Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality

Bach, CW ORCID: 0000-0003-0187-1820 and Perea, Andrés (2020) Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality. Economics Letters, 186. p. 108526.

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Abstract

We provide an existence result for the solution concept of generalized Nash equilibrium, which can be viewed as the direct incomplete information analogue of Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, a tuple consisting of a probability measure for every player on his choices and utility functions is a generalized Nash equilibrium, whenever some mutual optimality property is satisfied. This incomplete information solution concept is then epistemically characterized in a way that common belief in rationality is neither used nor implied. For the special case of complete information, an epistemic characterization of Nash equilibrium ensues as a corollary.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Common belief in rationality, Complete information, Epistemic characterization, Epistemic game theory, Existence, Generalized Nash equilibrium, Incomplete information, Interactive epistemology, Nash equilibrium, Solution concepts, Static games
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	19 Jul 2019 09:20
Last Modified:	19 Jan 2023 00:37
DOI:	10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108526
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3050086

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