Ahmad, Sardar ORCID: 0000-0002-9745-808X, Ullah, Subhan, Akbar, Saeed, Kodwani, Devendra and Brahma, Sanjukta
(2024)
The impact of compliance, board committees and insider CEOs on firm survival during crisis.
International Review of Financial Analysis, 91.
p. 102979.
ISSN 1057-5219
Text
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Abstract
This study investigates the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm survival during a financial crisis. Using a sample of FTSE 350 listed companies for the time period 2003–2010, our results show significant differences in the corporate governance mechanisms of firms that survived and those that failed during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. The findings indicate that compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code is negatively associated with the survival of firms when they experience exogenous shocks. However, the existence of insider CEOs and a higher number of board committees in organisations increase the chances of survival during an economic downturn. These findings have policy implications and show that non-compliance with a prescribed code of corporate governance does not necessarily lead to poor governance. Moreover, the establishment of extra board committees and CEO succession planning are shown as important dynamics in firms' strategic decisions, as they have implications for the survival of firms during difficult economic conditions.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | 3501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, 3502 Banking, Finance and Investment, 35 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services, 3507 Strategy, Management and Organisational Behaviour |
Divisions: | Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Management |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
Date Deposited: | 10 Oct 2023 07:34 |
Last Modified: | 07 Dec 2024 08:48 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102979 |
Related URLs: | |
URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3173545 |