Absorbing games with a clock and two bits of memory

Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt, Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus ORCID: 0000-0003-4783-0389 and Neyman, Abraham (2021) Absorbing games with a clock and two bits of memory Games and Economic Behavior, 128. pp. 213-230. ISSN 0899-8256, 1090-2473

Text submitted_paper_geb_april_5_2020.pdf - Author Accepted Manuscript Download (342kB) | Preview

Abstract

An absorbing game is a two-person zero-sum repeated game. Some of the entries are “absorbing” in the sense that, following the play of an absorbing entry, with positive probability all future payoffs are equal to that entry's payoff. The outcome of the game is the long-run average payoff. We prove that a two-person zero-sum absorbing game, with either finite or compact action sets, has, for each ε>0, ε-optimal strategies with finite memory. In fact, we show that there is an ε-optimal strategy that depends on the clock and three states of memory.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	38 Economics, 3801 Applied Economics, 3803 Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Science & Engineering > School of Electrical Engineering, Electronics and Computer Science
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	26 Oct 2021 08:08
Last Modified:	06 Dec 2024 19:52
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.008
Related Websites:	Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3141607
Disclaimer:	The University of Liverpool is not responsible for content contained on other websites from links within repository metadata. Please contact us if you notice anything that appears incorrect or inappropriate.