Can We Measure the Badness of Death for the Person who Dies?

Schramme, Thomas ORCID: 0000-0001-6319-6635 (2021) Can We Measure the Badness of Death for the Person who Dies? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 90. pp. 253-276. ISSN 1358-2461, 1755-3555

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Abstract

AbstractI aim to show that the common idea according to which we can assess how bad death is for the person who dies relies on numerous dubious premises. These premises are intuitive from the point of view of dominant views regarding the badness of death. However, unless these premises have been thoroughly justified, we cannot measure the badness of death for the person who dies. In this paper, I will make explicit assumptions that pertain to the alleged level of badness of death. The most important assumption I will address is the assignment of a quantitative value of zero to death, which leads to the conclusion that there are lives not worth living for the affected person. Such a view interprets the idea of a live worth living in quantitative terms. It is in conflict with actual evaluations of relevant people of their lives.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > School of the Arts
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	21 Jan 2022 09:00
Last Modified:	25 Apr 2025 06:55
DOI:	10.1017/s135824612100031x
Related Websites:	Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3147285
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