

1 **Changing patterns of SARS-CoV-2 infection through Delta and Omicron waves**  
2 **by vaccination status, previous infection and neighbourhood deprivation: A**  
3 **cohort analysis of 2.7M people.**

4

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22

23 **Abstract**

24 **Background:** Our study examines if SARS-CoV-2 infections varied by vaccination  
25 status, if an individual had previously tested positive and by neighbourhood

26 socioeconomic deprivation across the Delta and Omicron epidemic waves of SARS-  
27 CoV-2.

28 Methods: Population cohort study using electronic health records for 2.7M residents  
29 in Cheshire and Merseyside, England (3rd June 2021 to 1st March 2022). Our  
30 outcome variable was registered positive test for SARS-CoV-2. Explanatory  
31 variables were vaccination status, previous registered positive test and  
32 neighbourhood socioeconomic deprivation. Cox regression models were used to  
33 analyse associations.

34 Results: Originally higher SARS-CoV-2 rates in the most socioeconomically deprived  
35 neighbourhoods changed to being higher in the least deprived neighbourhoods from  
36 the 1st September 2021, and were inconsistent during the Omicron wave. Individuals  
37 who were fully vaccinated (two doses) were associated with fewer registered positive  
38 tests (e.g., individuals engaged in testing between 1st September and 27th  
39 November 2021 – Hazards Ratio (HR) = 0.48, 95% Confidence Intervals (CIs) =  
40 0.47-0.50. Individuals with a previous registered positive test were also less likely to  
41 have a registered positive test (e.g., individuals engaged in testing between 1st  
42 September and 27th November 2021 - HR = 0.16, 95% CIs = 0.15-0.18. However,  
43 the Omicron period saw smaller effect sizes for both vaccination status and previous  
44 registered positive test.

45 Conclusions: Changing patterns of SARS-CoV-2 infections during the Delta and  
46 Omicron waves reveals a dynamic pandemic that continues to affect diverse  
47 communities in sometimes unexpected ways.

48

49 **Keywords**: COVID-19; inequality; vaccination; SARS-CoV-2.

## 50 **Background**

51 Vaccination is the cornerstone of preventing severe COVID-19 disease among  
52 individuals infected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus (1). Vaccines have also provided  
53 some protection from becoming infected with SARS-CoV-2, as has prior infection (2–  
54 4). Unvaccinated individuals are at higher risk of severe illness, hospitalisation or  
55 death from COVID-19 (4,5). There is a lack of evidence over how long either  
56 vaccine- or infection-acquired immunity to SARS-CoV-2 infection and COVID-19  
57 disease may last for (6). Concerns over waning immunity (7,8), and immune escape  
58 with the Omicron variant (9), led to the introduction of ‘booster’ vaccination  
59 programmes in late 2021 (10). In addition to loss of biological protection, the risk  
60 behaviours of individuals change over time and may be influenced by feeling  
61 protected by vaccination or prior infection for longer than they actually are (11,12).  
62 Modelling of seasonal influenza vaccination programmes suggests that such  
63 behaviour changes can offset the effectiveness of vaccination programmes (13).

64

65 The COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced and amplified existing social inequalities in  
66 health. The number of infections, hospitalisations and deaths due to COVID-19 were  
67 disproportionately higher among residents of socioeconomically deprived  
68 neighbourhoods (14–16). Vaccination uptake was also lower among deprived  
69 populations (17). Assessing the importance of vaccine- and infection-acquired  
70 immunity are therefore social issues. However, current debates and evaluations of  
71 these issues largely ignore this social dimension. For example, estimates of vaccine  
72 effectiveness at reducing infections often present only unadjusted associations (18),  
73 which does not account for the differing levels of exposure to SARS-CoV-2 and  
74 vaccine uptake among different population and social groups.

75

76 The aim of this study is to examine if SARS-CoV-2 infections in England varied by  
77 vaccination status, if an individual had previously tested positive and by  
78 neighbourhood socioeconomic deprivation. We compare experiences during the  
79 epidemic curves of two SARS-CoV-2 variants: Delta and Omicron. The periods  
80 where these variants dominate infections represent an interesting case study due to  
81 high number of infections, high vaccine uptake, limited non-pharmaceutical  
82 interventions and changing public responses to national COVID-19 measures. It is  
83 also a period where all residents of England had access to free SARS-CoV-2 testing,  
84 allowing us to leverage electronic health records linked to testing records.

85

## 86 **Methods**

87

### 88 Data source

89 Data were accessed from the Combined Intelligence for Population Health Action  
90 (CIPHA; [www.cipha.nhs.uk](http://www.cipha.nhs.uk)) resource. CIPHA is a population health management  
91 data resource set up to support responses to COVID-19. It constitutes linked  
92 electronic health records from routinely collected administrative data. Here, we used  
93 the population spine for CIPHA (all people registered with a GP and their primary  
94 care records), linked to NHS vaccination records and all registered SARS-CoV-2  
95 tests.

96

### 97 Study population

98 CIPHA contains linked pseudonymised electronic health care records for 2,864,997  
99 people. We included people (n = 2,767,027) with a complete address who were

100 resident during the study period in the integrated care region the CIPHA resource  
101 was set up to serve (Cheshire and Merseyside, England). Participants with missing  
102 data (n=101) were excluded from analyses (other than missing data for ethnicity  
103 which we adjust for). For each period of analysis, we only include people who were  
104 alive up to the end of the period to minimise issues with immortal time bias.

105

## 106 Study design

107 We selected three time periods to analyse:

- 108 1. Delta – 3rd June to 1st September 2021: We defined the start of the period as  
109 when Public Health England (now UK Health Security Agency) stated that the  
110 Delta variant was 99% of all infections (19).
- 111 2. Delta – 1<sup>st</sup> September to 27<sup>th</sup> November 2021: We selected this period to  
112 cover the wave of infections associated with the new school year (starting 1<sup>st</sup>  
113 September 2021) up to where the first case of Omicron was detected in  
114 England. The latter period was selected to focus our analyses on cases  
115 relating primarily to the Delta variant of SARS-CoV-2 to avoid any differences  
116 in risk of further infection or vaccine escape the Omicron variant may have.
- 117 3. Omicron – 13<sup>th</sup> December 2021 to 1<sup>st</sup> March 2022: We defined the start of this  
118 period as when sequencing data suggested that most positive tests were for  
119 Omicron. The period is then up to the end of available data at the time of  
120 analysis.

121

## 122 Outcome variable

123 The primary outcome variable was time to SARS-CoV-2 infection (registered positive  
124 test) during each period. Time was defined as when the test was taken rather than

125 when it was processed. Positive cases are compiled from data feeds supplied by the  
126 UK Health Security Agency, who share all Pillar 1 (tests in care settings) and Pillar 2  
127 (tests in the community) positive tests which are linked within CIPHA. Positive cases  
128 are identified using both lateral flow and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests.

129

### 130 Explanatory variables

131 We focused on three key explanatory variables: COVID-19 vaccination status,  
132 previous SARS-CoV-2 infection and neighbourhood socioeconomic deprivation.

133

134 Vaccination status was defined as the number of doses (of any vaccine type  
135 combination e.g. BNT162b2 (Pfizer-BioNTech) and the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 (Oxford-  
136 AstraZeneca)) an individual had received (0-3). We identified the number of first  
137 doses received two weeks before the start of each period, and one week prior for  
138 two or three doses, which we define as the time to receive immune protection  
139 (following other research (3,8)). The measure was then updated (i.e., time-varying)  
140 over time to account for people who received an additional vaccination during each  
141 study period. This was achieved using established methods through updating the  
142 time interval based on vaccination status, holding other covariates constant (20).

143

144 Previous SARS-CoV-2 infection (binary) was defined as whether an individual had a  
145 registered positive test from the start of the pandemic up to two weeks before the  
146 start of each period (21). The measure was held constant and not time varying. We  
147 defined this two-week period as the time to develop immune protection. Infections  
148 were selected based on the first positive test, and subsequent positive tests  
149 occurring more than 90 days apart (which we defined as a further/subsequent

150 infections). This definition follows established research elsewhere (8,21). We  
151 evaluated if this definition affected our results by introducing immortal time bias (i.e.,  
152 some individuals could not test positive for parts of the study periods if they tested  
153 positive closer to the start period) through only including individuals who had a  
154 previous positive test at least 90 days before the start of the period as a sensitivity  
155 analysis.

156

157 Neighbourhood socioeconomic deprivation was measured through matching  
158 individual's residence to the 2019 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) (22). The IMD  
159 is a multi-dimensional index of neighbourhood deprivation, based on seven weighted  
160 domains including income, employment, education and health. The IMD score is  
161 measured for Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) which are small zones  
162 representing neighbourhoods (~1500 people). Larger scores represent higher levels  
163 of socioeconomic deprivation. We also reported analyses by IMD decile to aid  
164 interpretation.

165

#### 166 Control variables

167 We accounted for demographic factors sex (male or female) and age. Age was  
168 included as a categorical variable to account for non-linear dynamics and produced a  
169 better fitting model than a continuous measure. Age is an important factor for  
170 different risks in exposure to SARS-CoV-2, as well as to reflect that the vaccination  
171 programme was rolled out by age group. Ethnicity was included to account for  
172 inequalities in both exposure to SARS-CoV-2 and vaccination uptake. Broad ethnic  
173 groups were used: White, Asian, Black, Mixed and Other. We also include 'prefer not  
174 to say / missing' as a category in our models, since they accounted for a large

175 proportion of records and this can account for any issues with this group being  
176 different in causal behaviours. Health status was included to account for differences  
177 in behaviours, where people with long-term health conditions may ‘shield’ or  
178 minimise social contacts. We define health status (comorbidity) as if individuals had  
179 a registered Expanded Diagnosis Clusters codes (yes or no). Codes represent  
180 diseases, symptoms or conditions that are treated in ambulatory and inpatient  
181 hospital settings. Finally, we also adjusted for differences in testing dynamics by  
182 accounting for whether an individual had registered a negative test in the previous  
183 month.

184

#### 185 Statistical analyses

186 We found evidence of inequalities in registered test behaviours (Appendix Table A).  
187 To minimise this potential bias in our regression analyses, we focused our analyses  
188 on two cohorts. First, we selected only individuals who reported a negative test in the  
189 month prior to each time period as a proxy for being engaged in testing. This is  
190 similar to a ‘test-negative’ study design which have been used for studying vaccine  
191 effectiveness (23). Second, we analysed individuals who had received an influenza  
192 vaccine within a year of each time period as a proxy of being engaged in healthcare  
193 (i.e., likely to register a test even if unvaccinated and not disengaged with health  
194 care) (24). For the Omicron period, we extended this time frame to 1<sup>st</sup> September  
195 2020 to fully capture the previous year’s influenza vaccination campaign. While our  
196 main models use all individuals, in a sensitivity analysis we restricted this population  
197 to just people aged 65 years and over as they are the focus of the UK influenza  
198 vaccination programme. Matching methods were also investigated for balancing  
199 populations across our exposure variables, but did not significantly alter the models



200 and are not discussed here. We also reported analyses for all residents of Cheshire  
201 and Merseyside as a sensitivity analysis.

202

203 Descriptive statistics and visualisations were produced to summarise our data and  
204 identify key trends. Cox regression models were then used to predict the  
205 associations between our explanatory and control variables to our outcome variable  
206 (time to registered positive test). Hazard ratios and 95% confidence intervals were  
207 estimated from these models to summarise associations. Interaction effects for  
208 vaccine status and previous infection were tested, but not included in the results  
209 since they did not improve the model fit. We also stratified analyses by 10-year age  
210 group. This was to capture dynamics between children/adolescents and adults which  
211 will each have different modes of transmissions, risks and vaccination access (25).  
212 We tested the proportional hazards assumption of models through estimating  
213 Schoenfeld residuals. Most associations met the proportional hazards assumption.  
214 Where the assumption was violated, estimates were not extreme and/or resulting  
215 plots did not display obvious violations suggesting that findings were potentially  
216 exaggerated by our large sample sizes. Alternative model specifications did not  
217 produce significantly different findings.

218

### 219 *Patient and Public Involvement*


220 No patients and the public were involved in this piece of research.

221

## 222 **Results**


223

224 Table 1 presents the descriptive characteristics of our cohort. Figure 1 presents  
 225 trends in registered positive cases for all residents since the start of the pandemic to  
 226 contextualise our three periods. The number of cases was high during both Delta  
 227 periods compared to previous waves. Omicron saw large growth in cases (10.5% of  
 228 all residents registered a positive test; more than twice as high as both Delta  
 229 periods) from new infections and the emergence of subsequent infections that  
 230 almost reach the levels of new infections during the two Delta periods. We estimated  
 231 that 11.4% of positive tests during the Omicron period were subsequent positive  
 232 tests (in the other two periods, this figure was <1%). In particular, incidence of further  
 233 infections were roughly twice as high in the most deprived compared to least  
 234 deprived areas (Figure 2). Percentage of people with registered positive tests across  
 235 our exposure variables are described in Appendix Table B.  
 236



237

238 **Figure 1: Seven day moving average for registered positive tests for all**  
 239 **residents in Cheshire and Merseyside (England) by whether it was an**  
 240 **individual's first registered positive test (new infection) or further/subsequent**  
 241 **positive test. A = Total number of cases, B = Total number of cases per**  
 242 **100,000 population.**  
 243



244  
 245 **Figure 2: Seven day moving average for the percentage of all registered**  
 246 **positive tests that were identified as a subsequent infection ( $\geq 2$ nd positive**  
 247 **registered test more than 90 days apart) by decile of deprivation (3rd June**  
 248 **2021 – 2nd February 2022). Note: 1 = most deprived decile, 10 = least deprived**  
 249 **decile, other deciles set to low transparency to minimise distractions.**

**Table 1: Sample characteristics for each period. Note: Values are frequency counts (percentage) unless specified.**

	Delta (3rd June - 1st Sept 2021)			Delta (1st Sept - 27th Nov 2021)			Omicron (13th Dec - 2nd Feb 2022)		
	All residents	Negative test	Influenza vaccinated	All residents	Negative test	Influenza vaccinated	All residents	Negative test	Influenza vaccinated
Number of individuals [n]	2722708	321676	937054	2716029	376864	932416	2708637	445427	906193
Registered positive test	3.4%	4.6%	2.2%	4.3%	5.7%	4.4%	10.5%	17.4%	9.7%
<i>Explanatory variables</i>									
Vaccination status									
Unvaccinated	47.2%	35.7%	23.5%	36.0%	21.1%	22.0%	31.8%	19.7%	22.4%
1 dose	16.2%	18.1%	9.8%	6.5%	7.6%	1.2%	5.3%	5.6%	3.7%
2 doses	36.5%	46.0%	66.4%	57.3%	71.0%	76.5%	32.8%	35.9%	16.4%
3 doses	0.2%	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.4%	0.3%	30.1%	38.9%	57.5%
Previous infection	6.4%	9.4%	5.4%	9.2%	13.1%	7.1%	14.0%	16.1%	12.6%
Deprivation Score [mean (sd)]	28.8 (20.9)	25.7 (19.6)	25.1 (19.7)	28.8 (20.9)	25.7 (19.7)	25.0 (19.7)	28.8 (20.9)	25.2 (19.5)	25.1 (19.7)
<i>Covariates</i>									
Age [mean (sd)]	41.7 (23.5)	43.1 (22.4)	53.1 (26.7)	41.6 (23.5)	43.8 (21.0)	53.0 (26.6)	41.5 (23.4)	43.0 (22.0)	50.5 (27.5)
Sex									
Female	50.2%	59.2%	54.3%	50.2%	57.0%	54.4%	50.2%	57.1%	54.3%
Male	49.8%	40.8%	45.7%	49.8%	43.0%	45.6%	49.8%	42.9%	45.7%
Ethnic group									
White	73.2%	78.4%	82.8%	73.2%	77.1%	82.7%	73.1%	77.5%	82.0%
Asian or Asian British	1.4%	1.0%	1.0%	1.4%	1.0%	1.0%	1.4%	1.1%	1.1%
Black or Black British	0.7%	0.6%	0.5%	0.7%	0.6%	0.5%	0.7%	0.6%	0.5%
Mixed ethnicity	1.7%	1.7%	1.3%	1.7%	1.6%	1.3%	1.7%	1.6%	1.4%
Prefer not to say / Missing	8.2%	5.0%	2.6%	8.2%	6.0%	2.6%	8.2%	5.8%	2.7%
Other ethnicity	14.8%	13.3%	11.9%	14.8%	13.6%	11.9%	14.8%	13.4%	12.4%
Registered health issue	51.1%	59.3%	64.8%	51.0%	56.6%	64.7%	51.0%	57.7%	63.4%

Values are percentages unless specified. Characteristics are calculated at baseline for each time period.

258 Tables 2 (individuals engaged in testing) and 3 (individuals engaged in healthcare)  
259 presents findings from a series of Cox regression models predicting factors  
260 associated with time to registered positive test. There was agreement in associations  
261 across both model types for the two Delta periods, with less consistent findings for  
262 the Omicron period.

263

264 Unadjusted associations for both Delta waves showed that people who were  
265 vaccinated had lower likelihoods of registered positive test for SARS-CoV-2. For  
266 instance, in individuals engaged in testing we estimated that people who were fully  
267 vaccinated (2 doses) were 60% (Hazard Ratio (HR) = 0.40, 95% Confidence  
268 Intervals (CIs) = 0.39-0.42) and 52% (HR = 0.48, 95% CIs = 0.47-0.50) less likely to  
269 have a registered positive test in the first and second Delta waves respectively  
270 compared to unvaccinated people. In individuals engaged in healthcare, we  
271 estimated a larger effect size with individuals who were fully vaccinated being 63%  
272 (HR = 0.37, 95% CIs = 0.36-0.39) and 66% (HR = 0.34, 95% CIs = 0.33-0.34) less  
273 likely to have a registered positive test in the first and second Delta waves  
274 respectively compared to unvaccinated people. After adjusting for other demographic  
275 and social factors that may affect exposure to the virus, the strength of associations  
276 reduced but remained negatively associated (i.e., HR < 1 and 95% CIs did not cross  
277 1). In the second Delta wave (1<sup>st</sup> September to 27<sup>th</sup> November 2021), we observed a  
278 stronger protective effect in people who had received 3 doses in both models (i.e.,  
279 fully vaccinated and 'boosted').

280

281 Associations during the Omicron period were different to the previous Delta periods  
282 and varied between models. For both models, unadjusted associations suggested

283 positive associations in 1 or 2 doses, and a negative association for 3 doses (both  
284 compared to unvaccinated populations). For example, individuals engaged in testing  
285 with three doses were 14% less likely (HR = 0.86, 95% CIs = 0.84-0.89) and  
286 individuals who were healthcare engaged were 23% less likely (HR = 0.77, 95% CIs  
287 = 0.75-0.78). In adjusted models, negative associations for three doses remained in  
288 both models although effect sizes were smaller. This suggests that following  
289 adjustment for known risk factors that may affect exposure to SARS-CoV-2,  
290 individuals who were boosted were less likely to have a registered positive test.

291

292 People with a previous registered positive test had lower likelihood of having a  
293 registered positive test in each period across both models. Unadjusted effect sizes  
294 were large. For example, between 1<sup>st</sup> September and 27<sup>th</sup> November 2021 (Delta)  
295 we estimated that individuals with had a previous registered positive test were 84%  
296 (testing engaged model HR = 0.16, 95% CIs = 0.15-0.18; Table 2) and 86%  
297 (healthcare engaged model HR = 0.14, 95% CIs = 0.13-0.16; Table 3) less likely to  
298 have tested positive than compared to those who had not. Associations were  
299 consistent following adjusting for other covariates. The unadjusted effect size was  
300 smaller in the Omicron period (testing engaged model HR = 0.73, 95% CIs = 0.71-  
301 0.76; healthcare engaged model HR = 0.58, 95% CIs = 0.56-0.60), although effect  
302 sizes strengthened upon adjustment. Sensitivity analyses suggested that these  
303 associations remained consistent following assessing if our measure was affected by  
304 immortal time bias (Appendix Table C).

**Table 2: Results for a Cox regression predicting time to a registered positive test for individuals who had registered a negative lateral flow test within a month of the time period start date (as a proxy for testing engaged).**

	Delta (3rd June - 1st Sept 2021)			Delta (1st Sept - 27th Nov 2021)			Omicron (13th Dec - 2nd Feb 2022)		
	HR	LCI	UCI	HR	LCI	UCI	HR	LCI	UCI
	<i>Unadjusted</i>								
Unvaccinated	Reference			Reference			Reference		
1 dose	0.70	0.66	0.74	0.47	0.44	0.51	1.16	1.11	1.22
2 doses	0.40	0.39	0.42	0.48	0.47	0.50	1.66	1.61	1.70
3 doses	0.41	0.28	0.60	0.24	0.19	0.30	0.86	0.84	0.89
Previous infection	0.25	0.22	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.18	0.73	0.71	0.76
Deprivation Score	1.005	1.004	1.006	0.995	0.994	0.996	1.004	1.004	1.005
<i>Adjusted*</i>									
Unvaccinated	Reference			Reference			Reference		
1 dose	0.64	0.60	0.69	0.68	0.63	0.73	1.04	0.99	1.10

2 doses	0.53	0.51	0.56	0.66	0.63	0.68	1.30	1.26	1.34
3 doses	0.52	0.35	0.76	0.33	0.26	0.41	0.93	0.90	0.96
Previous infection	0.23	0.21	0.26	0.15	0.14	0.17	0.61	0.59	0.63
Deprivation Score	1.002	1.001	1.003	0.996	0.995	0.997	1.002	1.001	1.002

---

Definitions: HR = Hazard Ratio, LCI = 95% Lower Confidence Interval, UCI = 95% Upper Confidence Interval

Note: Deprivation score is numerical, with increasing values representing higher levels of deprivation

\* Adjusted for age (10-year age bands), sex, ethnicity, long-term illness, time varying vaccination status (with an interaction to time), previous infection status (and interaction to time), and 2019 Index of Multiple Deprivation score

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**Table 3: Full model results for a Cox regression predicting time to a registered positive test for individuals who had received an influenza vaccination within a year of the time period start date (as a proxy for healthcare engaged).**



	Delta (3rd June - 1st Sept 2021)			Delta (1st Sept - 27th Nov 2021)			Omicron (13th Dec - 2nd Feb 2022)		
	HR	LCI	UCI	HR	LCI	UCI	HR	LCI	UCI
<i>Unadjusted</i>									
Unvaccinated	Reference			Reference			Reference		
1 dose	0.69	0.65	0.74	0.36	0.33	0.40	1.27	1.21	1.32
2 doses	0.37	0.36	0.39	0.34	0.33	0.34	1.39	1.35	1.43
3 doses	0.43	0.32	0.59	0.13	0.11	0.15	0.77	0.75	0.78
Previous infection	0.19	0.17	0.22	0.14	0.13	0.16	0.58	0.56	0.60
Deprivation Score	1.0061	1.0054	1.0067	0.9951	0.9946	0.9956	1.0009	1.0005	1.0013
<i>Adjusted*</i>									
Unvaccinated	Reference			Reference			Reference		
1 dose	0.66	0.61	0.72	0.53	0.47	0.60	0.98	0.93	1.03
2 doses	0.55	0.51	0.59	0.60	0.57	0.64	1.15	1.09	1.21
3 doses	0.63	0.46	0.86	0.28	0.24	0.34	0.94	0.89	0.99

Previous infection	0.17	0.15	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.13	0.45	0.44	0.47
Deprivation Score	1.0031	1.0024	1.0038	0.9925	0.9920	0.9930	0.9992	0.9987	0.9996

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Definitions: HR = Hazard Ratio, LCI = 95% Lower Confidence Interval, UCI = 95% Upper Confidence Interval

Note: Deprivation score is numerical, with increasing values representing higher levels of deprivation

\* Adjusted for age (10-year age bands), sex, ethnicity, long-term illness, number of tests in previous month, time varying vaccination status (with an interaction to time), previous infection status (and interaction to time), and 2019 Index of Multiple Deprivation score


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305 The associations for neighbourhood deprivation vary across each time period. In the  
306 first period (Delta – 3<sup>rd</sup> June to 1<sup>st</sup> September 2021), we estimated positive  
307 associations in both models indicating that individuals in more deprived areas were  
308 more likely to have a registered positive test. To aid interpretation of this effect, we  
309 also estimated a model using national decile of deprivation (Appendix Tables D and  
310 E). Individuals engaged in testing who resided in the least deprived decile were 24%  
311 less likely (HR = 0.76, 95% CIs = 0.72-0.81) and individuals who were healthcare  
312 engaged were 33% less likely (HR = 0.67, 95% CIs = 0.63-0.70), both compared to  
313 people in the most deprived decile.

314

315 In the second Delta period (1<sup>st</sup> September to 27<sup>th</sup> November 2021), the direction of  
316 the association was negative suggesting that as areas become more deprived,  
317 registered positive tests decreased. Individuals engaged in testing who resided in the  
318 least deprived decile were 37% more likely (HR = 1.37, 95% CIs = 1.30-1.44) and  
319 individuals who were healthcare engaged were 37% more likely (HR = 1.37, 95%  
320 CIs = 1.32-1.42), both compared to people in the most deprived decile (Appendix  
321 Tables D and E). Age-stratified models suggest that the reversal of social  
322 inequalities appears to be driven by cases in children and older adults (Appendix  
323 Figure A).

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**Figure 3: Comparison of seven day moving average for the number of residents in Cheshire and Merseyside per 100,000 people who registered a COVID-19 positive test for the most and least deprived deciles by whether it was an individual's first registered positive test or a further/subsequent infection (3<sup>rd</sup> June 2021 – 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2022).**

In the Omicron period (13<sup>th</sup> December 2021 to 28<sup>th</sup> February 2022), associations for deprivation showed diverging patterns across our models. Associations were positive in the testing engaged model (Table 2) and negative following adjustment in the healthcare engaged model (Table 3). This reflects the complexity in identifying associations over this period, where deprived and less deprived communities had the highest rates of registered positive tests at different points (Figure 3). Initially incidence rates were higher in the least deprived decile, with trends reversing due to

339 a larger peak of infections in the most deprived decile post-Christmas. By the end of  
340 the period, social inequalities had reversed again with more positive tests in the least  
341 deprived decile. For subsequent infections, the social gradient is more distinct with  
342 higher rates in the most deprived decile for most of the period before converging  
343 together (Figure 2).

344

345 Our results were broadly consistent when analysing all residents in Cheshire and  
346 Merseyside (Appendix Table F). The only exception was for vaccination status in the  
347 Omicron period, where we found positive associations for all vaccination doses  
348 (although any interpretation should be made cautiously due to the level of bias in  
349 these data). Similarly, our results were broadly consistent when restricting the  
350 healthcare engaged individuals to only people aged 65 years and over (Appendix  
351 Table G).

352

## 353 **Discussion**

354

### 355 *Key results*

356 Our study details the complex changes over time in who was affected by the COVID-  
357 19 pandemic. While number of cases were high during the Delta waves, Omicron  
358 saw unprecedented numbers of cases with 10.5% of people in Cheshire and  
359 Merseyside having a registered positive test. Subsequent infections were identified  
360 in 11% of these tests, with rates higher in deprived areas. The types of people with  
361 registered positive tests has changed widely. Initially, social inequalities were evident  
362 with registered positive tests higher in the most deprived areas. Since 1<sup>st</sup> September  
363 2021, this has been less consistent with more registered positive tests in the least

364 deprived areas (partly driven by patterns in children and adolescents). While there  
365 were fewer registered positive tests in vaccinated populations, this changed with  
366 Omicron. Finally, we find that people with a previous registered positive test were far  
367 less likely to have a subsequent registered positive test.

368

### 369 *Interpretation*

370 Our study does not assess vaccine effectiveness or vaccine impact on SARS-CoV-2  
371 infection or COVID-19 disease. Rather it describes the types of people with  
372 registered positive tests for SARS-CoV-2 during the Delta and Omicron waves, and  
373 the complexity in being able to tease out these associations. Our analyses  
374 demonstrated that most new infections in the Delta wave occurred among  
375 unvaccinated populations. This association, however, becomes less clear with the  
376 emergence of Omicron where in individuals engaged in testing we observe more  
377 registered positive tests in individuals who were fully vaccinated (but not for those  
378 who were boosted or in individuals engaged with healthcare). This is not to suggest  
379 that being vaccinated places people at greater risk of being infected. Causal  
380 explanations for this association may include behavioural changes, such as  
381 increased physical contacts and working outside the home following vaccination  
382 increasing exposure to the virus (11,12). Evidence in England suggests that while  
383 individuals did not change behaviours after being vaccinated, increasing population  
384 vaccination levels were associated to changes in risk-compensatory behaviours and  
385 social contacts (26). In addition, as most people get vaccinated or infected, the pool  
386 of unvaccinated people most susceptible to infection becomes smaller. It is plausible  
387 that this group is very different behaviourally and socially, and aversion to  
388 vaccination may translate to aversion to receiving or registering a test. For example,

389 in the SIREN study where they test all individuals, they find fewer infections in  
390 vaccinated groups for each of our study periods (18), although the same study also  
391 has showed waning protection of vaccines in line with our findings (8). Additionally,  
392 their analyses do not adjust for other covariates that may explain exposure to the  
393 virus. Finally, evidence has suggested that vaccines may have offered less  
394 protection to the Omicron variant due to immune escape (9,27).

395

396 We find fewer registered positive tests in individuals with a previous positive test,  
397 with estimated effect sizes relatively larger than compared to vaccination status. This  
398 effect remains following adjusting demographic and social characteristics. The  
399 under-reporting of tests in individuals with a previous registered positive test may  
400 partly explain this difference. Immunity responses may also be different between  
401 vaccines and natural infections (6). A large protective effect in natural infection has  
402 been reported elsewhere (8,21). Our estimated effect size reduced during the  
403 Omicron period, suggesting that the variant may be more effective at immune  
404 escape when compared to Delta. This is further highlighted by the larger percentage  
405 of subsequent infections identified.

406

407 Our findings should not be interpreted as naturally acquired immunity being  
408 recommended over vaccination. It is difficult to fairly compare effects across different  
409 variable types to identify which is most important and our methods do not allow for  
410 this. The people in our study who were previously infected excludes those that died  
411 of COVID-19, and the benefits of safe and effective vaccines have been clearly  
412 demonstrated in reducing COVID-19 hospitalisations and deaths (1,4,5). However,

413 our analyses might give some clues as to why England has not witnessed ‘herd  
414 immunity’ despite high levels of vaccination uptake.

415

416 From 1<sup>st</sup> September 2021, we found evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infections being  
417 higher in the least socioeconomically deprived communities. This remains in contrast  
418 to trends earlier in the pandemic, which had seen consistently higher infections in the  
419 most deprived areas (15), although not always (16). The reversal of the social  
420 gradient in the Delta wave may be explained by several factors. One explanation  
421 may be the large protective effect of previous infections that we found. When  
422 combined with the concentration of infections in deprived areas in previous waves  
423 (15), this may have logically led to reduced population susceptibility to infections in  
424 more deprived communities during the Delta wave. When Omicron arrives it ‘resets’  
425 these patterns since it is effectively a new serotype with immune escape (28), and  
426 the most deprived areas are affected more again. However, our analyses suggest  
427 that the reversal of the gradient was independent of previous infection and  
428 vaccination status of communities. A second explanation may regard the  
429 heterogeneity of social networks. The increasing socioeconomic segregation of who  
430 lives where (29) and school intakes (30), combined with low socioeconomic mixing  
431 and contact (31), may produce waves of infections that do not transfer between  
432 social groups and their closed networks. Our age stratified models suggest the  
433 reversal of social inequalities was strongest in children and adolescents, suggesting  
434 the importance of school dynamics in driving infections during Delta and Omicron  
435 (25). Finally, inequalities in testing dynamics may produce an artefactual effect.  
436 Lower propensity to get tested or to register a test in deprived areas may bias our  
437 observations (32).



438

439 *Limitations*

440 There are limitations to our data source. CIPHA is based on all individuals registered  
441 with a GP. While this captures most people in the region, we do not have information  
442 for those individuals who are not registered which may introduce bias to our data.  
443 SARS-CoV-2 infections were identified based on a registered positive test. There  
444 was limited community testing availability during the first wave of infections and  
445 access to lateral flow tests were not available until late 2020 (6<sup>th</sup> November in  
446 Liverpool only, 3<sup>rd</sup> December rest of region). These issues may lead to missed  
447 infections that would not be reported in our data resulting in under-counts for  
448 previous positive tests. Not all individuals may get tested, nor register their test,  
449 leading to undercounts of infections in our measures. We do not know the extent of  
450 this under-reporting, including how it varies across our exposure variables, which  
451 may introduce selection bias. We attempted to account for some of these issues by  
452 restricting analyses to individuals who had registered a negative test in the month  
453 before due to established inequalities in testing uptake (32). The impact of this can  
454 be seen by comparing the models to analyses for all residents (e.g., Table 2 and  
455 Appendix Table F). We also report significant inequalities in who reported negative  
456 tests across our exposure variables (Appendix Table A) which may bias underlying  
457 associations. The range of bias we are unable to observe shows how difficult it is to  
458 investigate these phenomena using routine data, so our results should not be over-  
459 interpreted.

460

461 Our analyses are descriptive and exploratory. We could not investigate the  
462 mechanisms that may underlie the associations we report (e.g., the processes that

463 explain why social inequalities changed over time). We also are unable to account  
464 for all potential confounders or explanatory factors. For example, we did not have  
465 access to information matching individuals to households which may help to account  
466 for household transmission. It is plausible that our model adjustment may not be able  
467 to disentangle the association between demographic/social factors and our  
468 exposures (including risk behaviours and testing frequency). In particular, we only  
469 have access to area-level measures for socioeconomic deprivation which means any  
470 attempt to understand individual-level processes are at risk of the ecological fallacy.  
471 Future research should evaluate the potential reasons behind the relationships we  
472 describe, moving beyond the use of routine data to address some of the limitations  
473 of our analyses (e.g., social network analyses to study if the social segregation of  
474 communities explains inequalities flipping or using qualitative data to understand the  
475 contextual differences between poorer and affluent areas).

476

#### 477 *Conclusion*

478 Using linked NHS and public health testing records for 2.7M people in Cheshire and  
479 Merseyside, our study reveals the dynamic nature of SARS-CoV-2 infections through  
480 the Delta and Omicron waves. Socially patterned immunity by vaccination and prior  
481 infection resulted in social flips in who is infected, producing complex pictures of  
482 socioeconomic inequalities. Finding ways to effectively communicate the risks in  
483 exposure and infections among populations based on the changing dynamics we  
484 uncovered remains important. In the context of 'living with COVID-19' and the  
485 removal of most non-pharmaceutical interventions, our findings suggest that highly  
486 infectious SARS-CoV-2 variants will continue to spread unequally through society  
487 but not always in expected ways.

488

489 **Declarations**

490

491 *Ethics approval and consent to participate*

492 Ethical approval was granted by the University of Liverpool's Research Ethics  
493 committee (REF: 10634). Data access was granted by the CIPHA Information  
494 Governance panel and Liverpool Clinical Commissioning Group as part of the  
495 COVID-19 response work the team were involved in. All data accessed were  
496 pseudo-anonymised prior to use.

497

498 *Consent for publication*

499 Not applicable.

500

501 *Availability of data and materials*

502 Data are accessible via CIPHA (<https://www.cipha.nhs.uk/>). Requests can be made  
503 to the Data Access Committee for extracts of the larger-scale data which cannot be  
504 released openly due to information governance requirements. All analyses were  
505 undertaken using open source R statistical software and code is made openly  
506 available here [https://github.com/markagreen/social\\_flip\\_COVID-19](https://github.com/markagreen/social_flip_COVID-19).

507

508 *Competing interests*

509 IB declares grants from NIHR, personal fees and other from AstraZeneca, outside  
510 the submitted work. MGS declares non-remunerated participation on Pfizer's  
511 External Data Monitoring Committee for their mRNA vaccine programmes. MGS  
512 holds stocks in Integrum Scientific LLC and MedEx Solutions Ltd. MGS also declares

513 being a non-remunerated independent member of the UK Government's SAGE and  
514 NERVTAG groups. No further conflicts of interest are declared.

515

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528 paper for publication.

529

#### 530 *Authors Contributions*

531 MAG, MGF and IB came up with the idea for the study. Study design was then  
532 refined by all authors. MAG, DMH and CC accessed the data, cleaned and prepared  
533 it for analysis. Analyses were led by MAG, with input from DJH, DMH, and MGF.  
534 MAG, DJH, DMH, MGF, LT and IB led on initially drafting the paper, with CC, GL,  
535 MA, AS and MS providing input on revising the paper. The corresponding author  
536 attests that all listed authors meet authorship criteria and that no others meeting the  
537 criteria have been omitted. All authors have read and approved the manuscript.

538

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542

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651

## 652 **Figure legends**

653 Figure 1: Seven day moving average for registered positive tests for all residents in  
654 Cheshire and Merseyside (England) by whether it was an individual's first registered  
655 positive test (new infection) or further/subsequent positive test. A = Total number of  
656 cases, B = Total number of cases per 100,000 population.

657

658 **Figure 2: Seven day moving average for the percentage of all registered**  
659 **positive tests that were identified as a subsequent infection (>=2nd positive**  
660 **registered test more than 90 days apart) by decile of deprivation (3rd June**  
661 **2021 – 2nd February 2022). Note: 1 = most deprived decile, 10 = least deprived**  
662 **decile, other deciles set to low transparency to minimise distraction.**

663

664 Figure 3: Comparison of seven day moving average for the number of residents in  
665 Cheshire and Merseyside per 100,000 people who registered a COVID-19 positive  
666 test for the most and least deprived deciles by whether it was an individual's first  
667 registered positive test or a further/subsequent infection (3<sup>rd</sup> June 2021 – 2<sup>nd</sup>  
668 February 2022).

669

670 **Additional Files**

671 File name: Appendix.pdf

672 Title: Supplementary Appendix

673 Description: Additional results and sensitivity analyses that supplement the core  
674 paper and are referred to in text.