Assa, Hirbod, Eliston, S and Lehrer, E
(2016)
Joint games and compatibility.
Economic Theory, 61 (1).
pp. 91-113.
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Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00199...
Abstract
We introduce the concepts of joint games and compatibility. In a joint game, members of the grand coalition have the option to split and participate in different underlying games, thereby maximizing their total worths. In order to determine whether the grand coalition will remain intact, we introduce the notion of compatibility of these games. A set of games is compatible if the core of the joint game is non-empty. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | ## TULIP Type: Articles/Papers (Journal) ## |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Joint game, Compatibility, Cooperative games, Core, Concave integral |
| Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Jul 2016 07:45 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Jan 2023 07:33 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00199-015-0880-0 |
| Related URLs: | |
| URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3002478 |
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