The anti-mercenary norm and the market for combat force

Petersohn, Ulrich ORCID: 0000-0002-2423-5264 (2021) The anti-mercenary norm and the market for combat force. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, 76 (1). pp. 106-128.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020702021994519

Abstract

<jats:p> Since 2013, combat services have been increasingly exchanged on the market. This development is puzzling since the practice emerged despite an anti-mercenary norm banning such services, and without any revision of the norm. The article argues that the combat market is not a deliberate design, but the result of strategic interaction. For some, compliance with the anti-mercenary norm is the best strategy, while for others, violating the norm is best. However, once the norm violation occurs, it is in the interest of all actors to maintain a façade of compliance. Non-compliant actors benefit from the combat services, and compliant actors do not have to engage in costly sanctioning of the norm violation, and avoid the reputational costs associated with non-enforcement. The article employs game theory to investigate the strategic interactions of actors across eleven combat contracts from 2013 to 2019. </jats:p>

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Private military and security company, game theory, anti-mercenary norm, market for force, international norms
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	09 Mar 2021 14:35
Last Modified:	18 Jan 2023 22:57
DOI:	10.1177/0020702021994519
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3116849