Combating greenwashers in emerging markets: A game-theoretical exploration of firms, customers and government regulations



Huang, Hongfu, Xing, Xinjie ORCID: 0000-0001-6277-5045, He, Yong and Gu, Xiaoyu
(2020) Combating greenwashers in emerging markets: A game-theoretical exploration of firms, customers and government regulations. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 140. p. 101976.

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Abstract

The sustainability boom in developing countries has caused the emergence of greenwashing behaviors that are impeding sustainable progress in the third world. To combat greenwashing behaviors in emerging markets, this paper proposes a game-theory model that studies the competitive pricing strategies of green incumbents facing competition from greenwashing entrants in emerging markets. The research considers customer behaviors, greenwashing threats, and the different implications of anti-greenwashing government enforcement strategies. The results reveal that greenwashing acts are not always performed with negative intent, but benefit both green incumbents and total customer surplus if the market greenness gap is small. In addition, a loose enforcement level contributes to higher social welfare in emerging markets.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Greenwashing, Green-brown competition, Game theory, Anti-greenwashing enforcement
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 30 Jun 2020 07:18
Last Modified: 18 Jan 2023 23:49
DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2020.101976
Related URLs:
URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3090194

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