On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources

Christodoulou, George, Sgouritsa, Alkmini and Tang, Bo (2016) On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources. THEORY OF COMPUTING SYSTEMS, 59 (4). pp. 600-618.

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Abstract

We study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism that is widely used to allocate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and receives a fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the inefficiency of Nash equilibria by studying the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the induced game under complete and incomplete information. When agents’ valuations are concave, we show that the Bayesian Nash equilibria can be arbitrarily inefficient, in contrast to the well-known 4/3 bound for pure equilibria Johari and Tsitsiklis (Math. Oper. Res. 29(3), 407–435 2004). Next, we upper bound the PoA over Bayesian equilibria by 2 when agents’ valuations are subadditive, generalizing and strengthening previous bounds on lattice submodular valuations. Furthermore, we show that this bound is tight and cannot be improved by any simple or scale-free mechanism. Then we switch to settings with budget constraints, and we show an improved upper bound on the PoA over coarse-correlated equilibria. Finally, we prove that the PoA is exactly 2 for pure equilibria in the polyhedral environment.

Item Type:	Article
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	03 Nov 2016 16:42
Last Modified:	19 Jan 2023 07:26
DOI:	10.1007/s00224-016-9701-5
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3004333