Is Sexual-Orientation Discrimination a Form of Sex Discrimination?

Hill, D ORCID: 0000-0003-4546-8662 (2020) Is Sexual-Orientation Discrimination a Form of Sex Discrimination? Liverpool Law Review: a journal of contemporary legal issues, 41 (3). pp. 357-386.

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Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10991-0...

Abstract

In Bostock v Clayton County (2020) Gorsuch J holds that direct discrimination because of sexual orientation is a form of direct discrimination because of sex. I argue that the same is true under the Equality Act 2010. I consider the arguments of (Finnis 2011) and (Gardner 1998) that “because of”, “on grounds of”, and similar phrases in UK discrimination legislation invoke the state of mind of the discriminator. I apply this point to Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013] arguing that (i) the UK Supreme Court was wrong to find direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, while, (ii), nevertheless, under the Equality Act 2010, that case and similar cases actually involve direct discrimination because of sex, not because of sexual orientation. I conclude by considering some objections, precedents, and implications.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Finnis, Direct discrimination, Grounds, Sex, Sexual orientation, Bull, Equality Act 2010
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	24 Sep 2020 10:49
Last Modified:	18 Jan 2023 23:31
DOI:	10.1007/s10991-020-09257-w
Open Access URL:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-020-09257-w
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3102399