Director networks, turnover, and appointments



Renneboog, Luc and Zhao, Yang ORCID: 0000-0002-5018-6953
(2020) Director networks, turnover, and appointments. European Financial Management, 26 (1). pp. 44-76.

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the labor market (turnover and appointments) of executive and non‐executive directors by means of social network methodology. We find that directors with strong networks are able to obtain labor market information that enables them to leave their firm more easily for better opportunities. Networks also mitigate information asymmetry problems of external director appointments. Furthermore, the strong impact of indirect connections is in line with the ‘strength of the weak ties’ theory. The fact that direct connections are less important signifies that the connections to people that are close and local are likely to convey redundant information, whereas connections to distant individuals are more efficient in terms of information acquisition and labor market performance improvement.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: corporate governance, director appointments, director networks, director turnover
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 03 Feb 2020 08:45
Last Modified: 19 Jan 2023 00:05
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12213
Related URLs:
URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3073016