WHAT USE ARE REAL-WORLD CASES FOR PHILOSOPHERS?

Furman, Katherine ORCID: 0000-0003-0311-097X (2021) WHAT USE ARE REAL-WORLD CASES FOR PHILOSOPHERS? ERGO-AN OPEN ACCESS JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 7. pp. 441-456. ISSN 2330-4014, 2330-4014

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Abstract

In this paper I provide a defence of real-world cases as a legitimate part of the philosopher’s toolkit, in addition to the austere thought experiments and fictional cases that are more commonly used. I argue that thought experiments are effective because they streamline out extraneous details that might distract the philosopher from the principle under investigation. But in doing so they run the risk of inadvertently removing relevant information, thus preventing the philosopher from latching on to salient philosophical relationships. Fictional cases operate as extended thought experiments—removing what is hopefully irrelevant, but potentially at the cost of information that the philosopher needs. Cases from the real world are thus the only place that we can be sure that nothing important hasn’t been inadvertently lost, and so they are philosophically important.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	04 Feb 2020 11:32
Last Modified:	23 May 2026 02:17
DOI:	10.3998/ergo.1113
Related Websites:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3073401
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