Are sensory experiences contingently representational? A critical notice of David Papineau's The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience

Gow, Laura ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480 (2021) Are sensory experiences contingently representational? A critical notice of David Papineau's The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience. MIND & LANGUAGE, 36 (4). pp. 627-635.

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Abstract

<jats:p>David Papineau develops a new argument against representationalism, centering on the idea that sensory experiences are essentially representational on this view. He defends his own “qualitative view” according to which sensory experiences are only contingently representational. I discuss his main argument against essentialist representationalism and then provide two challenges for his positive account. First, Papineau's theory faces a dilemma when it comes to explaining the contents of our perceptual beliefs in situations where the conscious character of sensory experience comes apart from what it represents. Second, we may need to abandon the idea that sensory experiences are assessable for veridicality.</jats:p>

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	contingent representation, perception, qualitative view, representationalism, sensory experience
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of the Arts
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	18 Sep 2023 08:11
Last Modified:	18 Sep 2023 08:11
DOI:	10.1111/mila.12376
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3172807