CEO Incentives, Takeover Protection and Corporate Innovation

Mazouz, Khelifa and Zhao, Yang ORCID: 0000-0002-5018-6953 (2019) CEO Incentives, Takeover Protection and Corporate Innovation. British Journal of Management, 30 (2). pp. 494-515.

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Abstract

This study examines the effects of CEO equity‐based compensation and anti‐takeover provisions on corporate innovation. Using a large sample of US firms over the period 1996–2014, we find that long‐term incentives have a stronger influence on innovation when combined with takeover threats. We also show that equity‐based compensation is more likely to spur innovation for small firms and firms in industries with high product market competition and innovation pressure. However, this effect is somewhat weaker in the presence of anti‐takeover provisions, suggesting that takeover protection encourages managerial shirking even when external competition is high. Finally, in addition to the existing evidence on the valuation effect of CEO equity‐based compensation, we identify innovation as an important channel through which managerial incentives can enhance firm value. Our results have potential implications for shareholders, managers and policymakers.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	9 Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	03 Feb 2020 08:43
Last Modified:	15 Mar 2024 16:55
DOI:	10.1111/1467-8551.12330
Open Access URL:	https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1...
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3073018