Fearnley, John, Goldberg, Paul W, Savani, Rahul ORCID: 0000-0003-1262-7831 and Sørensen, Troels Bjerre
(2016)
Approximate Well-supported Nash Equilibria Below Two-thirds.
Algorithmica, 76 (2).
pp. 297-319.
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Abstract
In an ϵ-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most ϵ by changing his behaviour. Recent work has addressed the question of how best to compute ϵ-Nash equilibria, and for what values of ϵ a polynomial-time algorithm exists. An ϵ-well-supported Nash equilibrium (ϵ-WSNE) has the additional requirement that any strategy that is used with non-zero probability by a player must have payoff at most ϵ less than a best response. A recent algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis shows how to compute a 2/3-WSNE in polynomial time, for bimatrix games. Here we introduce a new technique that leads to an improvement to the worst-case approximation guarantee.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Bimatrix games, Nash equilibria, Well-supported approximate equilibria |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
Date Deposited: | 09 Dec 2019 11:31 |
Last Modified: | 19 Jan 2023 00:13 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00453-015-0029-3 |
Related URLs: | |
URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3065575 |