Empathy as a means to understand people



Schramme, Thomas ORCID: 0000-0001-6319-6635
(2024) Empathy as a means to understand people Philosophical Explorations, 27 (2). pp. 157-170. ISSN 1386-9795, 1741-5918

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Abstract

Misunderstanding other people can be interpreted as the result of an insufficient performance of people’s skills to understand other persons and their experiences. But what does understand mean in these contexts? And what are the relevant skills that need to be engaged to successfully understand other people? I argue that understanding other people is a form of recognition of the epistemic validity of another person’s perspective. I claim that minimal understanding does not require an endorsement of another person’s perspective. This makes the avoidance of lack of understanding a feasible achievement in almost all cases, though it often requires effort in the interactive process of understanding. I specifically analyse the epistemic and normative roles of empathy in this process. In pursuing this aim, I also defend empathy against recent philosophical arguments that point at moral dangers of empathic processes.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: empathy, interpersonal understanding, perspective-taking, misunderstanding, immorality, justice
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > School of the Arts
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 16 May 2024 09:43
Last Modified: 28 Feb 2026 00:41
DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2024.2344975
Open Access URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13869...
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URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3181040
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