Incomplete Information and Iterated Strict Dominance

Bach, CW and Perea, Andrés (2020) Incomplete Information and Iterated Strict Dominance. Oxford Economic Papers, 73 (2). pp. 820-836.

Text Submission_OEP_final.pdf - Author Accepted Manuscript Download (350kB) | Preview

Abstract

The solution concept of iterated strict dominance for static games with complete information recursively deletes choices that are inferior. Here, we devise such an algorithm for the more general case of incomplete information. The ensuing solution concept of generalized iterated strict dominance is characterized in terms of common belief in rationality as well as in terms of best response sets. Besides, we provide doxastic conditions that are necessary and sufficient for modelling complete information from a one-person perspective.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	38 Economics, 3801 Applied Economics, 3803 Economic Theory
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	18 Nov 2019 09:25
Last Modified:	20 Jun 2024 19:36
DOI:	10.1093/oep/gpz075
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3061938