Corporate governance compliance of family and non-family listed firms in emerging markets: Evidence from Latin America

del Carmen Briano-Turrent, Guadalupe and Poletti-Hughes, Jannine ORCID: 0000-0001-5959-2141 (2017) Corporate governance compliance of family and non-family listed firms in emerging markets: Evidence from Latin America. JOURNAL OF FAMILY BUSINESS STRATEGY, 8 (4). pp. 237-247.

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Abstract

Based on agency theory, this study analyzes whether family firms are more compliant with corporate governance recommendations than non-family firms in the context of emerging markets. Using a unique sample of 826 observations of the highest ranked companies on the stock exchange indices of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico during the period 2004–2010, we hypothesize that family firms may adopt better corporate governance practices to substitute for the absence or inefficiency of a regulatory system and to mitigate the agency problem between majority and minority shareholders. Additionally, we propose a corporate governance compliance index considering the legal and institutional framework of the region. The empirical results indicate that family firms report a higher corporate governance index. We find that board composition (independence, size and COB-CEO duality) does not moderate corporate governance compliance of family firms but rather such variables have a direct effect on the corporate governance index.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Family firms, Corporate governance, Board composition, Agency theory, Latin America
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	03 Oct 2017 08:40
Last Modified:	19 Jan 2023 06:53
DOI:	10.1016/j.jfbs.2017.10.001
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3009743