Does CDS trading affect risk-taking incentives in managerial compensation?



Chen, Jie, Leung, Woon Sau, Song, Wei and Avino, Davide ORCID: 0000-0002-5314-2067
(2019) Does CDS trading affect risk-taking incentives in managerial compensation? Journal of Banking and Finance.

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Abstract

We find that managers receive more risk-taking incentives in their compensation packages once their firms are referenced by credit default swap (CDS) trading, particularly when institutional ownership is high and when firms are in financial distress. These findings provide suggestive evidence that boards offer pay packages that encourage greater risk taking to take advantage of the reduced creditor monitoring after CDS introduction. Further, we show that the onset of CDS trading attenuates the effect of vega on leverage, consistent with the threat of exacting creditors restraining managerial risk appetite.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: credit default swaps, executive compenstation, risk taking, Leverage JEL classification, G32, G34
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 08 Jan 2019 12:52
Last Modified: 19 Jan 2023 01:07
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.01.004
Related URLs:
URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3030942