Enron and the California Energy Crisis: The Role of Networks in Enabling Organizational Corruption



Nix, Adam, Decker, Stephanie and Wolf, Carola ORCID: 0000-0001-7565-6977
(2022) Enron and the California Energy Crisis: The Role of Networks in Enabling Organizational Corruption. Business History Review, 95 (4). pp. 765-802.

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Abstract

<jats:p>We provide an analytically structured history of Enron's involvement in the California energy crisis, exploring its emergence as a corrupt organization and its use of an interorganizational network to manipulate California's energy supply markets. We use this history to introduce the concept of network-enabled corruption, showing how corruption, even if primarily enacted by a single dominant organization, is often highly dependent on the support of other organizations. Specifically, we show how Enron combined resources from partner firms with its own capabilities, manipulating the energy market and capitalizing on the crisis. From a methodological point of view, our study emphasizes the growing importance of digital sources for historical research, drawing particularly on telephone and email records from the period to develop a rich, fly-on-the-wall understanding of a phenomenon that is otherwise hard to observe.</jats:p>

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Organizational corruption, organizational misconduct, analytically structured history, digital sources, energy supply industry
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Management
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 28 Apr 2022 07:21
Last Modified: 18 Jan 2023 21:04
DOI: 10.1017/S0007680521001008
Related URLs:
URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3154012

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