Social discount rate: spaces for agreement

Hayashi, Takashi and Lombardi, Michele ORCID: 0000-0002-8613-053X (2021) Social discount rate: spaces for agreement. ECONOMIC THEORY BULLETIN, 9 (2). pp. 247-257.

Text
Hayashi-Lombardi2021_Article_SocialDiscountRateSpacesForAgr.pdf - Published version
Download (236kB) | Preview

Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40505-021-00209-9

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We study the problem of aggregating discounted utility preferences into a social discounted utility preference model. We use an axiom capturing a social responsibility of individuals’ attitudes to time, called consensus Pareto. We show that this axiom can provide consistent foundations for welfare judgments. Moreover, in conjunction with the standard axioms of anonymity and continuity, consensus Pareto can help adjudicate some fundamental issues related to the choice of the social discount rate: the society selects the rate through a generalized median voter scheme.</jats:p>

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Consensus Pareto, Social aggregation, Discounted utility model, Expected utility theory, Generalized median
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Management
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	10 Dec 2021 08:49
Last Modified:	18 Jan 2023 21:23
DOI:	10.1007/s40505-021-00209-9
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3145089