Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information

Jain, Ritesh ORCID: 0000-0003-0227-2491 and Lombardi, Michele ORCID: 0000-0002-8613-053X (2021) Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 99. p. 102605. ISSN 0304-4068, 1873-1538

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Abstract

A social choice rule (SCR) is a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over outcomes. When preference profiles are close to being common knowledge among players, an SCR is continuously virtually fully implementable if there exists a mechanism such that all its equilibrium outcomes are arbitrarily close to the outcomes recommended by the SCR. When there are at least three players and a domain condition is satisfied, we obtain the following result: any SCR is continuously virtually fully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibria, as well as in interim correlated rationalizable strategies, by a finite mechanism.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Continuous implementation, Virtual implementation, Social choice rules, Uniform-weak topology, Common knowledge
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Management
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	13 Dec 2021 08:02
Last Modified:	06 Dec 2024 21:06
DOI:	10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102605
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3145239