Nyatanga, Darryn
ORCID: 0009-0009-7302-4322
(2026)
Brexit and the Constitutional Absence of England: Revisiting the English Question
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies.
gqag011-.
ISSN 0143-6503, 1464-3820
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Clean copy Brexit and the Constitutional Absence of England- Revisiting the English Question.docx - Author Accepted Manuscript Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (86kB) |
Abstract
Abstract This article re-examines the English Question in light of Brexit and the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (DCEB). It argues that Brexit transformed England’s long-standing constitutional absence from a manageable anomaly into a source of acute constitutional strain. With the external disciplines associated with EU membership removed, the UK’s internal asymmetries have been exposed with greater force, revealing how England’s lack of distinct institutional representation weakens domestic accountability and complicates the operation of territorial governance. Through an analysis of the DCEB—the most ambitious attempt yet to rationalise England’s subnational governance—the article assesses whether recent reforms move England from administrative delegation towards constitutional accommodation. Applying four constitutional tests—identity, entrenchment, fiscal autonomy and voice—it concludes that while the DCEB enhances coherence and makes England’s subnational architecture more visible within the Union, it stops short of devolution in any meaningful constitutional sense. England’s governance remains derivative of Westminster authority, its institutions empowered yet fiscally dependent, politically included yet constitutionally insecure. The result is a more orderly form of constitutional absence: a settlement that manages England’s diversity without providing a collective locus of representation, which leaves unresolved the deeper question of how the largest nation in the Union can be governed without being constitutionally acknowledged. More fundamentally, it leaves unresolved how the Union can remain stable when its largest constituent nation is governed through undifferentiated state institutions rather than recognised channels of self-government.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | 4803 International and Comparative Law, 48 Law and Legal Studies, 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Faculty of Humanities & Social Sci (All T&R Staff) Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Feb 2026 10:52 |
| Last Modified: | 23 May 2026 10:59 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/ojls/gqag011 |
| Related Websites: | |
| URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3197198 |
| Disclaimer: | The University of Liverpool is not responsible for content contained on other websites from links within repository metadata. Please contact us if you notice anything that appears incorrect or inappropriate. |
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