Implementation in strong core by codes of rights

Lombardi, M ORCID: 0000-0002-8613-053X, Savva, F ORCID: 0000-0001-6613-8721 and Zivanas, N (2023) Implementation in strong core by codes of rights Social Choice and Welfare, 60 (3). pp. 503-515. ISSN 0176-1714, 1432-217X

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Abstract

Following the seminal contribution of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018), we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are fundamental behavioral units, and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the strong core. The planner’s exercise includes designing a code of rights that specifies the collection of coalitions having the right to block one outcome by moving to another. We provide a complete characterization of the implementable social choice rules.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	38 Economics, 3803 Economic Theory, Behavioral and Social Science
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > School of Management
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	14 Sep 2022 14:46
Last Modified:	24 Jan 2026 03:51
DOI:	10.1007/s00355-022-01425-3
Related Websites:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3164690
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