Understanding the Maternal-Foetal Group and Pregnancy Rights

Rawson, Megan (2026) Understanding the Maternal-Foetal Group and Pregnancy Rights PhD thesis, University of Liverpool.

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Abstract

This thesis posits two main questions: 1) What is the nature of the connection that exists between a pregnant person and her foetus? 2) How does the way that we conceive of this connection impact our understanding of reproductive rights? I will consider two main metaphysical ways of understanding the maternal-foetal connection: the container model and the parthood model. The container model of pregnancy assumes that there is an inherent separation present between pregnant person and foetus and that the foetus is merely contained within the gestational carrier. The parthood model of pregnancy, on the other hand, states that there is a clear physiological connection present during pregnancy and thus it is better to view the foetus as a metaphysical part of its gestational carrier. I will show how the history of understanding the maternal-foetal relationship, particularly in terms of a supposed lack of maternal agency during gestation, has led to an over-emphasis on a container-based view of pregnancy, both historically and in the present. Medical and legal attitudes towards pregnancy typically assume that there is a separation and a clash of needs present during gestation, leading in turn to the perpetuation of a supposed ‘maternal-foetal conflict’, which impacts beliefs and understanding about reproductive rights. My thesis shows that, despite its prominence, there are metaphysical inconsistencies with the container model. I outline the parthood model in detail and show how elements of this model, instead, provide a more accurate depiction of pregnancy and the maternal-foetal relation. I acknowledge that the parthood model of pregnancy is neither perfect nor incontestable, and I note several potential problems with this view, the most detrimental being the counting problem. The counting problem is concerned with the question of how we count pregnant organisms (i.e. is there one entity / organism 6 present during pregnancy, or two?). I will show how the inextricability of both parthood and containment with western substance metaphysics exacerbates this problem. I suggest that pregnancy is a unique ontological phenomenon that does not fit neatly into pre-established metaphysical frameworks and is analogous with other ontologically complex phenomena such as conjoined twinning. I propose that, to avoid the issues raised by the counting problem, we reconceive pregnant organisms as group agents in line with Ritchie’s (2013) understanding of group relations. I argue that the pregnant group is a conglomerate group and introduce an analogy with corporations in order to elucidate this. I term this the corporate model of pregnancy. The final part of my thesis shows how the current literature on the ethics of reproductive rights is heavily influenced by container-based metaphysics, as well as showing how metaphysical assumptions can have a huge impact on our ethical assessment. I consider how abortion, surrogacy and ectogestation can be reconsidered from a parthood perspective. Following this, I apply my corporate model of pregnancy to an ethical reassessment of reproductive rights and show how this novel way of viewing the ontology of gestation can have a positive and pragmatic impact on how we understand and establish reproductive rights, which ultimately moves away from a container-based emphasis on conflict.

Item Type:	Thesis (PhD)
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Applied Metaphysics, Metaphysics of Pregnancy, Group Ontology, Maternal-Foetal Group
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences > School of the Arts > Philosophy
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	29 Jun 2026 15:27
Last Modified:	30 Jun 2026 07:20
DOI:	10.17638/03198568
Supervisors:	Schramme, Thomas Furman, Katherine
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3198568
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