Behavioral strong implementation

Hayashi, T, Jain, R, Korpela, V and Lombardi, M ORCID: 0000-0002-8613-053X (2023) Behavioral strong implementation. ECONOMIC THEORY, 76 (4). pp. 1257-1287.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01494-0

Abstract

Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players’ choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our model implies that with non-rational players, the formation of groups greatly affects the design exercise. As a by-product, we also propose a notion of behavioral efficiency and we compare it with existing notions.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	(behavioral) group strategy-proofness, Implementation, Non-rational behavior, State-contingent choice rules, Strong equilibrium
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Management
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	29 Sep 2023 15:22
Last Modified:	06 Apr 2024 01:30
DOI:	10.1007/s00199-023-01494-0
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3173182