Power-sharing, conflict resolution, and the logic of pre-emptive defection



Johnson, Chelsea ORCID: 0000-0003-4849-1825
(2021) Power-sharing, conflict resolution, and the logic of pre-emptive defection. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 58 (4). pp. 734-748.

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Abstract

<jats:p> Conclusions about the potential for peace via power-sharing are mixed. For some, power-sharing does little to overcome the commitment problem characterizing a transition from conflict, while others argue that such concessions provide signals of parties’ willingness to incur costs. This article develops and tests a new theory, aiming to shed light on the mechanisms through which power-sharing bargains help to overcome the commitment problem. I argue that government parties tend to hold an electoral and military advantage, which heightens incentives for rebel leaders to defect from a settlement prior to conceding their capacity to use violence. Where settlements provide discrete guarantees that offset the risks of electoral defeat and the co-optation of forces, these incentives for pre-emptive defection should be mitigated. I offer a novel disaggregation of provisional power-sharing subtypes, distinguishing between long-term and short-term arrangements. The analysis rests on an original, cross-national dataset of government-and-rebel dyads to negotiated settlements signed between 1975 and 2015 (N = 168). The logistic regression results clearly indicate that power-sharing settlements stipulating ‘consociational’-style reforms are significantly more likely to resolve conflict between settlement dyads, all else equal. Meanwhile, standard conceptualizations of power-sharing, which include transitional coalitions and troop integration, appear unlikely to secure rebel commitment beyond the transition period, which helps to explain the contradictory findings in existing research. </jats:p>

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: conflict resolution, negotiated settlement, power-sharing, post-conflict democratization
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Histories, Languages and Cultures
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 14 Oct 2021 14:30
Last Modified: 13 Nov 2023 03:25
DOI: 10.1177/0022343320924699
Open Access URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022...
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URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3140401