Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting

Balinski, Michel and Laraki, Rida ORCID: 0000-0002-4898-2424 (2020) Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting. OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 70 (3). pp. 1296-1316.

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Abstract

<jats:p> The two main criticisms by approval voting (AV) supporters have been that majority judgment (MJ) is not “Condorcet” and that it admits the no-show paradox. That MJ is not Condorcet consistent is a good property shared with AV: the domination paradox shows that majority rule may well err in an election between two. Whereas the no-show paradox is in theory possible with MJ, it is as a practical matter impossible. Moreover, it is proven that MJ with three grades does not admit the no-show paradox. In contrast, AV suffers from serious drawbacks. With AV, voters cannot express their opinions adequately; experiments show that Approve is not the opposite of Disapprove and that AV does not admit the no-show paradox—it admits the very closely allied no-show syndrome. Two grades are simply too few! The debate must concern three or more grades. </jats:p>

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	majority judgment, majority rule, approval voting, Condorcet consistency, domination paradox, no-show paradox, no-show syndrome
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	19 Mar 2019 09:57
Last Modified:	09 Mar 2024 08:12
DOI:	10.1287/opre.2019.1877
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3034484