Walrasian equilibria in markets with small demands



Deligkas, A, Melissourgos, T and Spirakis, PG ORCID: 0000-0001-5396-3749
(2021) Walrasian equilibria in markets with small demands. In: 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS2021), 2021-5-3 - 2021-5-7.

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Abstract

We study the complexity of finding a Walrasian equilibrium in markets where the agents have k-demand valuations. These valuations are an extension of unit-demand valuations where a bundle's value is the maximum of its k-subsets' values. For unit-demand agents, where the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed, we show that the problem is in quasi-NC. For k = 2, we show that it is NP-hard to decide if a Walrasian equilibrium exists even if the valuations are submodular, while for k = 3 the hardness carries over to budget-additive valuations. In addition, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for markets with 2-demand single-minded valuations, or unit-demand valuations.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Unspecified)
Divisions: Faculty of Science and Engineering > School of Electrical Engineering, Electronics and Computer Science
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 12 Apr 2021 08:41
Last Modified: 18 Jan 2023 22:53
URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3118701