rest of society.

Establishing trust and association across the communal divide is obviously particularly challenging in Northern Ireland given its history of ethno–sectarian rivalries. Moreover, building relationships and developing trust with an individual from the ‘other side’ does not remove, or necessarily diminish, fundamental differences or even negative assumptions about the ‘other side’. One interviewee, a former local councillor with multiple cross–community relationships, described an experience of the school that he governs, with an overwhelming Protestant student population, which he claimed

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69 Data taken from 2013–14 School Census, collected by the Department for Education
suffered vandalism at the hands of ‘a group of Catholic youths.’\textsuperscript{70} For the interviewee, the damage caused by these ‘hooligans’ was, for him, entirely a Catholic sectarian issue, rather than a wider issue of anti-social behaviour.

Paxton draws a distinction between the impacts of social capital development at both the individual level and at the communal level. He suggests that ‘social capital within a single group need not be positively related to social capital at the community level.’\textsuperscript{71} Paxton distinguishes between the two components that contribute to social capital development independently: objective associations between individuals or external network structures; and subjective relationships between the same individuals.\textsuperscript{72} In the case of Northern Ireland, the tightly-bound relationships found within each of the two ethnically divided communities enable Protestant Unionists to engage and cooperate with fellow Protestant Unionists, and Catholic Nationalists with other Catholic Nationalists. These closely-bound ties often preclude social capital developing between the two groups.\textsuperscript{73} Almost universally in interviews conducted by the author, members of the institution who referenced a ‘friend’,\textsuperscript{74} a ‘colleague’,\textsuperscript{75} a ‘neighbour’,\textsuperscript{76} or a ‘co–worker’\textsuperscript{77} were directly referencing members of their own community. On this reading, Northern Ireland may contain bonding social capital internal to a community but little bridging social capital. Moreover, it raises the questions of whether bonding

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{70} Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 22 September 2016

\textsuperscript{71} Paxton, ‘Is social capital declining in the United States?’ (1999) Page 96, original emphasis

\textsuperscript{72} Paxton, ‘Is social capital declining?’ (1999) Pages 94–96

\textsuperscript{73} Field, \textit{Social Capital} (2008) Page 75

\textsuperscript{74} For example: Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 28 September 2014; David Brown, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Newtownards, 3 June 2015; Member of the Orange Order from a rural setting, interview with author, 8 January 2017

\textsuperscript{75} Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 25 April 2017

\textsuperscript{76} For example: George Chittick, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014; Marc O’Callaghan, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Liverpool, 20 January 2015

\textsuperscript{77} Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 2 June 2015
\end{footnotesize}
within a single community can be maintained in an increasingly atomistic society and whether groups which have helped bond a community fall out of favour and can no longer bind.

Cochrane and Dunn contend that the impact of civil society on Northern Ireland’s peace process has been gradual and indirect, and Farrington concluded civil society had little or no measurable impact on the Good Friday Agreement. In an effort to understand civil society as a means by which to reduce intercommunal hostility, Taylor argues civil society is complementary to the political framework and peace process, citing the Opsahl Commission in 1992 and the Good Friday Agreement ‘Yes’ Campaign in 1998 as examples. Brewer’s analysis of voluntary associations contends that civil society has played a critical role in the peace process, but the opportunity for civil society to transform post–conflict environments is neglected and not afforded sufficient space. He suggests that civil society exists within four spaces: intellectual, where new ideas are envisioned and personal tribulations are reflected upon; institutional, in which such ideas are practiced and engaged with in a local or global arena; sociological, where cultural, social, and physical resources are utilised by associations and voluntary groups to mobilise these ideas; and political, in which groups within civil society interact with the political infrastructure aiding peace. Each space allows Northern Ireland’s civil society to impact upon the wider community and to contribute to sustainable peace. Curtis offers similar optimism regarding civil society, stressing its capacity to champion human rights issues, such as LGBT+ rights in Northern Ireland (and the 2015 referendum to legalise same–sex marriage in the

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82 Ibid Pages 55–56
Republic of Ireland can be offered as evidence of a nearby example of the way active civil society can transform social policy. However, in Northern Ireland demands from sections of civil society may be thwarted by political decisions. Moreover, discussion of voluntary associations in civil society tends to ignore controversial organisations within that sphere which may nonetheless be large. Thus the (ill-fated) civic forum attached to the Northern Ireland Assembly after the GFA deliberately excluded the biggest civil society actor of all: the Orange Order.

There is official appreciation of social capital development, perhaps most notably in the publication of the 2010 community relations policy consultation document: *Cohesion, sharing and integration*. The document, not a strategy but a programme for consultation and action, expressed the aim of developing a more diverse society, one which would bond and ‘socialise in a context of fairness, equality, rights, responsibilities, and respect’ and foster social cohesion. The document was nonetheless seen as too ‘separate—but–equal’ in tone, inadequately appreciating the need for cross-community engagement. Critics claimed: ‘[m]utual accommodation of our divided community [that was proposed within the *Cohesion, sharing and integration* policy consultation document] is not acceptable – we need to learn, live, work, and play together’, and the Assembly’s response of establishing a five–party working group on community relations collapsed following political dissent. Hence, despite efforts on the part of policy–makers to promote social cohesion and bridging social capital in Northern Ireland, the delivery of such has proven challenging so far.

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84 Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, *Cohesion, sharing and integration* (Belfast: OFMDFM, 2010)
85 *Ibid*
Social capital and the Orange Order

Within civil society, the Orange Order plays a number of important roles. The institution offers non-state sponsored associational, representative, and recreational activity. The right to civil and religious freedom is articulated by the Order. However, the linkage of these to the Protestant throne and the defence of the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland means that the Order is an advocate for the unionist community, assisting bonding but limiting its bridging capacities external to its own community. The Order straddles political and civil society in its civic and religious missions. Furthermore, the Order plays a role in the life and development of its members. It socialises members within a framework of values and social norms pertinent to its foundation. One member recalled: ‘I was at a lodge dinner not long ago and some of us were discussing the latest attempt to make [same-sex] marriage legal; people were furious about it. [...] We’re not a political organisation, you understand, not at all, but unquestionably brethren have political opinions and we will discuss them with one another’. That political socialisation and the resultant transmission of shared cultural norms and values impacts more widely on the unionist community at large.

Within civil society, the Orange Order operates as a multi-faceted institution, encompassing the shared values of a commitment to a Reformed Christian faith and belief in a Trinitarian God; civil and religious liberty; and devoted loyalty to the British throne. Orangeism traditionally helped unite many within the unionist bloc, encompassing the broadest possible range of different unionists on a cross-class and multi-(Protestant) denominational basis. However, the Orange Order no longer enjoys the ability it once had to bring such elements of Protestantism together.

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89 Member of the Orange Order from a rural setting, interview with author in Belfast, 8 January 2017
The Orange Order unites its supporters around a number of socially significant stimuli. At the grassroots level, the Order bonds members together along three specific lines. Firstly, within the context of Northern Ireland’s ethnically–divided, post–conflict society, the importance of defining oneself as clearly within one group is paramount. Membership of the principal unionist civic institution is a bonding experience providing members with ‘insider’ status. Secondly, as an all–male fraternity, the Order bonds its members together along lines of gender. The strength of such an experience is more significant in Northern Ireland where the experience and impact of gender is more acute than in the rest of the UK. Thirdly, members of the Orange Order are bond together along lines of identity and commitment to traditional, conservative values.

As a fraternal organisation, comprised of an exclusive group – men, aged over eighteen, professing the tenets of the Protestant faith – the extent to which the organisation can operate as a social network that bridges individuals together is limited. Whilst social capital theory distinguishes between social networks that develop bonding and bridging social capital, the Orange Order bonds members but can only bridge individuals along the same lines as its bonds. The development of social capital within the institution spawns from a shared identity that promotes a particularised form of trust to solidify Protestant unionist hegemony. The Orange Order is best defined by its exclusivity rather than its inclusivity, and the way it develops social capital is consistent with this reading. It defines ‘us’ and ‘them’, the us being Protestant unionist males and the ‘them’ being those outside the organisation. However, the ‘them’ or the ‘other’ can be sub–divided between outright opponents of the Orange Order, often assumed to be Catholic Nationalists and those ambivalent towards the institution within the Protestant unionist community, who may, for example, witness the Twelfth of July demonstrations but have no desire to join the Order’s ranks. These form the bulk of the community in which the Order operates. The ethno–sectarian divide ‘constitutes the central axis around which all political affairs
revolve’, leaving asphyxiating conditions for any other cross-cutting cleavage to establish itself. This leads to insider/outsider divisions dependent on which community’s identity and culture an individual shares. The British Protestant unionist and Irish Catholic nationalist communities differ further in their cultures, collective memories, histories, songs, and, to a degree, languages. Political organisations have developed reflecting these ethnic hegemonies and political boundaries have become congruent with cultural boundaries. Each community is engrossed by the cultural, religious, and political aspects that define the ‘other’ and are used as boundaries. Insiders are accepted and protected.

Such a reading assumes a rather negative discord, which may fail to adequately encompass the complicated, compounding nature of identity, which can overlap relationships of social class, ethnicity, gender, race, family, and national identifications, all of which can impact upon collective ideologies that aspects of the population observe and impact upon how they erect boundaries. Overlapping identities exist and modes of belonging used to define the insider/outsider line are not unchangeable. They fluctuate just as attachments to these communities do. In Northern Ireland, being inside or outside of a group relies upon religion, area of residence, schooling, and national identity. Communal segregation, perpetuated and reinforce by the structures within society, leads to distrust, disharmony, and disunity with the opposing community. As one member acknowledged, ‘No, I wouldn’t say I have any Catholic friends, that’s just not the way it is here. I’m Protestant, I’m a Unionist, I’m British so I wouldn’t find myself amongst those who are opposed to those qualities’. Positive engagement is

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96 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 6 June 2016
obstructed. Deviating from the communal line runs the risk of rejection. As a result, being different is feared. The Reverend Martin Smyth recalled an incident from his own youth:

It was during an election and there was a knock at the door [...] it was unionist election workers. And they said [...] “How are [your parents] going to vote?” I said, “Isn’t that a personal matter, how they’re voting? When you go into a ballot box, is that not a private matter?” So, they went off, and so my mum and dad came in the door and said, “What have you been up to? [...] As we were coming up the street, people were saying ‘have you heard? Gerry Smyth’s not voting unionist anymore’. And yet he was a committee member of the Ulster Unionist Council for years, and a member of the local band.

This community mentality allows for perpetual cultivation of individuals resistant to change, resulting in a culture opposed to diversity of thought.

The Orange Order bonds members of the unionist community as membership offers verification – privately, amongst fellow brethren, and publicly to the wider community – of an individual’s acceptance of, and support for, their Protestant and unionist culture and heritage. Sporting an Orange collarette providers its wearer with ‘insider’ status within the unionist community, it emphasises the acceptance and protection of the group identity and offers access to a social network, allowing the Orangeman to develop social capital. Even if born of necessity to avoid communal rejection, membership of the Order is in and of itself a form of social capital bonding. As indicated, the primary bonding aspects, beyond the psychological rewards of association, are those of shared expressions of religious, cultural, and political identities, along with the gendered aspect. Northern Ireland’s conflict

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98 The Reverend W. Martin Smyth, former Grand Master of the Grand Orange Lodge, interview with author in Belfast, 3 September 2013
fostered a patriarchal mentality, cultivating conservative family values and women’s roles within that framework. Ward contends men and women occupied completely different spheres of influence within northern unionism. The man, resolute in his defence of the country, was the principal bread–winner and politically minded. The woman’s role, on the other hand, was one of support for her husband behind the scenes, maintaining the household and raising the children.100

Protestant unionism portrayed women in roles as housemaker, a loyal daughter of the Union steadying the ship at home.101 In the Orange Order’s monthly publication – the Orange Standard – the narrative around women is consistent with that of unionist cultural discourse. The role of women is one of faithful servitude; women make the dinner for the men at their Quiz nights,102 and bake cakes to support charity drives.103 Bonding men along lines of gender, the Orange Standard gives priority to celebrating the brave boys on parade, who were ‘not deterred by inclement weather’,104 Orangemen demanding action on political matters, and pictures featured in the publications are almost universally photographs of men on parade, or at presentations. In one article from February 2014, men could expect great praise for their role in a review of a bowling competition, whilst the women could expect a grateful albeit solitary footnote: ‘Teas were provided by the ladies committee of the host lodge’.105

Orangemen, similarly, embody these norms and outlooks. Whilst speculating as to why some men may have less time to join fraternal organisations (like the Orange Order) more recently, one member commented, ‘it’s not the same anymore. Men are working longer hours and, when they come home, fewer find their dinner on the table because so many of their wives are out working too. A stable

102 Orange Standard, February 1994
103 Orange Standard, September 2014
104 Orange Standard, May 1994
105 Orange Standard, February 2014
homelife, that was basis of society, has gone now’. Another member commented that he enjoyed seeing women’s lodges on parade because it ‘adds a bit of glamour to the event’, instead of seeing women as equal contributors to the unionist community and the celebration thereof. This institutional mind-set of the Orange Order, perpetuated in the institution’s public output, is consistent with unionist cultural discourse of the role of the woman. The contribution of women is limited in official coverage to their role as home-maker, loyal wife and faithful mother, which bonds men together in their alternative role of bread-winner and patriarch; it bonds men together in their stated appreciation for the work of their ladies; and reinforces cultural unionist attitudes that further bonds men together along lines of gender within their ethnic bloc.

The patriarchalism of Orangeism and the unionist culture stems from the Protestant church. Sales contends this has a direct correlation with the impact of evangelicalism in the region, oftentimes hostile to feminism. One member of the Order noted, ‘in the church, men have their role to play, and women have their role to play, and that’s how it is’, and, in 2013, former First Minister Peter Robinson observed similarly, ‘it has to be said, in churches women have to stay in their place’. Robinson’s predecessor as First Minister, the Reverend Ian Paisley, claimed: ‘I believe that the husband is the head of the wife and the home’. In many Protestant pulpits, clerics used the religious teaching to emphasise the role of men as head of the household and supporting the subjugation of women; husbands and fathers were considered the moral guide of a family, and clerics reinforced

106 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 12 August 2015
107 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 25 September 2014
109 Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 28 September 2014
110 Words of Peter Robinson, quoted in Braniff and Whiting, ‘Gender and representation in the Democratic Unionist Party’ (2016) Page 103
the ‘male–supremacist religious codes’. Consequently, the Orange Order – by creating and maintaining an all–male fraternity – buys into a culture supported by the church, is harnessed by political leadership, cultural discourse, and its own public commentary, and ultimately bonds men together through formal membership of its fraternity. The Orange Order is a bastion of the culture of male–primacy and members are bound within a brotherhood, consistent with the cultural, religious, and political landscape around them.

**The Orange bonding identity – and the threat to it**

An Orange Order member described unionist politics and ‘the ethos of the Orange [Order]’ as ‘working hand in glove’. Political views and identity are reaffirmed annually by the passing of resolutions on the Twelfth. Within communities, values and customs are shared generationally through cultural and political socialisation, reinforcing political identities and cultural norms. This process involves the transmission of culturally–subjective myths and politicised historical narratives, replicating a collective memory to nurture social and political categorisations. This is further reinforced through familial settings and smaller social networks, but also through cultural pageantry and ritualistic display, like for example the Orange parading tradition. Within the Protestant unionist community, the Orange Order provides an institutional focus for a distinctive identity and its expression. In collective memory (encouraged and fostered by the Order), the institution is placed at the heart of the Protestant experience in Northern Ireland and provides for its members an opportunity to see themselves as part of political and cultural experience, rooted in the past and, in the Order’s view, still pertinent in the present.

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114 Member of the Orange Order from a rural setting, interview with author, 13 March 2014
116 See: Chapters 3 and 4
The institution’s greatest cultural experience – the Twelfth of July – is a day for thousands of Order members to adorn their lodge regalia, take to the streets with their gathered brethren and parade their banners and colours in front of the community. For them, this is the greatest possible expression of their British cultural identity and their Protestant religion. How a community interprets and perceives its past has been researched within the field of anthropology. Hobsbawm understands ‘invented traditions’ to be ‘a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past’.\(^{117}\) The importance of this symbolic expression and role of this ritualistic display cannot be understated within the politics of Northern Ireland\(^{118}\) and, as Anderson argued in his landmark 1983 text, whilst economic and power structures provide a social environment within which political interests compete, it is through expressions of cultural identity – those of flags, colours, and banners, anthems and symbols – that the vast majority of a group ‘imagine’ the political community within which they function.\(^{119}\)

The historical integrity to which the institution clings is sustained and promoted by Orange cultural narratives. These provide the framework necessary for the Order to understand and respond to contemporary events.\(^{120}\) In developing a collective memory, Hunt contends, ‘memory is interplay between events, time, society and individual. Memories [...] are manipulated by society [...] and none of the interpretations of the past are objectively true’.\(^{121}\) The Orange Order draws upon these heavily-doctored memories in a particular way in order to incite tailored responses to current affairs,


\(^{119}\) Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (1983)

\(^{120}\) McAuley et al. *Loyal to the Core?* (2011) Page 95

explaining in part why many critics of the institution view it as habitually stuck in the past. The Order uses the past to illustrate its continued significance to the present and to the community’s group identity.\textsuperscript{122} That process is deployed by the Grand Lodge in its official communications as well as unofficially by individual members. One member explained how Northern Ireland was ‘the most ancient part of the kingdom because the Queen can trace her ancestry right back to Fergus Mór, the last Scots king of Ireland’.\textsuperscript{123} The collection of artefacts held at the Grand Lodge headquarters, including King William’s gloves and stirrups, and the small collarette George Best wore as a child whilst carrying the banner strings in the Cregagh estate. The educational programmes offered by the Grand Lodge cover periods of history significant to the Orange Order and its attachment to historical events far and wide, from commemorating First and Second World War anniversaries to reporting that John F. Kennedy’s driver on the day of his assassination was a member.\textsuperscript{124} These all serve to increase the cultural significance of the institution as the ‘great guardian of Protestant, Unionist and British values’\textsuperscript{125} and to give its members the chance to see themselves as part of this noble, historical tradition.

Narratives tend to centre upon themes that will incite the most significant emotional response, including the protection of Protestantism, the rejection of the Roman Catholic Church, and historic threats the unionist community has faced (from Catholic pretenders to the throne to more recent examples of republican terrorism). The Order focuses on threats, past and present, including secularism, Catholicism, and republicanism,\textsuperscript{126} creating a defensive mind–set. ‘You only have to look at the firebombing of the [Everglades H]otel in Londonderry [in May 2014]. We’ll never be safe from

\textsuperscript{122} McAuley et al. Loyal to the Core? (2011) Pages 96–97
\textsuperscript{123} George Chittick, member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 17 January 2014
\textsuperscript{124} Orange Standard, December 2014
\textsuperscript{125} Orange Standard, August 1999
\textsuperscript{126} See: Chapter 5
republican terrorists, not until the Irish tricolour flies over Stormont’, \(^{127}\) one Order member claimed and another contended: ‘My Orange hall has been vandalised about six times over the last year by gangs. Practicing your faith freely is not something [the Orange Order is] afforded’.\(^{128}\) Coverage of Orange hall attacks in the *Orange Standard* would, in the past make surreptitious reference to the local Catholic nationalist community – for example noting that the attacked Orange Hall in Lurgyross, County Armagh, was ‘on the fringe of a nationalist area’,\(^{129}\) and that the attacked Portadown Hall was situated in ‘a mainly Roman Catholic extension of the notorious “Tunnel” area’.\(^{130}\)

The Order’s focus on historical legacy puts great emphasis on the importance of traditional values. In March 1994, the *Orange Standard* dedicated a full page to challenging the ‘Moral decline of British society’, yearning for the 1950s where, it claims, ‘80 per cent of British children attended Sunday Schools’.\(^{131}\) In 2014, the publication shared an article lamenting the demise of corporal punishment and cynically criticised the modern culture of safeguarding children and young people.\(^{132}\) The *Orange Standard* does not appear to be out–of–step with the opinions of its members at the grassroots level, one member commenting: ‘You see them all [young people] on their phones, texting one another instead of talking. Some of them are texting whilst looking after their own kids, even though they’re just kids themselves. What hope have we got with this generation?’\(^{133}\) Another noted:

> What you have today is a growing rejection of authority: students ignoring their teachers, parents defending their children when they get in trouble with the police. There’s no parental leadership though, parents are never around; they’re always working in this 24/7 shopping culture. Binge drinkers would rather brawl on the street than read a book or

\(^{127}\) Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 11 September 2014  
\(^{128}\) Member of the Orange Order from a rural setting, interview with author in Belfast, 7 September 2016  
\(^{129}\) *Orange Standard*, May 1994  
\(^{130}\) *Orange Standard*, July 1994  
\(^{131}\) *Orange Standard*, March 1994  
\(^{132}\) *Orange Standard*, December 2014  
\(^{133}\) Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with the author in Belfast, 12 August 2015
spend an evening with a friend. It goes on. Our society is in complete disarray and I don’t know how you stop it.\footnote{Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 7 September 2016}

A more recent example of an encroaching political and societal evolution, rejected by the Orange Order, is same–sex marriage. In 2013, the Order’s Twelfth of July resolutions were adapted to condemn ‘the many attempts being made to undermine the traditional values of our society’, and affirmed ‘the firm and unwavering Biblical and Christian understanding of marriage as between one man and one woman, seek[ing] to uphold it and deplor[ing] all efforts to undermine it’.\footnote{Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, ‘Twelfth of July Resolutions’ (2013), reproduced at \url{http://www.grandorangelodge.co.uk/twelfthresolutions.aspx#.WY1-DGjyuUK} accessed 11 August 2017} Speaking on behalf of the institution’s leadership, the Deputy Grand Master, the Reverend Alistair Smyth publicly commended the Christian owners of Ashers Bakery in Newtownabbey who had refused to bake a cake supporting the introduction of same–sex marriage legislation.\footnote{Orange Standard, August 2014} One member said: ‘I don’t care if it’s not a popular standpoint, I believe marriage is between one man and one woman’,\footnote{Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author, 25 August 2014} whilst another explained, ‘It’s not that I have a problem with homosexuals, I don’t agree with their lifestyle but I don’t have a problem with them \textit{per se}, it’s that my bible says marriage is between a man and a woman. There’s no variance on that: man and woman’.\footnote{Member of the Orange Order from a rural setting, interview with author, 8 January 2017} Fear and rejection of cultural evolution bonds members together. Moving away from what some remember as a ‘safe, supportive society’ (despite the irony that this memory fails to appreciate the impact of Northern Ireland’s armed conflict and its significant legacy),\footnote{Member of the Orange Order from an urban setting, interview with author in Belfast, 7 September 2016} is troublesome for some members who see aspects of modern life challenging their world view and their reading of scripture. These values are part of their identity as Orangemen and as Protestant Unionists and so the response is consistent with challenges to their identity: defensiveness. In that environment, members bond together.
Yet the extent to which the Orange Order can continue to offer bonding social capital is increasingly questionable. Part of the reason why is exogeneous to the institution, involving broader processes of social anomie. Yet there are also endogenous causations. The Order cannot offer bridging social capital beyond its own community as it is – by its own rules – a single religion organisation, which with formal prohibitions on bridge–building, such as religious inter–marriage or ecumenical actions. In order to survive therefore, the Order has to offer bonding value to its members and, to increase the number of those members, hold a bonding appeal to others within the Protestant unionist community. Yet as urban lodges, in particular, have thinned, there is less social value in Orange Order membership. Pecuniary or employment advantages to Orange Order membership, akin to those of Masonic Lodge belonging, no longer pertain. Indeed, Orange Order membership may be a barrier to entry to employment in various areas of the public sector in particular, such as the police, civil service, or the BBC. The religious bonding afforded by the Orange Order can be attained by belonging to a local Protestant church parish, although these too are suffering decline. Those with a love of the parading and band traditions can continue to enjoy them outside the Order,140 as many members of loyalist bands might testify. So, on the basis of the rational self–interest which the theories of social capital outlined at the opening of this chapter, the question begged is why would anyone want to join the Orange Order? Family tradition offers an insufficient supply and rationale.

Conclusion

Social capital theory provides a useful framework within which the associational life of the Orange Order and the benefits of membership can be understood. Just as with other forms of capital, social capital can be accrued through collaborating with individuals within a social network, where norms of reciprocity are accepted and social trust exists between contributors. Bonding social capital is evident, with Orangeism a unifying force amongst an exclusive, tightly–bound group invoking a segregated

140 See: Chapter 3
identity. The Orange Order develops social capital amongst brethren by bonding them along three principal lines. Firstly, in Northern Ireland religious denomination and national identity eclipse other socio–political cleavages, so much so that segregation remains commonplace. Membership of the Orange Order provides accredited, ‘true believer’ identification and status within the Protestant unionist bloc, and that status along with a shared world outlook helps bond members. Secondly, as an all–male brotherhood, the institution provides the opportunity for men to bond together, reinforced by culture in which women are subjugated, confined to the role of home–maker, and by a mentality within the institution that sees women as supporters and organisers, not as leaders. Thirdly, the Orange Order develops bonding social capital through the cultivation, nurturing, and reinforcement of the Orange identity. Committed to the crown, the Protestant faith, and the state, and opposed to Roman Catholicism, Irish nationalism, and secularist tendencies, the Order challenges threats to traditional, conservative values and unites its members against cultural evolution and change.

There is little evidence of external bridging in that the latter encompasses a much broader range of individuals, is inclusive, and develops amongst less well–acquainted individuals. The Orange Order has attempted limited bridging. It supports certain charities and articulates its civic mission in some Catholic schools which have invited the Orange leadership. Relations are often cordial with local Ancient Order of Hibernians groups. However, the bridging element is much smaller than the internal bonding. The development of bridging social capital within Northern Ireland is unlike other developed societies because of its ethno–religious division.

Yet it is not just the communal divide which acts as a barrier to Orange social capital. An increasingly atomistic society poses its own challenges. Alternative entertainment to that offered by the Orange Order is much more easily attainable than was once the case. Self–help has partially displaced mutuality. Citizens are more mobile. The communal bonding of Orangeism has been reshaped by
social mobility, secularism, and cultural change. The Orange Order may still bond but the bonding is occurring in a shrinking pool. A unionist operating on the basis of rational self–interest might prefer not to join a collective like the Orange Order – and not many do, nowadays. The Order cannot offer selective incentives to membership and the benefits of camaraderie have been set against significant internal division over the GFA and on parading, in particular. The Orange Order’s social conservatism is being increasingly challenged within the broader unionist community. Whilst the Orange Order can offer resistance, it remains vulnerable to broader societal reshaping.
Conclusion

The social and political contexts in which the Orange Order operates in Northern Ireland have changed dramatically since the outbreak of the Troubles. Having enjoyed a strong membership base in the late 1960s (with approximately 100,000 members), the Order’s integral position in Northern Ireland’s politics and society seemed assured. The institution was instrumental in maintaining the cross-class, pan-Protestant alliance upon which unionist political hegemony was based. The Order enjoyed an influential position within the dominant political party, the UUP. The link between cultural and religious Protestantism was robust and liberal and civic versions of unionism were subordinate to religious and cultural forms, as unionism appeared synonymous with Protestantism.

However, over the course of subsequent decades, the Orange Order has moved from the centre to the margins of Northern Ireland’s politics and society and its continuing prominence owes more to controversy than to cachet. Unionism has undergone huge changes in the face of the controversial, discordant Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which added to existing internal difficulties (primarily, but not exclusively, over parades) consuming the institution. The Order lost members and there was a configuration of the institution’s remaining membership base towards working-class loyalist elements.¹ The Order’s avowed religious mission often appeared subordinate to the political or parading controversies in which it was embroiled. The Order’s once quiet approach to politics became noisy and overtly aggressive in the face of regulation of its activities.

Analytical prism: Political isolation, Sectarianism, Secularism, and Declining social capital

This thesis has attempted to view the decline of the Orange Order through the analytical prism of four approaches to understanding its retreat: firstly, it has sought to examine the extent to which the Orange Order has become politically isolated since the collapse of the Northern Ireland Parliament in

¹ McAuley et al., Loyal to the Core? (2011)
1972 and the extent to which that has meant the Order has been of insufficient relevance to replenish brethren. It has assessed the extent to which the institution’s recent marginalisation is attributable to the growing unacceptability and diminishing appeal of overt religious sectarianism that the Orange Order is alleged to promote. Is has tested the degree to which secularism within modern society and movement away from religion – in practice, belief and association – has resulted in individuals being less interested in joining religious or quasi–religious organisations, such as the Order. Finally, this thesis has explored the extent to which a decline in social capital has meant that the Orange Order has been subsequently unable to attract sufficient numbers of new recruits amid broader societal atomisation and the lack of collective incentives towards participation in a local lodge.

Through the first qualitative, ethnographic study of the Orange Order, using data contributed by forty–three interviewees and data collected through the first content analysis of the Order’s official monthly publication, Orange Standard, this thesis has been able to add to the research of other scholars in the field and clarify understanding of how this distinctly ethno–religious organisation has attempted to survive amid transformed socio–political and religious contexts. It has tested the four aforementioned hypothesis, using an analytical approach to answer the research questions critically and evaluatively.

Secularism and movement from religion

The thesis has tested the degree to which secularism within society and the general move away from religion and religious institutions has resulted in individuals being less interested in joining religious or quasi–religious organisations. Religious observance in Northern Ireland remains high compared to elsewhere in the UK or Ireland albeit with some decline. Religious affiliation remains part of the cultural identity of the two main ethno–national groups in Northern Ireland. Protestant Unionist and Catholic Nationalist markers remain strong and religious affiliations shape political divides and local government allocations, with the local state constructed on a dual–resource, ‘separate–but–equal’,
two–community basis. Separation remains the norm in compulsory education, perpetuating division. Religion remains of political and social significance despite a decline in religious observance. With religious affiliations remaining extensive, even if in slight decline, the pool of Protestants in which the Orange Order can fish for recruits has remained fairly constant.

Whilst the thesis has found only limited evidence to support the hypothesis that the decline of religion is a causal factor in Orange decline, today’s binary may be far more about unionism versus nationalism than Protestantism versus Catholicism. Many unionists comprehend their identity and politics in civic or liberal terms, preferring not to interpret their unionism as intrinsically linked with Protestantism. They perceive the threat to their unionist identity as coming from Irish republicanism and Sinn Féin, not from an expansionist and ‘idolatrous’ Church of Rome. The DUP has got the message and the religiously–informed aspects of its policy output – opposition to same–sex marriage and abortion (the latter view shared by many nationalists) apart – are now minimal. Consequently, the context within which the Orange Order operates has altered. For the Orange Order, unionism and Britishness are linked to the Protestant faith. For many unionists, unionism concerns Northern Ireland remaining in a multi–faith or minimal–faith United Kingdom. The more that unionism departs from its religious past, the less the relevance of the Orange Order. However, the findings of this research suggest only a very modest role for secularism as an explanation of Orange decline when tested alongside alternative explanations.

The demise of Stormont and political isolation

The thesis found the Orange institution’s political marginalisation of greater significance in explaining decline. A path–dependent model shows how the removal of influence via the demise of local political institutions meant decline in Orange influence which in turn made the incentives to join the Order

\[2\text{ Ibid Page 169}\]
diminish. The collapse of Stormont in the early 1970s and the resultant political fallout – including significant divisions within the Protestant unionist bloc, the absence of devolved regional governance between 1972 and 1997, and, since 1998, the establishment of a fractious power-sharing executive that saw unionists entering consociational government with historic enemies – has changed irreparably the circumstances within which the Orange institution operates. Whilst no definitive evidence that the Orange Order had a direct veto over government policy between the 1920s and late 1960s has been found, it is clear that there was little need for the Order to exert any pressure on the regional government. The Northern Ireland Parliament remained unionist-dominated throughout the period with a symmetry of UUP and Orange interests. Following the collapse of the Sunningdale Executive in 1974 and the imposition of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, the Order was forced to contemplate the reality: a unionist, majoritarian parliament would not return. With Molyneaux leading the UUP and Smyth at the Order’s helm, their axis afforded some level of continuity amongst the Order’s membership, binding unionism together throughout the period of direct rule, a continuity that would be brought down by the GFA.

The thesis has demonstrated that the controversies over the GFA accelerated the Order’s departure from the UUP, ending a hundred–year marriage. In the aftermath of the 1998 deal, Paisley’s ‘No’ form of unionism grew in popularity and political significance; the DUP would itself move from a bit player to a main political actor and its ‘No’ turned to ‘Yes’. A new generation of young Protestant Unionists who were not politically socialised in UUP dominance emerged as the DUP was able initially to mobilise hostilities against the GFA. The Orange Order’s strong opposition towards the GFA was consistent with the convictions of its membership. As the UUP has become increasingly marginalised in unionist politics of the province, this thesis has proven that so too has the Orange Order. As the compromises of the peace process have embedded, Orangeism has struggled to adapt to the new polity. Unionist anti–GFA sentiment was harnessed by the DUP but, within a decade of the deal, the DUP had accepted its contents. In its position on the outskirts of politics, the Orange Order urges unionist inter–party
unity but, given the powerlessness of the UUP, the Order is reliant upon favours from the DUP. Given that half of DUP MLAs and a majority of DUP MPs belong to the Order, its worldview may continue to attract some sympathy and articulation, but any formal political role has ended. The DUP does not have a clientelistic relationship with the Orange Order and does not specifically pursue Orange interests in its political dealings, notwithstanding an oft shared outlook.

**Diminishing social capital and the struggle for relevancy**

Whilst there may be no pecuniary, professional, or political advantages to Orange Order membership today, engagement in associational life and the development of social capital through interactions with like-minded citizens in local lodges does provide members with social benefits. Within the social network of the Orange Order, the development of bonding social capital is evident amongst an exclusive, tightly-bound group invoking a segregated Protestant British identity in which there is much pride. Social capital is developed through three principal means: firstly, membership of the Orange Order provides institutionalised ‘insider’ status within the Protestant unionist bloc, bonding members. Secondly, the institution develops bonding social capital by cultivating, nurturing, and reinforcing of the Orange identity, standing opposed to Roman Catholicism, Irish nationalism, and secularism, and committed to the Crown, the Protestant faith, and the state. Thirdly, membership also allows Orange male brethren to bond along lines of gender and this bonding is reinforced by a culture which has subjugated and confined the roles of women to ancillaries.

However, whilst the internal bonding within the Orange Order remains strong, political (DUP versus UUP, pro–GFA versus anti–GFA, and whether to deal with the Parades Commission) divisions have challenged the previous sense of unity which assisted bonding. Perhaps more significant though has been the onset of an increasingly atomistic society, in which many collective organisations have struggled to recruit. This can be overstated: the long–predicted death of political parties as they were
to become shell organisations has been partly reversed in recent years. However, the Order has struggled to present itself as an association one would want to join rather than membership being merely a family rite of passage. Alternative entertainment can be found more readily than was once the case; self-help has partially displaced mutuality; geographical mobility is extensive; and the communal bonding of Orangeism has been reshaped by social mobility and cultural change. Although the institution can offer resistance to this shifting trend, it remains vulnerable to broader societal reshaping. The Orange Order finds itself fighting for relevancy in the social context. In an increasingly atomistic society in which traditional forms of social capital development are being negated and formal institutional membership disregarded, the Orange Order operates in heavily reduced circumstances.

The diminishing appeal and growing unacceptability of sectarianism

The Orange Order has always been charged with sectarianism by its critics and its promotion of Protestantism has always maintained direct conflict with Roman Catholicism. What has changed has been the societal outlook upon Orange prohibitions, such as the bans on marrying Catholics or participating in ‘Roman’ worship; the marriage ban seen by many as anti–Catholic bigotry and the church service prohibition as unacceptably narrow–minded, not least when unionists were attending the funeral of a Catholic police officer killed by dissident republicans. In a society intolerant of intolerance, can the Orange Order afford to attract such opprobrium over its stances? Whilst repeating its respect for individual Roman Catholics and civil and religious liberty for all, the Order appears vulnerable to perceptions that its anti–Catholicism outweighs its Christianity. Moreover, the Order’s draconian by–laws appear irrelevant and increasingly bypassed relics of a more fevered religious age in which the view of ‘Popery’ as a threat was more mainstream among Protestants.
This thesis has demonstrated, however, that it has been aspects of the Orange Order’s parading tradition which have attracted most attention and criticism as sectarian. The principal discourses used by the institution to justify parading is that demonstrations are ‘traditional’, commemorative, and express the collective identity of Protestant Unionists. Political, religious, and cultural drivers motivate unionists to engage with parade culture; one that cultivates a collective consciousness celebrating heritage. The timelessness of the tradition lends a legitimacy. This activity fosters a collective unionist memory and the pageantry of the parades presents the Orange institution, to both its own community and those beyond, as fulfilling its role of creating and nurturing unity within the Protestant unionist bloc.

Yet a combination of the onset of concepts of parity of esteem, changing local demography, and negative nationalist attitudes have caused difficulties over some parades. Added to these problems have been attitudes held by some bandsmen operating outside the Order’s remit. Bands retain their own social dynamism and cultural practices that may not always coincide with those of the Order. The parading dispute in Drumcree in the 1990s damaged the institution’s standing among moderates. Caught in a showdown, played out on the public stage, Orange Order members and sympathisers publicly articulated their frustration in the mid–1990s. Having rejected paramilitarism and stood for law and order throughout the Troubles, the Orange Order now found its own members confronting the authorities. To many onlookers, the dispute in Drumcree presented the institution as intent on creating sectarian strife and exacerbating communal conflict, an organisation obsessed with unrestricted parading, whilst the attendant disorder contradicted the institution’s traditional position of support for law enforcement. Since the initial ‘victories’ at Drumcree, the Order has found itself habitually locked into losing battles with the Parades Commission. Politically, the Order has been faced with a new infrastructure; one in which power is shared with unrepentant republican ‘terrorists’. Measures endorsing the equality of nationalist culture and identity – part of the identity politics approach of the Good Friday Agreement – were perceived by the Order as anti-Protestant.
It’s in these factors that the institution’s marginalisation has been accelerated. Whilst many unionists may still profess a benign attitude towards the Order, the violence of the dispute and the images of an out-of-date organisation, obsessed with marching and inflaming sectarian tension, saw the Order’s respectability amongst middle-class unionists decline. The more recent dispute in the Ardoyne area of Belfast represented a different watershed for the Order. Coming to a head in 2013, having been preceded by number of years of annual violence around the Twelfth of July celebrations, this was finally resolved in 2016 with an agreement between the main residents’ group and the local Orange lodges. The compromise the institution made, however, left some feeling betrayed by their leadership. For militant loyalists, a strong, defiant response was not delivered by the Order; for Catholic nationalist residents and outsiders, the Order was characteristically stubborn and sectarian. For the Orange Order, the parading dispute at Drumcree represented a turning-point in respectability amongst the Protestant middle-classes. Conversely, the Order’s ultimate readiness to negotiate and compromise over the parade conflict in the interface area of Ardoyne disillusioned some loyalists in north Belfast, who sought stronger support.

Stuck between a parade and a hard place

Whilst its clear there is no one single factor that can be identified as being solely responsible for the institution’s recent social and political marginalisation, it is clear that the sectarianism the Order is accused of, the resultant decline of respectability (especially amongst the middle class), and the regularly–repeated fallouts between Orangemen obsessed with unfettered parading and Catholic Nationalist residents wishing to appear vulnerable, downtrodden and attacked, has intensified a process of decline beyond other causal factors.
Beyond the sectarian image problems, the removal from power of the UUP, the impact of direct rule, and the long absence of a devolved political structure over which to exert pressure, caused serious difficulties from which the Orange Order may never fully recover. Thus, the interplay of societal change (the demise of permissibility of routinised sectarian discourses) and structural factors has been crucial. Stormont’s demise in 1972 effectively ended the Order as a notable political entity although it maintained influence within the UUP – not the same as political power. From thereon, the Order’s struggles have been for social, cultural, and religious relevance. This thesis has found the impact of secularism to have been of only limited significance in contributing to the Order’s marginalisation. However, the waning of religious fervour – if less so affiliation – means that the band may mean more than the bible to many participants in Orange activities. The thesis argues that secularism has been partially responsible for the decline of the Order, but its principal function has been to reshape many ostensibly Orange activities, recast into broader ‘loyalist’ events beyond longstanding church parades.

The Order is reliant upon benefits of tradition, heritage, and continuity to recruit and maintain an intergenerational bond and to develop social capital. More than four out of five Orangemen joined the Order because they were invited to do so by a relative or friend and family tradition remains the principal reason for joining for members. The institution remains reliant on family generational transmission. Despite not growing, the Order has demonstrated some activity tailored to broaden its reach. As one example: the Orange Society at the University of Ulster, Jordanstown, established to promote and maintain Orange culture, erected a stall at the university’s Freshers’ Fair in September 2017. Such attempts need to combat the reputation damage inflicted upon the Order.

The Orange institution is aware of the need to re–pitch its appeal away from undiluted Protestantism or charges of sectarianism. In terms of the nature of its Protestantism, the declining clerical presence

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Data supplied by McAuley, Tonge and Mycock, Membership Survey (2011) Unpublished raw data

Orange Order Twitter [https://twitter.com/OrangeOrder/status/912972408415490048] accessed 2 October 2017
within the Order indicates how some clergy find distasteful the sectarian image with which the Order has been associated. Grand Lodge has fostered a more cultural persona, for example moving away from its traditional Twelfth of July commemorations towards a more family-oriented ‘Orangefest’ event and focusing on its provision of historical education through its Orange museum at Schomberg House. These small efforts however do not confront the hard truth: the Order’s overt religious sectarianism – aggravated by both individual members and institutionally through its structure and arcane laws – is less appealing in today’s Northern Ireland.

The end of the Orange Order is not nigh but certainly it seems unlikely that institutional Orangeism can ever hope to return to the membership breadth, political influence, and social status it once enjoyed. Aspects of its former prominence linger; the institution’s key marching day – the Twelfth of July – remains a national holiday in the province, some of its main marches are covered favourably on television as crowds flock to spectate (albeit to support the bands also). Within unionism, and especially working-class loyalism, the Order continues to enjoy a certain degree of brand loyalty; sympathy for its cause and objectives, even if that sympathy does not always translate into formal membership. Consequently, whilst institutional Orangeism is in decline, Orangeism itself – as distinct from the Orange Order – remains an important strand of loyalism and part of the ‘social fabric and the culture’ within the loyalist sub-culture, albeit finding its motivation in bands and banding culture rather than religious factors. It remains premature to announce the death of the Orange Order in Northern Ireland, but the institution has been dislocated and reduced to the margins of society and politics in the region. At best, the institution exists as one of the many pressure groups in Northern Ireland, competing for political, cultural, and social capital in a competitive market place as it seeks influence amid considerable alternative group perspectives and interests. Orangeism, on the other

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5 Danny Kennedy, former UUP MLA and member of the Orange Order, interviewed by author, 16 September 2016
hand, endures as an important political and cultural strand of loyalism. Although partially subsumed by band culture, Orangeism continues to inspire sympathy and empathy amongst the Protestant working-class. The Order continues to have a role to play amongst the working-class, even though its role within the Protestant middle-class has substantially waned.

That waning has been partly due to an image problem associated with a small number of parades. Charges of sectarianism against the Orange Order are inevitable given its rules, changes to which might further rupture internal unity. The extent to which such moves could hope to undo the damage to the Order’s image is difficult to quantify. The impact of sectarianism and the decline in its middle-class component amid growing proletarianization may be difficult to reverse. Reimagining itself as an entity endorsing cross-community engagement and standing defiantly opposed to elements of sectarianism in its own activity may be possible but would require considerable internal upheaval. The Orange Order is caught between a parade and a hard place.
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- Jonathan Aubrey, member of the Orange Order.
- Brian Beattie, member of the Orange Order.
- Sebastian Bell, member of the Orange Order.
- Brian Blair, Secretary of Friends of Schomberg House; and member of the Orange Order.
- Craig Boyd, member of the Orange Order.
• David Brewster, Legal Adviser to the Grand Lodge of Ireland; and member of the Orange Order.

• Christopher Brown, Special Project Officer for the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland; and member of the Orange Order.

• David Brown, member of the Orange Order.

• Desmond Brownlie, Committee member of Friends of Schomberg House; and member of the Orange Order.

• John Burrows, member of the Orange Order.

• Steven Burrows, member of the Orange Order.

• Aaron Callan, Democratic Unionist Party Councillor for Limavady District Electoral Area; and member of the Orange Order.

• George Chittick, Belfast County Grand Master, 2013–present; and member of the Orange Order.

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• Tom Elliott, Leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, 2010–2012; Ulster Unionist Party Member of the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, 2003–2015; Ulster Unionist Party Member of Parliament for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, 2015–2017; Fermanagh County Grand Master, 2004–2008; and member of the Orange Order.

• Richard Finlay, member of the Orange Order.

• Paul Gallagher, member of the Orange Order.

• Alderman Thomas Haire, Democratic Unionist Party Councillor for Belfast, 2011–present; High Sheriff of Belfast, 2017–2018; Belfast County Grand Master, 2010–2012; former Belfast County Grand Master of Juniors; and member of the Orange Order.

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Appendix I

Interview Questions

1. Why do people join the Orange Order in Northern Ireland?

2. What has been the biggest challenge to Orange Order membership since the early 1970s?

3. To what extent do people not join organisations in Northern Ireland in a way they once did and how has this affected Orange Order membership?

4. Are all organisations suffering falling memberships in Northern Ireland or is the Orange Order/religious organisations suffering particularly badly in comparison?

5. Are the efforts of Grand Lodge to make the Order more appealing (for example, rebranding the Twelfth of July ‘Orangefest’) likely to work in attracting more members?

6. How did the collapse of the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1972 affect the Orange Order?

7. What did a return to devolved government in 1998 mean for the Orange Order?

8. How has the Orange Order’s role changed in the new, post–Belfast Agreement political landscape?

9. What effect has the 2005 UUP decision to end the formal link had on the Orange Order?

10. What is the generally held view of the Order’s current political status in the wider unionist electorate?

11. How would you describe relations between the Order and unionist parties?

12. ONLY TO BE ASKED OF PARTICIPANTS OVER THE AGE OF 50:
What role did the Orange Order play in the governance of Northern Ireland between 1921 and 1972 and how accurate is it to contend that the Orange Order had a genuine influence over regional politics before 1972? What form did it take?

13. ONLY TO BE ASKED OF PARTICIPANTS OVER THE AGE OF 50:
Did Unionists join the Order because of its political standing and influence before 1972?

14. Is the Orange Order anti–Roman Catholic and, if so, why is that the case?

15. Is there a religious role for the Orange Order to play in Northern Ireland and, if so, what role?

16. How is membership of the Orange Order an expression of your personal faith?
17. Is it fair to say most Orange Order members would prefer their children not to marry a Roman Catholic and, if so, why is that?

18. Is the Protestant faith more important for the Orange Order than political influence?

19. How has secularism affected Northern Ireland and the unionist community at large?

20. Has the Orange Order suffered as a result of secularism? If so, how?

21. Is it fair to say the fall in Order membership has been similar to the fall in Church attendance in the past decades?

22. Has the impact of secularism had a consistent effect on the Order across the six counties?

23. Should the Order change any rules (for example, lifting the ban on members marrying Roman Catholics or allowing members to participate in Roman Catholic services)?