Approximate Well-supported Nash Equilibria Below Two-thirds

Fearnley, John, Goldberg, Paul W, Savani, Rahul ORCID: 0000-0003-1262-7831 and Sørensen, Troels Bjerre
(2016) Approximate Well-supported Nash Equilibria Below Two-thirds. Algorithmica, 76. 297 - 319.

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In an ϵ-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most ϵ by changing his behaviour. Recent work has addressed the question of how best to compute ϵ-Nash equilibria, and for what values of ϵ a polynomial-time algorithm exists. An ϵ-well-supported Nash equilibrium (ϵ-WSNE) has the additional requirement that any strategy that is used with non-zero probability by a player must have payoff at most ϵ less than a best response. A recent algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis shows how to compute a 2/3-WSNE in polynomial time, for bimatrix games. Here we introduce a new technique that leads to an improvement to the worst-case approximation guarantee.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Bimatrix games, Nash equilibria, Well-supported approximate equilibria
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 09 Dec 2019 11:31
Last Modified: 28 Apr 2022 15:11
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-015-0029-3
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