Space Debris Removal: Learning to Cooperate and the Price of Anarchy

Klima, Richard, Bloembergen, Daan, Savani, Rahul ORCID: 0000-0003-1262-7831, Tuyls, Karl, Wittig, Alexander, Sapera, Andrei and Izzo, Dario (2018) Space Debris Removal: Learning to Cooperate and the Price of Anarchy Frontiers in Robotics and AI, 5 (JUN). 54-. ISSN 2296-9144, 2296-9144

Text frobt-05-00054 (1).pdf - Published version Download (1MB)

Abstract

In this paper we study space debris removal from a game-theoretic perspective. In particular we focus on the question whether and how self-interested agents can cooperate in this dilemma, which resembles a tragedy of the commons scenario. We compare centralised and decentralised solutions and the corresponding price of anarchy, which measures the extent to which competition approximates cooperation. In addition we investigate whether agents can learn optimal strategies by reinforcement learning. To this end, we improve on an existing high fidelity orbital simulator, and use this simulator to obtain a computationally efficient surrogate model that can be used for our subsequent game-theoretic analysis. We study both single- and multi-agent approaches using stochastic (Markov) games and reinforcement learning. The main finding is that the cost of a decentralised, competitive solution can be significant, which should be taken into consideration when forming debris removal strategies.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	space debris, active debris removal, tragedy of the commons, price of anarchy, markov decision process
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	10 Dec 2018 10:39
Last Modified:	23 May 2026 01:38
DOI:	10.3389/frobt.2018.00054
Related Websites:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3029645
Disclaimer:	The University of Liverpool is not responsible for content contained on other websites from links within repository metadata. Please contact us if you notice anything that appears incorrect or inappropriate.