The Social Structure of the Market for Force

Petersohn, Ulrich ORCID: 0000-0002-2423-5264 (2015) The Social Structure of the Market for Force. Cooperation and Conflict, 50 (2). pp. 269-285.

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Abstract

Over the past two decades, governments have increasingly contracted private military and security companies (PMSCs) to support military operations in conflicts. However, many observers have argued that such companies are ‘greedy market actors’ or ‘reckless mercenaries’ and their level of performance very poor. A minority has defended them as security professionals. If market competition is present, the level of performance is high and positive contributions to the client’s military operation can be expected. However, neither PMSC opponents nor proponents can account for the variance in the level of performance in three crucial cases – Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This article argues that different market structures explain this variance. At least three ideal configurations exist: collaborative, competitive, and rival structures. These structures influence the level of performance. PMSC performance levels are expected to decrease from the first configuration, being positive, to the last, being negative.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	## TULIP Type: Articles/Papers (Journal) ##
Uncontrolled Keywords:	contracting, markets for force, outsourcing, private security
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	19 Mar 2019 10:29
Last Modified:	19 Jan 2023 00:56
DOI:	10.1177/0010836714545686
Related URLs:	Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3034492