Necessarily Veridical Hallucinations: A New Problem for the Uninstantiated Property View

Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480 (2023) Necessarily Veridical Hallucinations: A New Problem for the Uninstantiated Property View. The Philosophical Quarterly, 74 (2). pp. 569-589.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad075

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Philosophers of perception have a notoriously difficult time trying to account for hallucinatory experiences. One surprisingly quite popular move, and one that cross-cuts the representationalism/relationalism divide, is to say that hallucinations involve an awareness of uninstantiated properties. In this paper, I provide a new argument against this view. Not only are its proponents forced to classify many hallucinations as veridical, such experiences turn out to be necessarily veridical. In addition, I show that representationalists who endorse the uninstantiated property view must reject the common fundamental kind claim and adopt disjunctivism, and naïve realists/relationalists must radically modify their disjunctivism: The distinction between ‘veridical’ and ‘hallucinatory’ will no longer track a metaphysical distinction between the relevant experiences.</jats:p>

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	hallucination, perception, uninstantiated properties, representationalism, naive realism, relationalism, veridicality
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of the Arts
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	15 Sep 2023 09:22
Last Modified:	08 Apr 2024 03:09
DOI:	10.1093/pq/pqad075
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3172779