Ambiguity and price competition

Routledge, RR and Edwards, RA (2020) Ambiguity and price competition. THEORY AND DECISION, 88 (2). pp. 231-256.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09725-4

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>There are few models of price competition in a homogeneous-good market which permit general asymmetries of information amongst the sellers. This work studies a price game with discontinuous payoffs in which both costs and market demand are ex ante uncertain. The sellers evaluate uncertain profits with maximin expected utilities exhibiting ambiguity aversion. The buyers in the market are permitted to split between sellers tieing at the minimum price in arbitrary ways which may be deterministic or random. The role of the primitives in determining equilibrium prices in the market is analyzed in detail.</jats:p>

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Ambiguity, Maximin utilities, Asymmetric information, Game theory
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	02 Dec 2019 09:54
Last Modified:	19 Jan 2023 00:18
DOI:	10.1007/s11238-019-09725-4
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3064213