Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality


Bach, CW and Perea, Andrés (2020) Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality Economics Letters, 186. 108526-. ISSN 0165-1765, 1873-7374

This is the latest version of this item.

[thumbnail of GNE_without_CBR.pdf] Text
GNE_without_CBR.pdf - Author Accepted Manuscript
Download (339kB) | Preview

Abstract

We provide an existence result for the solution concept of generalized Nash equilibrium, which can be viewed as the direct incomplete information analogue of Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, a tuple consisting of a probability measure for every player on his choices and utility functions is a generalized Nash equilibrium, whenever some mutual optimality property is satisfied. This incomplete information solution concept is then epistemically characterized in a way that common belief in rationality is neither used nor implied. For the special case of complete information, an epistemic characterization of Nash equilibrium ensues as a corollary.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Common belief in rationality, Complete information, Epistemic characterization, Epistemic game theory, Existence, Generalized Nash equilibrium, Incomplete information, Interactive epistemology, Nash equilibrium, Solution concepts, Static games
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 19 Jul 2019 09:20
Last Modified: 22 May 2026 20:04
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108526
Related Websites:
URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3050086
Disclaimer: The University of Liverpool is not responsible for content contained on other websites from links within repository metadata. Please contact us if you notice anything that appears incorrect or inappropriate.

Available Versions of this Item

Altmetric
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)