Jain, Ritesh 
ORCID: 0000-0003-0227-2491 and Lombardi, Michele ORCID: 0000-0002-8613-053X
(2021)
Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 99.
p. 102605.
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cvimpl-14July21-rev2 - 11_11_2021.pdf - Author Accepted Manuscript Download (248kB) | Preview |
Abstract
A social choice rule (SCR) is a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over outcomes. When preference profiles are close to being common knowledge among players, an SCR is continuously virtually fully implementable if there exists a mechanism such that all its equilibrium outcomes are arbitrarily close to the outcomes recommended by the SCR. When there are at least three players and a domain condition is satisfied, we obtain the following result: any SCR is continuously virtually fully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibria, as well as in interim correlated rationalizable strategies, by a finite mechanism.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Continuous implementation, Virtual implementation, Social choice rules, Uniform-weak topology, Common knowledge |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Management |
| Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Dec 2021 08:02 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Jun 2023 01:30 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102605 |
| Related URLs: | |
| URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3145239 |
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