Balinski, Michel and Laraki, MR ORCID: 0000-0002-4898-2424
(2020)
Majority Judgment vs. Majority Rule.
Social Choice and Welfare, 54 (2-3).
pp. 429-461.
Text
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Abstract
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on evaluating candidates—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparing candidates—lead to another method, majority judgment, that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of “polarized” candidates. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.
Item Type: | Article |
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Additional Information: | Special Issue: In Memory of Kenneth J. Arrow |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
Date Deposited: | 07 Jun 2019 07:33 |
Last Modified: | 19 Jan 2023 00:40 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00355-019-01200-x |
Related URLs: | |
URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3044780 |