Coordinated cyber-physical attack on power grids based on malicious power dispatch

Wang, Xiaoliang ORCID: 0000-0003-4467-6005, Xue, Fei ORCID: 0000-0003-3567-258X, Lu, Shaofeng, Jiang, Lin ORCID: 0000-0001-6531-2791, Bompard, Ettore ORCID: 0000-0003-0735-2626, Masera, Marcelo and Wu, Qigang
(2024) Coordinated cyber-physical attack on power grids based on malicious power dispatch. International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 155. p. 109678.

[img] PDF
IJEPES+Coordinated+Cyber-Physical+Attack+on+Power+Grids+based+on+Malicious+Power+Dispatch[62].pdf - Author Accepted Manuscript

Download (3MB) | Preview


This paper proposes a new mode of cyber-physical attack based on injecting false commands, which poses an increasing risk to modern power systems as a typical example of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Such attacks can trigger physical attacks by driving the system into vulnerable states. To address the critical issues arising from this new mode, we define an inverse-community (IC) in power flow distribution and evaluate it using inverse-modularity. To identify the most vulnerable state of the IC that represents the inherent vulnerability of the system, we employ a full malicious power dispatch problem. We also analyze an example of the proposed mode, where a partial malicious power dispatch that maximizes inverse-modularity is combined with physical attacks aimed at disconnecting vulnerable IC boundary lines, making cascading failures highly likely. To demonstrate the potential impact of this coordinated cyber-physical attack, we use the IEEE-118 and IEEE-300 bus systems for simulation. The results show the effectiveness of this attack strategy and provide a new perspective to analyze cyber-physical security issues in modern power systems.

Item Type: Article
Divisions: Faculty of Science and Engineering > School of Electrical Engineering, Electronics and Computer Science
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 18 Dec 2023 13:54
Last Modified: 12 Jan 2024 00:15
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijepes.2023.109678
Related URLs: