Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms

Varloot, Estelle Marine and Laraki, Rida ORCID: 0000-0002-4898-2424 (2022) Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms. In: EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.

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Abstract

In the problem of aggregating experts' probabilistic predictions or opinions over an ordered set of outcomes, we introduce the axiom of level-strategyproofness (level-SP) and argue that it is natural in several real-life applications and robust as a notion. It implies truthfulness in a rich domain of single-peaked preferences over the space of cumulative distributions. This contrasts with the existing literature, where we usually assume single-peaked preferences over the space of probability distributions instead. Our main results are (1) explicit characterizations of all level-SP methods with and without the addition of other axioms (certainty preservation, plausibility preservation, proportionality); (2) comparisons and axiomatic characterizations of two new and practical level-SP methods: the proportional-cumulative and the middlemost-cumulative; (3) an application of the proportional-cumulative to construct a new voting method that extends majority judgment and where voters can express their uncertainties/doubts about the merits/qualities of the candidates/alternatives to be ranked.

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Unspecified)
Divisions:	Faculty of Science and Engineering > School of Electrical Engineering, Electronics and Computer Science
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	15 Aug 2022 07:40
Last Modified:	18 Nov 2023 18:45
DOI:	10.1145/3490486.3538309
Related URLs:	Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3161051