Safe implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium

Chopra, Anand ORCID: 0009-0003-5566-0436, Gavan, Malachy James ORCID: 0000-0002-2601-9012 and Penta, Antonio (2026) Safe implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 122. 103196-. ISSN 0304-4068, 1873-1538

Text Safe_Mixed_Nash_Equilibrium.pdf - Author Accepted Manuscript Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (324kB) | Preview

Abstract

Safe Implementation (Gavan and Penta, 2025) combines standard implementation with the requirement that the implementing mechanism is such that, if up to k agents deviate from the relevant solution concept, the outcomes that are induced are still ‘acceptable’ at every state of the world. In this paper, we study Safe Implementation of social choice correspondences in mixed Nash equilibrium. We identify a condition, Set-Comonotonicity, which is both necessary and (under mild domain restrictions) almost sufficient for this implementation notion.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Set-Comonotonicity, Implementation, Mechanism design, Mixed Implementation, Robustness, Safe Implementation
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > School of Management Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Faculty of Humanities & Social Sci (All T&R Staff) Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > School of Management > Economics Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > School of Management > School of Management (T&R Staff)
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	13 Nov 2025 08:37
Last Modified:	16 Jun 2026 17:15
DOI:	10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103196
Related Websites:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3195340
Disclaimer:	The University of Liverpool is not responsible for content contained on other websites from links within repository metadata. Please contact us if you notice anything that appears incorrect or inappropriate.