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Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480
(2021)
Are sensory experiences contingently representational? A critical notice of David Papineau's The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience.
MIND & LANGUAGE, 36 (4).
pp. 627-635.
Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480
(2023)
Beyond adverbialism: A new non-relational theory of perceptual experience.
MIND & LANGUAGE, 38 (1).
pp. 2-19.
Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480
(2014)
Colour.
Philosophy Compass, 9 (11).
pp. 803-813.
Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480
(2017)
Colour hallucination: A new problem for externalist representationalism.
Analysis, 77 (4).
pp. 695-704.
Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480
(2021)
Empty Space, Silence, and Absence.
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 51 (7).
pp. 496-507.
Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480
(2023)
Intentionality as intentional inexistence.
INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 66 (8).
pp. 1371-1385.
Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480
(2016)
The Limitations of Perceptual Transparency.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 66 (265).
pp. 723-744.
Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480
(2023)
Necessarily Veridical Hallucinations: A New Problem for the Uninstantiated Property View.
The Philosophical Quarterly.
Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480
(2021)
Perceptual Experience and Physicalism.
In:
Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception.
Oxford University PressOxford, pp. 127-146.
ISBN 9780198853534, 019885353X
Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480
(2018)
Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism.
Ratio, 31 (S1).
pp. 35-50.
Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480
(2021)
A new theory of absence experience.
European Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1).
pp. 168-181.